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Abstract  
 
New health technologies offer both challenges and opportunities. Regulation is 
one mechanism to help balance the benefits and risks of new health technologies. 
This thesis examines the extent to which ‘good’ health technology regulation is 
achieved and the effectiveness of the policy measures regulators (and others) employ 
to meet such aims. To accomplish these objectives, a conceptual framework of ‘good 
regulation’ based on the academic and practitioner literatures was developed and its 
various dimensions considered and explored across eight different studies. Taken 
together, the studies provide an analysis of the roles, processes, policies, and 
performance of the regulators responsible for the market authorisation and coverage 
and reimbursement of pharmaceuticals and medical devices in Europe and the US; 
the role and use of technology assessment in health technology regulation and its 
impact on attaining good regulation; and, the factors that impact regulatory 
performance. The thesis demonstrates that attaining good health technology 
regulation is complex and challenging, because of the inherent uncertainty regarding 
the benefits and risks of new technologies, their growing diversity and complexity, 
the limitations of existing study designs and assessment methods, the increased 
demands placed on regulators to meet sometimes conflicting objectives, and the 
underlying political nature of making decisions about public access to and financing 
of new health technologies.Regulators have made progress on addressing these 
challenges. However, additional improvements are needed to improve health 
technology regulatory performance. Like much of health care policy, movement 
toward achieving the various criteria of good regulation will be incremental, 
especially considering the often step-wise nature of technological innovation. 
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for The Commonwealth Fund (New York, United States) on medical device policy 
and was therefore reviewed and commented on by Fund staff, principally Robin 
Osborn (Vice President and Director, International Program in Health Policy and 
Innovation). In total, CS contributed 95% of the work.   
 
Study 3 
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  CS and EM devised the paper. CS conducted the literature review and drafted 
the paper. EM reviewed and commented on drafts of the paper. CS finalised the 
paper. In total, CS contributed 95% of the work. 
 
  Parts of the paper drew upon earlier work by CS, particularly material specific 
to drug reviews. However, this study substantially updates the previous work to 
address the quickly evolving nature of this policy area. The previous work was 
published as a book in 2008:  
 
Sorenson, C., M. Drummond, and P. Kanavos (2008). Ensuring value for money in health 
care: the role of health technology assessment in the European Union. Observatory Studies 
Series, 11. Copenhagen, Denmark: World Health Organization, Regional Office for Europe. 
 
  The book is based on a comprehensive literature review and interviews of 
select experts in six EU member states (Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom). The study underpinning the book was a year-
long project under the title ‘Financing Sustainable Health Care in Europe’, which 
was endorsed by the Luxembourg Ministry of Health, Sitra, and the Finnish 
Innovation Fund, and funded by Pfizer.  
 
  CS and EM devised the book. CS reviewed the literature and other secondary 
data sources, interviewed experts, and wrote the book. MD reviewed and commented 
on the book, with some input from Panos Kanavos (PK; Reader, Department of 
Social Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science) and EM on the 
final draft. Drafts of the book were also peer reviewed by David Taylor (Professor of 
Pharmaceutical and Public Health Policy, University College London) and Frans 
Rutten (Professor of Health Economics, Institute of Health Policy and Management, 
Erasmus University Rotterdam) and Willy Palm (Dissemination Development 
Officer, European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies). CS addressed all 
reviewer comments and readied the book for publication. In total, CS contributed 
95% of the work. 
 
 
 
  
16 
 
Study 4  
 
  The fourth study of the thesis is primarily the work of the PhD author (CS). In 
2013, the paper was published as:  
 
Sorenson, C., M. Drummond, and L.R. Burns (2013). Evolving reimbursement and pricing 
policies for devices in Europe and the United States should encourage greater value. Health 
Affairs 32(4): 788-796. 
 
  Prior to publication in the journal, it was subject to double-blind peer review by 
two referees. It was also critically reviewed by the senior editorial staff at Health 
Affairs.   
 
  CS devised the paper, reviewed the literature and other secondary data sources, 
and drafted the paper. MD and LB reviewed and commented on drafts of the paper. 
CS addressed the reviewer comments and prepared the final paper for journal 
submission. The paper was part of a larger report prepared for The Commonwealth 
Fund (New York, United States) on medical device policy and was therefore 
reviewed and commented on by Fund staff, principally Robin Osborn (Vice 
President and Director, International Program in Health Policy and Innovation). In 
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  The fifth study of the thesis is primarily the work of the PhD author (CS). In 
2012, the paper was published as:  
 
Sorenson, C. and K. Chalkidou (2012). Reflections on the evolution of health technology 
assessment in Europe. Health Economics, Policy and Law 7(4): 25-45. 
 
  Prior to publication in the journal, it was subject to double-blind peer review by 
two referees. It was also critically reviewed by senior policy analysts at the King’s 
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drafts of the paper. Furthermore, Julia Kreis (JK), Karine Chevreul (KC), and 
Isabelle Durand-Zaleski (IDZ) provided helpful information on key developments in 
health technology assessment in Germany (JK) and France (KC and IDZ). An earlier 
draft of the paper was also presented and critically discussed by Carols Gouveia and 
30-40 members of the European Health Policy Group (EHPG) during the 10th 
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  CS devised the paper, reviewed the literature and other secondary data sources, 
and wrote the paper. Kalipso Chalkidou (KC; Director, NICE International and 
Visiting Faculty, Berman Institute of Bioethics, Johns Hopkins University) reviewed 
and commented on drafts of the paper. CS addressed all reviewer comments and 
finalised the paper for journal submission. In total, CS contributed 95% of the work. 
 
  The paper draws upon and updates earlier work by CS. This work was 
published as a book in 2008:  
 
Sorenson, C., M. Drummond, and P. Kanavos (2008). Ensuring Value for Money in Health 
Care: the Role of Health Technology Assessment in the European Union. Observatory 
Studies Series, 11. Copenhagen, Denmark: World Health Organization, Regional Office for 
Europe. 
 
  See study 3 above for further details on the methods underpinning the book, 
author provenance, and details regarding peer review and publication.  
 
Study 6 
 
  The sixth study of the thesis is principally the work of the PhD author (CS). It 
constitutes a longer paper that has been reformatted into two separate papers 
submitted for publication in December 2013 and January 2014. In particular, the 
larger paper (which is presented in the thesis) was fashioned into one paper 
comparing coverage with evidence development (CED) policies across seven 
countries and another paper examining the application of CED specifically to 
medical devices. The former paper was submitted to Value in Health and the latter 
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was submitted to Health Policy; the first paper is under review, while the second has 
been provisionally accepted.  
 
  The paper draws on a literature review and expert (health technology 
assessment bodies/policy makers, industry representatives, and academics/policy 
analysts) interviews. The experts represented seven countries in North America and 
Europe.   
 
  CS devised the paper, reviewed the literature and other secondary data sources, 
developed the interview instruments, conducted the interviews, analysed the 
interview data, and wrote the paper. MD reviewed and commented on the interview 
instruments and drafts of the paper. Six medical device coverage and reimbursement 
experts throughout Europe also reviewed the paper. In addition, the study was also 
presented at two European conferences, which provided the opportunity to verify the 
accuracy and relevancy of the findings. The presentation won Best Podium 
Presentation at one of the conferences, which is an award based on the relevancy of 
the research, methods, meeting the study aims, and clarity of presentation. CS 
finalised the papers for journal submission. In total, CS contributed 90% of the work. 
 
Study 7 
 
  The seventh study of the thesis is solely the work of the PhD author (CS). In 
2012, it was published as: 
 
Sorenson, C. (2012). Valuing end-of-life care in the United States: The case of new cancer 
drugs. Health Economics, Policy and Law 7(4): 411-430. 
 
  Prior to publication, the paper underwent double-blinded peer review by one 
referee. The paper was also presented and discussed amongst the LSE-Columbia 
Health Policy Group in December 2010. MD and KC also reviewed and commented 
on early drafts of the paper.  
 
  CS devised the paper, reviewed the literature and other secondary data sources, 
and wrote the paper. CS addressed all reviewer comments and prepared the final 
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paper for journal submission. In total, CS contributed 100% of the work (sole-
authored). 
 
Study 8  
 
  The eighth and final study of the thesis is primarily the work of the PhD author 
(CS). The paper was published in 2013 as follows:  
 
Sorenson, C., M. Gusmano, and A. Oliver (2013). The politics of comparative effectiveness 
research: Lessons from recent history. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law; published 
ahead of print November 5, 2013, doi:10.1215/03616878-2396181. 
 
  Prior to publication in the journal, the paper was subject to double-blind peer 
review by four referees.  
 
  CS, Michael Gusmano (MG; Research Scholar, The Hastings Center, and 
adjunct faculty member at Columbia and Yale Universities), and Adam Oliver (AO; 
Reader, Department of Social Policy, London School of Economics and Political 
Science) devised the paper. CS reviewed the literature and other secondary data 
sources and wrote the paper. MG and AO reviewed and commented on drafts of the 
paper. CS addressed all reviewer comments and prepared the final paper for journal 
submission. In total, CS contributed 90% of the work. 
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Introduction   
 
Brief overview of the focus of the thesis   
 
  New health technologies offer both challenges and opportunities. They promise 
hoped-for improvements in health, reduced spending on health from public 
authorities, and economic development. However, they can also come with risks to 
individual and population health and public budgets if technologies are adopted and 
financed that are unsafe, ineffective, or used inappropriately. Regulation is one 
mechanism to help balance the benefits and risks of new health technologies. 
Regulatory institutions, policies, and processes have been developed by governments 
to meet these objectives, namely to authorise technologies for use on the market and 
to determine the terms of their coverage, reimbursement, and pricing. In this context, 
regulators aim to ensure that the risk-benefit balance from the safety, efficacy, and 
quality of the technologies they review is acceptable in the context that they are to be 
used, and that available budgets are allocated effectively to allow use of such 
technologies in clinical practice. In practice, however, the regulation of health 
technologies has inherent limitations and challenges. Industry often maintains that 
the regulatory process is unpredictable and protracted, thereby thwarting innovation 
and timely market access of their products; regulators frequently face political 
pressures, expert-citizen contestation, and stakeholder resistance, leading to problems 
with compliance or hastened approval processes that may introduce later safety risks 
or actualised injury; payers are sometimes faced with making coverage and 
reimbursement decisions based on poor or limited evidence of value; and patient 
groups and the public frequently decry any restrictions of access to beneficial new 
technologies. 
 
  To that end, this thesis examines the extent to which ‘good health technology1 
regulation’ is achieved and the effectiveness of the policy measures regulators (and 
others) employ to meet the aims or criteria of ‘good regulation’. Indeed, good 
regulation is achieved through a set of tools, activities, and discourses through which 
different regulators (and involved governments, institutions, and other actors) 
                                                            
1 While health technology can include drugs, devices, biologics, medical and surgical procedures, support 
systems, and organisational and managerial systems, the thesis focuses on drugs and devices.   
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address their policy objectives and reform priorities. To that end, regulators have 
increasingly relied upon evidence-based approaches to regulation, namely the use of 
some form of technology assessment to ascertain or substantiate a technology’s 
safety, efficacy, and comparative effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. Such 
processes typically engage different stakeholders and experts in regulation and, 
overall, aim to enhance the transparency, accountability, impartiality, and 
effectiveness of the regulatory process.  
 
Toward a framework of ‘good regulation’   
 
  If good health technology regulation is to be pursued, it is important to first 
elucidate a conceptual framework of how ‘good regulation’ is defined and measured. 
Yet, developing such a framework raises a number of challenges. First and 
fundamentally, deriving at a consensus on the definition of ‘regulation’ is difficult. 
As Baldwin et al. (1998: pg. 2) note “there is no single agreed meaning of the term 
[regulation], but rather a variety of definitions in usage that are not reducible to some 
platonic essence or single concept”. The concept itself is somewhat ambiguous; it 
can be used in both a broad and narrow sense and can encapsulate hard, soft, and 
self-regulatory approaches. Nonetheless, Baldwin et al. (2012) suggest thinking of 
regulation in different ways: 1) as a specific set of commands, 2) deliberate state 
intervention (in the economy or the private sphere), and 3) all forms of social or 
economic influence (including non-intentional and non-state mechanisms). This 
thesis is primarily concerned with the first conceptualisation, viewing regulation as 
a) goal formation, rule-making, and standard setting; b) monitoring, information-
gathering, scrutiny, inspection, evaluation, and audit; and, c) enforcement, 
behaviour-modification, and the application of rewards and sanctions (Hood, 
Rothstein and Baldwin 2001). These functions may be carried out by a single 
organisation or delegated separately to specialised agencies. The concept of 
regulation is often considered an activity that restricts behaviour and prevents certain 
“undesirables”. However, a broader view, which is one this thesis adopts, is that the 
influence of regulation may also be enabling or facilitative (Baldwin et al. 2012).    
 
  Such definitional issues relate to a second challenge. Radaelli and De 
Francesco (2007: 83) highlight that “...the concept of regulatory quality is prismatic”, 
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and they rightly question whether there is sufficient agreement on what constitutes 
good regulation, especially across different institutional settings. Indeed, conceptions 
of quality are likely to vary according to audience constituency, market position, or 
even discipline (Weatherill 2007). This is often due to divergent weightings of the 
various criteria or dimensions underpinning good regulation.  
 
  Consequently, defining (and indeed measuring) good regulation in all cases is 
not possible. Nonetheless, it remains important to develop frameworks that can 
transcend multiple jurisdictions, sectors, institutional settings, and affected actors. To 
meet this aim, both scholars and practitioners have produced a notable body of 
literature examining regulation at various levels, offering a range of concepts, ideas, 
and understandings. While a review of the entire literature is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, major themes can be identified from several streams of relevant research and 
drawn upon to develop a framework of good regulation.     
 
Academic approaches2 to good regulation tend to be theoretical and less 
prescriptive in relation to the pursuit of specific outcomes than practical or empirical 
conceptions. The economics literature is focused largely on (economic) efficiency3 
and high productivity (via encouraging investment and innovation) as the primary 
indicators of regulatory performance, especially when examining public service 
sectors (e.g. utilities, transportation) (Cubbin and Stern, 2004; den Hertog 2010; Fink 
et al. 2003; Peltzman 1989).  Alternatively, the literature from political theorists and 
empirical-oriented political scientists emphasise the importance of achieving and 
furthering accountability, transparency, legitimacy, and other procedural-oriented 
values (e.g. responsibility, control, openness, predictability, and responsiveness) 
(Black 2008; Johannsen et al. 2004; Majone 2001; Mulgan 2000; Powell and 
DiMaggio 1991; Scharpf 1999; Stern 1997).   
 
Taking into consideration both economic and political science perspectives, 
Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge (2012) put forth the most comprehensive framework 
based on five criteria or ‘tests’ of good regulation and is oriented toward “...those 
                                                            
2 The academic literature on good regulation covers a range of disciplines. I focus on the economic and political 
science literatures principally; other disciplines of inquiry include philosophy, socio-legal studies, and 
organisational studies.  
3 Namely, that regulation is good if it is efficient in the sense that it maximises wealth. 
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arguments that have a general currency when regulatory arrangements and 
performance are discussed in the public domain” (26).  The five criteria include 
mandate, accountability, due process, expertise and impartiality, and effectiveness. 
These criteria or tests aim to transcend the biases of using efficiency (or any other 
one indictor) as a single measuring rod or justification for regulation. Moreover, they 
are applicable to both the instruments of regulation and the regulatory authorities that 
execute them.   
 
Majone (1996: 300) offers a similar view to Baldwin et al. (2012), where 
regulatory agencies require a combination of ‘control mechanisms’ to ensure their 
legitimacy, which he identifies as: “...clear and limited statutory objectives to provide 
unambiguous performance standards; reason-giving and transparency requirements 
to facilitate judicial review and public participation; due process provisions to ensure 
fairness among the inevitable winners and losers from regulatory decisions; and, 
professionalism to withstand external interference and reduce the risk of an arbitrary 
use of agency discretion”. 
 
In parallel with academics, international bodies and intergovernmental 
organisations concerned with regulation at various levels, in particular the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World 
Bank, have published practical guidelines, typically employing scorecard approaches 
on regulatory reform, what constitutes good regulation, and what impact it may have 
in practice4. Much of this work is concerned with economic regulation, often 
focusing on individual sectors or on issues associated with deregulation. As these 
guidelines are generally underpinned by an interest in promoting good regulation, by 
way of a better economic environment, several common features can be identified. 
Such elements include that regulation 1) have a strong legal basis (regulators must be 
independent), 2) be clear and feasible to implement, 3) bring a net benefit, and 4) is 
efficient. These dimensions are echoed in various national level guidelines, with 
notable examples including the work of the Australian Office of Regulation Review 
(AORR 1998), the Council of Australian Governments (2007), the United 
                                                            
4 See Jaramillo 2013; Kaufmann et al. 1999, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2009; and, OECD 1997, 2005.  
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Kingdom’s Better Regulation Task Force (BRTF 2000)5, and the External Advisory 
Committee on Smart Regulation to the Canadian Government (CEACSM 2004). 
Again, these are largely economic focused, but in being issued by elected 
governments, they do take wider social concerns into account.  
 
This is also true of related guidance put forward at the European level. For 
example, the Mandelkern Report on Better Regulation (COM 2001a) served as a 
basis for drawing the Better Regulation Policy in the European Union (EU). In 
parallel, the 2001 White Paper (COM 2001b) on European governance6 outlined five 
principles – openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence – 
aimed at engendering and maintaining trust in the way the EU governs. These 
principles are particularly important for those agencies whose remit carries direct 
social policy impacts. More recent publications of the European Commission focus 
on the importance of responsiveness in good regulation – meaning that regulatory 
policies and tools undergo frequent modification in light of experience and evolving 
needs to ensure that they are “fit for purpose” and moderate any undue administrative 
burdens (COM 2010a; COM 2010b; COM 2012). Such objectives are reflective in 
the academic literature on “responsive regulation” (Braithwaite 2006; Neilsen and 
Parker 2009; Ojo 2009), “risk-based regulation” (Baldwin and Black 2007), and 
“really responsive regulation” (Baldwin and Black 2007; Black 2008). 
 
The conceptual framework of good regulation employed in this thesis draws 
principally upon the work of Baldwin and colleagues, but is also informed and 
complemented by elements from the aforementioned practitioner-oriented guidelines. 
While the former represents objective dimensions for assessing regulatory 
performance, it is largely indicative. As such, the practitioner criteria are therefore 
considered complementary to Baldwin et al.’s more overarching conceptual 
principles. Together, they help form a framework that encompasses both theoretical 
and empirical considerations of good regulation. In particular, the framework 
                                                            
5 See also the Regulatory Impact Unit’s work on the effective undertaking of regulatory impact assessments 
(RIU, 2003). 
6 While distinct concepts, good regulation can be seen as an element or exercise of good governance, with similar 
criteria and principles applicable to both constructs. The OECD (2001) and Kaufmann et al. (2002) have both set 
out criteria of good governance, and then specifically linked them to regulatory agencies. Moreover, as much 
work on European integration considers regulation as the hallmark of the EU in terms of a sui generis form of 
governance (see Eberlein and Kerwer 2002; Majone 1996), the two concepts can be linked together in this 
context. 
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encompasses the five criteria outlined by Baldwin and colleagues (mandate, 
accountability, due process, expertise and impartiality, and effectiveness), in addition 
to one other criterion commonly used by practitioners – cost-efficiency. In attempts 
to remain sensitive to the economic orientation of health technology regulation, the 
framework adopts the differentiation made by the Canadian government between 
effectiveness and cost-efficiency. The framework therefore separates regulatory 
efficiency from regulatory effectiveness, with the latter focused on the delivery of 
policy results as opposed to questions of cost and allocative efficiencies. Outlined in 
Table 1, the thesis therefore defines and evaluates good regulation across the 
following criteria:  
 
Criteria 1: Mandate 
 
  Regulators are authorised or mandated to assume certain responsibilities or 
functions, typically by a relavant legislative authority (e.g. Parliament, Congress). 
Such mandates normally presume a public interest outcome to be served, and success 
requires that the regulator follows and achieves its particular mandate(s), which 
allows for claims of public support and legitimacy (Baldwin and Cave, 1999; 
Baldwin et al. 2012; Kaufmann et al. 1999, 2002, 2009). They also suppose that the 
regulator and associated actions are proportional7 and consistent with other national 
or international regulations, law, or policies (Australian Office of Regulation Review 
1998; Canadian External Advisory Committee 2004; European Commission 2001a; 
Kaufmann et al. 1999; UK Better Regulation Task Force 2000). Furthermore, a 
regulator’s mandate should be clear to ensure it is enforceable and can be assessed 
for performance against its stated objectives (Australian Office of Regulatory 
Review 1998; OECD 1997, 2003).      
 
In many cases, regulators of health technologies can be categorised as 
independent regulatory agencies, which are formally independent from direct (ex-
ante and ex-post) political control. Legitimization of the agency and its mandate is 
normally based on a large array of “non-democratic” justifications, but primarily the 
                                                            
7 The proportionality principle states that the means used to achieve certain ends must be necessary and least 
burdensome, hences, the minimum necessary to reach a certain goal.  
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need for insulation from day-to-day politics and the exercise of specific policy 
competencies (e.g. technical expertise) (Majone 1996).  
 
Criteria 2: Accountability 
 
Further claims for support or legitimacy can be made when the second criterion 
–accountability– is achieved. In most cases, health technology regulatory bodies are 
non-elected, which means they are not democratically accountable in the traditional 
sense of being politically responsive to citizens by way of a chain of political 
delegation (Maggetti 2010). The question of ensuring regulatory bodies are 
accountable is indeed a significant concern (Finders 2004; Hood and Scott 2000). 
Accountability is an expanding terms that means, in its core sense, to be called to 
account for one’s actions, hence presupposing the existence of “external scrutiny” 
and ability to justify decisions via sufficient reason-giving (Baldwin et al. 2012; 
Castigilione 2006; European Commission 2001a; Mulgan 2000; UK Better 
Regulation Task Force 2000). Accountability may encompass different meanings: 
answerability, responsibility, control, responsiveness, openness, and dialogue with 
citizens (Baldwin et al. 2012; Mulgan 2000). Bovens (2007) underlines the fact that 
accountability should be conceptualised as a social relation between the regulator and 
its “accountability form”, which can be an individual actor, or a collective form, such 
as parliament, government, or a stakeholder group(s).  
 
Therefore, the link between accountability and legitimacy is often conceived in 
procedural terms. Stakeholders, even if they disagree with a regulatory decision, 
should accept it as legitimate and justifiable if it was made in a way considered fair 
and appropriate, namely if it originated from an open and inclusive political process, 
ideally based on openness, transparency, equal access, and deliberation. Thus, one of 
the principal objectives of accountability is to establish and maintain public trust in 
and support of a regulator’s mandate, actions, and outputs. This involves the 
application of a number of measures, such as the development of standards or 
guidelines for production and service delivery; the presence of interest groups, users, 
and other stakeholders in overall governance and processes; the employment of 
performance surveys or evaluations of internal and external review; the availability 
of public reports about regulators’ performance (e.g. annual report); and, more 
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generally, the improvement or adjustment of regulator’s policies and processes to 
answer, explain, and justify their actions (Lodge 2004; Majone 1997; Scott 2000).  
 
Criteria 3: Due Process 
 
The third criterion, due process, largely relates to the decision making and 
implementation phase of public policy making.  Here, the focus in on transparency, 
fairness, and consistency of treatment, as well as the levels of participation regulators 
afford the public, consumers, and other affected parties. Due process effectively 
ensures proper democratic influence over regulation, thereby, in concert with 
accountability, exercising a legitimising effect and securing public trust. In practice, 
this involves ensuring a reliable and open flow of information available to affected 
actors and the public that allows sufficient understanding of what decisions are made 
and who makes them; the processes and criteria for arriving at said decisions, 
including any dissenting views; changes in governance, policies, and processes; and, 
appropriately detailed and reliable information about the activities, achievements, 
and failures of the regulatory entity. In addition, due process requires availing 
opportunities for involvement of a wide range of stakeholders in various levels of 
regulation (‘regulatory discretion’) and some degree of ‘substantive equality’, where 
there are consistencies in regulation, associated processes, and opportunities for 
stakeholder engagement (Knill and Lenschow 2003). 
 
Criteria 4: Expertise and Impartiality  
 
 The fourth criterion relates to the fact that regulators are expected to be 
impartial and have sufficient expertise to exercise judgement in a way acceptable to 
the public (Thatcher 2002). This is particularly true for delegated agencies, where the 
efficiency of the regulatory process and the credibility of the agency depend on high 
quality data and cutting-edge expertise (Genoud 2003).  Together, expertise and 
impartiality engender public trust and support, which allows for an agency to 
exercise discretion in their work (Baldwin et al. 2012). These elements also confer a 
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level of professionalism to withstand external interference, avoid regulatory capture8, 
and reduce arbitrary use of discretion in decision making (Majone 1996; OECD 
1997, 2003). This is particularly important in situations wehther the regulator or 
decision maker is required to consider a range of competing options, opinions, and/or 
values and arrive at a balanced judgement on incomplete or shifting evidence. To 
that end, securing a sufficient level of expertise in regulation may also help ensure 
that decisions are robust to errors.     
 
Criteria 5: Effectiveness  
 
 The effectiveness criterion can be best understood as whether a regulator 
delivers intended results or policy objectives (Baldwin and Cave 1999; Baldwin et al. 
2012; OECD 1997, 2003). Several of the practical framworks for good regulation 
emphasise that achievement of these aims should be based on standards and targets 
(Australian Offie of Regulation Review 1998; Canadian External Advisory 
Committee 2004; UK Better Regulation Task Force 2000) or ‘goal-based 
approaches’ (OECD 1997, 2003). Such standards can orginate either internally or 
externally to the regulatory organisation. 
 
 The notion of regulatory responsiveness, as previously discussed, relates to the 
effectiveness criterion in two overarching ways – the first being that the regulator is 
organised in such a way that adequately allows it to meet current and future 
challenges and, second, that the regulator can and does alter its procedures to 
ongoing needs and challenges, where appropriate. On a more specific level, Baldwin 
and Black (2007) propose that successful responsiveness entails accounting for 
different values, opinions, and experiences that operate within regulated bodies and 
the regulated; responding to the constraints and opportunities presented by 
institutional and external contexts; receptivity to the logics of different regulatory 
tools and strategies; and, awareness of regulatory performance and adaptiveness to 
modification.       
 
 
                                                            
8 Regulatory capture is the result or process by which regulation, in law or application, is consistently or 
repeatedly directed away from the public interest and toward the interests of the regulated industry, by the intent 
and action of the industry itself (Carpenter and Moss 2013).  
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Criteria 6: Cost-Efficiency 
 
  Regulation is cost-efficient when the output of regulation justifies the cost. In 
order to meet this end, it is essential to understand the cumulative impact of policies 
and to avoid duplication and overlap in regulatory activities. In particular, claims to 
this test involve both productive efficiency and efficient regulatory outcomes. The 
former reflects whether the mandate is implemented at the least possible level of 
inputs or costs. The latter encapsulates whether the regulator or regulation under 
examination leads to results that are efficient9, which unlike productive efficiency, is 
judged with a degree of independence from the mandate itself. 
 
Furthermore, achieving cost-efficiency must be based on first meeting the first 
four criteria of the framework. Consequently, it is perhaps the most interesting (and 
complex) criterion from an evaluation point of view, in that it aims to capture the 
dichotomy underlying most regulatory policies – the tension between the public and 
private aspects of regulation. In the case of health technology regulation, the tension 
is premised on opposing interests between consumers (patients) and producers 
(industry), with the former focused on protecting societal, public health concerns and 
the latter maintaining that regulation is designed first to serve industry. It is this 
strain, in particular, that characterises many of the challenges raised in the first four 
criteria of the framework. There are therefore definitional problems related to the 
cost-efficiency criterion, in terms of determining which objectives and whose needs 
are met first. In other words, how to balance and assess economic efficiency versus 
social objectives?  
 
  Therefore, according to the framework, good health technology regulation can 
be achieved or enhanced through the following mechanisms: 
 
 Clear and appropriate mandates of involved regulators; 
                                                            
9 Outcome efficiency can be judged across two measures: allocative efficiency (whether it is possible to 
redistribute goods to increase the benefits to or welfare of any one consumer without making another consumer 
worse off) and dynamic efficiency (whether there is encouragement of desirable process and product innovation, 
and whether the system produces flexible responses to changes to demand).  
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 Accountable and independent regulators and associated processes, which are 
subject to external scrutiny and sufficient “reason-giving” for their policies 
and decisions;  
 Fair, open, transparent, and inclusive regulatory processes and policies; 
 Sufficient expert involvement to secure public support and trust in decisions, 
withstand external interference, reduce arbitrary use of discretion, facilitate 
evidence-based decision making, and protect against errors;  
 Responsiveness to the constraints and opportunities presented by institutional 
environments within which regulators act, as well as the logics of different 
regulatory tools and strategies and requirements for change; 
 Timely regulatory processes that avoid duplication and overlap and where the 
benefits justify any costs; and, 
 Delivery of intended results or policy objectives.  
   
  Certainly, there may be other mechanisms that may play a role (again, different 
stakeholder groups may differ on what constitutes ‘good regulation’), but the 
framework offers a comprehensive foundation for examining the different 
dimensions of regulatory performance and quality.  
 
  The framework is intended to be of interest to and potentially used by a variety 
of affected stakeholders to better understand and assess the processes, policies, and 
performance of regulators. A broad audience aligns with some of key criteria of good 
regulation, namely opportunities for stakeholder involvement and external evaluation 
or scrutiny of regulatory performance. Such stakeholder groups include national 
policy makers, academics or policy analysts, industry, patient organizations, 
consumer groups, etc. National policy makers, for example, could employ the 
framework to evaluate how publicly funded regulatory bodies are performing against 
the criteria of good regulation. This could inform funding priorities, reform policies, 
new initiatives, communication and interaction with affected parties, and resource 
allocation decisions, among others.  As mentioned, it would also be useful to 
industry. Similar to other affected stakeholders, industry could employ the 
framework to understand how effectively regulators are overseeing and making 
authorisation and coverage and reimbursement decisions on their products. 
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Accordingly, manufacturers may be better able to identify areas of reform as well as 
pressure points to more effectively engage with regulators to ensure satisfactory 
regulatory performance.   
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Table 1: Conceptual framework of ‘good regulation’  
Mandate (External) Accountability Due Process Expertise & Impartiality Effectiveness Cost-Efficiency 
Authorised legislative mandate 
to claim public support (1)(2) 
Answerable to elected body 
representing the public 
(‘democratically responsive’) 
(1)(2) 
Fairness, openness, 
transparency, inclusion of 
relevant stakeholders 
(1)(7)(8)(9) 
‘Sufficient’ expertise in order to 
secure public support for 
exercise of discretion (1)(2) 
Delivering intended results 
(1)(2)(4) or policy objectives, 
as based on standards and 
targets (6)(7)(8) 
Costs and savings 
generated (1)(2) where 
benefits justify costs (4) 
Able to balance and ensure independence and accountability (3)(4) 
Promote innovation through 
incentives and goal-based 
approaches (4) 
Minimise costs and market 
distortions (4) 
Sound legal basis (4) and 
regulatory backing (authority) 
(5) 
Able to justify decisions and be 
subject to public scrutiny 
(5)(7)(8)(9) 
Ensure fairness amongst 
inevitable winners and losers 
(3) 
Professionalism to withstand 
external interference and reduce 
arbitrary use of discretion (3) 
Better than alternatives (6) 
Understanding cumulative 
impact of policies (risk 
and problem awareness) 
and avoiding duplication 
and overlap (8) 
Stated regulatory objectives (5) 
which are better than 
alternatives (6) 
Subject to adjustment (6)a  
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Proportionality (7)(9) and 
necessity (8) 
Subject to appraisal by independent bodies (6) or other external scrutiny (6)(9) in order to avoid 
‘regulatory capture’ (4)  
Takes account of the cultures 
and understanding that operate 
within regulated bodies; 
responds to constraints and 
opportunities presented by 
institutional environments 
within which regulator acts; 
responsiveness to the logics of 
different regulatory tools and 
strategies; performance 
awareness and modification; 
adaption to change (10)b 
Timelines (8) 
Consistency with other 
(national and international) 
regulations/law/policies 
(5)(6)(7) and, in the EU, 
respecting subsidiarity(9) 
‘Reason-giving’ and transparency to facilitate judicial review and 
participation (1)(2)(3) 
Robust to errors (6)  
Based on verifiable 
performance criteria (4)(6) 
 Clear and practical for users (4) Evidence-based decision making (8)c 
Enforceable (6)  
Improving internal management 
and serving stakeholders (2) 
 
Sources: Authors’ compilation based on: (1) Baldwin and Cave 1999; (2) Baldwin et al. 2012; (3) Majone 1996; (4) OECD 1997, 2003; (5) Kaufmann et al.1999, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2009; (6) 
Australian Office of Regulation Review 1998; (7) UK Better Regulation Task Force 2000; (8) Canadian External Advisory Committee 2004; (9) Mandelkern Report, European Commission 
2001a; (10) Baldwin and Black 2007.   
a This is potentially limited by the mandate. 
b Some of these issues also related to accountability.  
c The Canadian Report considers evidence-based decision making as an element of the ‘effectiveness’ criterion, but it is considered applicable also to the requirements of ‘expertise’ and ‘cost-
efficiency’. 
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Why focus on health technology regulation?  
 
  Health technology regulation has a long and important history in national and 
international health policy. With the establishment of the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) in the United States (US) and the European Medicines 
Agency (EMA) in Europe10, new health technologies are required to undergo review 
and assessment to ascertain their benefits and risks to public health before being 
marketed on the health care system. In other words, new technologies must 
demonstrate that they do more good than harm in a defined group of patients, where 
benefits and risks are considered in clinical terms (i.e. will it work?) (Figure 1). Most 
often, this means that each new technology is evaluated on its own merit, not 
compared to other available treatments, and under controlled conditions (typically a 
randomised controlled trial, RCT).      
 
  Until the 1990s, market authorisation was the sole hurdle to market access for 
health technologies. However, over the past two decades or so, national governments 
and, in particular, entities responsible for the public financing (coverage and 
reimbursement) of health technologies have instituted similar assessment processes 
(broadly termed, health technology assessment, or HTA11) to ascertain the health and 
(sometimes) costs consequences associated with new technology. The overarching 
goal, in most cases, is to optimise the health outcomes for a population of patients by 
considering all available treatment options while accounting for budgetary 
constraints. Therefore, such assessments typically compare the new technology 
against existing treatment alternatives to address the question of whether a 
technology provides therapeutic value and, in some circumstances, health system and 
societal value (Figure 1). Assessments typically involve a broader range of 
evidentiary approaches (e.g. RCTs, comparative benefit/effectiveness studies, 
observational studies, health economic modelling). Some government bodies conduct 
all assessments in-house or avail themselves of (semi-) independent, quasi-regulatory 
                                                            
10 There are other pharmaceutical licensing bodies, but the FDA and EMA are responsible for approximately 
80% of the world pharmaceutical market (McCabe et al. 2008). The FDA also reviews other types of health 
technologies, namely medical devices.  
11 HTA is the broadest term for technology assessments, but similar research has recently been termed 
‘comparative effectiveness research’ or CER, predominately in the US. There are, however, differences. CER 
typically equates to a comparative assessment of effectiveness only, while HTA includes effectiveness, but also 
an economic dimension (cost-effectiveness) and may also consider the social, ethical, and legal aspects of health 
technologies.  
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of policy makers to improve regulatory processes. These key points are elaborated 
further below. 
 
Growing interest in and use of evidence-based approaches to health technology 
regulation  
 
  Market authorisation and coverage and reimbursement authorities face 
uncertain choices when considering the adoption of health care technologies. While 
consideration of the available evidence on the benefits and risks has traditionally 
played a role in market authorisation decisions, particularly with regards to 
pharmaceuticals, this has not always been the case with respect to coverage and 
reimbursement policy.  
 
  Health technology assessment originated in the US in the 1970s in response to 
mounting concern about the diffusion of costly health technologies and governments’ 
and taxpayers ability and willingness to fund their use. The Office of Technology 
Assessment (OTA) was established to provide Congress impartial assessments of 
technologies in medicine and other technology-based sectors that became the basis of 
many subsequent public policies (Bimber 1986). While the OTA was not involved in 
coverage and reimbursement policy and was ultimately disbanded in 1995, it served 
as a model for the creation of similar entities in Europe and elsewhere. Some of these 
bodies focus on the production of evidence-based reports for use in a broad context 
(e.g. the Swedish Council on Technology Assessment in Health Care), while others 
attend to the production of guidance decisions linked to the coverage and 
reimbursement of health technologies (e.g. NICE in England, the Institute for Quality 
and Efficiency in Health Care (IGWiG) in Germany, and the Canadian Agency for 
Drugs and Technologies in Health (CADTH) in Canada). In some countries, such as 
France, the Netherlands, and Sweden, rather than establishing a stand-alone HTA 
body to advise or decide on coverage and reimbursement policy, technology 
assessment processes have been adopted within the purview and operations of an 
existing government authority.  
 
  Since the disappearance of the OTA, the US has experimented with HTA and 
similar types of policy research (e.g. outcomes research, health services research, 
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comparative effectiveness research), but its implicit use to inform coverage and 
reimbursement has been limited, especially at the Federal level. Compared to other 
countries, the adoption of HTA at the national level, especially to determine access 
to new technologies, has been most challenging and contentious, in part due to the 
decentralised public-private health system and the national politics around rationing. 
The 2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA), however, promulgated the need for evidence 
on health care interventions and invested substantially in a new institute, the Patient-
Centered Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI) to fund and oversee comparative 
effectiveness research (CER).  
 
  Since their inception, these bodies (and technology assessment more broadly) 
have grown in influence, as a result of an ever-expanding number and breadth of new 
technology and, in turn, growing evidence demands to ascertain value and safety; 
expanding health care expenditures and constrained budgets; growing stakeholder 
demands for information and expedient access to technology; and, the increasingly 
interconnectedness of national health technology markets. Moreover, it is 
increasingly the case that new technologies must attain not only market 
authorisation, but also a positive coverage decision and sufficient level of 
reimbursement in order to reach patients in a timely way or at all. This has resulted 
in important consequences for regulators, physicians, patients, and the health system 
as a whole. First, the decision-making power of coverage and reimbursement bodies 
has grown, which has effectively replaced some of the decision authority of 
physicians, as prescribing decisions are becoming more restricted by payer’s 
decisions (Eichler et al. 2010). Second, the ability of new technology, especially 
those of high expense, to be adopted into practice is increasingly driven by the ability 
of manufacturers to demonstrate added value to payers. Third, unlike prescribing, but 
similar to authorisation decisions, coverage and reimbursement decisions are often 
taken by specialised institutions, expert committees, and increasingly based on a 
dossier of complex data and sophisticated methodology. Fourth, the dual assessments 
performed by the two regulators can result in contentious situations (e.g. a 
technology is approved by a licensing agency on the basis of its safety and efficacy, 
but is subsequently deemed not reimbursable by payers). 
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  Health technology regulation has therefore become more visible and 
contentious, as it inevitability brings together public and private interests in a process 
where there are potentially winners and losers and the perception of outcome is 
highly contingent on each party’s point of view. Indeed, advocates herald the use of 
technology assessment and resulting evidence in decision making to advance 
population-based health and promote efficient resource allocation, while critics and 
sceptics consider such approaches a way to simply restrict access to new technology 
or displace inherently political choices with technical ones. 
 
  As a consequence, academic and policy interest in health technology regulation 
have risen. Studies have focused on the following areas12:  
 
 Regulation of pharmaceuticals (Abraham 1995; Abraham and Lewis, 1998; 
Abraham and Lewis 1999; Barbui et al. 2011; Bassi et al. 2003; Gardner 
1996; Garattini and Bertele 2007; Garattini and Chalmers 2009; Lexchin and 
Donovan 2010; Mossialos et al. 2006; Regnstrom et al. 2010; Wiktorowicz 
2003), and in particular to Europe (Abraham and Lewis 2000; Ernst and 
Young 2010; Gardner 1996; Mossialos et al. 2004; Permanand and Mossialos 
2005; Mossialos and Oliver 2005; Motola et al. 2006; Permanand 2006), the 
US (Carpenter 2010; Daemmrich 2004; Kane 1997; Lakdawalla et al. 2009), 
and across multiple jurisdictions (Banta 1995; Franken et al. 2012; Kanavos 
2003; Morgan et al. 2006; Mossialos and Oliver 2005; Vogler et al. 2009).  
 
 Pharmaceutical coverage and reimbursement in Europe (mostly focused on 
select member states) (Annemans et al. 1997; Barros 2010; Folino-Gallo et 
al. 2008; Franken et al. 2012; Garattini et al. 2007; Gulasci et al. 2002; Haga 
and Sverre 2002; Kanavos 2003; Lundkvist 2002; Moise and Docteur 2007; 
Mossialos et al. 2006; Mossialos and Oliver 2005; Paris and Docteur 2007; 
Pedersen 2003; Rinta 2001; Rovira and Darba 2001; Stafinski et al. 2011a; 
Yfantopoulos 2008; Vogler et al. 2009; Vogler et al. 2011), the US (Berndt 
and Newhouse 2010; Forrest et al. 2005; Neumann et al. 2008), and in other 
jurisdictions (Lexchin and Mintzes 2008; Paris and Docteur 2006). 
                                                            
12 List intended to be a comprehensive, but not exhaustive, outline of literature in the field. Discussion of specific 
literature gaps can also be found in the paper summaries and the individual papers. 
  
39 
 
 
 Development and status of health technology assessment and the role or need 
for evidence-based coverage and reimbursement decision making (Banta 
2003; Banta and Oortwijn 2000; Battista and Hodge 1999; Battista 2006; 
Jonsson 2002; Maynard and McDaid 2003; Perry et al. 1997; Perry and 
Tharner 1999; Sorenson et al. 2008a; Stevens et al. 2003; Valesco-Garrido et 
al. 2008);   
 
 Technology assessment in particular jurisdictions, with the United Kingdom 
(UK) and NICE, in particular, the most heavily researched (Banta et al. 1995; 
Berg et al. 2004; Bos 2000; Carlsson 2004; Chalkidou and Walley 2010; 
Culyer 2006; Devlin and Parkin 2004; Drummond and Sorenson 2009; 
Eisenberg and Zarin 2002; Gerdhardus 2006; Lauslahti et al. 2000; Menon 
and Topfer 2000; Oliver et al. 2004; Oortwijn et al. 2008; Orvain et al. 2004; 
Perleth et al. 2009; Rawlins and Culyer 2004; Sorenson et al. 2008b; Stevens 
and Milner 2004; Sullivan et al. 2009; Woolf and Henshall 2000);  
 
 Health technology assessment institutions and processes across different 
jurisdictions (Chalkidou et al. 2009; Chinitz 2004; Clement et al. 2009; 
Draborg et al. 2005; Garcia-Altes et al. 2004; Harris et al. 2001; Lexchin and 
Mintzes; 2008; Nicod and Kanavos 2012; Sorenson et al. 2008a; Sorenson 
and Kanavos 2009; Sorenson 2010; Stafinski et al. 2011a; Stafinski et al. 
2011b; Oliver et al. 2004; Perry and Tharner 1997; Velasco-Garrido et al. 
2008; Zentner et al. 2005) and different therapeutic areas, including orphan 
conditions (Nicod and Kanavos 2013), cancer (Faden et al. 2009; Mason et 
al. 2010), and biosimilar drugs (Minghetti et al. 2011);  
 
 Methods and processes of technology assessment (Abelson et al. 2007; Anell 
2004; Anell and Persson 2005; Boulenger et al. 2005; Busse et al. 2002; 
Chalkidou et al. 2007; Claxton et al. 2005; Drummond et al. 2005; Facey et 
al. 2010; Greenberg et al. 2005; Hutton et al. 2008; Johnson 2009; Lehoux 
and William-Jones 2007; McGregor and Brophy 2005; Neumann 2004; 
Neumann et al. 2010; Noorani et al. 2007; Phillips et al. 2006); 
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 Use of evidence/technology assessment in coverage and reimbursement 
decisions (Borowski et al. 2007; Carino et al. 2006; Cookson et al. 2001; 
Drummond et al. 2008; Draborg and Andersen 2005; Hivon et al. 2005; 
Hutton et al. 2006; Hutton et al. 2007; Luce and Brown 1995; Miller and 
Pearson 2008; Mohr and Tunis 2010; Oortwijn et al. 2010; Ramsey and 
Sullivan 2005; Sorenson et al. 2008a; Sorenson et al. 2010; Trueman et al. 
2010).   
 
  Despite the ever-expanding knowledge base, more research is needed, 
especially to assess new regulatory developments and evolutions in practice. In 
particular, there is limited research on market authorisation, especially from the 
agency perspective and with regards to medical devices. Only a few studies have 
been published focusing on medical device regulation (Altenstetter 2003; 
Altenstetter 2008; Altenstetter 2012; Altenstetter and Permanand 2007; Kramar et al. 
2012; Kramar et al. 2013). Of those studies focused on pharmaceutical regulation, 
the majority were conducted five to ten years ago and therefore somewhat outdated.    
  
  The evidence on national health technology coverage and reimbursement 
policy making is more expansive, but, again, existing studies have principally 
focused on pharmaceuticals. Research on the coverage and reimbursement of 
devices, including assessment or methodological challenges, has only recently 
received academic attention (Basu and Hassenplug 2012; Gelijns et al. 2013; Kirisits 
and Redekop 2013; Schreyogg et al. 2009; Sorenson and Kanavos 2011; Sorenson et 
al. 2011a; Torbica and Cappellaro 2010). The need for such research is notable, 
given the significant growth in the medical device industry in recent years and, as a 
consequence, the increased development and availability of sophisticated, costly 
devices.   
 
Awareness of challenges associated with health technology regulation in practice 
 
  Given the diversity of available health technologies and the complexity of 
regulating them, there are inherent challenges to regulation in practice. The 
limitations associated with health technology regulation have been noted in the 
literature. Key challenges relate to10: 
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 Timeliness of regulatory decisions and access to technology (Basu and 
Hassenplug 2012; Carpenter et al. 2008; Mason and Drummond 2009; 
Munos 2009); methodological and evidence hurdles (Campillo-Artero 2013; 
Cookson and Hutton 2003; Drummond 2004; Drummond and Sculpher 
2005; Drummond et al. 2009; Drummond 2013; Eichler et al. 2010; Eichler 
et al. 2011; Naci et al. 2012; Oliver and Sorenson 2009; Sorenson et al. 
2011a; Sorenson et al. 2011b);  
 
 Ensuring post-market technology safety, effectiveness, and cost-
effectiveness (Abraham and Davis 2005; Furberg et al. 2006; Resnic and 
Normand 2012);  
 
 Securing public accountability, transparency, and legitimacy (Permanand 
2006) and stakeholder involvement (Abelson et al. 2007; Facey et al. 2010; 
Facey et al. 2011; Gauvin et al. 2010; Milewa and Barry 2005; Milewa 
2006); 
 
 Social and political concerns (Avorn 2009; Brown 1991; Carpenter 2006; 
Cookson and Maynard 2000; Gelijns et al. 2005; Gerber et al. 2010; 
Gusmano and Gray 2010; Iglehart 2010; Lehoux and Blume 2000; 
Manchikanti et al. 2010; Oberlander et al. 2001; Permanand 2006; Wilensky 
2009);  
 
 Defining and judging value (Valesco-Garrido et al. 2008; Gelijns et al. 2013; 
Goldman et al. 2010; Hofman 2008; Kennedy 2009; Littlejohns et al. 2012); 
and,  
 
 Impacts of technology assessment (Drummond and Weatherly 2000; Jacob 
and McGregor 1997; Sigmund and Kristensen 2002; Oliver et al. 2004; 
Sorenson et al. 2008b).   
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  Many of the challenges relate particularly to technology assessment and its use 
in practice to inform decision making, particularly coverage and reimbursement. 
However, most studies have focused on a specific issue (e.g. stakeholder 
involvement, economic evaluation) and not on a broader set of issues (and the 
dynamics between them).  In relation, the policies or reforms introduced by 
regulators and other actors to address said challenges deserves examination. 
 
Commitment of policy makers to improve regulatory processes 
 
  Policy makers have increasingly recognised that health technology (and their 
regulation) forms an integral part of any truly effective modern health care system, 
and that it plays an important role in ensuring a healthy and productive society. 
Significant resources are dedicated to funding the activities of regulatory agencies, 
and various advisory committees have been created to advise policy makers on key 
issues related to the regulation of health technologies, particularly pharmaceuticals. 
In addition, there is considerable interest among policy leaders in Europe, 
particularly with regards to HTA, to enhance cross-border collaboration between 
involved bodies and identify “core” assessment standards to be shared and exercised 
internationally, in attempts to make regulation more efficient and predictable 
(Kristensen et al. 2009a; Kristensen et al. 2009b; Sorenson et al. 2008b). The 
European Parliament’s recent directive on patient rights and cross-border health care 
supported more formalised cooperation between national HTA bodies through the 
European Network of Health Technology Assessment (EUnetHTA) (European 
Parliament 2011). Similar aims have been sought within the pharmaceutical market 
authorisation arena with the International Conference on Harmonisation (ICH).          
 
  There is also growing interest in understanding and addressing the entire 
regulatory continuum for health technologies (i.e. the regulatory life-cycle). 
Historically, market authorisation and coverage and reimbursement processes have 
been perceived as dissimilar and separate. Academics in the field have generally 
focused on some aspect(s) of market authorisation or coverage and reimbursement, 
but rarely together. There has been some work in this area in recent years 
(Breckenridge 2010; Eichler et al. 2010; Fronsdal et al. 2012; Henshall et al. 2011; 
Henshall et al. 2013). Research on the topic has aligned with policy makers’ interest 
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in ensuring better synergies between market authorisation and coverage and 
reimbursement. In Europe, for example, policy makers (particularly DG Sanco and 
DG Enterprise) have discussed the idea of a Europe-wide relative efficacy and/or 
relative effectiveness assessment for new pharmaceuticals (Kleijnen et al. 2011; 
Eichler et al. 2010). In the US, the FDA and CMS have started a pilot ‘parallel-
review’ programme for medical devices (Messner and Tunis 2012). Interest in this 
topic amongst policy makers (and academics) is attributable to a number of factors, 
including a commitment to ensuring patient access to beneficial and appropriate 
interventions, enhancing the efficiency of the development of new products and their 
regulation, strengthening the evidence base for decision making, and facilitating the 
transparency of such decisions and their rationale to the general public.  
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Contributions of the thesis 
 
  Against the aforementioned backdrop, it is therefore an opportune moment to 
investigate health technology regulatory performance and the measures used to 
ensure good regulation. This thesis accomplishes these objectives by addressing the 
following main and sub-questions: 
 
1. To what extent is ‘good health technology regulation’ being achieved? 
 
1a. Does regulatory performance differ between systems for drugs and 
devices?  
1b. Are any of the criteria outlined in the framework more important to 
attaining good regulation?  
 
2. What factors, if any, inhibit or facilitate meeting the various criteria of 
good regulation? 
 
3. Have evidence-based approaches to health technology regulation aided 
regulators ability to achieve and maintain good regulation? 
 
3a. Is the impact of such approaches different for pre- (market authorisation) 
and post-market (coverage and reimbursement) regulation?  
3b. Are they “fit for purpose”? What could be improved?   
 
  The eight studies presented herein aim to cumulatively address the 
aforementioned questions. This body of research addresses an important gap in the 
academic and practitioner arenas by devising a conceptual framework of good 
regulation and applying it to examine the health technology regulation continuum of 
market authorisation and coverage and reimbursement. To date, there has been 
limited research on what constitutes good regulation in the context of health 
technologies and the effectiveness or usefulness of the different policies, processes, 
and practices that policy makers (and other relevant stakeholders) adopt and exercise 
to meet this end. Moreover, as previously evidenced, few studies have investigated 
the regulation of medical devices.        
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Key propositions underpinning the thesis  
 
  A number of key propositions underpin the thesis and provide a guiding 
foundation for the individual papers, including:  
 
1. Health technologies cannot be considered as one coherent group. Research 
and discourse regarding health technology regulation tends to combine 
different types of technologies in one singular group or they only consider 
pharmaceuticals. Many technology assessment frameworks to aid coverage 
and reimbursement policy (and, to some extent, market authorisation) were 
developed with pharmaceuticals in mind, not other types of technologies, 
such as devices. Different types of technologies, however, possess unique 
attributes that can potentially impact their assessment, overall regulation, and 
use in and benefit to patient care.      
 
2. Market authorisation and coverage and reimbursement of health 
technologies should be considered as interconnected in order to effectively 
address some of the challenges of regulation. Certainly those entities 
responsible for market authorisation and coverage and reimbursement have 
different missions and mandates – differences that arguably impact the 
similarities and differences between their respective evidence requirements 
and processes. Nonetheless, they share the central principle of balancing the 
benefits and risks in deciding whether a technology should be available for 
use in the health care system, and increasingly such decisions are being made 
based on similar evidence (even if assessments are conducted separately and 
with different endpoints). Figure 1 illustrates the potential synergies and 
overlap. Better understanding these synergies (and potential gaps or 
disconnects in meeting common objectives) is central to facilitating good 
health technology regulation. 
 
3. Important differences exist in the approaches to health regulation taken by 
different jurisdictions, but regulators share similar challenges in ensuring 
good regulation. Countries assume different approaches to health policy, 
including health technology regulation, because of variations in their 
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organisation and financing, cultural traditions, and norms and values. Despite 
these differences, there are common challenges shared by regulators to 
ensuring effective health technology regulation, especially with regards to 
assessing the benefits and risks of technologies to inform decision making. 
Comparing regulatory policies provides a lens though which we can better 
understand how countries respond to such challenges (e.g. timely access to 
safe and effective therapies, managing limited budgets, needs for robust, 
relevant, and transparent information), which may highlight collective lessons 
or insights for best addressing existing and future issues that arise in 
regulating health technologies. According to Klein (Klein 1997: 1269), “the 
challenge to improving our capacity to learn from the experiences of other 
countries is to deepen our understanding of the respects in which they differ 
or are similar”.  
 
4. Evidence-based regulation is a dynamic, not static process. Early proponents 
of technology assessment (and similar approaches) maintained that it would 
provide a more rational and linear process to decision making. Aside from 
whether such approaches do indeed meet these objectives, the process of 
technology assessment and applying evidence to policy is better characterised 
as dynamic, requiring regulators to modify and improve their policies and 
practices to reflect ever-changing circumstances. This is because 
technological development and innovation itself is complex and evolves 
rapidly, creating new products or incremental improvements to existing 
treatments on a frequent basis. Such changes result in new demands regarding 
evidence requirements, assessment methods, expertise to interpret and apply 
evidence, and patient access to care. Moreover, health technology regulation 
has become an increasingly visible, high profile and collaborative activity. By 
virtue of greater scrutiny as well as discussion and research on the topic, 
regulators are pressured to correct limitations and improve their processes. 
Also, the broader the range of stakeholders involved, the more policies and 
processes are required to evolve, in order to meet and address diverse and 
changing needs and expectations.    
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5. The lines between state-centred and self-regulation with regards to health 
technology regulation have become increasing blurred. In any regulatory 
domain, including health technology regulation, there are generally state 
actors who are engaged in regulating, private sector actors who are being 
regulated, and third party parties who may provide input into how the 
particular area or sector ought to be regulated. However, the lines between 
these modes of regulation have become increasingly blurred in the health 
technology arena, with manufacturers and other stakeholders (e.g. patients) 
involved in the regulation process itself and interest and affected groups (e.g. 
medical associations, patient groups, other regulators) engaged in monitoring 
and enforcing good regulatory performance. In particular, such changes have 
resulted in “pre-emptive self-regulation”, whereby manufacturers react to 
concerns from regulators, other policy makers, and the public by directly 
engaging in regulation. The blurring of boundaries may lead to better 
regulatory outcomes.    
 
6. Attaining ‘good regulation’ cannot be considered in isolation of the 
particular organisation or agency. Given the prominence of health care 
issues in society and the often very public nature of health technology 
approval and coverage decisions, broader political and social values and 
priorities influence the attainment of good regulation, despite the regulatory 
organisation’s or agency’s efforts. Such influences are increasingly 
persuasive given the increasing role of media, including social media, and the 
Internet in public life. Depending on the circumstances, these external forces 
can have a facilitative or inhibiting influence on good regulation. 
 
7. While often overlooked compared to effective regulatory output, “good 
process” plays an important role in achieving good regulation. Although 
good process in and of itself is not sufficient to achieve good regulation, it is 
central in two main ways: 1) facilitates the likelihood of an effective 
regulatory outcome and 2) helps maintain the credibility and sustainability of 
regulatory decisions or policies when they come under question. This is 
particularly important in the case of health technology regulation, which, as 
previously noted, is increasingly complex, under external scrutiny, and 
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involves a broad range of affected stakeholders with often times competing 
interests. For example, if a regulator is criticised and challenged by a 
particular decision, the fact that it was derived by way of a transparent, 
inclusive, accountable, and independent process may protect against undue 
stakeholder influence and facilitate increased support and adoption.  
 
The contribution of each study to the overall thesis and current evidence base 
 
  The thesis presents eight studies, five of which have been published (or are in 
press) in peer review journals (Sorenson 2012; Sorenson and Chalkidou 2012; 
Sorenson et al. 2012; Sorenson et al. 2013; Sorenson and Drummond 2014); two of 
the three other studies are currently under review. Taken together, the studies aim to 
explore the dimensions of (and issues raised by) the good regulation framework in 
addressing the aforementioned research questions (Table 2).  
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Table 2: Overview and contribution of each paper 
Study 
Title Aims Technology of 
Focus  
Area of Health 
Technology 
Regulation
Main Research 
Question(s) 
Addressed
Dimensions of Good 
Regulation Explored 
Study 1 ‘Good regulation’ and 
public health protection 
in the European Union: 
Evaluating the European 
Medicines Agency 
 Evaluate the regulatory performance 
of the EMA 
Drugs Market 
Authorisation 
Q1, Q2, and Q3 All (entire framework 
formally applied) 
Study 2 Improving medical 
device regulation: The 
United States and Europe 
in perspective 
 Provide a comparative analysis of 
medical device regulation 
 Explore key challenges facing device 
regulation 
 Discuss current and proposed reforms 
 Specify and explore actions to 
improve regulation 
Devices Market 
Authorisation 
Q1, Q2, and Q3 All 
Study 3 Comparative analysis of 
pharmaceutical coverage 
and pricing in Europe: 
Policy levers and 
mechanism and insights 
for the United States 
 Crtically review pharmaceutical 
coverage and pricing policies across 
eight European countries 
 Explore evidence-based drug 
assessment processes in depth 
 Explore areas of regulatory 
improvement 
 Draw implications for US 
pharmaceutical coverage and pricing 
policy 
Drugs Coverage, 
Reimbursement, 
and Pricing 
Q1, Q2, and Q3 All 
Study 4 Evolving reimbursement 
and pricing policies for 
devices in Europe and the 
United States and 
considerations of value  
 Compare coverage, reimbursement, 
and pricing policies for medical 
devices in Europe and the US 
 Ascertain extent to which evidence of 
value is considered 
 Critically assess policy initiatives that 
have supported or could facilitate 
Devices Coverage, 
Reimbursement, 
and Pricing 
Q1, Q2, and Q3 Cost-efficiency and 
effectiveness 
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value-based device access and 
payment policies 
 Identify measures for improvement 
Study 5 The evolution and impact 
of health technology in 
Europe 
 Investigate the evolution of HTA in 
Europe over last 10 years 
 Assess differences across countries 
 Evaluate impact of HTA on various 
outcome measures  
Both. ‘Coverage, 
Reimburemsent, 
and Pricing 
Q1, Q2, and Q3 All 
Study 6 Decision making under 
certainty: An 
investigation of 
international coverage 
with evidence 
development policies in 
the context of medical 
devices 
 Investigate adoption and use of CED 
policies in different countries 
 Explore application of CED to 
medical devices 
 Ascertain success of CED approach 
to date 
 Identify areas and strategies for 
improvement 
Devices Coverage, 
Reimburemsent, 
and Pricing 
Q2 and Q3 All 
Study 7 Valuing end of life care: 
The case of advanced 
cancer drugs in the 
United States 
 Examine availability and use of 
advanced cancer drugs in the US 
 Review and analyse their value for 
money and other consideratons of 
value 
 Assess key technical, political, and 
social challenges to assessing their 
value and applying evidence to 
decision making 
 Elucidate strategies to obtain greater 
value in advanced cancer care  
Drugs Coverage, 
Reimburemsent, 
and Pricing 
Q2 and Q3 Due process, expertise 
and impartiality, cost-
efficiency, effectiveness 
Study 8 The politics of 
comparative 
effectiveness in the 
United States: Lessons 
from recent history 
 Examine past federal attempts at 
technology assessment in the US 
 Identify reasons for success or failure 
 Distill political lessons for current 
and future CER efforts 
Both Coverage, 
Reimburemsent, 
and Pricing 
Q2 and Q3 All 
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  The first two studies provide an in-depth analysis of health technology market 
authorisation. The first study formally applies the entire framework in full to assess 
the EMA - the key regulatory body for authorising pharmaceuticals in Europe. In 
particular, it ascertains how well the agency functions to protect public health and 
meet other policy objectives and how it has evolved (and the measures used) to 
enhance its performance across the different dimensions of good regulation. This 
study represents the first in-depth evaluation, employing a conceptual framework of 
good regulation, of the EMA and its regulatory practices since its inception.   
 
  The second study critically reviews and evaluates existing medical device 
regulation in both Europe and the US. The analysis allows readers to understand the 
mandates, organisation, processes and policies of both systems (along with their 
respective strengths and weaknesses), compare and contrast proposed or adopted 
reforms, and identify further policy improvements to ensure that safe and effective 
devices are available to patients and that regulatory processes meet many of the 
procedural criteria (e.g. transparency, openness, impartiality) outlined in the 
framework. The comparison of Europe and the US is important in this context, as 
both jurisdictions have been heavily criticised for ineffective medical device 
regulatory practices and are undergoing reform (largely in parallel and with many of 
the same aims). To date, medical device regulation has escaped academic focus. As 
as result of recent reforms, there have been a couple of recent studies on US and 
European medical device regulation (Basu and Hassenplug 2012; Kramer et al. 2012) 
and focused commentaries on specific problems with existing regulation systems 
(Cohen and Billingley 2011; Freemantle 2011; Hines et al. 2010). However, this 
study is the first to provide an in-depth comparative analysis of the key issues 
involved in existing regulatory frameworks and how reforms might or could address 
outstanding weaknesses. In addition, it also offers practical actions to further 
strengthen medical device regulation in both jurisdictions.  
 
  The subsequent two studies, studies 3 and 4, focus on health technology 
coverage, reimbursement, and pricing. The third study provides a comparative 
analysis of the range of regulatory tools employed by European policy makers to 
meet key health system objectives regarding pharmaceutical coverage, 
reimbursement, and pricing. It delves into particular detail on the policies and 
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practices associated with assessing drugs (via technology assessment) to inform such 
determinations. In particular, the various dimensions of the framework are explored 
and how they facilitate or hamper technology assessment in particular and coverage 
and reimbursement more broadly. Because the US is a high spender on health care 
and has recently adopted health reforms aimed at improving the value of health care 
and “bending the cost curve” (CER being one such policy), the paper provides 
options for consideration on how the US might incorporate evidence from CER 
studies in existing coverage and reimbursement policies based on the European 
experience. This study contributes a comprehensive and updated comparative 
analysis of coverage, reimbursement, and pricing policies across Europe, providing 
an in-dpeth investigation of evidence-based approaches in particular. To date, most 
studies have focused on one particular regulatory tool (e.g. reference pricing) or 
country.  
 
  The fourth study focuses on medical device coverage and reimbursement (and, 
where applicable, pricing) in Europe and the US, with a particular focus on the use of 
evidence on the value of a technology to support such decisions (similar to the 
companion study on pharmaceuticals). It provides the reader with an understanding 
of institutions, policies, and processes involved in the coverage, reimbursement, and 
pricing of devices in both jurisdictions and the similarities and differences between 
them, in addition to their respective strengthens and weaknesses for fostering patient 
access to cost-effective new devices. The paper also provides a critical analysis of 
various policy initiatives that have supported or could better foster value-based 
device coverage and reimbursement. This study is the first analysis on device 
coverage and reimbursement policies and from a comparative perspective. To that 
end, a key objective of this analysis is to provide an evidence base to stimulate 
debate on medical device coverage and reimbursement policy in the US and Europe, 
a topic that has received limited analysis or discussion. Compared to the third study 
on pharmaceuticals, this paper examines Europe as whole with specific country 
examples (rather than an in-depth focus on a particular selection of member states) to 
complement the other work (i.e. some of the countries examined in the third study 
use similar assessment processes for drugs and devices and the fifth study examines 
HTA processes and policies in Europe in more detail) and because robust data on 
national device policies are limited.  
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  All together, the first through fourth studies provide an in-depth understanding 
of the institutions, policies, and processes involved in the market authorisation and 
coverage and reimbursement of health technologies, highlight the similarities and 
differences between the regulatory approaches taken for drugs and devices in Europe 
and the US, and elucidate shared (or divergent) challenges and opportunities to 
achieving good regulation. To that end, they also analyse the measures used or 
proposed in the two jurisdictions to better regulation, particularly in terms of the 
assessment and consideration of evidence on the value of technologies in coverage 
and reimbursement policy. In addition, the four studies aim to make a link regarding 
the important (and growing) synergies between market authorisation and 
coverage/reimbursement decisions in regulating health technologies.  
 
  The final set of studies (fifth through eighth) delves further into health 
technology coverage and reimbursement. In particular, the studies provide 
substantive analyses on the role and impact of evidence-based approaches to health 
technology coverage and reimbursement on achieving and maintaining good 
regulation. They also explore measures that regulators and other stakeholders have 
adopted (or might adopt) to improve policy in this area.   
 
  The fifth study expands some of the work provided by the third study by giving 
a comprehensive comparative analysis of how HTA systems and their role in 
coverage and reimbursement in Europe have evolved over the last decade. It 
identifies the key challenges and discusses policy actions taken by policy makers and 
others to better regulation in this arena. Part of the rationale behind these systems is 
that the approach will advance important good regulation goals, such as 
independence, transparency, impartiality and expertise, stakeholder representation, 
and more effective and efficient decision making. The study strives to provide a 
qualitative assessment, based on the available literature, of the usefulness and impact 
of technology assessment on these aims as well as on clinical practice, health and 
economic outcomes, and innovation. Earlier studies have examined the evolution of 
technology assessment over time in select countries (Banta and Oortwijn 2009; 
Drummond and Banta 2009; Eisenberg and Zarin 2002; Jonsson 2009; Luce and 
Cohen 2009; Perleth et al. 2009; Sigmund and Kristensen 2009; Weill and Banta 
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2009) or have looked at the development of HTA more generally. This study is the 
only existing work to provide a comprehensive retrospective comparative analysis of 
the establishment and use of HTA in several European countries. Indeed, it not only 
examines what changes have expired over time, but also identifies key trends and 
outstanding challenges associated with the overall approach.    
 
  The sixth study gives a more in-depth examination of coverage with evidence 
development (CED) policies discussed in the third and fourth studies. In particular, it 
explores the use of the approach across countries and namely with regards to devices. 
While the concept of CED and its use in a particular country has been discussed in 
the literature (Carino et al. 2006; Chalkidou et al. 2007; Chalkidou et al. 2008; 
Dhalla et al. 2007; Hutton et al. 2007; Levin et al. 2007; Levin et al. 2011; 
Longsworth et al. 2012; Miller and Pearson 2008; Mohr and Tunis 2010; Tunis and 
Chalkidou 2007; Ramsey and Sullivan 2005; Trueman et al. 2010; Tunis and Pearson 
2006; Walker et al. 2012), there are no existing empirical studies that comparatively 
examine CED across different countries. A few case studies on CED applied to a 
particular device have been published, but none that examine the use of CED for 
devices more broadly. Given that the evidence base for devices is often lacking at the 
time of coverage decisions (more so than for drugs), they are particularly viable 
candidates for this approach. This study addresses this gap, providing a comparative 
analysis of CED policies across a number of countries, including those that have not 
been covered to date in the literature (France, Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland), and their application to medical devices. The study is also the first to 
empirically gather and analyse stakeholder experiences with and perceptions of CED 
policies.  
 
  The seventh study provides a case example of the difficulties (technical, 
political, social) associated with assessing the value of new technologies and 
applying such evidence to coverage, reimbursement, and practice decisions. In 
particular, the analysis focuses on advanced cancer drugs, given their high expense, 
questionable economic value, and strong social and political support for patient 
access. These issues coincide with a particular need to consider the following 
dimensions of good regulation: due process, expertise and impartiality, cost-
efficiency, and effectiveness. The existing literature on this topic has focused on two 
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principal streams of inquiry: 1) opinion pieces stating that drug prices are exorbitant 
and concerns that they provide questionable value for money and 2) limited studies 
examining oncologists’ perceptions of the value of advanced cancer drugs (Fojo and 
Grady 2009; Meropol and Schulman 2009; Neumann et al. 2010). The paper 
provides a more comprehensive analysis, using an extensive bodyof multi-
disciplinary research (health policy, health economics, political science, sociology), 
to critically examine the reasons why these therapies are notably expensive and the 
implications for affordability and patient access; how a variety of stakeholders 
(oncologist, patients, payers, general public) value advanced cancer drugs; and, the 
technical, policial, and social challengs raised in ascertaining their value and 
accounting for such considerations in decision making. Overall, the study is intended 
to lend a better understanding of the current issues raised by technology assessment 
in this therapeutic area and how existing practice and policy might be enhanced.        
 
  The eighth and final study focuses on the politics of generating and using 
evidence in policy and practice. Resource allocation decisions are not simply 
technical in nature, but also political. The politicalisation of technology assessment, 
especially when used to inform coverage and reimbursement, is no more evident than 
in the US, where it has experienced a turbulent history, namely at the Federal level.  
Despite various attempts at institutionalising CER and similar approaches in US 
health care over the last several decades, research is lacking to understand previous 
attempts at adopting and implementing this type of research. There has been some 
research on select agencies or organisations, such as the OTA and the Agency for 
Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR) (Bimber 1996; Gray, Gusmano, and 
Collins 2003), but no analyses have investigated the collection of entities and efforts 
over time. This study therefore provides an in-depth historical case analysis of the 
use of CER (and related approaches) in the US, focusing on efforts supported or 
adopted at the Federal level (successful and failed). The historical analysis elicits 
important lessons for the latest US investment in CER on new technologies and other 
health care services and programmes – PCORI. It highlights how good regulation or 
the lack thereof (across the six dimensions) can facilitate or hinder the usefulness of 
technology assessment in the US context.    
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Summary of the thesis methods  
 
  The principle methods employed in this thesis include qualitative documentary 
analysis and in-depth expert interviews. This section will first discuss the 
documentary research approach, followed by explanation of the usefulness of expert 
interviews. Subsequently, the methodological particulars to each study are outlined.  
 
Documentary analysis  
 
  A broad definition of a document is a ‘written text’. A document is an 
important source of information, and such sources of data might be used in various 
ways in social research. Researchers (Bailey 1994; Denscombe 1998; Flick 2014) 
note that documents include institutional memoranda and reports, census 
publications, government announcements, proceedings, and policy dcouments, 
diaries, white papers, articles and papers, visual and pictorial sources and so on.  
 
The documentary research method refers to the analysis of documents that 
contains information about a phenomenon of interest to study (Bailey 1994). The 
method is used in investigating and categorising sources, most commonly written 
documents, whether in the private or public domain (Payne and Payne 2004). This 
research method is just as robust and viable and sometimes more cost-effective than 
social surveys, in-depth interviews, or participant observation. As per Scott (1990: 
34), a document “must be studied as socially situated products”. That is, 
documentary research is much more than recording or describing facts. It is a 
reflexive process in which the research confronts the “moral underpinnings of social 
inquiry” (Coles 1997: 6). “Documents do not stand alone” (Atkinson and Coffey 
1997; 55), but need to be situated within a theoretical or conceptual frame of 
reference in order for its content to be understood. 
 
Documentary research has been a staple of social research since its early 
inception. Along with surveys and ethnography, documentary research is one of the 
three major types of social research. The key issues surrounding the types of 
documents and the ability to use them as reliable sources of evidence must be 
considered by all who use documents in their research. Using this type of material in 
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a research study means that the documents are recorded as secondary data sources in 
the fact that they contain material “not specifically gathered for the research question 
at hand” (Stewart and Kamins1999: 11). Documentary studies also often call for 
originality in translating existing documents into trends or general concepts, and are 
particularly susceptible to alternative interpretations (Flick 2014).  
 
In order to ensure proper handling of the documentary data collected for this 
thesis and guard against some of the limitations of the approach, Scott’s (1990) 
quality control criteria were employed. Such criteria include authenticity, credibility, 
representativeness, and meaning. Authenticity refers to whether the evidence is 
genuine and from reliable sources; credibility relates to whether the evidence is 
typical of its kind; representativeness refers to whether the documents consulted are 
representative of the totality of relevant documents; and, meaning refers to whether 
the evidence is clear and comprehensible. The criteria were applied flexibly and 
interdependently, as suggested by Scott, in that one criterion did not exclude another 
and the criteria were considered when selecting documents to review and include in 
each study.   
 
Expert Interviews 
 
  Meuser and Nagel (2009) identify the expert interview as a specific form of 
applying semi-structured interviews. There are different perspectives on who is seen 
as an expert in the literature. As noted by Deeke (1995: 7-8), “…who and what are 
experts can be very different depending on the issue of study and the theoretical and 
analytical approach used by it. We can label those persons as experts who are 
particularly competent as authorities on a certain matter of fact”. Meuser and Nagel 
(2009) provide a more detailed characterisation, where an expert is a person who is 
responsible for the development, implementation or control of 
solutions/strategies/policies and/or who has privileged access to information about 
groups of persons or decision processes. They also outline different types of expert 
knowledge to be considered and sought in selecting and conducting the interviews. 
The three dimensions of knowledge include: 1) technical knowledge (specific 
knowledge of the field), 2) process knowledge (information on processes and 
procedures, typically for direct daily involvement in the field), and 3) explanatory 
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knowledge (subjective interpretation of relevance, importance, and potential 
influence of rules, ideas, policies, etc.).   
 
  Expert interviews can be used with different aims. Bogner and Menz (2009) 
suggest a threefold typology of expert interviews, where such interviews can be used 
for exploration, systematising, and theorising. Explorative interviews are helpful for 
orientation in a new field of study and to better structure hypotheses. The 
systematising expert interview focuses on the exclusivity or robustness of expert 
knowledge (i.e. person has expertise in a field or issue and likely operates in a 
position requiring such expertise) and is often used to obtain infomraiton that is not 
accessible otherwise. Here the focus is also on generating information for 
comparability and aggregation. Theory-generating expert interviews are appropriate 
when interviewees are considered more than an information source and the focus is 
on subjective aspects of an expert’s knowledge, including motivies and implicit 
beliefs about institutional or system functioning.  
 
  The aims and contents of this thesis align most fully with the systematising 
expert interview, as the objectives of the expert interviews used in particular chapters 
are to obtain specialised knowledge from deemed experts in the field – knowledge 
and information that is not readily available through the documentary analysis – for 
the purpose of aggregating and comparing the collected data to address the relevant 
topic(s) of inquiry and research question(s). However, it is common to include 
questions to capture more subjective aspects of an expert’s knowledge in 
systematising interviews, which normally relate to the theorising interview. Because 
experts influence the establishment and adoption of regulatory decisions and internal 
and external stakeholder assessment of performance is important to good regulation, 
the interviews included some open-ended questions to gather experts’ situated and 
subjective views on particular policies, processes, or dimensions of good regulation.    
 
Table 3 outlines the advantages and disadvantages of the documentary research 
and expert interview methodological approaches. 
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Table 3: Advantages and disadvantages of documentary research and expert 
interview approaches 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Documentary Analysis 
Advantages Disadvantages 
 Data readily available 
 Inexpensive and 
economical form of data 
 Researcher does not have 
to be present during data 
collection 
 ‘Non-reactivity’ – records 
unbiased by data collection 
process 
 Limited by the availability 
of the data 
 Inaccuracies in original 
material 
 Bias – ‘selective deposit or 
publication’ 
 Data studied may be out of 
context 
 Timely preparation before 
analysis 
 
 
 
 
Expert Interviews 
 Ability to obtain 
specialised knowledge 
from subject matter and/or 
process expert 
 Offer details and nuances 
not available through other 
research methods or data 
sources 
 Some differentiation of 
interviewees facilitates 
ability to obtain both high-
level policy and more 
detailed procedural 
information  
 Knowledge obtained not 
neutral 
 Potential interaction effects 
(e.g. procedureal not 
rigorously standardised; 
danger of anecdotal and 
illustrative ‘information’; 
not inter-subjectively 
repeatable) 
Sources: Bogner, A., B. Littig, W. Menz (2009). Interviewing Experts. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillian; Dunn, W.N. 
(2004). Public Policy Analysis: An Introduction. Third Edition. Princeton, NJ: Prentice Hall; Flick, U. (2014). An 
Introduction to Qualitative Research. Fifth Edition. London: Sage.  
 
  To address the aforementioned weaknesses, Scott’s quality control criteria 
were applied to the data collection and analysis process, as noted previously. In 
addition, the various studies included a range of documents from a variety of sources 
to ensure accuracy, representativenss, and guard against selective deposit bias. In 
terms of the expert interviews, a range of interviewees were included to ensure the 
information obtained was as neutral or balanced as possible, and not merely 
anecdotal. In addition, the entire interview process was largely standardised, with 
formal and uniform procedures for inviting interviewees to participate, 
communicating the aims of the study(s), and posing questions (i.e. standardised 
interview guide).  
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  Following data collection, the goal of the data analysis was to bring order, 
structure, and meaning to the mass of generated information. With qualitative data, 
structure must first be derived from the data, which requires systematically analysing 
it so as to tease out themes, patterns, and categories (Flick 2014). Punch (2005: 199) 
stresses, “there is no single right way to do qualitative data analysis – no single 
methodological framework”. Therefore, methods of data analysis need to be 
systematic and well structured. Miles, Huberman, and Saldana (2014) view data 
analysis as an interactive process comprised of three main components – data 
reduction, data display, and drawing and verifying conclusions. These processes 
transpire before data collection, during data collection as interim and early analyses 
are carried out, and after data collection when the papers are approached and 
completed. 
 
  Data reduction is the translation of information from one form to another to 
simplify storage, analysis, and dissemination to others (Miles, Huberman, and 
Saldana 2014). The main aim of this stage is to reduce the data without significant 
loss of information. Taking the gathered documents and reducing them to certain 
patterns and themes accomplished this objective. Flick (2014) refers to this process 
as “de-contextualisation” and “re-contextualisation”, which results in a higher level 
of analysis where deconstructing the data lends to the emergence of a larger, 
consolidated understanding of the issue, policy, or phenonomen under study. Data 
reduction was achieved in the thesis through editing, segmenting, and summarising 
the documents used to support each study and the overall thesis. Where appropriate, 
coding and memoing were subsequently employed to identify and note key findings, 
trends, and themes and, ultimately, to understand, conceptualise, and explain health 
technology regulation (particular policies and processes, evolution in regulatory 
priorities and tools, regulatory performance, and challenges and opportunities for 
attaining good regulation).  
 
  Data display is the process of presenting and analysing data, with narrative text 
being the most frequent form of display for qualitative data (Miles, Huberman, and 
Saldana 2014). Accordingly, the thesis primarily relied on narrative text, which 
enabled the documents and interview data to be organised and summarised in a 
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meaningful way. This was an iterative process, as the text consistently evolved 
during the writing process when new understandings or themes were developed. 
 
    The final stage, data drawing and verifying conclusions, actually occurs more or 
less concurrently with the earlier steps. Initial conclusions are noted throughout the 
research process, but are not finalised until all data is analysed and can be considered 
and contexualised as a whole. This final step of an analysis requires the researcher to 
interpret the reduced and displayed data.  
 
Study 1 
 
  This study employed a comprehensive review of the literature on the EMA 
guided by the conceptual framework of good regulation. Relevant literature was 
identified through searches of bibliographic databases (PubMed, EconLit, Web of 
Science, Scopus) and the Internet (Google Scholar and Google for both published 
and grey literature [working papers, reports, agency committee reports, 
presentations, government and legislative documents]).  
 
Study 2 
 
  The analysis presented in the paper is based on a comprehensive review of the 
literature. Relevant literature was identified through searches of bibliographic 
databases (PubMed, Web of Science, Scopus) and the Internet (Google Scholar and 
Google for both published and grey literature [working papers, reports, agency 
committee reports, presentations, government and legislative documents]). The paper 
also benefited from helpful comments from three anonymous journal referees. 
 
Study 3  
 
  This study is based on a review and analysis of the available literature. 
Relevant literature was identified through searches of bibliographic databases 
(PubMed, Web of Science, Scopus) and the Internet (Google Scholar and Google for 
both published and grey literature [working papers, reports, agency committee 
reports, presentations, government and legislative documents]). The review focused 
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on Denmark, England, France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and 
Switzerland. These countries were selected because they represent a mix of different 
models of health care systems (Beveridge, Bismark, mixed models, centralised, 
decentralised) with divergent financing policies for pharmaceuticals. Moreover, the 
countries comprise the largest pharmaceutical markets in Europe. Therefore, the 
countries selected allowed for an in-depth comparative examination of European 
pharmaceutical coverage and pricing policies.      
 
  Parts of the paper also built on earlier work by the thesis author (Sorenson et 
al. 2008a), which examined the role of HTA in Europe, particularly with regards to 
coverage, reimbursement, and pricing policy. This work (a published book) was 
based on a comprehensive literature review and interviews of select experts in six 
EU member states (Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the 
UK). 
 
Study 4  
   
The information presented in the paper is based on a comprehensive review of 
the literature. Relevant literature was identified through searches of bibliographic 
databases (PubMed, EconLit, Scopus) and the Internet (Google Scholar and Google 
for both published and grey literature [working papers, reports, agency committee 
reports, presentations, government and legislative documents]). The paper also 
benefited from the comments from two anonymous journal referees and helpful 
feedback from the journal’s Editors. Moreover, the Commonwealth Fund provided 
valuable guidance on earlier drafts of the paper.    
 
Study 5 
 
  The information presented in the paper is based on a review of the literature. 
Relevant literature was identified through searches of bibliographic databases 
(PubMed, EconLit, Scopus) and the Internet (Google Scholar and Google for both 
published and grey literature [working papers, reports, agency committee reports, 
presentations, government and legislative documents]). The review focused on 
England, France, Germany, and Sweden. These countries were selected because 
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HTA assumes a central role in decision making in each jurisdiction, albeit to varying 
degrees. HTA bodies in England and Sweden assume the most formal (regulatory) 
role, while they are largely advisory in France and Germany. Each country also 
employs somewhat different procedures and methods for assessing new technologies, 
and the role of different stakeholders in HTA varies across jurisdictions. The 
countries also represent different models of health care systems: England 
(Beveridge), Germany and France (Bismark), and Sweden (mixed model of elements 
of Beveridge and National Health Insurance systems). Taken together, the mix of 
countries allowed for an in-depth investigation of how HTA has evolved differently 
across different health care contexts. 
 
  In addition to the literature review, the paper also benefited from the comments 
from two anonymous journal referees and helpful feedback from the journal’s guest 
Editors for that particular issue.  Moreover, select academics/policy analysts in 
Germany and France provided helpful information and document translation for 
those particular countries.   
 
  The paper also built on earlier work by the thesis author (Sorenson et al. 
2008a), which examined the role of HTA in Europe. This work (a published book) 
was based on a comprehensive literature review and interviews of select experts in 
six EU member states (Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the 
UK). 
 
Study 6  
 
  This study adopted a two-staged methodological approach. First, a literature 
review was conducted on international CED schemes. The review focused on CED 
policies in Europe and North America, namely Canada, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK, and the US. These countries represent a mix of 
health care financing systems and jurisdictions with more established and new CED 
schemes. In addition to these national CED schemes, the available literature on the 
CED approach more generally was searched. Relevant literature was identified 
through searches of bibliographic databases (PubMed, EconLit, Scopus) and the 
Internet (Google Scholar and Google for both published and grey literature [working 
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papers, reports, agency committee reports, presentations, government and legislative 
documents]). Second, semi-structured in-depth expert interviews (policy 
makers/HTA bodies, industry, and academics/policy analysts) were conducted to 
supplement the information gathered from the literature and to obtain information on 
expert experiences with and perspectives on the different national CED schemes and 
on the approach more generally.  
 
Study 7 
 
  The information presented in the paper is based on a comprehensive review of 
the literature. Relevant literature was identified through searches of academic 
databases (PubMed, EconLit, Scopus) and the Internet (Google Scholar and Google 
for both published and grey literature [working papers, reports, agency committee 
reports, presentations, government and legislative documents]). The paper also 
benefited from discussions with US and UK health policy and economics experts 
associated with the LSE-Columbia Health Policy Group, feedback on drafts of the 
paper from experts in cancer policy and CER, namely Michael Drummond, Professor 
of Health Economics, University of York, and Kalipso Chalkidou, Director, NICE 
International and Visiting Faculty, Berman Institute of Bioethics, Johns Hopkins 
University, and the comments from an anonymous journal referee.   
 
Study 8 
 
  The information presented in the paper is based on a comprehensive review of 
the literature. Relevant literature was identified through searches of bibliographic 
databases (PubMed, Scopus) and the Internet (Google Scholar and Google for both 
published and grey literature [working papers, reports, agency committee reports, 
presentations, government and legislative documents]). The paper also benefited 
from the comments from four anonymous journal referees and helpful feedback from 
the journal’s Editor.  
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SECTION I: MARKET AUTHORISATION OF HEALTH 
TECHNOLOGIES 
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Study 1: ‘Good regulation’ and public health protection in the EU: 
Evaluating the European Medicines Agency  
 
Introduction  
 
With regulation perhaps the “area of greatest EU policy output” (Broscheid and 
Cohen 2007: 346), the European Commission has increasingly turned to 
supranational agencies to govern regulatory policy making. At present, there are 30 
EU agencies operating in various policy areas. The growth of regulatory agencies is 
considered a significant development, forming part of the emergence of ‘distributed 
governance’ and an important element in a wider transformation of the EU’s 
administrative system (Chiti 2000; Egeberg 2006; Majone 1997; Trondal and 
Jeppesen 2008). In particular, agencies form a constitutive element within the so-
called ‘new modes of governance’ approach of creating and enforcing rules at the 
EU level. This approach advocates a shift away from the traditional Community 
method of regulation13 to embrace softer, more responsive and reflexive modes, with 
the incremental and consensus-generating approach of the open method of 
coordination best conforming to this ideal (Trubek and Trubeck 2005).        
 
Consequently, there has been considerable interest in and comparative research 
on the reasons underpinning the creation of agencies, their functioning, and 
implications for European governance (Barbieri and Ongaro 2008; Gehring and 
Kraphol 2006; Geradin and Petit 2004; Geradin et al 2005; Gilardi 2002; Gilardi 
2005; Kraphol 2004; Rittberger and Wonka 2011; Thatcher 2011; Vos 2000). 
Despite a growing body of evidence in this area, there remains a paucity of 
evaluative research on the performance of individual agencies. To address this gap, 
this paper evaluates the EMA14, which is responsible for licensing new medicines in 
the EU, and has two principal aims. First, the paper strives to set out a conceptual 
framework for evaluating ‘good regulation’ and, second, to apply the framework to 
the EMA. Given the EMA’s primary function in assessing marketing applications for 
                                                            
13 Where the European Commission has the exclusive right of legislative initiative and decisions are taken by the 
Council in interaction with the Parliament, all under the supranational control of the Court.  
14 The EMA, previously known as the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA), is 
also responsible for veterinary medicines, but we focus only on human medicines.  
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new medicines on the basis of efficacy and safety criteria, the analysis focuses on the 
agency’s commitment to protect public health.     
 
In meeting these aims, the paper adopts a somewhat different approach to 
evaluating regulation or regulatory agencies than pursued elsewhere in the literature. 
For instance, instead of developing and applying a set of detailed indicators or 
checklists and scorecards to measure regulatory performance (De Panizza and 
Visaggio 2006; Lee and Kirkpatrick 2006; Radaelli and De Francesco 2007; Renda 
2006) or employing an econometric analysis to address specific dimensions of 
regulatory function (Gilardi 2003; Hanretty and Koop 2012; Montoya and Trillas 
2009), the aims of this study is to apply a framework for assessing agencies around 
principles of so-called ‘good regulation’15 and one geared less towards viewing 
market efficiency as the primary performance measure. Our approach is also less 
concerned with specific outcomes than with the EMA’s overall work. Rather than 
focusing on a single aspect, such as approval guidelines, transparency or speed of 
decision making, as more descriptive work on the EMA has done to date16, the study 
evaluates the agency’s operations in practice against its stated objectives.   
 
The paper first considers the creation and regulatory objectives of the EMA. 
The subsequent section provides the conceptual foundation for the analysis, which 
involves extrapolating key themes from existing work on ‘good regulation’ and 
‘good governance’ in developing an evaluative framework. The framework is then 
applied to the EMA and the paper closes with potential policy learnings and 
implications for the agency and pharmaceutical regulation more generally.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
15 Wider debates on the different types of regulation are excluded, such as private versus public interest 
regulation, economic and social regulation, or self-regulation and de-regulation. 
16 The EMA was subject to an audit/review by an independent consulting firm in 2000. Based on interviews with 
stakeholders, this evaluation was limited mainly to the agency’s authorisation procedures and telematics. The 
report did, however, provide the basis for new regulation.  (Internal Audit Service (2009) Final Audit Report on 
Selected Administrative Procedures Supporting the Provision of Scientific Evaluation of Human Medicines in the 
European Medicines Agency, April 30”).  
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The EMA and public health protection 
 
  While the rich history underpinning the development and scope of EU public 
health competences17 cannot be reviewed in full here, it is worth highlighting several 
important milestones that contributed to the emergence of health protection as an 
area for agency authority and the creation of the EMA in particular. First, in the 
aftermath of the thalidomide tragedy, the European Community instituted the first 
legislation in the area of pharmaceuticals in 1965. Directive 65/65/EEC defined a 
medicinal product within the European market context and stipulated rules regarding 
the development and manufacture of medicines in the Community, along with initial 
guidelines for post-market monitoring. Importantly, it established safety and efficacy 
as the sole grounds for marketing approval, which still applies today. A second 
milestone was the 1975 establishment of a ‘mutual recognition’ procedure and the 
Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP)18, which aimed to speed up 
marketing applications for new medicines and to alleviate the burden of applications 
being made separately to each national authority. In particular, the committee was to 
act as the single authorisation and arbitration body for the community market. 
However, these procedures were not wholly successful in practice, as member states 
and the industry leaned toward continued use of the traditional national route for a 
variety of reasons (e.g. less cumbersome). Another attempt was made in 1986 
through introduction of the Single European Act (SEA) and through the 
‘concertation’ procedure19, in particular, to speed up the authorisation process. More 
broadly, the SEA effectively established the legal basis for the single market to take 
consumer health protection requirements into consideration, which was further 
supported by several subsequent Community developments (e.g. treaties and 
European Court of Justice rulings)20. Additional legislation pertaining to good 
                                                            
17 See M. McKee, T. Hervey, and A. Gilmore, ‘Public heath policies’, in E. Mossialos, G. Permanand, R. Baeten, 
and T. Hervey, Health Systems Governance in Europe: The Role of EU Law and Policy (Cambridge University 
Press 2010) and G. Permanand, EU Pharmaceutical Regulation: The Politics of Policy-Making (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press 2006) for a more detailed history of European medicines regulation.   
18 Council Directive 75/318/EEC , OJ 1975 No. L147/1 and 75/319/EEC, OJ 1975 No. L147/13, respectively.  
19 Council Directive 87/22/EEC, OJ 1987 No. L15/38. 
20 For further details on these developments, see, for instance, G. Permanand and E. Vos, ‘EU regulatory agencies 
and health protection’, in E. Mossialos, G. Permanand, R. Baeten, and T. Hervey, Health Systems Governance in 
Europe: The Role of EU Law and Policy (Cambridge University Press 2010); M. McKee and E. Mossialos, 
‘Heath policy and European law: closing the gaps’, Public Health (2006) 120: 16-20; T. Hervey, ‘EU law and 
national health: problem or opportunity?’, Health Economics, Policy and Law (2007) 2: 1-6.   
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manufacturing practice, labelling, patent protection, advertising and sales promotion, 
and wholesale distribution all followed within this free movement context21.      
 
   The aforementioned events led to legislation in 1993 that established the 
European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (now the EMA). The 
EMA’s creation was driven largely by the European Commission, along with 
informal networks of scientists; neither industry nor the member states were initially 
interested in a pan-European medicines licensing body. However, the then 
Directorate General for Industrial Affairs, now DG Enterprise and Industry, began 
championing the idea in the late 1980s. In particular, an agency was seen as a means 
to facilitate implementation of the SEA. Following several years of negotiation with 
European governments, the EMA opened in 1995 and subsumed the CPMP22. The 
Agency operates as a decentralised scientific agency and its principal responsibility 
is to evaluate all applications for marketing authorisation for new medicines23 in the 
EU. It also monitors centrally-authorised products24 and national referrals, develops 
technical guidance, and provides scientific advice to sponsors. With national 
medicines agencies (e.g. Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency, 
MHRA, in the UK) directly involved in EMA’s processes, as further discussed 
below, the regulation of medicines remains a joint EU-member state competence. 
Such an arrangement reflects a ‘hub and spoke’ model of regulation (Groenleer 
2009).       
  
                                                            
21 Commission Directive 91/356/EEC outlines the principles and guidelines of good manufacturing practice for 
medical products for human use, OJ 1991 No. L193/30; Council Directive 92/27/EEC on the labelling of 
medicinal products for human use and on package leaflets, OJ 1992 No. L113/8; Council Regulation 
1768/92/EEC concerning the creating of a supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products, OJ 1992 
No. L182/1; Council Directive 92/26/EEC concerning the classification of the supply of medicinal products for 
human use, OJ 1992 No. L113/5; Council Directive 92/25/EEC on the wholesale distribution of medical products 
for human use, OJ 1992 No. L113/1. Further, see L. Hancher, Regulating for competition, government, law, and 
the pharmaceutical industry in the United Kingdom and France (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1990); L. Hancher, 
‘The European pharmaceutical market: problems of partial harmonization’, European Law Review 15 (1990): 9-
33; and, L. Hancher, ‘Creating the internal market for pharmaceutical medicines – an Echternach jumping 
procession?’, Common Market Law Review 28 (1991): 821-853.  
22 The CPMP, however, was transformed as a core scientific advising committee within the EMA. 
23 Includes medicinal products for human and veterinary use, including biologics and advanced therapies, and 
herbal medicinal products. 
24 Pharmacovigilance is part of the agency’s mandate and, since 2005, it has maintained public access to the 
‘Eudravigilance’ database, which is a network and management system for reporting and evaluating suspected 
adverse reactions during the development and post-approval phases of medicines. Accurate and timely 
communication of emerging data on risk is considered an essential part of the agency’s pharmacovigilance 
program, with risk education, risk management, and risk minimisation activities being essential components. 
Such activities include use of risk management plans, Summaries of Product Characteristics (SmPCs), Patient 
Information Leaflets (PILs), patient alert cards, and periodic safety update reports (PSURs). In addition, the EMA 
also operates a Europe-wide clinical trials database to monitor adverse events and other relevant study outcomes.    
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Along with its establishment came a revamp of the earlier Community 
approval procedures, resulting in either a centralised or decentralised procedure to 
drug authorisation. The former represents the mandatory application route for certain 
products, namely biotechnology-derived products (including biosimilars), orphan 
drugs, and medicines for the treatment of HIV/AIDS, cancer, diabetes, 
neurodegenerative disorders, and, as of mid-2008, auto-immune and viral diseases. 
The centralised procedure is also open (voluntary) to products containing a new 
active substance not previously authorised in the EU and those that constitute a 
significant therapeutic, scientific or technical innovation or in cases where 
authorisation is in the interest of patients at the Community level25 (EMA 2007b). 
Review of submitted applications is carried out by one of several committees26, 
although the actual assessment work is undertaken by two national medicines 
agencies (‘rapporteurs’) working independently of one another, but under the 
oversight of the relevant committee. Following the committee opinion, the European 
Commission then issues a formal EU-wide decision, which is binding across member 
states. Alternatively, the decentralised procedure or ‘mutual recognition’ procedure, 
involves one member state granting a product a license, after which it can obtain 
authorisation in other countries without the need for separate national applications. 
This is the process for conventional products and allows member states to put forth a 
formal objection27. Should a manufacturer seek to launch a product in only one 
member state, the application is simply made to the national agency concerned, and 
the EMA is not involved except to arbitrate in cases of dispute. Both the centralised 
and decentralised routes have a 210-day turnaround period from submission of 
application to an EMA opinion, which was instituted to facilitate the availability of 
new medicines in the EU.  
 
Compared to other EU agencies, the EMA assumes a unique role in the 
Community. First, determining which medicines meet the standards of efficacy, 
                                                            
25 To determine whether a product is innovative, the EMA considers if a new medicine a) provides a new 
treatment alternative to patients, b) is based on significant new scientific knowledge or on the application thereof, 
or c) was developed using a new technology or application of a technology. Even if a medicine does not 
constitute a significant innovation as defined, it may be of patient interest at the Community level if it addresses a 
particular health need, allows access to medicines, or provides another type of contribution to patient care in the 
Community. 
26 Committees include the Committee for Medicinal Products (CHMP), Committee for Orphan Medicinal 
Products (COMP), a Committee on Herbal Medicinal Products (HMPC) and, since 2007, a Paediatric Committee 
(PDCO).  
27 Member States may object and appeal on public health grounds, and the EMA has a protocol in place to 
consider such instances. 
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safety, and quality for EU market approval28 requires a high degree of expertise and 
responsibility. This extends to the agency’s post-market surveillance activities of 
already approved medicines, which requires the knowledge and proficiency to 
identify and evaluate adverse events and the authority to issue opinions on any 
changes to initial licensing agreements (e.g. recall or withdrawal of a medicine from 
the market). As these functions have immediate and long-term public health 
protection implications, these decisions carry considerable weight. This is heightened 
by the fact that the European Commission lacks the expertise and capacity to verify 
the agency’s recommendations. The EMA’s role, therefore, goes beyond simply 
influencing or informing the commission’s decision making. It essentially instructs 
the commission on the decisions it should take; EMA opinions are frequently given 
to the commission as ready-to-deliver documents. Second, in keeping with the 
commission’s interest in supporting the European pharmaceutical industry29, the 
agency also serves as an agent of EU industrial policy. This has been a stated 
objective of the agency since 2004 (EMA 2004). Taken together, these various 
functions reflect a quasi-regulatory role for the EMA, and one that differentiates it 
from the more informational or guideline (advisory) roles of the other EU agencies 
and the regulatory powers of the FDA in the US30. It is this role that we aim to 
evaluate the EMA, bearing in mind the overarching objective to protect public 
health. The following section establishes the parameters of our analysis and outlines 
our evaluative framework.  
 
Toward a framework of ‘good regulation’ 
 
 If ‘good regulation’ is to be pursued, it is essential to measure both the quality 
and performance of regulatory tools, policies, and the institutions that wield them. 
However, this is a challenging exercise for a number of reasons. First and 
                                                            
28These duties were laid down in 1965 in the first European Community legislation aimed solely at 
pharmaceuticals (Council Directive 65/65/EEC, OJ 1965 No. L22/369), and they remained the criteria against 
which all new medicines are assessed before being granted marketing authorisation.   
29There have been numerous initiatives to support industry, including the establishment of the EU Pharmaceutical 
Forum (http://ec.europa.eu/pharmaforum) and the Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI).   
30The FDA carries similar oversight responsibilities as the EMA, although more expansive as the former also 
regulates medical devices, food stuffs, veterinary products, and cosmetics. However, the FDA holds greater 
executive regulatory power than the EMA, in large part due to the political and institutional constraints 
surrounding the comparative roles and interests of the European Commission and the member states in the EU 
polity. This relates to the imbalance or constitutional asymmetry between the Commission’s economic and social 
policy competencies, and has been shown to have had an effect on the EMA’s mandate and wider EU regime for 
pharmaceutical regulation. See G. Permanand and E. Mossialos (2005). Constitutional asymmetry and 
pharmaceutical policy making in the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy, 12: 687-709.   
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fundamentally, deriving at a consensus on the definition of ‘regulation’ is difficult. 
As Baldwin et al. (2011: pg. 2) note “there is no single agreed meaning of the term 
[regulation], but rather a variety of definitions in usage that are not reducible to some 
platonic essence or single concept”. This relates to a second challenge. Radaelli and 
De Francesco (2007: 83) highlight that “...the concept of regulatory quality is 
prismatic”, and they rightly question whether there is sufficient agreement on what 
constitutes good regulation and its use in different institutional settings. Indeed, 
conceptions of quality are likely to vary according to audience constituency, market 
position, or even discipline (Weatherill 2007). This is often due to divergent 
weightings of the various criteria underpinning good regulation. In the case of 
pharmaceuticals, for example, economists and policy makers may stress the pursuit 
of efficiency, citizens and politicians may emphasize the importance of 
accountability, transparency, and other process measures, and industry may place 
value on international competitiveness, predictability, or potential for market access 
or growth. Consequently, defining (and indeed measuring) good regulation in all 
cases is not possible. Nonetheless, it remains important that we seek to develop 
frameworks that can transcend multiple jurisdictions, sectors, institutional settings, 
and affected actors. To meet this aim, scholars and practitioners alike have produced 
a notable body of literature evaluating regulation at various levels, offering a 
diversity of concepts, ideas, and understandings. While a review of the literature is 
beyond the scope of this paper, major themes from several streams of research that 
are relevant to the analysis are considered and drawn upon to develop the framework.       
 
Academic approaches31 to good regulation tend to be theoretical and less 
prescriptive in relation to the pursuit of specific outcomes than practical or empirical 
designs. The economics literature is focused largely on (economic) efficiency32 and 
high productivity (via encouraging investment and innovation) as the primary 
indicators of performance, especially when examining public service sectors (e.g. 
utilities, transportation) (Cubbin and Stern, 2004; den Hertog 2010; Fink et al. 2003; 
Peltzman 1989).  Alternatively, the literature from political theorists and empirical-
oriented political scientists emphasise the importance of achieving and furthering 
                                                            
31 The academic literature on good regulation covers a range of disciplines. Here, the focus is principally on the 
economic and political science literatures; other disciplines of inquiry include philosophy, socio-legal studies, and 
organisational studies.  
32 Namely, that regulation is good if it is efficient in the sense that it maximises wealth. 
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accountability, transparency, legitimacy, and other procedural-oriented values (e.g. 
responsibility, control, openness, predictability, and responsiveness) (Black 2008; 
Johannsen et al. 2004; Majone 2001; Mulgan 2000; Scharpf 1999; Stern 1997; 
Powell and DiMaggio 1991).   
 
Taking into consideration both economic and political science perspectives, 
Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge (2012) put forth the most comprehensive framework 
based on five ‘tests’ of good regulation and oriented toward “...those arguments that 
have a general currency when regulatory arrangements and performance are 
discussed in the public domain” (26). Such tests or criteria aim to transcend the 
biases of using efficiency (or any other one indictor) as a single measuring rod or 
justification for regulation. Moreover, the five tests are applicable to both the 
instruments of regulation and the regulatory authorities for executing them.  
 
The first test, legislative mandate, judges regulators according to their success 
in achieving their mandates as authorised by Parliament. This presumes a public 
interest outcome to be served, and success requires that the regulator demonstrate 
achievement of its mandate(s), which allows for claims of public support. Further 
claims for support or legitimacy can be further made when the second test – formal 
accountability to democratic institutions – is achieved. The third test, due process, 
necessitates transparent and accessible processes. Here, the focus in on openness, 
fairness, and consistency of treatment, as well as the levels of participation regulators 
afford the public, consumers, and other affected parties. Due process effectively 
ensures proper democratic influence over regulation, thereby exercising a 
legitimising effect and securing public trust. Among other things, in practice this 
involves a strong ‘reason giving’ function - making decision and dissenting views 
available, delivering timely responses, granting access to documentation, and 
involving a wide range stakeholders in various levels of regulation. Fourth, 
regulators are expected to have sufficient expertise to exercise judgement in a way 
acceptable to the public. This is particularly the case in situations where the decision 
maker has to consider a range of competing options or values and arrive at a 
balanced judgement on incomplete or shifting evidence. Finally, the regulator must 
be efficient. Claims to this test involve both productive efficiency and efficient 
regulatory outcomes. The former reflects whether a legislative mandate is 
  
74 
 
implemented at the least possible level of inputs or costs. The latter encapsulates 
whether the regulation under examination leads to results that are efficient33, which 
unlike productive efficiency, is judged with a degree of independence from the 
mandate itself.       
 
Majone (1996: 300) offers a similar view to Baldwin et al. (2012), where 
regulatory agencies require a combination of ‘control mechanisms’ to ensure their 
legitimacy, which he identifies as: “...clear and limited statutory objectives to 
provide unambiguous performance standards; reason-giving and transparency 
requirements to facilitate judicial review and public participation; due process 
provisions to ensure fairness among the inevitable winners and losers from 
regulatory decisions; and, professionalism to withstand external interference and 
reduce the risk of an arbitrary use of agency discretion”. 
 
In parallel with academics, international bodies and intergovernmental 
organisations concerned with regulation at various levels, in particular the OECD 
and the World Bank, have published practical guidelines, typically employing 
scorecard approaches on regulatory reform, what constitutes good regulation, and 
what impact it may have in practice34. Much of this work is concerned with 
economic regulation, often focusing on individual sectors or on issues associated 
with deregulation. As these guidelines are generally underpinned by an interest in 
promoting good regulation, via a better economic environment, we can identify 
several common features. Such elements include that any regulation 1) have a strong 
legal basis (regulators must be independent), 2) be clear and feasible to implement, 
3) bring a net benefit, and 4) is efficient. These dimensions are echoed in various 
national level guidelines, with notable examples including the work of the Australian 
Office of Regulation Review (AORR 1998), the Council of Australian Governments 
(2007), the United Kingdom’s Better Regulation Task Force (BRTF 2000)35, and the 
External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation to the Canadian Government 
(CEACSM 2004). Again, these are largely economic focused, but in being issued by 
                                                            
33 Outcome efficiency can be judged across two measures: allocative efficiency (whether it is possible to 
redistribute goods to increase the benefits to or welfare of any one consumer without making another consumer 
worse off) and dynamic efficiency (whether there is encouragement of desirable process and product innovation, 
and whether the system produces flexible responses to changes to demand).  
34 See Jaramillo 2013; Kaufmann et al. 1999, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2009; and, OECD 1997, 2005.  
35 See also the Regulatory Impact Unit’s work on the effective undertaking of regulatory impact assessments 
(RIU, 2003). 
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elected governments, they do take wider social concerns into account. This is also 
true of related guidance put forward at the European level. For example, the 
Mandelkern Report on Better Regulation (COM 2001a) served as a basis for drawing 
the Better Regulation Policy in the EU. In parallel, the 2001 White Paper (COM 
2001b) on European governance36 outlined five principles – openness, participation, 
accountability, effectiveness and coherence – aimed at engendering and maintaining 
trust in the way the EU governs. These principles are particularly important for those 
agencies whose remit carries direct social policy impacts.  
 
The aforementioned publications were followed by several European 
Commission documents aimed at improving regulation in Europe, including 
proposals to simplify the EU regulatory environment (COM 2002; COM 2003) and 
several strategic reviews of the Better Regulation policy (COM 2006; COM 2008; 
COM 2009). In 2010, the commission shifted focus from “better regulation” to 
“smart regulation” (COM 2010a). Influenced by an emphasis on “smart, sustainable, 
and inclusive” growth set by the Europe 2020 strategy (COM 2010b), the Smart 
Regulation policy sought to place greater attention on the whole policy cycle – from 
design to implementation to enforcement to evaluation and revision. In particular, the 
policy focused on the importance of proper implementation and modification in light 
of experience to ensure that existing regulatory frameworks and policies are “fit for 
purpose”. It also outlined the need to enhance collaboration between EU institutions 
and member states and to make greater strides to open policy making to citizens and 
other stakeholders. Such objectives extended many of the aims of the Better 
Regulation agenda and aligned with the concepts of “responsive regulation” 
(Braithwaite 2006; Neilsen and Parker 2009; Ojo 2009), “risk-based regulation” 
(Baldwin and Black 2007), and “really responsive regulation” (Baldwin and Black 
2007; Black 2008). Heavily influenced by the global economic crisis, the Smart 
Regulation policy has since been bolstered by the introduction of the commission’s 
Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme in 2012. The programme aims to 
reduce regulatory burden and streamline regulatory administration by identifying 
                                                            
36 Although distinct concepts, good regulation can be seen as an element or exercise of good governance, with 
similar criteria and principles applicable to both constructs. The OECD (2001) and Kaufmann et al. (2002) have 
both set out criteria of good governance, and then specifically linked them to regulatory agencies. Moreover, as 
much work on European integration considers regulation as the hallmark of the EU in terms of a sui generis form 
of governance (see Eberlein and Kerwer 2002; Majone 1996), the two concepts can be linked together in this 
context. 
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burdens, gaps, and ineffective measures, especially in terms of how EU legislation is 
implemented at the national and sub-national level (COM 2012a).  
 
The framework principally draws upon Baldwin and colleagues’ approach, and 
is bolstered with elements from the practitioner-oriented guidelines outlined above. 
While the former represents objective dimensions for assessing regulatory 
performance, it is largely indicative. As such, the latter substantiated criteria are 
therefore considered complementary to Baldwin et al.’s more overarching conceptual 
principles. Together, they help form a framework that encompasses both theoretical 
and empirical considerations for assessing regulatory performance. Table 4 outlines 
the integrated framework. In addition to the five tests indicated in Baldwin et al.’s 
framework, an additional criterion was added. In attempts to remain sensitive to the 
economic perspective given the EMA’s two-part role, we endorse the differentiation 
made by the Canadian government between effectiveness and cost-efficiency. This 
allows a separation between regulatory efficiency and regulatory effectiveness, with 
the latter focused on the delivery of policy results as opposed to questions of cost and 
allocative efficiencies.  
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Table 4: Criteria of ‘good regulation’: An evaluative framework 
Mandate (External) Accountability Due Process Expertise & Impartiality Effectiveness Cost-Efficiency 
Authorised legislative mandate 
to claim public support (1)(2) 
Answerable to elected body 
representing the public 
(‘democratically responsive’) 
(1)(2) 
Fairness, openness , 
transparency, inclusion of 
relevant stakeholders 
(1)(7)(8)(9) 
‘Sufficient’ expertise in order to 
secure public support for 
exercise of discretion (1)(2) 
Delivering intended results 
(1)(2)(4) or policy objectives, 
as based on standards and 
targets (6)(7)(8) 
Costs and savings 
generated (1)(2) where 
benefits justify costs (4) 
Able to balance and ensure independence and accountability (3)(4) 
Promote innovation through 
incentives and goal-based 
approaches (4) 
Minimise costs and market 
distortions (4) 
Sound legal basis (4) and 
regulatory backing (authority) 
(5) 
Able to justify decisions and be 
subject to public scrutiny 
(5)(7)(8)(9) 
Ensure fairness amongst 
inevitable winners and losers 
(3) 
Professionalism to withstand 
external interference and reduce 
arbitrary use of discretion (3) 
Better than alternatives (6) 
Understanding cumulative 
impact of policies (risk 
and problem awareness) 
and avoiding duplication 
and overlap (8) 
Stated regulatory objectives (5) 
which are better than 
alternatives (6) 
Subject to adjustment (6)a  
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Proportionality (7)(9) and 
necessity (8) 
Subject to appraisal by independent bodies (6) or other external scrutiny (6)(9) in order to avoid 
‘regulatory capture’ (4)  
Takes account of the cultures 
and understanding that operate 
within regulated bodies; 
responds to constraints and 
opportunities presented by 
institutional environments 
within which regulator acts; 
responsiveness to the logics of 
different regulatory tools and 
strategies; performance 
awareness and modification; 
adaption to change (10)b 
Timelines (8) 
Consistency with other 
(national and international) 
regulations/law/policies 
(5)(6)(7) and, in the EU, 
respecting subsidiarity(9) 
‘Reason-giving’ and transparency to facilitate judicial review and 
participation (1)(2)(3) 
Robust to errors (6)  
Based on verifiable 
performance criteria (4)(6) 
 Clear and practical for users (4) Evidence-based decision making (8)c 
Enforceable (6)  
Improving internal management 
and serving stakeholders (2) 
 
Sources: Authors’ compilation based on: (1) Baldwin and Cave 1999; (2) Baldwin et al. 2012; (3) Majone 1996; (4) OECD 1997, 2003; (5) Kaufmann et al.1999, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2009; (6) Australian 
Office of Regulation Review 1998; (7) UK Better Regulation Task Force 2000; (8) Canadian External Advisory Committee 2004; (9) Mandelkern Report, European Commission 2001a; (10) Baldwin and 
Black 2007.   
a This is potentially limited by the mandate. 
b Some of these issues also related to accountability.  
c The Canadian Report considers evidence-based decision making as an element of the ‘effectiveness’ criterion, but we consider it applicable also to the requirements of ‘expertise’ and ‘cost-efficiency’.  
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Before applying the framework to the EMA, it is important to acknowledge 
potential criticisms with this approach, mainly related to the fact that some of the 
criteria are over-lapping and in parallel may be difficult to measure. Indeed, Table 1 
does suggest the potential for overlap in several areas, which are listed across 
multiple columns even where the initial source may only be applicable in one area. 
The potential for overlap, however, is not necessarily a weakness. Lodge (2004), for 
instance, argues that traditional discussions of accountability and transparency (as 
represented in the due process test) are inherent across the regulatory process and 
therefore should not be seen as separate dimensions of regulatory performance. A 
related concern may be that the individual criteria involve some level of trade-off, in 
particular between accountability and independence. Nevertheless, as any trade-off is 
context or case-specific and reflects the role played by the individual regulator, it 
becomes useful in assessing a given agency’s position. Finally, there are challenges 
to measuring the various criteria. For instance, it can be difficult to precisely state 
and measure what fulfilling a mandate(s) entails, as most regulatory statues grant 
regulators broad discretions and scope for exercising expertise and judgement in 
taking regulatory action. This can, in turn, also pose barriers to measuring 
effectiveness and efficiency. We deem the aforementioned points valid without being 
restrictive and, thus, consider them throughout our discussion. Therefore, we do not 
claim our framework to be definitive or without potential methodological caveats. 
However, it does encompass the main elements of good regulation relevant to 
evaluating a regulatory agency. The following section turns to this aim, where the 
outlined framework is applied to the EMA. 
 
Evaluating the EMA 
 
Legislative mandate 
 
  Table 3 demonstrates that a legitimate mandate and its various dimensions is 
perhaps the most widely-shared criterion of good regulation. While there are 
numerous facets to this test, they are all aimed at ensuring a clear, appropriate and 
(legislatively) authorised remit. Regulation 2309/93 committed the newly-established 
EMA to “protect public health and users of medicinal products” via an improved 
approval process for new medicines. To meet this objective, evaluations were 
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intended to meet specific criteria for marketing authorisation37 and be more 
expedient and less contestable than the earlier mutual recognition and multi-state 
procedures.  
 
  Although the EMA’s principal remit has not changed substantively since the 
founding legislation, the agency’s mission statement has undergone several revisions 
over the years, expanding the EMA’s objectives and becoming more specific over 
time. Moreover, starting in the early 2000s, greater emphasis was placed on the need 
to develop and ensure efficient and transparent review procedures, support the 
competitiveness of the European pharmaceutical industry, and employ 
pharmacovigilance activities to safeguard patient safety, which have been outlined in 
‘guiding principles’ in support of the EMA’s mission38. In the last five years, 
additional focus has been placed on stakeholder engagement in the EMA’s work and 
involvement in international regulatory standard setting and harmonisation (EMA 
2010c). At present, the agency’s statement, in respect to its main function, reads:  
 
The mission of the European Medicines Agency is to foster scientific excellence in 
the evaluation and supervision of medicines, for the benefit of public and  
animal health. 
 
  Evaluation of the agency’s mission and associated objectives (and their 
evolution over the years) raises a number of issues. First, it is not clear that working 
to “benefit public health” is the agency’s main function in practice. Even on paper, 
the language is vague and inconclusive as to the centrality of this particular function; 
as currently written, it reads as more of a by-product of the agency’s activities. To 
illustrate this point, the FDA’s statement39 is much more focused and, indeed, 
clearer:           
                                                            
37Council Directive 65/65/EEC on the approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative 
action relating to propriety medicinal products, OJ 1965 No. L22/369. 
38 In support of the mission statement, the EMA recently accompanied the mission statement with  several key 
‘guiding principles’, including: “we are strongly committed to public and animal health”; “we made independent 
recommendations based on scientific evidence, using state of the art knowledge and expertise in our field”; “we 
support research and innovation to stimulate the development of better medicines”; “we value the contribution of 
our partners and stakeholders to our work”; “we assure continual improvements of our processes and procedures, 
in accordance with recognised quality standards”; “we adhere to high standards of professional and personal 
integrity”; “we communicate in an open, transparent manner with all of our partners, stakeholders and 
colleagues”; and, “we promote the well-being, motivation and ongoing professional development of every 
member of the agency”.   
39Statement abridged in respect of medicinal products.   
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The FDA is responsible for public health by assuring the safety, efficacy and security 
of human drugs... The FDA is also responsible for advancing the public health by 
helping to speed innovations that make medicines more effective, safer, and more 
affordable; helping the public get the accurate, science-based information they need 
to use medicines to improve their health; and, fostering development of medical 
products that respond to deliberate and naturally emerging public health threats. 
 
  Secondly, and more specifically, compared to the member states’ own 
medicines agencies, the EMA’s competencies appear more geared towards 
accelerating approvals as an end in itself (Lewis and Abraham 2001). To this end, the 
CHMP has a Scientific Advice Review Group, which provides applicants with 
scientific advice up to six years in advance of the submission of an application and to 
help in the presentation of supporting documentation towards achieving a positive 
opinion (so-called ‘protocol assistance’)40. Such remit has historically gone beyond 
the support offered by the FDA, although the agency has strengthened it cooperation 
with industry in recent years, following urging from industry, patient groups, and 
other stakeholders for a faster and more predictable regulatory process. Currently, the 
FDA provides guidance to industry regarding what evidence (e.g. trial design, 
effects, etc.) they recommend to assure approval. This is particularly the case for 
priority drugs meeting unmet medical needs and “breakthrough” therapies.              
                                                                                                                                                                
  There have a been calls (mostly from industry and, to some extent, at the 
Commission level) for the EMA’s cooperation with industry to be similarly 
strengthened, most notably in terms of streamlining regulatory processes and 
providing greater certainty for manufacturers regarding development issues in 
particular therapeutic and technology areas. While such calls may neglect the EMA’s 
limited resources and capacity, they also seem to ignore a perhaps more fundamental 
issue as to whether this should in fact be the role of a medicines agency in the first 
instance.      
 
                                                            
40As noted by Garattini and Bertele (2004), this is an irregular arrangement, as the CHMP decides on 
applications, acts as arbiter in disputes and where companies might appeal a decision, and provides advance help 
to the industry on pre-clinical drug development issues.  
  
82 
 
  Nonetheless, this strong industry-supporting role was designed as an integral 
aspect of the agency from the outset. Public health interests were secondary to 
industrial policy and single market concerns throughout the policy process leading to 
Regulation 2309/93, where stakeholders representing the consumer or patient 
perspective were generally excluded from discussions, and suggested amendments 
from Community institutions, including members of the European Parliament and the 
Economic and Social Committee41, were often ignored by the European Commission 
in drafting its proposals (Permanand 2006).  By comparison, the member states and 
industry were directly consulted and involved in developing the final model. It was 
also the internal market council of ministers rather than health ministers that 
discussed and approved the final legislation. Even before it commenced operations, 
the EMA was attacked by consumer and interest groups as operating as an industry-
serving body (Orzack 1996). In particular, the agency was criticised for having a 
skewed mandate focused on accelerating market access rather than on ensuring more 
stringent approvals. This has also raised questions about the agency’s ability to 
adequately balance and ensure independence and accountability.  
 
  The lack of clarity in the mandate makes it difficult to discern whether the 
EMA’s stated principal objective is better than an alternative aim(s), which is another 
element in fulfilling the mandate criterion. To that end, the vagueness of the mission 
puts into question whether the agency is working towards important and verifiable 
performance criteria, especially those that are particular to and appropriate for public 
health protection. For example, although the various committees work to strict 
timelines for the completion of evaluations and decisions are required to be reached 
within 210 days, these are primarily speed of turnover targets aimed at facilitating 
the timely availability of new therapies. While such targets may indeed have an 
indirect impact on public health protection by ensuring patient access to needed 
beneficial new therapies, the primary impetus for accelerated review processes is 
more focused on the agency’s role in cooperating with manufacturers and 
safeguarding innovation than that of public health protection.  
   
                                                            
41The Economic and Social Committee is the assembly of European ‘social and economic partners’ and is granted 
a reading of proposed legislation. Its role is consultative and its opinions and proposals are not binding.   
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      Legislation in 2005 sought to improve on the EMA’s initial 10 years of work 
(EMA 2005). However, the agency’s mandate and the authority it has to exercise it 
were largely left unaltered. Insofar as the commission and industry equated quicker 
approvals and innovation-spurring intellectual property rights with public health 
protection, there were important new provisions on shortening approval times for 
more innovative therapies42 or in the case of public health emergencies, and for 
lengthening periods of data protection. There were limited public health provisions 
included of equal weight. Nevertheless, the new regulation did influence some 
important changes aimed at improving the agency’s public health role, many of 
which were insisted upon by the European Parliament.43  These included better 
packaging and leaflet labelling44, allowance of conditional marketing authorisations, 
and increased funding for pharmacovigilance activities. Additionally, a 
‘compassionate use’ clause was introduced, which enabled a provisional license to be 
granted via the centralised procedure for drugs treating chronic or debilitating disease 
and for which no viable treatment alternative exists. 
 
  In 2008, the European Commission published a major policy document on 
medicines, “Safe, Innovative and Accessible Medicines: A Renewed Vision for the 
Pharmaceutical Sector” (COM 2008). As intimated by the title, most of the proposals 
focused on facilitating a strong single market in Europe and enhancing the 
competitiveness of the pharmaceutical industry, rather than on public health. 
However, the document did emphasise the need to strengthen the EU framework on 
monitoring patient safety to decrease the number of medication errors and to provide 
patients with reliable and objective information on available medicines to aid 
decisions regarding their treatment.  
 
  As a continuation of the longer-term strategy introduced in 2005, the agency 
published a ‘Road Map to 2015’ document, which outlined its key strategic 
objectives over the next five years (EMA 2011a). In previous years, the EMA’s 
responsibilities expanded as a result of access to the centralised procedures for both 
                                                            
42 Although, as noted, there is not a clear definition of what constitutes an innovative advance. 
43 It is worth noting that Regulation726/2004 was approved via the Community’s co-decision procedure, under 
which the Parliament and Council adopt proposals jointly, and where Parliament can, in extenuating 
circumstances, exercise a veto. Co-decision did not exist when Regulation 2309/93 was passed, and the 
Commission was therefore able to push through its proposals via the internal market council.  
44 Included the use of Braille and the International Non-Proprietary Name (INN), a unique, global designation 
used to identify a pharmaceutical substance or active pharmaceutical ingredient.   
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generic/biosimilar and non-prescription medicines, in addition to legislation in the 
fields of paediatric and advanced therapy medicinal products. Recent EU legislation 
on pharmacovigilance and falsified medicines has further increased the agency’s 
coordinating role in the international pharmaceutical arena, especially with regards to 
patient safety. Some of these changes have increased the involvement of the EMA in 
public health protection. Accordingly, compared to the 2005 strategy, the 2015 road 
map document assumes a greater public health orientation, with two of the main 
strategic areas focused on addressing unmet public health need and optimising the 
rational and safe use of medicines. The first aim, in particular, focuses on stimulating 
medicines development in the areas of unmet medical needs and neglected and rare 
diseases (e.g. antibiotics) and more proactively preparing for and reacting to public 
health threats, namely global pandemics. Regarding the latter aim, the agency 
expressed a clear commitment to further strengthen post-market regulation by 
requesting sponsors to prospectively collect real-world data and strengthen synergies 
with the FDA’s post-market surveillance Sentinel Initiative. In parallel, under a new 
legal basis granted by the pharmacovigilance legislation, the EMA can now require 
post-market studies. 
 
  One longstanding issue is the lack of requirement that new drugs demonstrate 
relative efficacy or benefit compared to similar products on the market. One 
consequence is that regulators and payers, while both aiming to avail medicines that 
contribute to public health, currently apply different approaches. Payers or HTA 
bodies, for example, require evidence on the comparative therapeutic benefit and 
costs of new medicines, where such information is used to support coverage, 
reimbursement and, sometimes, pricing decisions. Attaining this evidence, however, 
is made more difficult as a result of the type of evidence (i.e. efficacy of product 
alone) required by EMA and other licensing agencies. While the 2015 road map plan 
does not change the agency’s position on requiring relative efficacy evidence for new 
medicines, it does acknowledge that it has a role to play in fostering closer 
interaction between both parties of the health care system, mainly through improving 
the information provided in the European Public Assessment Reports (EPARs) and 
engaging with HTA agencies in the early stages of drug development to provide joint 
scientific advice and debate evidence requirements.           
 
  
85 
 
  Indeed, recent legislative developments and the growing complexity of new 
medicines have pushed the EMA toward greater focus on its public health function, 
at least in principle. This orientation is partly reflected in the recent addition of 
supporting ‘principals’ to its mission statement, which among them includes a 
statement that the agency is “strongly committed to public and animal health”. 
Whether or not the agency will effectively achieve these objectives is yet to be seen, 
especially in light of historical performance, where industrial objectives have often 
superseded the EMA’s public health protection responsibilities. Although DG Sanco, 
the European Commission unit responsible for health and social affairs, assumed 
responsibility for the EMA in 2009, the influence of meeting industrial policy 
objectives is well engrained within the agency’s orientation and operations. In order 
for the agency’s legislative mandate to be properly authorised in the manner that the 
framework implies, it must also have competencies to represent those that its 
mandate impacts. Given the EMA’s two-part role, it should therefore have relative 
capabilities in both industrial and public health policy. This raises questions 
regarding for whom the agency is and ought to be answerable to, and leads to 
discussion of the second evaluative criteria, the issue of accountability.  
 
Accountability 
 
  As Table 3 indicates, accountability also features highly in conceptions of good 
regulation, including in the European Commission’s own guidelines. According to 
the White Paper on good governance, accountability is a ‘political principle’, which 
is important for establishing ‘democratic governance’. It further states that 
“....regulatory agencies must be accountable to institutions, operators concerned, and 
more generally the public” (COM 2001b: 10). Baldwin et al. (2012) argue that a 
regulator must be ‘democratically responsive’ to a body that is ‘properly 
representative’, in terms of the public trust. In other words, an agency must be 
answerable to an external authority in which the public has confidence. However, 
accountability is, in general, a contentious subject in the supra-national context. The 
unelected nature of the commission has led to a wide-spread notion of a ‘democratic 
deficit’ in the EU.  Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that being accountable at 
the EU level means being accountable to the European Parliament, which comprises 
directly-elected representatives and exercises budgetary control. The parliament’s 
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representation on the EMA management board may help serve this accountability 
function, but as these representatives have limited direct contact with the parliament, 
it appears more cosmetic than substantive (Permanand and Vos 2010).     
 
  The public interest perspective, in particular, has posed a problem for the 
EMA. Various actors inside and outside of the agency have criticised the EMA for 
insufficient ‘democratic control’ and inappropriate accountability (de Andres Trelles 
et al. 2002; Garattini and Bertele 2001; Garantti and Bertele 2010; ISDB 2006).  For 
instance, there was initial consternation about whether DG Enterprise was best 
placed to represent the health or public interest in medicines regulation. In the early 
1990s, the axis of EMA accountability underwent considerable debate, most notably 
in 2002 with the parliament’s debate of the review of pharmaceutical legislation. At 
that time, members of the then CPMP wrote an open letter to parliament members 
requesting a transfer of responsibility of the EMA to DG Sanco. Their proposal was 
largely based on the notion that doing so would make the agency more accountable 
to public health interests and would also be closer in line with the model of 
accountability assumed by the FDA, which reports to the US Department of Health 
and Human Services (DHHS).  
 
  Although a transfer of accountability was not immediately pursued by the 
European Commission, the surrounding debates highlighted concerns regarding the 
lack of patient and consumer involvement in the EMA process, which was viewed as 
a potential deficit to achieving procedural accountability (and sufficient due process) 
and discussed further below. Consequently, following the introduction of the 2005 
legislation, the EMA management board added two representatives each from 
consumer and medical associations. These representatives are generally appointed by 
the Council in consultation with the parliament from a list of candidates selected by 
the commission. The debates also underlined additional accountability issues with 
other stakeholders, namely industry and, in particular, around the fees paid by the 
industry to the EMA for review and evaluation of their products (i.e. ‘user fees’). 
While applicant fees are relatively common among certain national agencies, 
including the FDA (with a quarter of its total budget and 65% of its spending on 
reviewing drug applications coming from such fees), the EMA has generated 
criticisms regarding its financial dependence on industry.  Currently, the EMA 
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receives 80% of its budget from user fees, with the remaining 20% coming from 
commission subsidies. The proportion of the agency’s activities funded by industry is 
slated to increase, given that as of July 2012 the EMA started collecting additional 
fees from industry to support its growing role in post-marketing pharmacovigilance, 
including the maintenance of new committees (e.g. EMA scientific advisory 
committee, Pharmacovigilance Risk Assessment Committee (PRAC)) and 
strengthening the existing EudraVigilance database to handle a larger volume of 
post-market data. 
 
Due process 
 
  The third test, due process, involves open, accessible, and fair regulatory 
processes, all of which are closely linked to transparency – an aspect of good 
governance that is closely related to independence and accountability. If a regulator 
is going to be successful in securing public trust and attaining credibility, it needs to 
be as open and forthcoming as possible with respect to its activities generally and of 
(scientific) decision making in particular. Among other factors, this means ensuring 
sufficient ‘reason giving’ by making decisions and dissenting views available, 
delivering timely responses, granting access to key documentation, and involving 
stakeholders in the regulatory process (Permanand and Vos 2010).  
 
  In the EU context, transparency most often means accessibility of documents, 
and, in this regard, the EMA is subject to the EU’s legislation on public access to 
European institutions’ documents45 (European Parliament 2001). Its website, 
therefore, contains a considerable amount of information, covering both the science 
and the administration and operations of the agency. In particular, four main 
documents are released by EMA when a new drug is approved, including a 1) press 
release containing only general information; 2) summary of product characteristics 
(SmPCs), which is largely intended for prescribers; 3) patient information leaflet 
inserted in the drug package; and, 4) the EPAR summarising the documentation 
                                                            
45 The basic principles on citizens’ access to EU documents states: “Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or 
legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State has a right of access of the institutions, 
subject to the principles, conditions and limits defined in this Regulation”....”Openness enables citizens to 
participate more closely in the decision-making process and guarantees that the administration enjoys greater 
legitimacy and is more effective and accountable to the citizen in a democratic system. Openness contributes to 
strengthening the principles of democracy and respect for fundamental rights as laid down in Article 6 of the EU 
Treaty and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union”. 
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produced by the manufacturer and the procedures that led the CHMP to approve the 
new drug. In addition to positive opinions, the agency makes negative decisions 
public – a requirement instituted in 2005.       
 
  Despite the available information (and some movement to expand the range of 
accessible information), the agency falls short in certain areas. First, although a basic 
EU principle is to allow its citizens the widest possible access to the documents its 
agencies possess, as previously discussed, there are some exceptions. For instance, 
the EMA has and can refuse access to information if disclosure would threaten 
commercial interests, unless there is an over-riding public interest (EMA 2006a). 
Getzsche and Jorgensen (2011) attempted for three years to gain access to 
unpublished trial reports on the obesity drug, Orlistat, held by the EMA, before 
ultimately succeeding. The overarching reason given by the agency against release of 
the report was that it would undermine the protection of commercial interests. It also 
justified its decision by pointing to the resulting administrative burden of redacting 
the report(s) and that they would be worthless after removing any personal data. 
However, allowing researchers’ access to unpublished trial reports is important for 
protecting public health, a point emphasised by Getzche and Jorgensen in 
communications with the EMA, as such reports are notably detailed and provide 
more reliable data than published papers.  
 
  Available evidence also suggests that compared with unpublished trial 
protocols available at regulatory agencies, published papers often demonstrate 
widespread selective reporting of favourable results and underplay associated risks 
(Chan et al. 2004; Melander et al. 2003; Rising et al. 2008; Turner et al. 2008;Vedula 
et al. 2009). In addition, positive trial results are more often apt to be published than 
negative ones (Dolgin 2009; Rising et al. 2008; Stern and Simes 1997). In 2010, 
concerns regarding the benefits and safety of the flu drug, oseltamivir, instigated 
debate regarding the secrecy of the documents submitted for marketing authorisation 
of new medicines. The overall tenant of the debate was that a lack of data 
transparency makes it easier for companies to hide unfavourable data. Later that 
year, the EMA declared it would widen public access to documents, including trial 
reports and protocols (EMA 2010a). This aim was reinforced in the agency’s Road 
Map to 2015 document (EMA 2011a) and in recent revisions made to the Clinical 
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Trials Directive by the European Parliament. In particular, the parliament’s 
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety called for full 
publication of all clinical trials data once marketing authorisation is obtained.    
 
  Second, the aforementioned documents published by the agency fail to provide 
comprehensive information that would be helpful for public health protection and for 
researchers to conduct additional analyses of trial data. For example, the SmPC does 
not mention when a drug is approved by majority vote, and does not give the reasons 
for the minority’s opposition (i.e. attaining adequate ‘reason-giving’). To provide 
meaningful assistance to prescribers, the objective of SmPCs should be to provide a 
more comprehensive listing of side effects, possible drug interactions in accordance 
with clinical importance, and documentation and standardisation of summaries for 
generic drugs.  
 
  The EPARs are also problematic and have been criticised as opaque, 
inconsistent, and even misleading (Barbui et al. 2011; Garattini and Bertele 2010; 
Gotzsche and Jorgensen 2011). In particular, Barbui et al. (2011) found that 
examined EPARs often lacked key data (or selectively included favourable published 
clinical trials) as well as consistent reporting of available evidence. These issues 
were particularly acute with regards to reporting of Phase III studies. EPARs also 
failed to capture the critical issues that the committee examined and discussed during 
their review and did not contain the initial reports submitted by the rapporteurs (i.e. 
two members of the committee who prepare a preliminary assessment report for the 
committee to discuss and approve) or the manufacturer’s replies to any questions 
raised. This information would presumably play a central role in clarifying how the 
final decision was reached.  
 
  Third, the EMA cannot release any original documents that the manufacturer 
submits for the approval process. In contrast, in the US, the FDA can, under certain 
conditions, make at least substantial parts of the original documentation available to 
scientists, clinicians, or patients’ representatives. Fourth, besides a comprehensive 
availability of information, issues of potential conflict of interest are present. In 
particular, except for press releases, all of the agency’s documents are written in 
close collaboration with the manufacturer. 
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  The above issues are largely attributable to the long-standing reporting 
structure to DG Enterprise. Industry considers it has the right to “commercial-in-
confidence”, in order to protect the substantial investments made to develop a new 
drug. Any disclosure of data could benefit competitors and damage industrial interest 
and profits, which may subsequently reduce investments in research. This would also 
create a disadvantage for patients, who might in turn have access to fewer drugs 
(Garattini and Chalmers 2009).   
 
  Finally, as aforementioned, involving affected stakeholders in the regulatory 
process is central to good regulation (Baldwin et al. 2012).  The EU has emphasised 
the need to involve a broad range of stakeholders, particularly civil society groups 
(e.g. patients, consumers, health professionals), as a central tenant of its good 
governance policy. To meet the European Commission’s aims, the EMA has a 
Patients’ and Consumers’ Working Party (since 2006), which provides 
recommendations to the agency and its human scientific committees on all matters of 
direct or indirect interest to patients in relation to medical products. Moreover, 
patient representatives are formal members of the agency’s management board and 
some of the scientific committees, and participate in medicines evaluation with the 
CHMP, among other agency activities. As previously discussed, industry 
representatives have a significant role in the EMA’s processes and in review of 
sponsored products, in particular.  
 
  However, while the noted participation from key stakeholder groups is a 
crucial component towards achieving due process and improving accountability, 
there are other related issues that must be duly addressed to effectively meet this aim. 
Firstly, representatives from stakeholder groups must be fully vetted to ensure no 
potential conflicts of interest exist. For example, during the first nomination process, 
DG Enterprise named the European Patients’ Forum. However, external reports 
pointed to the fact that the Forum not only receives funds from the pharmaceutical 
industry, but also benefits from the use of a public relations company that has several 
pharmaceutical companies as clients. The commission has since demonstrated 
preference toward involving the more prominent (and larger) patient groups, which 
has often been questioned, given that they are often financed, directly or indirectly, 
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by industry (Herxheimer 2003; Perehudoff and Alves 2011). In fact, a challenge with 
achieving due process (and, to some end, accountability) through expanded 
participation is that controversy will often attend to those individuals, groups, or 
bodies involved.                
 
  In addition to the issue of who participates lies consideration of the degree of 
representativeness of those involved. For example, the views and experiences of 
certain patient representatives may not reflect those of similar patients (e.g. those 
suffering from the same conditions(s)). This, of course, also extends to other actors, 
such as clinicians or scientific experts involved in the authorisation process. 
Demonstrating representativeness may include questions of competency, which is 
related to the next criterion, expertise and impartiality. Indeed, ensuring appropriate 
accountability encompasses meaningful participation of involved stakeholders, 
where proportional attention is given to all represented viewpoints and concerns. For 
instance, the well-organised manufacturer might manage to generate more effective 
pressure on the regulator than the heterogeneous group of consumers of these 
products (Abraham and Lewis, 2002: 78-82; Lewis and Abraham, 2001: 62-73).  
 
Expertise and impartiality 
 
  An important contributor to whether a regulator, bureaucracy, or other arbiter 
exercises its duties in an effective manner is its impartiality and expertise (Thatcher 
2002). This is particularly true for delegated agencies, where the efficiency of the 
regulatory process and the credibility of the agency depend on high quality data and 
cutting-edge expertise (Genoud 2003).  Together, expertise and impartiality engender 
public trust and support, which allows for an agency to exercise discretion in their 
work (Baldwin et al. 2012). These elements also confer a level of professionalism to 
withstand external interference, avoid regulatory capture, and reduce arbitrary use of 
discretion in decision making (Majone 1996; OECD 1997, 2003). Securing a 
sufficient level of expertise also helps ensure that regulatory decisions are robust to 
errors.     
 
  The challenge for regulatory systems is how to construct a system of risk-
benefit assessment that can accommodate the inevitably socio-political nature of the 
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required judgements. For example, the selection and interpretation of evidence 
crucially affects risk-benefit assessments, which are arguably influenced by the 
various social interests involved and the particular expertise of the arbiter.  If some of 
the scientific experts on committees are themselves involved in clinical trials and the 
drug development process, they will likely identify more strongly with the aim of 
bringing new drugs to market. In such cases, it is difficult to discern when expertise 
or social interests lends to partiality, as different evidence could be selected and/or 
interpreted differently with similar levels of rationality and with divergent outcomes 
in terms of the risk-benefit assessment.   
 
  As previously noted, the EMA relies on several scientific committees to aid it 
in its reviews and decision making regarding approvals, with the primary committee 
being the CHMP. The members of the CHMP are largely nominated by the member 
states in consultation with the agency’s management board, based on the strength of 
their qualifications and expertise with regards to drug evaluation. However, this has 
recently been modified, where, in choosing experts, the EMA considers individual 
expressions of interest from qualified experts. By doing so, the agency has opened 
opportunities for involvement to experts who may not be part of the “establishment” 
in their own country. 
 
  The committee’s scientific advice role is unusual and expansive, as it decides 
on applications, appeals, participates in and coordinates importance 
pharmacovigilance activities, and provides advice to the industry on pre-clinical drug 
development issues. There are likely distinct advantages and disadvantages of this 
arrangement. For example, diverse involvement may deepen understanding and 
expertise of the broader drug review and approval process, but may also increase 
opportunities for conflicts of interest, given those involved in reviewing available 
evidence and making authorisation decisions duly input into providing pre-clinical 
development advice as well as appeals. However, the scientific assessment work of 
the CHMP is subject to an internal peer-review system to safeguard the accuracy and 
validity of opinions reached by the committee. Moreover, in the last couple of years, 
the EMA has strived to attain greater transparency about potential conflict of interest 
of its experts. In late 2011, the agency launched a database housing an electronic 
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declaration of conflict of interest for all its scientific committee members and other 
experts involved in the agency’s work.   
 
  Much of the evaluation of medicines is carried out by the national medicines 
agencies on behalf of the EMA. While the EMA has required declaration of interests 
from its experts, national authorities have generally been much slacker in this regard.  
As a result of a critical indictment of the EMA from the European Parliament in 
2011, the agency has been asked to disclose the terms of its agreements with the 
national authorities on such issues as the independence of committees, experts, and 
the evaluation process (Phillips 2011). At the time of the indictment, the parliament 
refused to sign off on the EMA’s account, as a result of concerns that “there is no 
guarantee that the evaluation of human medicines is performed by independent 
experts” and that “some experts had conflicting interests”.  In particular, issues were 
raised about expert connections to industry46. Additional changes since the 
indictment include a new screening process of the declarations of interest of the 
EMA’s experts and committee members, including its management board, against 
their curriculum vitae and publication of the minutes of some scientific committees’ 
meetings. As of February 2012, the agency also started requiring employees to file 
public declarations of interests and be assessed for conflict risk47.  The conflict of 
interest policy declares that pharmaceutical industry employment, a strategic 
advisory role, a consultancy, or financial interests as incompatible with expert work 
with the EMA, particularly with regards to the board.  
 
Effectiveness 
 
  The effectiveness criterion can be best understood as whether the EMA has 
delivered intended results or policy objectives (Baldwin and Cave 1999; Baldwin et 
al. 2012; OECD 1997, 2003). In particular, this can be measured across two principal 
dimensions. First, the extent to which the EMA has contributed to the provision of 
the best possible scientific opinion for the centralised authorisation of medicines for 
                                                            
46 Concerns were, in part, instigated by the activities of Thomas Lonngren, former Executive Director of the 
EMA, following departure from the agency. Lonngren’s resignation came two months after he incorporated 
Pharma Executive Consulting, a consulting firm working directly with the private pharmaceutical industry.    
47 Employees are assigned to one of three conflict-risk classifications: Level one for no conflicts; Level two for 
minor, likely indirect conflicts, which may preclude the employee form full participation in some decisions; and, 
Level three for employees with direct conflicts of interest. The Executive Director may grant exceptions case-by-
case to Level two or three employees. 
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the EU. Second, whether the EMA has achieved its mandate to protect public health 
by providing EU citizens with medicines fulfilling the basic requirements for quality, 
safety, and efficacy.  Several of the practical frameworks for good regulation 
emphasise that achievement of these dimensions should be based on standards and 
targets (Australian Office of Regulation Review 1998; Canadian External Advisory 
Committee 2004; UK Better Regulation Task Force 2000) or ‘goal-based 
approaches’ (OECD 1997, 2003).  
 
  The standards that could be applied to address the first dimension, which attend 
to the quality and accuracy of the EMA’s scientific advice, involve the following: the 
number of reviews; input available, sought, and considered across experts and 
relevant stakeholders; and, organisation and responsiveness towards recent and 
future contextual challenges48.  
 
  The widening of the scope of the centralised procedure has increased – in fact, 
more than doubled – the total number of initial applications for human medicines 
(average of 45 in the 2000-2005 period compared to 95 in the 2006-2012 period, 
with a peak in 2008) (EMA 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006c, 2007a, 
2008, 2009, 2010c, 2011c, 2012a).  The rise in applications is due principally to 
generic and biosimilar products, especially in recent years – a trend that will likely 
continue as the patent period starts to expire for an increasing number of drugs. The 
number of positive and negative opinions and withdrawn applications varies from 
year to year, and depends on a number of factors, such as the type and complexity of 
the products under evaluation, the robustness of the data in the application, and the 
type of applicant (EMA 2012). However, there has been a high average of positive 
opinions across time – about 77% of outcomes for new medicines were positive from 
2004 to 2012 (EMA 2004, 2005, 2006c, 2007a, 2008, 2009, 2010c, 2011c, 2012a).  
 
  According to a recent survey conducted by Ernest and Young (2010), a large 
majority of the national authorities queried consider the output of the EMA 
centralised procedures to be of good quality. In particular, 87% of respondents deem 
                                                            
48We assume Baldwin and Black’s (2007) definition of “really responsive regulation” to ascertain responsiveness, 
which includes the following aspects: accounts for different cultures, understandings, and attitudes that operate 
within regulated bodies and the regulated; responds to constraints and opportunities presented by institutional 
environments/external contexts; responsiveness to the logics of different regulatory tools and strategies; 
performance awareness and modification; adaption to change.  
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current timelines appropriate and less than one third think that some aspects of the 
process could be simplified. The majority (53%) are not in favour of an extension of 
the centralised procedures to other products. The experts also mainly rated EMA 
from good to outstanding. However, the respondents highlighted that the quality of 
the assessment may vary, depending on the national authority(s) and experts 
involved in the assessment team. Moreover, the lack of resources may impact the 
robustness or completeness of the assessment.  
 
  In a separate study, Downing and colleagues (2012) found that the EMA 
approved almost every application (96%) in a single review cycle, while only 62% 
and 69% of applications were approved by the FDA and Health Canada in a single 
review cycle, respectively. In both cases, more than 30% of applications required 
multiple reviews before approval. More than one cycle is typically required due to 
requests for additional statistical analysis, data collection, or sometimes new clinical 
trials. While a predominance of single cycle approvals may indicate greater 
efficiency at the EMA compared to its sister regulatory agencies, it could also 
indicate a tendency to emphasise speed of review over completeness.  
 
  However, single cycle reviews may be aided by the EMA’s growing 
involvement in providing scientific advice and protocol assistance to sponsors during 
the research and development of new medicines. Scientific advice early on may 
contribute to the submission of better, more comprehensive and relevant data to the 
agency later on. As stated in the latest EMA annual report (EMA 2013: 32), 
“scientific advice is considered as a means to facilitate and improve earlier 
availability of medicinal products to patients and health care professionals....and, as a 
means to promote innovation and research”. In 2012 alone, there were 339 requests 
for scientific advice and follow-up and 81 requests for protocol-assistance and 
follow-up (EMA 2013). The majority of the requests were received for products 
undergoing Phase III evaluation. Scientific advice appears particularly important for 
small to medium enterprises (SMEs) that may not have the in-house regulatory, 
financial and administrative expertise required to develop their medicine – 64% of 
registered SMEs requested scientific advice (EMA 2013). A study by Regnstrom et 
al. (2010) showed that seeking scientific advice from the agency and complying with 
it is associated with a greater chance of receiving a positive opinion.       
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Along those lines, experts contribute to different stages of the authorisation 
process, including in providing scientific advice (when requested by the company), 
in assessment teams, through the peer review process, in groups supporting the work 
of committees, and during discussions between committee members and member 
state representatives. The EMA has, as previously discussed, put a number of actions 
and requirements in place to safeguard conflict of interest and ensure a broad range 
of expertise is represented and involved. Nonetheless, existing evidence (Ernest and 
Young 2010) suggests that some specific technologies are less represented than 
others. For instance, less than one third of the respondents claimed to have some 
level of expertise in-house on gene or cell therapies or tissue engineering. However, 
national agencies working with the EMA often contract with external experts for 
clinical and scientific or research advice.        
 
  The final measure is the contribution of the EMA to its objectives in terms of 
effectiveness, which we argue can be seen as involving two different aspects: 1) 
whether the agency is organised (structure) in such a way that adequately meets 
current and future challenges and 2) whether the agency is responsive (procedure) to 
ongoing needs and challenges. The organisation of the EMA to effectively achieve 
its objectives depends heavily on its committees. According to the Ernest and Young 
(2010) study, the committee system is largely considered to be effective. However, 
the EMA has become more complex over time, through the addition of various 
committees, working parties, scientific advisory groups, and other ad-hoc groups. 
The number of committees and groups may indeed place the system under pressure, 
rendering coordination more difficult and potentially stymieing the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the EMA’s activities. In recognition of this issue, in 2012 the EMA 
launched a new Scientific Coordination Board, composed of chairs of the agency’s 
scientific committees, scientific advisory groups, working parties, and other relevant 
senior management staff, to ensure sufficient coordination between committees and 
that the standards they set for medicines development and evaluation are consistent. 
Nonetheless, the growing number and complexity of medicines are placing greater 
time and resource demands on committees. In addition, the rise in the number of 
committees and working groups increases the risk of duplication of efforts and 
wasted resources and potentially discordant standards or opinions. The new board 
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may be able to address such issues through regular review of committee activities 
and foster coordination and communication between these groups. 
 
  The development of a sophisticated organisational architecture and its 
associated activities can be seen as a reaction to the growing demands on the 
regulatory agency and the evolution of scientific advances and EU legislation. In this 
regard, the EMA – on the whole – has adapted well and reacted to the ever-changing 
regulatory and scientific landscape. For example, the agency has instituted a number 
of new initiatives and mechanisms to respond to the new EU pharmacovigilance 
legislation, as discussed further below. Moreover, as patients and the general public 
assume a more central role in their health care, the EMA has responded accordingly 
by involving these groups in the evaluation process and providing more transparent 
and accessible information about its activities and the risks and benefits of available 
medicines.  
 
  From a more scientific perspective, the EMA has produced guidance and other 
materials (e.g. reflection papers) to explore new scientific developments, such as 
biosimilars and advanced therapies, which not only stimulates stakeholder dialogue 
on these issues, but helps modify, where appropriate, existing regulatory practices to 
align with such advances and new challenges. Of course, some commentators would 
argue that the EMA has been slow or insufficient in reacting to existing and future 
needs. For instance, as previously discussed, EPARs could provide more 
comprehensive and helpful information than they do currently and it still remains 
challenging to obtain clinical trial data and evidence submitted by industry in support 
of market authorisation. Similarly, as more treatment alternatives are available to 
patients and providers and payers demand evidence of comparative effectiveness to 
support reimbursement decisions, the EMA could do more to support relative 
efficacy assessment of new medicines, as discussed in further detail below.      
   
  The second dimension of effectiveness focuses more on the public health 
protection aspect of the EMA’s performance. Similar to the first dimension, there are 
a number of measures to ascertain the extent to which the agency is effective in 
protecting public health. These include the availability of high-quality, safe and 
effective medicines for EU citizens; support for development of medicines of major 
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therapeutic interest and need; impact of market surveillance and post-authorisation 
procedures; and, provision of quality information for EU patients and health care 
professional (aimed at health protection).  
 
  Although access to high quality, safe and effective medicines and their 
distribution do not fall strictly within the EMA scope of responsibility49, the agency 
nonetheless contributes significantly to meeting this end through the centralised 
procedure itself, the quality of its assessments, guidelines production, and 
pharmacovigilance and other post-authorisation activities to monitor medicines use 
once on the European market. For example, the EMA produces a variety of 
guidelines, which contribute to harmonisation across member states (and at the 
global level) and access to medicines with a satisfactory level of quality, safety and 
efficacy. They also aid efficiency by making expectations more explicit for both 
applicants and assessors, which may reduce the evaluation workload. Such 
guidelines include scientific guidelines related to assessing the quality, safety and 
efficacy of new drugs, Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) guidelines, Good 
Clinical Practice (GCP) guidelines, clinical trials guidelines, and pharmacovigilance 
guidelines, among others.  In producing guidelines, the EMA has increasingly 
interacted with stakeholders to ensure their relevancy and usefulness through 
different mediums, including concept papers, focus groups, workshops, and 
consultation periods. Stakeholder interactions also include other regulators, namely 
the FDA; the EMA and FDA have launched collaborative GCP and GMP Initiatives, 
for example.   
 
  Nevertheless, there remain challenges. The ability to ensure the availability of 
the safest and most effective drugs for EU citizens may be hampered by EMA’s 
current evidence requirements for new drugs. To date, the EMA only requires that 
new drugs demonstrate that they are efficacious and safe for a defined group of 
patients, but not compared to existing therapies50. It, therefore, remains difficult for 
patients, clinicians, and other health care decision makers to determine whether a 
new drug is superior, equivalent, or inferior to existing treatment alternatives 
                                                            
49 For instance, industry is not required to introduce a centrally approved medicinal product in all member states 
and distribution monitoring is under individual member states responsibility, apart from parallel imports 
monitoring.  
50 Only required when use of placebo is deemed unethical. 
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(Sorenson et al. 2011b; van Luijn et al. 2007), which may result in widespread use of 
potentially less efficacious and unsafe drugs, as highlighted by the recent case of the 
diabetes drug, rosiglitazone. The relative effect of rosiglitazone against pioglitazone 
emerged after years of widespread use (Juurlink 2010), where rosiglitazone was 
shown to increase the risk of myocardial infarction and cardiovascular death (Loke 
2010; Nissan 2010). A lack of comparative efficacy data also makes it more 
challenging and time consuming for national HTA bodies and payers to ascertain the 
relative effectiveness of new drugs.    
 
  The fact that relative efficacy evidence is not required is arguably not efficient 
from a public health perspective, but it likely contributes to a quicker and less 
bureaucratic approval process. The recent road map plan fails to move towards 
relative efficacy requirements, although it does highlight the need to provide HTA 
bodies with transparent information to aid technology assessments and to engage 
with them from early medicine development through the medicine’s lifecycle. Better 
information reporting in the EPARs, joint approaches to scientific advice, and mutual 
input on clinical guidelines are some of the key initiatives put forth to meet these 
aims (EMA 2011). 
 
  The promotion of the development of medicines of major interest has been an 
important aim of the EMA since its establishment. The creation of the Committee for 
Orphan Medicinal Products (operating since April 2001), the Paediatric Committee 
for Medicinal Products (operating since July 2007), and the Committee for Advanced 
Therapies (operating since January 2009) demonstrates the commitment of the 
agency to address important public health needs.  Designation of Orphan Medicinal 
Product status, for example, provides applicants with various incentives to facilitate 
drug development and authorisation, including enhanced access to scientific advice 
and protocol assistance, fee reductions for many types of centralised activities, and 
potential eligibility for specific EU research funding. The year the Committee for 
Orphan Medicinal Products was established saw 83 application submissions; in 2012, 
submissions numbered 139. Interestingly, the committee has given very few negative 
opinions over the years, but this may be attributable to the relatively high application 
withdrawal rate, generally due to the medicine lacking the necessary criteria for the 
orphan designation. Most therapeutic areas have been covered by orphan product 
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designations, although the most represented areas are oncology and metabolic 
diseases (EMA 2012). Besides orphan, paediatric, and advanced therapies, in the last 
decade, the EMA has approved a number of important new medicines with public 
health benefits (Box 1).  
 
Box 1: Examples of important new medicines with public health benefits approved by 
the EMA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
As previously noted, pharmacovigilance has received a high level of attention 
by the European Commission, other EMA stakeholders, and the media in recent 
years. Since 2001, the EMA utilises EudraVigilance to collect pharmacovigilance 
data on a daily basis from all member state authorities and from companies and 
clinical trial sponsors. EudraVigilance receives an average of 45,000 reports per 
 Forxiga (dapagliflozin): Treatment of type-2 diabetes mellitus - allows improvement of 
glycaemic control without increasing insulin secretion. 
 
 Constella (linaclotide): Treatment of moderate to severe irritable bowel syndrome (IBD) with 
constipation in adults - first medicine authorised specifically for IBD in the EU. 
 
 Vibativ (telavancin): An antibacterial medicine treating adults with nosocomial pneumonia, 
known or suspected to be caused by methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). 
 
 Dificlir (fidaxomicin): A first-in class macrocyclic antibiotic intended to treat adults with 
Clostridium difficile infections, characterised by inflammation of the gut and severe diarrhoea.  
 
 Zytiga (abiraterone acetate): An anti-cancer medicine with a novel mechanism of action, 
intended for use in combination with prednisone/prednisolone, for the treatment of metastatic 
castration-resistant prostate cancer in adult men whose disease has progressed on or after a 
docetaxel-based chemotherapy regimen.  
 
 Buccolam (midazolam): The first medicinal product recommended for a paediatric-use 
marketing authorisation for the treatment of prolonged, acute, convulsive seizures in paediatric 
patients from the age of 3 to 18 months. 
 
 Fourth and fifth influenza H1N1 pandemic vaccines intended for prophylaxis of influenza in an 
officially declared pandemic situation. 
 
 A medicine for the treatment of moderate to severe manic episodes associated with bipolar I 
disorder, and another for the treatment of schizophrenia. 
 
 Revestive (teduglutide): Treatment for adult patients with short bowl syndrome (SBS), a 
seriously debilitating condition – shown to additionally reduce parenteral nutrition 
requirements in patients with the condition.  
 
 Adcetris (brentuximab vedotin): Treatment for Hodgkin’s lymphoma and systemic anaplastic 
large cell lymphoma. Adcetris is an antibody-drug conjugate, which combines both an antibody 
and an active substance. The antibody can direct the medicine to a specific target on lymphoma 
cells, allowing a selective delivery of the active substance to tumor cells.    
  
101 
 
month and is analysed by EMA staff and relevant national authorities (on average 
2,000 analyses are conducted per month) (Ernest and Young 2010). To further aid 
transparency and protect public health, in May 2012, the agency began publishing 
suspected side-effect reports for centrally authorised medicines on a public website. 
These reports come directly from EudraVigilance. The introduction of the database 
has coincided with year-on-year increase in the total number of adverse drug reaction 
(ADR) reports received by the EMA. For example, in 2012 the total number of ADR 
reports received increased by 34% compared with 2011, with a particularly notable 
increase in the number of reports coming from countries outside the European 
Economic Areas for centrally authorised products (60% increase) (EMA 2013).  An 
increase of non-EEA ADR reports relates to the extended scope of ADR reporting as 
set out in the new pharmacovigilance legislation, particularly the expansion of 
reporting requirements from serious unexpected adverse reactions to reporting of all 
serious adverse drug reactions, and the inclusion of spontaneous reports submitted 
directly to patients and consumers without prior vetting by a health care professional 
(EMA 2013).  
 
  However, the EudraVigilance system is only as good as the reporting that 
supports it. While the increase in the number of ADR reports submitted annually 
indicates an enhanced commitment of stakeholders to provide data, the EMA has 
expressed concerns regarding the compliance of national authorities and the industry 
with reporting requirements and timelines (Ernest and Young 2010).  One reason the 
perhaps hinders reporting is that EudraVigilance remains a fairly complex system to 
handle, dealing with substantial amounts of data, which may make it difficult to 
understand and manage. Alternatively, informants may be concerned about the 
potential consequences of their reporting for both themselves and their patients or 
consider pharmacovigilance processes too burdensome. The EMA has recently 
recognised some of these challenges and in 2012 produced the first set of guidelines 
of good pharmacovigilance practices (EMA 2012b), which contain a set of measures 
to facilitate the performance of pharmacovigilance in the EU. It also established a 
Pharmacovigilance Risk Assessment Committee that same year, which provides 
dedicated, expert oversight of all areas of EU pharmacovigilance. In addition, the 
agency created the Article 57 database – the first EU-level database of all authorised 
medicines. Once populated, it will serve as an important tool for regulators to 
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identify with greater accuracy and rapidity medicines for which public health 
concerns exist, whether due to pharmacovigilance or issues related to the 
manufacturing or supply chain of a medicine.        
 
  The communication of information to patients, health care providers, and the 
general public is a critical function to assist the EMA objectives in protecting public 
health. The EMA utilises a variety of mechanisms to relay information about new 
medicines to end-users. Product-specific information can be communicated through 
the product label or patient information package insert. Labels (often referred to as 
the summary of product characteristics, SmPC, in Europe) are sometimes updated to 
reflect new evidence (positive or negative) on a drug’s safety and efficacy. 
Increasingly, regulators, including the EMA, have encouraged the inclusion of 
patient-reported outcomes (PROs) information in the product label or SmPC. PROs 
assess patient views on product efficacy, particularly related to symptoms, 
functioning, health status, quality of life, patient satisfaction, compliance, and 
treatment preferences – arguably all aspects contributing to public health. Such 
information is also advantageous to industry, as it serves to demonstrate a drug’s 
‘added value’ beyond safety and efficacy. A review of PRO labels for drugs 
approved in 2007 and 2008 showed that the EMA included signs and symptoms-
based PROs in 55% of SmPCs authorised, activity limitations were included in 14% 
and health-related quality of life endpoints in 31% of the summaries (Caron et al. 
2008).  
 
  Yet, SmPCs are not always of high quality or effective. An EMA study 
(2007b) found that mistakes are often made in the information provided in the 
SmPC, such as wrong shelf-life and batch number, wrong blue box (contains 
essential authorisation information). Such oversights may result in unsafe and 
inappropriate medicines use. The agency, however, has made strides in recent years 
to enhance the accuracy and usability of package summary information. For 
example, risk management plans are put in place (and increasingly common) in cases 
of insufficient patient information leaflets or inadequate labelling. In 2012, 128 and 
190 risk-management plans were developed for initial-marketing authorisations and 
post-authorisations, respectively – this marks a 24% and 50% increase from 2011 
(EMA 2013).  The rise in risk-management plans highlights the impacts of the new 
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pharmacovigilance legislation. Similarly, through the legislation, the EMA has 
updated the summary product information template used by industry for the 
medicines they market in the EU. The updated template will make it easier to 
identify medicines that are subject to additional monitoring and to encourage ADR 
reporting.  For example, as of September 2013, all medicines subject to additional 
monitoring will display a black inverted triangle in their product information 
summaries. In addition, the new template puts emphasis not only on the risks of 
taking the given medicine, but also on the benefits the patient can expect and 
provides concrete recommendations on the conditions of use of the medicine 
concerned.     
 
  The EPARs are also aimed to provide detailed information on newly approved 
medicines to a variety of stakeholders. However, as previously argued, the EPARs do 
not always provide sufficient information to inform patient and health professional 
decision making and help protect public health. EPARs are intended to be published 
immediately following market authorisation approval, but in practice only 28% are 
published within two weeks and 73% within a month (EMA 2011; EMA 2012).   
 
  Another avenue for patients, health care professionals, academic researchers, 
and the general public, among others, to obtain information is through formal 
requests to access EMA documents. As previously discussed, public access to 
documents has traditionally been limited. An analysis by Ernest and Young (2010) 
suggests that until 2010, only about two-thirds of the requests for access to 
documents were fully accepted. While there is no available evidence to indicate 
whether the agency’s new 2010 policy on access to documents has increased the 
accessibility of documents, there has been a rise in the total number of requests for 
information. In fact, the number of requests almost doubled (108 to 207) between 
2010 and 2011 (EMA 2013).  
 
  Finally, the EMA’s website is an essential vehicle to provide stakeholders with 
key information about the agency, the regulatory process, and the products it 
evaluates. The agency has strived to simplify the website over time and make it more 
user-friendly. These efforts also coincide with the drive to increase the transparency 
  
104 
 
of the EMA’s activities and, as a result, there are an increasing number of documents 
and other relevant materials available on the website.       
 
Cost-efficiency 
 
  Regulation is cost-efficient when the output of regulation justifies the cost. In 
order to meet this end, it is essential to understand the cumulative impact of policies 
and to avoid duplication and overlap in regulatory activities. Moreover, achieving 
cost-efficiency must be based on meeting the other criteria previously discussed. 
Consequently, it is perhaps the most interesting (and complex) criterion from an 
evaluation point of view, in that it aims to capture the dichotomy underlying most 
regulatory policies – the tension between the public and private approach to 
regulation. Both approaches are premised on opposing interests between consumer 
(patients) and producer (industry), with the former focused on protecting societal, 
public health concerns and the latter maintaining that regulation is designed first to 
serve industry. It is this tension, in particular, that characterises many of the 
challenges raised in discussions regarding the four previous criteria. Consequently, 
there are definitional problems related to the cost-efficiency criterion, in terms of 
determining which objectives and whose needs are met first. In other words, how to 
balance and assess economic efficiency versus social objectives?  
 
  Historically, commentators have lauded the EMA for being more efficient – in 
economic terms – than the FDA, as evidenced by shorter time-to-market for new 
drugs and what some considered more ‘streamlined’ approval processes. However, 
this has changed in recent years, with recent studies highlighting the fact that it now 
takes longer for drugs, on average, to gain approval in Europe. For instance, 
Downing and colleagues (2012) found that for novel therapeutic agents approved 
between 2001 and 2010, the FDA reviewed applications involving novel therapeutics 
more quickly, on average, than did the EMA (or Health Canada, the Canadian drug 
regulator), and the vast majority of these therapeutic agents were first approved for 
use in the US. This trend also applied to the time of the first regulatory review. The 
median length of time for completion of the first review was 303 days for 
applications approved by the FDA, 366 for those approved by the EMA, and 352 
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days for those approved by Health Canada51. Similar findings were highlighted by 
Roberts et al. (2011), who found that between 2003 and 2010, the FDA approved 32 
new anti-cancer drugs, while only 26 were approved by the EMA. The FDA not only 
approved more new cancer drugs than did the EMA, it approved these drugs more 
quickly. Of the 23 drugs approved by both agencies, the median time from marketing 
submission to approval was 182 days for the FDA versus 350 days for the EMA.     
 
  Certainly there are many factors that impact potential differences in timing of 
approvals between the various agencies. For instance, differences could be due to 
timing of entry into the different markets and the new information that becomes 
available as a result. Other factors may be differences in resources (funding, staff) to 
review new applications and the robustness of reviews. Therefore, it is difficult to 
ascertain whether the estimated times to approval for the EMA are a limitation or a 
success and the underlying contributing factors. Arguably the answer differs across 
stakeholder groups, where, for example, industry or patient groups would consider 
longer review times problematic. It may be the case that the agency is more closely 
scrutinising new drug applications or requiring more data to support approval, or it 
may be that the longer approval times are due to expanding responsibilities and 
activities, which would arguably slow review processes, especially if available 
resources were not increased to support a growing workload. Although this scenario 
may be somewhat more desirable from a public health protection perspective, it may 
put the EMA at disadvantage, in terms of efficiency and meeting important public 
health needs (by delaying approval of essential treatments).  
 
  Given that the agency has not made significant changes to its review processes 
or evidence requirements in recent years, any increase in time to approval may be 
due to changes to its scope and complexity of responsibilities (as well as the growing 
complexity of the products under evaluation52). Indeed, the EMA’s sphere of 
responsibilities has expanded over time, in line with new EU legislation. Most 
importantly, the centralised procedure now extends to orphan drugs, HIV/AIDS, 
cancer, diabetes, and mental health (neurodegenerative disorders) drugs, as well as to 
                                                            
51 However, if multiple cycles of review were required, the time of review was substantially longer for the FDA – 
a medium time of 765 days.  
52 Indeed, over time, particularly since 2010, there has been a decrease in the number of generic and hybrid 
applications and an increase in the number of applications for medicines with orphan designation. More complex 
applications under evaluation often require clarification and additional data prior to making a final opinion.  
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generics, biosimilars, and non-prescription medicines. Recent changes have 
transpired in the fields of paediatrics and advanced-therapy medicine products. As 
previous discussed, new legislation is under way, for example in the fields of 
falsified medicines and pharmacovigilance, which will further increase the agency’s 
role in the pharmaceutical arena (EMA 2011a). Such changes have resulted in a 
marked increase in workload (EMA 2011a). A 2010 evaluation of the agency (Ernst 
& Young 2010) highlighted the fact that the main committees are overwhelmed with 
work and that consistency between the agency’s numerous committees was a 
constant challenge. Consequently, the most recent Road Map document (EMA 
2011a) emphasised the need to maintain efficiency in the agency’s operations, 
placing it as “the primary focus for the agency over the next five years” (EMA 
2011b). Attaining greater efficiency is seen particularly important, given economic 
pressures across the entire EU regulatory network. Many of the proposed strategies 
that may impact upon efficiency centre on greater collaboration with other EU 
authorities, national experts, and industry. For instance, the document outlines the 
intent to foster EU-wide pooling of expertise and data as well as close collaboration 
with the national competent authorities. The challenges to effective partnership are 
real, considering that more than 40 national agencies are involved; countries that 
differ not only by size of the country and associated resources, but also by their 
sophistication and experience in drug regulation.    
 
  In addition, one of the key strategic areas of the Road Map focuses on 
facilitating access to medicines, which addresses – among other things – time to 
market for new drugs. Suggested priorities such as promoting information and work 
sharing with other (global) drug regulators and ‘staggered’ marketing authorisation, 
in particular, could likely have a positive impact on cost-efficiency. Alignment 
between agencies would encourage a global approach to regulatory activities, such as 
the conduct of clinical trials, manufacture, and pharmacovigilance, which would not 
only bring greater efficiencies in EMA’s operations, but also to worldwide 
pharmaceutical research and development more generally. Conditional or staggered 
authorisation would ensure that potentially beneficial drugs reach patients more 
quickly, while safeguarding public health by requiring additional evidence 
generation before a final approval decision is made. The 2015 Road Map defines a 
staggered approval approach for situations not covered by conditional market 
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authorisations (EMA 2011a). Approval would initially focus on restricted 
populations of good responders, but later modified as real-life data becomes 
available (EMA 2011a). The EMA appropriately acknowledges that this approach 
should not lead to reducing evidentiary requirement for first-time market 
authorisations, but rather allows more flexibility in addressing the particulars of a 
given drug and any uncertainties in the available evidence (Barker 2010). Clearly, 
the ‘staggered’ approach is still in its infancy, with considerable work to be done to 
develop and implement a viable framework. 
 
Discussion 
 
  Given the proliferation of regulatory agencies across Europe, it has become 
ever more important to assess their performance in practice. However, to date, there 
has been a paucity of evaluative research on European agencies and in the health 
sector, in particular. This paper addresses this gap by evaluating the EMA, a highly 
influential agency within the health care arena. Rather than simply assuming a 
descriptive analysis of the agency’s performance, the study applies a framework 
grounded in academic and practitioner research on the key criteria reflecting or 
encompassing ‘good regulation’. Indeed, good regulation, and the role of the 
regulator, should be designed to enable ongoing appraisal of a regulator’s strengths 
or successes and weakness or failures. An external audit system of sorts is therefore 
needed to aid continuous reflection and improvement. If a regulator or regulation is 
to remain useful, it must be robust, flexible, and responsive. Moreover, periodic 
external assessment also helps guard the agency and its respective regulations from 
undue political influences or ‘regulatory capture’, or perceptions thereof (Dal Bo 
2006).  
 
  As evidenced by our evaluation, the EMA has made strides, especially in 
recent years, to ensure or improve its attainment of good regulation across the 
various criteria. In particular, the agency has attained, overall, a more balanced 
approach to meeting both of the main tenants of its mandate – industrial support and 
public health protection. To be sure, industrial objectives remain central to the EMA; 
however, in recent years, there has been a shift toward greater attention and activities 
focused on its public health responsibilities. Such improvements include the 
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provision of more reliable and objective information on new medicines for patients 
(e.g. packaging and leaflet labelling), allowance of conditional marketing 
authorisations, increased regulation of and funding for post-market data collection 
and pharmacovigilance. In addition, the agency has increased its interactions and 
collaboration with other leading medicines agencies, such as the FDA, to better align 
regulatory processes and harness surveillance activities to improve patient safety. 
These changes may be attributable to the shift in oversight from DG Enterprise to 
DG Sanco, expanded responsibilities of the agency, and increased pressure from 
stakeholder groups to protect public health given the growing number and 
complexity of new medicines.  
 
  In addition, it can be argued that the agency has enhanced its accountability in 
recent years through greater representation of patients, consumers, and medicines on 
the management board and on other key committees involved in the approval 
process. This also contributes to meeting the due process criteria, through enhanced 
stakeholder representation and involvement and transparency of process. In parallel, 
the EMA has moved, at least in principle, to wider public access to documentation, 
such as trial reports and protocols, which also contributes to improved transparency. 
Some of these improvements will be facilitated by the revised Clinical Trials 
Directive, provided approval by the European Parliament in late 2013. Furthermore, 
the agency’s cost-efficiency has also become of central importance over time, 
especially as it has expanded its responsibilities and activities. While actions to 
improve efficiency are under discussion rather than actualised, the EMA plans to 
meet this end principally through increased collaboration with national and 
international regulators and more flexibility in regulatory decision making for 
promising new innovations (e.g., ‘staggered’ authorisation). In addition, the EMA 
has largely been responsive to stakeholder demands, new legislation and expanded 
scope of responsibilities, and scientific advances.         
 
  Although the EMA has made certain strides towards ensuring good governance 
over the years, additional actions are needed to effectively meet this aim. One of the 
most significant areas requiring improvement is the lack of systematic provisions for 
obtaining important data to guide clinical practice and downstream research on the 
effectiveness and safety of new drugs. The recent revisions to the Clinical Trials 
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Directive are certainly important steps toward attaining greater transparency and 
helping independent, interested parties define the benefit-risk profile of new 
medicines before they are allowed on the market. The reliability and benefit of post-
market studies will also be enhanced through access to original clinical data. Along 
with the changes proposed in the revised Clinical Trials Directive, the EMA should 
offer access to the rapporteurs’ initial reports, the discussion between the CHMP and 
industry, and the minority opinions. In parallel, companies should be required to 
generate clinical study reports (describing the clinical trial and its results) using 
International Conference on Harmonisation (ICH) guidelines. This will help sponsors 
provide harmonised information and enhance transparency by greatly increasing the 
amount of data available to independent researchers and the public. Moreover, access 
should be prompt, ideally soon after the EMA’s decision, and documents should be 
available in a user-friendly format. Other improvements in agency documentation 
could entail continuous review of guidelines to reduce any inconsistencies, ensure 
relevancy of information, and monitor their impact.        
 
  In line with the proposed changes to the Clinical Trials Directive, abolition of 
confidentiality would help make the system more transparent and enable clinicians 
and patient representatives to obtain information on new medicines and the 
associated approval process, establish greater public confidence in the EMA, and 
improve clinical research. Similar to the US, a distinction could be made between 
material that demands some degree of commercial secrecy, such as information on 
the production of the active ingredients and methods used for drug discovery, and 
findings from pre-clinical testing and clinical trials that are unlikely to be important 
for the competition. 
 
  Another key area of governance requiring improvement is protection against 
conflict of interest to better uphold impartiality of involved experts and, ultimately, 
more objective regulatory decisions and improved public trust. To this end, it may be 
advisable for the EMA to ban members of drug-industry-sponsored organisations 
from participating as patient and health care professional representatives on EMA’s 
management board and/or scientific committees and serve as experts. There should 
also be a common protocol and criteria for appointing experts to ensure consistency 
within the agency and across member states. For example, since 2008, the FDA has 
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employed an 11-step algorithm for determining conflict and eligibility criteria for 
advisory committee participation. Moreover, the FDA recently adopted rules that 
conditions participation in advisory committee meetings by regular and special 
government employees on their acknowledgement that their financial interest 
information (range, not specific amount) and waivers will be made public. In 
conjunction with stronger participation rules, the EMA should instigate systematic 
and random checks to verify declarations of interest filed by experts. Beyond experts 
and employees, anti-conflict rules should also be extended to clinical investigators. 
The US Department of Health and Human Services, for examples, maintains a 
minimum disclosure threshold of $5,000 for clinical investigators receiving Public 
Health Service funding and requires that any equity interest in private entities be 
disclosed. Of course, as the EMA looks to improve its own conflict of interest 
regulations, any new rules will only prove as effective as their enforcement. 
 
   As previously discussed, the EMA does not currently require evidence on 
relative efficacy for new drugs and, consequently, this information is often 
unavailable at the time of market authorisation. Van Luijin et al. (2007) estimated 
that comparative data was available for less than half of new drug approvals by the 
EMA and even in case where it was accessible, a limited proportion (~25%) were 
published and publicly available at the time of licensing. However, evidence on the 
comparative risks and benefits of new medicines is needed by a range of decision 
makers when a drug comes to market. Such information, for example, can help the 
EMA and other regulatory agencies to safeguard public health from inferior and 
unsafe treatments, ensure that HTA agencies and payers make funding decisions 
based on the best available evidence of different treatment options, and aid 
clinicians’ and patients’ understanding of what therapies work best and their 
appropriate position in the treatment pathway (Sorenson et al. 2011b).  
 
  In 2010, the agency did outline a role for relative efficacy evidence in cases 
where a new drug might be associated with safety concerns, and if treatment with a 
medicine of inferior efficacy might conceivably lead to significant, long-term or 
irreversible harm for the patient (EMA 2010b). However, relative efficacy evidence 
should not only be recommended or required in these circumstances, but for all 
conditions where alternative drug options (with similar mechanisms of action or 
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intended for the same indications) exist. Comparative information would 
demonstrate whether differences in efficacy or safety are clinically important, 
whether responses to a product by patients resistant to a different one are thoroughly 
assessed and documented, and reward those medicines that provide value to the 
health system (Naci et al. 2012; Sorenson et al. 2011b). 
 
A number of steps could be taken to facilitate this aim. First, clear criteria (and 
any exceptions) need to be established. If evidence standards are set unrealistically 
high or criteria for relative efficacy study requirements are unclear, for example, 
manufacturers may prematurely terminate development programmes for potentially 
valuable drugs or authorizations may be delayed.  Second, open discussion and 
agreement is needed between all relevant stakeholders on what type of study 
design(s) and associated standards can be accepted as fit-for-purpose for generating 
relative efficacy evidence (Cholski et al. 2010; Eichler et al. 2010). Third, increased 
investments need to be made to develop a robust clinical research infrastructure to 
support relative efficacy evidence generation, both in terms of establishing research 
priorities and funding studies. This aim might be supported by establishing an 
independent expert panel to recommend appropriate comparators, sample size 
requirements to demonstrate the margin of superiority, equivalence or non-inferiority 
between new and existing medicines, and options to improve the operational 
efficiency of both pre- and post-market studies (Eichler et al. 2010). Finally, the 
EMA could assist industry and researchers by developing guidance on how to best 
prospectively plan, conduct, and analyse such studies, as well as support a publicly-
accessible database housing study protocol details and results (Eichler et al. 2010; 
O’Conner 2010).     
 
The EMA’s pharmacovigilance activities have undergone notable changes and 
improvements in recent years. However, there is some indication that such processes, 
particularly ADR reporting and EudraVigilance, could be simplified to improve the 
rate of use and usability. In addition, the agency should utilise EudraVigilance to its 
full potential by developing better (and updated) quantitative and qualitative data 
analysis methodologies for capturing and interpreting potential adverse events.   
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Finally, it will be important for the EMA to evolve with and address challenges 
introduced by new therapeutic and scientific developments. For example, the issue of 
whether a patient population can be considered an orphan population may become 
more complex in the future. Indeed, the trend toward the development of targeted 
therapies and personalised medicine could lead to more and more segmentation of 
patient populations into sub-populations. The rational for such segmentation should 
be carefully monitored, as these subgroups may end up meeting the criteria for 
orphan status, while being a sub-indication of a non-orphan disease. These types of 
situations will likely lead to an increase in EMA workload in the near future, which 
is problematic given the already increasing number of orphan applications and 
budget to review such medicines.   
 
  It is, of course, important to acknowledge any limitations to the analysis. First, 
this type of consolidated framework may not address all of the complexities of good 
regulation. It may, for instance, be considered too abstract to be practically relevant. 
Hood (2000) has demonstrated that even poor legislation can fulfil given theoretical 
criteria of good regulation and, therefore, suggests that they represent a wish list 
rather than tests. Similarly, Radaelli and De Francesco (2007) highlight the 
importance of context and the policy maker’s own subjective interests in deciding on 
regulatory quality. However, it is precisely because of such points that the tested 
practitioner criteria were integrated within the six principal dimensions, and why the 
framework was applied to a specific case, the EMA. It can be argued that such 
criteria, when taken collectively, are useful. Adherence with only one or partial 
adherence with several would suggest that the regulation or agency under 
consideration is less deserving of support than one that adheres to several criteria, or 
adheres to them all to a greater extent. As La Spina (2003: 2) noted with regard to 
assessing regulatory quality, “...a decision will be legitimate, if the process that led to 
its adoption and its expected results are in line with such principles”.    
 
  In addition, there may be concerns that the criteria employed are not 
universally applicable. As with other indicators (e.g. those outlined by Radaelli and 
de Francesco), the framework is indeed potentially useful in multiple contexts, not 
just the EMA or an equivalent regulator in the health arena. While we share 
Radaelli’s (2000) broader concern that stakeholders uphold different criteria to 
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ascertain good regulation, it does not necessarily follow that this should preclude 
attempts at wider approaches.  Indeed, as Table 3 demonstrates, the framework goes 
beyond a single perspective to offer a more encompassing social science-based 
approach, which draws upon inputs from practitioners and academics, and takes 
account of economic, legal and public policy perspectives53. 
 
  Of course, the framework may benefit from further improvement. For example, 
while the indicators of target-setting and responsiveness are presumed to be captured 
within the various criteria used in the framework, namely effectiveness and, to some 
extent, accountability and cost-efficiency, it may be more advantageous to include 
them as separate criteria. Targets are themselves subjective constructs, however. 
Nonetheless, they can have an impact, particularly if developed externally and with 
input from a variety of stakeholders. Responsiveness, meanwhile, although 
presumably a part of the accountability and effectiveness criteria, is perhaps worthy 
of separate delineation in order to clarify what is required to meet this objective, 
especially given the recent emphasis of the European Commission on ‘responsive 
regulation’.  
 
Conclusion    
 
  Although there is no perfect or all-encompassing framework of good 
regulation, it remains important that we pursue and develop mechanisms for 
assessing regulation in practice. Indeed, ongoing performance evaluation is a key 
part of the better or responsive regulation agenda (Bevan and Hood 2006; OECD 
1999; OECD 2004). Furthermore, evaluative research supports better discourse on 
regulation, which in itself is a channel whereby regulatory reform gains legitimacy in 
both European and international circles. Radaelli and Schmidt (2004) posit that better 
regulation discourse enables policy makers to make sense of their reality – cognitive 
judgments about what is ‘good’ and what is ‘wrong’ in regulatory activities and 
governance. Because discourse is both coordinative and communicative (Schmidt 
                                                            
53 This wider approach can be compared with the earlier-mentioned consultants’ review of the EMA, which either 
applied a strong economic (C/MA, 2000) or only examined the agency’s performance against one or two specific 
criteria, which mostly focus on outcome-oriented indicators (e.g. efficiency and effectiveness), such as the recent 
Ernest and Young (2010) evaluation.   
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2002), it may indeed begin with ideas and more normative activity of assessing, but 
ends in the more concrete arena of policy change and legitimacy.  
 
  In closing, this study has demonstrated that EMA’s commitment to public 
health protection has historically been somewhat weaker or, perhaps, implicit with 
regards to its pursuit of its mandate and objectives, which also includes industrial 
policy goals. However, in recent years, the EMA has placed greater emphasis on 
meeting its public health remit, in terms of its pursuits and achievements, while duly 
attending to the aim to support research and innovation. Importantly, in parallel and 
often in interaction, the agency has continuously adopted new policies and processes 
to meet the other criteria of good regulation (e.g. transparency, stakeholder 
involvement, efficiency). As elucidated by herein, the dynamic nature of drug 
regulation and associated scientific advances will necessitate continuous evolution 
(and thus evaluation) of the EMA.    
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Study 2: Improving medical device regulation: The United States 
and Europe in perspective 
 
Introduction 
 
  Medical devices are serving an increasingly central role in clinical practice, 
improving patients’ health and quality of life. The medical device industry and the 
areas of patient care it touches have grown considerably in recent years. For 
example, the annual revenues of the US medical device industry rose from 
approximately $85 billion in 2001 to $146 billion in 2009 (Kruger and Kruger 2012). 
While part of this growth is due to the greater use of medical devices already on the 
market, new market entrants drove a large portion. During the 2000s, more than 
30,000 medical devices were cleared by the US FDA’s 510(k) pre-market 
notification pathway and more than 300 new devices received original pre-market 
authorisation (FDA 2011a). Along with the higher number of new devices, these 
technologies have become more complex.         
 
  The growing number and sophistication of medical devices have introduced 
regulatory challenges. Recent debates and events in the US and Europe have brought 
into question the effectiveness of the existing regulatory frameworks in both 
jurisdictions to ensure the performance, safety, and quality of new devices. In the 
US, for example, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) recently called for the FDA to 
eliminate its 510(k) clearance process, maintaining that it was an unreliable screen 
for the safety and effectiveness of devices (IOM 2011; Miller 2011).  
 
  Industry has generally taken a different stance, focusing on concerns that the 
US regulatory system is too slow, risk-adverse, and expensive. The European system 
is therefore often viewed as superior, given its somewhat faster regulatory process 
for devices and earlier access to some high-risk technologies (e.g. coronary stents, 
replacement joints) (Gottlieb 2011; Pollack 2011). However, European regulators 
have also faced criticism. In a commentary to the British Medical Journal, 
Freemantle (2011) asserted that the current European regulatory framework for 
medical devices, through the Conformité Européenne (CE) marketing process, is 
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inadequate to provide sufficient safeguards for technologies that affect morbidity, 
mortality, and health-related quality of life. The cited inadequacies include inferior 
regulatory evidence standards, non-transparent decision-making processes, and 
insufficient post-market surveillance to ensure devices’ safety and long-term 
performance. The European Commission has echoed such concerns, stating a need to 
“adapt the European regulatory framework in order to secure patients’ safety while 
favouring innovation” (European Commission 2011). Recent market recalls of 
articular surface replacement hip prostheses, PolyImplant Protheses (PIP) breast 
implants, and PleuraSeal for lung incisions, many of which were denied approval by 
the FDA, have further heightened concerns about current regulatory practices (FDA 
2012; Heneghan 2011; Meier 2013).  
 
  Given that the US and Europe have recently introduced or are currently 
debating reforms of medical device regulation, it is an opportune time to examine the 
current regulatory policies and practices in both jurisdictions and identify areas for 
additional improvement. Despite the recent studies comparing medical device 
regulation in the US and Europe (Basu and Hassenplug 2012; Kramer et al. 2012), 
there is little in-depth analysis of the key issues in reforming the existing regulatory 
frameworks and strategies to be considered and employed to improve medical device 
regulation. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap. First, the paper offers a brief 
comparative overview of medical device regulation in the US and Europe. Second, it 
examines the main challenges facing the regulation of devices, followed by an 
analysis of recent and ongoing reforms. The analysis closes with a discussion of 
additional policies and practices that could be considered in current reform plans, or 
in the future, to strengthen the regulation of medical devices in both jurisdictions.  
 
Comparative overview of US and European medical device regulation 
 
United States 
 
  The 1976 Medical Device Amendments gave the FDA primary authority to 
regulate medical devices and to substantiate “reasonable assurance of safety and 
effectiveness” before allowing manufacturers to market their products (GAO, 2006). 
This legislation has subsequently been updated, with the Medical Device User Fee 
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and Modernization Act (MDUFMA) of 2002, which established sponsor user fees for 
application reviews and set certain performance goals for the agency.    
 
  The FDA assigns devices to one of three regulatory classes based on their 
intended use, whether the device is invasive or implantable, and the risk posed by the 
device to the user. As Table 4 shows, the device class determines the level of 
evidence and evaluation required to demonstrate safety and effectiveness.  Low-risk 
Class I devices are generally exempt from pre-market notification (510(k)) and FDA 
clearance before being marketed, although their manufacturers are subject to general 
controls, such as registering their name and products with the FDA. Medium-risk 
Class II devices usually are required to clear the 510(k) review process, which 
determines principally whether the new device is substantially equivalent to a legally 
marketed (predicate) device. Substantial equivalence means that the device performs 
in a manner similar to that of the predicate in its intended use, technological 
characteristics, and safety and effectiveness (FDA 2000). If a device is determined to 
be substantially equivalent, a clinical trial is usually not required to prove its safety 
or effectiveness. Other requirements (special controls) may be imposed, however, 
such as those for labelling requirements and post-market surveillance (Kramer et al. 
2012). If the FDA deems a device to not be substantially equivalent, the 
manufacturer can petition for reclassification or file a de novo application.   
 
  High-risk Class III devices require closer scrutiny. These technologies are 
generally required to undergo the most formal review process for devices: pre-market 
authorisation (PMA), in which a device must demonstrate safety and effectiveness 
through the submission of clinical studies. Devices in this class that have been 
created from changes to previously PMA-approved devices may not be required to 
generate additional clinical evidence (Code of Federal Regulations 2012; FDA 
2008). Novel devices without a predicate are automatically classified as Class III, 
regardless of their risk profile. But, if the device is classified as low to moderate risk, 
the manufacturer can apply for reclassification to Class II or I through the de novo 
process and need not undergo PMA, a process discussed further in subsequent 
sections.    
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  To safeguard public health once a device is on the market, the FDA requires a 
range of post-market surveillance activities (Table 5), including adverse event 
reporting by manufacturers and user facilities (via the Medical Device Reporting 
[MDR] program) and post-market studies to ascertain and monitor the device’s 
safety and effectiveness (Kramer et al. 2012). The agency also supports a number of 
surveillance data networks, such as MedWatch, the Medical Device Surveillance 
Network (MedSun), and the Medical Device Epidemiology Network Initiative 
(MDEpiNET), to identify and address safety problems and advance epidemiological 
methods for device surveillance.       
 
Europe 
 
  Until the 1990s each member state had its own approach to regulating devices. 
To regulate a diverse and complex market and promote the “internal market” in 
Europe, new regulations, known as the New Approach Directives, were introduced 
by the European Council that defined the “Essential Requirements” to ensure 
devices’ safety and performance (Kramer et al. 2012). These requirements apply to 
all countries. Therefore, if a device meets the requirements and receives a CE mark 
in one country, it can be marketed in all member states. A CE mark certifies that a 
device is safe and functions according to the intended purpose described by the 
manufacturer. Under these directives, devices are categorised into four classes 
according to the degree of risk associated with their intended use (Table 6).  
 
  Similar to those of the US, Europe’s evidence requirements for market 
authorisation increase with the degree of risk associated with the device. 
Manufacturers of low-risk devices (Class I) are required only to self-declare 
conformity with the Essential Requirements to a national “Competent Authority”54, 
such as the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) in the 
UK. More moderate- and high-risk devices (Classes IIa, IIb, and III) require a 
combination of clinical and non-clinical data on the device being evaluated. If 
available, data for an equivalent device already on the market may be submitted, if 
                                                            
54 Competent Authorities are national bodies that designate independent Notified Bodies to monitor that device 
manufacturers conform to the Directives’ requirements. Authorities also exercise oversight in that they monitor 
the work of the Notified Bodies. Within their remit, they can also monitor manufacturers’ compliance with EU 
legislation as part of their market surveillance activities. To that end, Competent Authorities are also responsible 
for monitoring and reporting the safety of medical devices on the market.  
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available. Although clinical studies are generally requested for high-risk Class III 
devices, the evidence requirements are vague, not available to the public, and non-
binding for manufacturers and studies need not be randomised (Fraser et al. 2011). 
For manufacturers claiming similarity to an existing product, a comparative literature 
review typically suffices.  
 
  Manufacturers of these devices select and pay one of about 80 largely for-
profit, independent “Notified Bodies”55 to evaluate their device and receive a CE 
mark. Award of a CE mark is based on an evaluation of safety and performance (that 
a device functions as intended), and not effectiveness (clinical benefit).     
 
  Once a device is on the market, manufacturers are required to report all serious 
adverse events to the Competent Authorities. In Europe, this information is collated 
into a central database, the European Databank on Medical Devices (Eudamed). In 
addition to vigilance information, Eudamed contains data on manufacturers, 
certificates issued, modified, suspended, withdrawn or refused, and clinical 
investigations. The use of Eudamed has been mandatory since 2011. Post-market 
studies also may be required if a device’s medium or long-term safety and 
performance are not known from previous use of the device or when other post-
market surveillance activities would provide insufficient data to address risks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
55 Notified Bodies ensure that device manufacturers conform to Directives’ requirements. In particular, they 
initially verify and evaluate manufacturers against EU legal requirements and standards before they market their 
products. Any changes to an approved design of a device must also receive further approval from the Notified 
Body. Not all bodies can verify technologies and not all Member States have Notified Bodies. National 
governments choose if they wish to designate a Notified Body or not. In doing so, they must ensure the body is 
capable of covering the products concerned and can monitor and evaluate the body and its work.    
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Table 5: US classification of medical devices and regulatory requirements for 
approval and post-marketing surveillance 
Classification Description Pre-Market 
Requirements 
General 
Time to 
Clearance/
Approval 
Post-Market 
Requirements 
Class I These devices are 
typically simple in 
design and 
manufacture, and 
have a history of 
safe use. Device 
examples are 
tongue depressors, 
crutches, and 
scalpels. No to 
negligible risk.    
Subject to the least 
regulatory control, most 
Class I devices are 
exempt from premarket 
notification and/or good 
manufacturing practices 
regulation, although some 
general controls apply 
(e.g. device registration 
and listing, labelling 
regulations).  
Varies Reporting of 
device safety and 
performance 
problems are 
mandatory for 
manufacturers, 
but voluntary for 
providers and 
users. 
 
Use of MAUDE 
(Manufacturer 
and User Facility 
Device 
Experience 
database); 
MedSun 
(Medwatch 
adverse event 
reporting 
program); and, 
Medical Device 
Surveillance 
Network (network 
of facilities 
collecting data on 
device-related 
problems).  
 
Post-market 
studies are 
required for select 
devices, 
particularly Class 
II and III devices. 
  
 
 
Class II These devices are 
more complicated 
and are associated 
with a higher level 
of risk than Class I 
technologies and 
include 
endoscopes, 
infusion pumps, 
and condoms. Low 
risk.  
Most Class II devices 
required to clear pre-
market notification 510(k) 
requirements. In rare 
cases, clinical studies are 
required for a 510K 
submission. 
In addition, these devices 
maybe subject to other, 
special controls, including 
special labelling 
requirements and 
mandatory post market 
surveillance. 
6-12 months 
Class III Devices belonging 
to this category 
usually support or 
sustain human life, 
are of substantial 
importance in 
preventing 
impairment of 
human health, or 
present a potential 
unreasonable risk 
of illness or injury 
to the patient. 
Such devices 
include coronary 
stents, 
defibrillators, and 
tissue grafts. 
Medium and high 
risk. 
Most stringent 
requirements. Typically 
insufficient information 
exists to assure safety and 
effectiveness solely 
through general or special 
controls. Therefore, a 
premarket application 
(PMA) is required for 
Class III devices, which 
includes evidence from 
prospective, randomised 
control trials.  
12+ months  
Source: Authors’ compilation 
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Table 6: European classification of medical devices and regulatory requirements for 
approval and post-marketing surveillance 
Classification Description Pre-Market 
Requirements 
General 
Time to 
Clearance/
Approval 
Post-Market 
Requirements 
Class I These devices are 
typically simple in 
design and 
manufacture, and 
have a history of 
safe use. They pose 
extremely little risk 
to the human body. 
Device examples 
here include reading 
glasses, 
thermometers, and 
examination gloves. 
No to negligible risk.   
Manufacturer allowed 
to -declare conformity 
with the Essential 
Requirements. 
Approval not 
required. 
Manufactures are 
required to 
implement a post-
market study 
and/or vigilance 
program 
according to 
national 
requirements, 
which includes 
reporting serious 
incidents to the 
relevant 
Competent 
Authority. 
Reports are 
synthesised in the 
Eudamed 
database.  
Class IIa These devices 
include short or 
long-term use of 
devices posing 
relatively low risk to 
the human body. 
Devices in this class 
include digestive 
catheters, infusion 
pumps, and powered 
wheelchairs. Low 
risk. 
In general, 
manufacturers are 
required to submit a 
dossier of relevant, 
supporting literature 
(clinical and 
nonclinical) to 
substantiate safety and 
performance.  Although 
there are general pan-
European data 
standards, evidence 
requirements are fairly 
fluid, depending on 
what is submitted by the 
manufacturer and 
required or 
recommended by the 
relevant Notified Body. 
1-3 months (+ 
any time 
required for 
the sponsor to 
address any 
deficiencies in 
the 
submission) 
Class IIb These devices 
include those posing 
relatively high risk 
to the human body, 
including 
technologies such as 
respirators, 
dialyzers, and 
orthopaedic 
implants. Medium 
risk. 
Class III Includes long-term 
surgically invasive 
devices that may 
endanger patients’ 
life. These devices 
include coronary 
stents. Also includes 
special Class III 
(AIMD) devices, 
which require a 
source of energy to 
function (e.g. 
pacemakers, 
defibrillators, 
cochlear implants). 
High risk. 
Clinical studies 
generally recommended 
for high risk devices, 
but most are non-
randomised and single 
arm (focused on 
demonstrating safety).  
Requirements are 
somewhat vague on the 
European-level and 
variable across Notified 
Bodies.  
Source: Authors’ compilation 
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Comparing the US and Europe 
 
  The US and European approaches to medical device regulation have 
fundamental differences. For example, the FDA was established to promote and 
protect public health through the regulation of medical products, whereas the 
European system of Notified Bodies developed as part of a broader initiative to 
strengthen innovation and industrial policy across Europe. Notified Bodies therefore 
were not designed to function as public health agencies. Instead, the protection of 
public health lies largely with the Competent Authorities, with the extent of their role 
varying widely among member states. Kramer and colleagues (2012) argue that these 
differences help explain why the US and Europe have adopted different regulatory 
processes and evidence requirements for devices. For instance, in Europe devices 
must prove only that they work as intended, whereas in the US devices require 
evidence of effectiveness.     
 
  Another key difference relates to the organisation of the regulatory systems. In 
the US, the FDA oversees all regulation of devices. In contrast, the European system 
confers significant authority on a collection of governmental (Competent 
Authorities) and private (Notified Bodies) bodies to oversee device evaluation, 
market approval, and post-market surveillance.  The US approach theoretically 
allows for better coordination and ease of enforcing regulatory requirements, 
although as mentioned earlier, some commentators believe that greater centralisation 
results in a rigid, lengthy, and costly regulatory process (Gottlieb 2011; Pollack 
2011). While the more flexible European approach may grant faster market access to 
certain devices, it is not without problems. For example, evidence standards have 
been found to differ across Notified Bodies (Cohen and Billingsley 2011), which 
may encourage manufacturers to seek a CE mark from a less rigorous body. 
Decentralisation also hinders the collection and analysis of safety data, especially for 
rare, but life-threatening, adverse events, for which a substantial amount of patient 
information is required to detect potential problems (Thompson et al. 2011).   
  
 
 
 
  
123 
 
Outstanding challenges in US and European medical device regulation 
   
  Despite the differences between the US and European systems, both 
jurisdictions face similar outstanding challenges to effective medical device 
regulation. The next section discusses several issues needing improvement. 
    
Establishing and upholding appropriate evidence requirements  
 
  Requiring sufficient evidence (and applying rigorous review mechanisms) to 
safeguard public health and certify effectiveness, especially for high-risk devices, is 
perhaps the greatest challenge currently facing both US and European device 
regulation. In the US, there are concerns that too many high-risk devices are 
evaluated through less rigorous review mechanisms (IOM 2011). Over the last 10 
years, only about 2% of medical devices have undergone PMA (Sweet et al. 2011). A 
Government Accounting Office (GAO) study (GAO 2013) found that between 2003 
and 2007, only 79% of Class III devices actually underwent PMA, with the 
remainder proceeding through the 510(k) pathway. Unlike PMA, direct evidence of 
safety and effectiveness is usually not required for 510(k) submissions, and only 10-
15% of submissions contain any clinical data (GAO 2006). Furthermore, devices 
deemed substantially equivalent to devices previously cleared by the FDA do not 
need to go through the pre-market approval process, even if that previous model was 
never assessed for safety and effectiveness or recalled for a major safety defect 
(Ardaugh et al. 2013). One study investigating a cohort of high-risk recalls in the US 
showed that 71% of such devices had previously been cleared through the 510(k) 
process and another 7% had been exempt from review (Zuckerman et al. 2011). The 
greatest number of recalls was related to one type of device, automated external 
defibrillators, so these findings should be interpreted with caution. Besides the 
quantity of robust evidence are quality issues. Based on an internal analysis by the 
FDA, more than half of the 510(k) submissions it received had quality problems, 
including incompleteness or failure to address basic elements such as a description of 
the device and proposed indications for its use (FDA 2011b).   
 
  Even the PMA has challenges. FDA mandates only that PMA applications 
provide a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness (FDA 2012). The 
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evidence available suggests that this typically means applications were approved 
based on a single clinical study (Dhruva et al. 2009). In addition, only a minority of 
trials are randomised or blinded, use an active control group and hard end points, and 
are consistent in the way they account for patients and report data (Chen et al. 2011; 
Chen et al. 2012; Dhruva et al. 2009). Such standards differ for drugs, which are 
expected to show “substantial evidence [of safety and effectiveness]” and for which 
uncontrolled or partially controlled studies are not considered sufficient for approval 
(FDA 1998). An alternative perspective (often taken by the FDA, industry, and some 
analysts) is that devices are different from drugs and therefore should not be held to 
the same standards (Miller 2009). In particular, devices introduce challenges that 
render clinical trials less feasible. For example, for a surgical device, it is difficult to 
randomise patients for surgery or no surgery and/or blind patients or physicians. 
Moreover, many different types of devices make it difficult to apply one evidence 
standard to all devices.       
 
  Another issue arises from a stipulation of the Medical Device Amendments of 
1976, which established varying safety standards for devices that the FDA deems as 
low, medium, and high risk, as previously discussed. The law applied immediately to 
new types of devices and directed the FDA to retroactively classify products that 
were already on the market when the law passed. This meant that Class I and II 
devices underwent review for substantial equivalence to devices already on the 
market. But, even though Class III devices were intended for PMA, they were 
allowed to receive review for substantial equivalence temporarily until the FDA 
down-classified them or required PMA.  
 
  Congress always intended Class III devices to undergo PMA, and in 1990 
under the Safe Medical Devices Act, it directed the FDA to establish a timeline to 
complete the transition to PMAs for all devices that were to remain in Class III (IOM 
2011). The FDA, however, still has not classified some of the “grandfathered” 
devices. As of early 2013, 19 different types of Class III devices are allowed to reach 
patients through 510(k) clearance (Ardaugh et al. 2013). Consequently, potentially 
high-risk devices continue to reach the market without ever being tested in humans. 
One such example is metal-on-metal hip implants. Ardaugh and colleagues (2013) 
traced the 510(k) history of the DePuy ASR XL Acetabular Cup System and found 
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that, in most cases, the predicates used for clearance were not metal-on-metal and 
were substantially different in design from the ASR XL or their clinical performance 
was poor. Almost a year after its approval, the ASR’s high revision rate was 
discovered when it was compared with all other total conventional hip prostheses in 
the Australian Joint Registry. By this time, ASR’s were implanted in millions of 
patients, many of whom suffered serious harm and, as a result, needed additional 
procedures to replace the device (Meier 2013).     
   
  In Europe, the majority of Class III devices need only to demonstrate their 
safety and performance, not that they directly benefit patients, and there are no 
requirements to verify the adequacy of submitted clinical data. In most cases, the 
submission of robust clinical data is limited, and often the evidence submitted is 
from laboratory testing, literature reviews, or small clinical trials (FDA 2012).   
 
  A less stringent pre-market review process increases the risk that later studies 
may demonstrate that the device has no benefits or identify important adverse events 
that did not emerge at the time of market authorisation. For example, although 10 
times more drug-eluting stents are approved in Europe than in the US, many of those 
approved offer no advantage over other treatment alternatives for preventing 
restenosis or have worse outcomes than other stents (Di Mario et al. 2011). Other 
devices approved in Europe have been withdrawn from the market after later studies 
demonstrated poor performance or unexpected complications (Cohen and Billingsley 
2011). The Notified Bodies’ lack of uniform evidence requirements is another related 
concern. Such diversity results in regulatory unpredictability as well as inconsistent 
evidence standards being applied to similar devices. 
 
  Overall, US and European evidence requirements for devices introduce not 
only risks to patients, but also the wrong incentives to generate the needed evidence 
to better understand and evaluate the benefits and risks of new devices. Considering 
that manufacturers often take advantage of existing evidence from already marketed 
devices to gain approval for a new device, they are reluctant to undertake new 
clinical studies. In addition, because later devices may be able to claim equivalence, 
the first manufacturer to market does not have a very strong incentive to undertake 
extensive clinical studies. This may be exacerbated by the fact that many device 
  
126 
 
manufacturers are small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs) that often lack the requisite 
expertise and resources to conduct large clinical studies. Taken together, all these 
issues suggest that when a device (or procedure using a device) enters clinical 
practice, the information about its efficacy and short- and long-term safety is meagre. 
Accordingly, adoption of a new device may be driven more by marketing and the 
enthusiasm of clinicians than by evidence.                   
 
Monitoring and evaluating post-market device safety and effectiveness  
 
  Despite the variety mechanisms to collect post-market surveillance data in the 
US, such as the MedWatch and MedSun systems, the reporting of adverse events 
remains weak. Although by law, manufacturers must report deaths or serious adverse 
events, they are not required to if they decide that the events are unrelated to the 
device (Lenzer and Brownlee 2010). Furthermore, voluntary reporting by providers, 
patients, and health facilities is somewhat rare and may be subject to reporting 
biases. A 2009 government report (OIG 2009) pointed out that only 6% of adverse 
event reports come from health care providers and users. Several factors contribute to 
under-reporting, including the reports’ voluntary nature, fear of litigation, difficulties 
in connecting problems with a device, and failure by patients and providers to 
understand their obligation to report (Malenka et al. 2005). Moreover, clinicians may 
not have sufficient time or support to collect and submit data routinely. The FDA’s 
ability to detect potentially unsafe devices is further hampered by the fact that many 
post-approval studies required as a condition of approval are actually not conducted 
or are of such poor quality as to not produce meaningful post-market evidence 
(Lenzer and Brownlee 2010).   
 
  European post-market systems face similar challenges. Manufacturers are 
required to report adverse events to Competent Authorities, but the events’ inclusion 
in Eudamed is dependent on the Competent Authorities, who are not mandated to 
report. Only a few national Competent Authorities provide the majority of adverse 
event reports and public notifications of device-related safety concerns (Kramer et al. 
2012), and no mechanism is available for providers and patients to report adverse 
events. Eudamed allows information to be exchanged only between national 
Competent Authorities and the European Commission, and it is not available to the 
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public. In addition, Kramer and colleagues (2012) noted that the coordination and 
analysis of post-marketing reports from Eudamed are highly variable. Consequently, 
to date, Eudamed has had limited utility. While guidelines have been issued to 
address some of these issues, they are vague and remain at the discretion of 
manufacturers.  Poor adverse event reporting, in addition to fraud and poor post-
market regulatory oversight, was associated with the recent PIP implant recall 
(Heneghan 2011).  
 
  Without systematic post-market data collection, it is difficult for clinicians, 
other health professionals, and regulatory agencies to understand to whom health 
care is provided and the actual outcomes of particular procedures or the use of 
devices once they are on the market. This is particularly important in the case of 
medical devices, for which evidence regarding their performance is frequently 
limited at the time they are first used. Moreover, often only through the actual use of 
a device are unforeseen problems related to safety and performance identified and 
addressed (Cheng 2003). For example, an analysis of stent implantation between 
2003 and 2004 using the Swedish Coronary Angiography and Angioplasty Registry 
(SCAAR) found that patients treated with drug-eluting stents (DES) had a higher rate 
of morality than did those receiving bare-metal stents.38 The findings caused 
upheaval, and prompted an immediate decline in the use of DES and an urgent 
review of their safety. A follow-up SCARR study (with data extended to 2010), 
however, found that the new generation of DES was associated with lower rates of 
restenosis, stent thrombosis, and mortality (Sarno et al. 2012). The difference in 
outcomes was largely explained by cardiologists’ increased use of the device and the 
introduction of better stents.    
 
Ensuring adequate and transparent information exchange on the benefits and risks of 
devices 
 
  The public’s demand for accessible and transparent information about devices 
and the regulatory process has grown in recent years, and both the US and Europe 
have taken action to improve the exchange of information with stakeholders. For 
instance, the FDA produces publicly available information about its regulatory 
pathways for various device types and associated evidence requirements; publishes 
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advisory committee input on new devices; and, summarises its justification for its 
approval of high-risk devices and information about associated adverse events. The 
agency also requires the disclosure of any financial interests that a clinical 
investigator may have in a device or product sponsor. Although, the FDA does not 
publicly disclose this information, in its recent guidance on financial disclosure, the 
agency noted that it intends to provide information about the number of clinical 
investigators as well as financial information in the product reviews it posts for an 
approval decision (FDA 2013). In Europe, collected post-market data are shared with 
Competent Authorities, and individual Competent Authorities provide on their 
websites information regarding their operations.   
 
  Achieving an open and accessible information exchange still is elusive. In the 
US, much of a sponsor’s application for a new device remains proprietary, as is 
information about applications not approved. Moreover, European Notified Bodies 
have no obligation to publish their decision-making process, the evidence provided 
by sponsors, or the basis for granting a CE mark. Additionally, post-market data are 
not shared with the public.   
 
Current reforms to improve medical device regulation  
 
  The current regulatory systems for medical devices clearly must be improved. 
The paper next discusses several areas of reform that are under way or have been 
proposed. 
 
Enhancing existing regulatory frameworks  
 
  The growing number and complexity of medical devices are challenging 
current regulatory frameworks. To address some of these challenges and those 
associated with the FDA’s device review programs in general, in mid-2012 the US 
passed the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (Public Law 
112-144) (Federal Register 2012). Among its various provisions, the law supports 
enhanced transparency and justification of significant agency decisions regarding 
device applications; a change in the agency’s guidance when device modifications 
require pre-market notification before marketing; programs to improve the device 
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recall system; modifications of the de novo application process; new procedures to 
reclassify devices previously grandfathered into the system; and, mechanisms to 
enhance post-market surveillance, such as the inclusion of devices in the Sentinel 
surveillance system. While some of these actions are intended to make the regulatory 
process more efficient, such as changes to the de novo application process, others 
(e.g. device reclassification, Sentinel) strive to better safeguard public health.  
 
  Since the publication of the IOM report, the FDA has introduced additional 
measures to improve the existing 510(k) process, although it did not accept the 
IOM’s overall recommendation to eliminate the program altogether. The FDA’s 
initiatives include new guidances to improve the program’s predictability and 
effectiveness (e.g. guidance to improve the quality and performance of clinical trials 
and clarify when changes in a device warrant a new 510(k) submission); additional 
programs to fortify the 510(k) systems, including analysing the use of multiple 
predicates; and, training for agency staff and industry on various facets of the 
program.            
 
  The European Parliament is currently considering proposals to reform the EU’s 
legislation on medical devices and in vitro diagnostics put forward by the European 
Commission and the parliament’s Rapporteur and Committee on the Environment, 
Public Health and Food Safety (European Commission 2012; European Parliament 
2013). The commission’s proposal offers insubstantial modifications of European 
device regulation. The parliament rapporteur and committee have called for far more 
oversight and transparency than the current system offers, with extra scrutiny of the 
highest-risk devices, including a more centralised pre-market authorisation process. 
Industry groups are fiercely debating the proposals, particularly the parliament 
rapporteur’s and committee’s measures, claiming that they would slow patients’ 
access to beneficial technologies and hamper the “edge that industry has here in 
Europe” (Cohen 2013).   
 
  The latest parliament vote on the reforms sidestepped a centralised pre-
marketing authorisation system, but supports a number of measures clarifying the 
roles and responsibilities of the involved parties (e.g. national authorities, clinical 
experts), fostering coordination and harmonisation across member states, enhancing 
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the oversight and standards associated with Notified Bodies, and increasing the 
transparency and traceability of devices. Among other things, this means that 
Notified Bodies will continue to grant market approval through CE certification, but 
will face increased oversight and quality assurance by the Competent Authorities and 
a new Medical Device Coordination Group (MDCG), especially for high-risk 
devices. The MDCG, composed of experts and representatives of relevant 
stakeholder groups, is intended to provide advice to the European Commission and to 
assist the commission and Competent Authorities in ensuring the harmonised 
implementation of the reforms. For instance, before a Notified Body can issue a 
certificate, the MDCG will have the ability to request a preliminary conformity 
assessment on which it can issue comments within a deadline of 60 days. A small 
group of independent scientific experts will support the MDCG in its decision 
making.    
 
  Although the Notified Bodies will retain much of their current authority, the 
new legislation does result in greater regulatory centralisation. The European 
Commission will be more involved in the review and approval of devices. For 
example, certain members of the commission, along with the MDCG and other 
experts, will advise on the designation of Notified Bodies and ensure that the 
member states charge comparable fees. The commission also will be responsible for 
maintaining Eudamed, which is central to the implementation of some of the new 
rules, particularly with regard to enhancing devices’ transparency and traceability.  
 
  Other significant changes are requirements that certain devices (e.g. high-risk 
implantables) undergo assessment by specialised notified bodies designated by the 
EMA, the European regulator for pharmaceuticals. Notified Bodies will be expected 
to have permanent in-house competent personnel and technical and medical expertise 
related to devices and will be subject to assessment of compliance and ongoing 
monitoring. Manufacturers also will be subject to unannounced inspections and 
possible imprisonment if they commit fraud. 
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Strengthening pre-market evidence standards and requirements 
 
  The impact of the US reforms on device evidence standards and requirements 
is somewhat limited, with the most significant developments being changes to the de 
novo application process and the reclassification procedures.  
 
  In the past, the de novo process required manufacturers to submit a 510(k) 
application, which is exhaustively reviewed by the FDA before a device can receive 
a “not substantially equivalent” determination. If deemed not equivalent, the device 
will automatically receive a Class III designation. Only then can the manufacturer 
submit a de novo request to have the device reclassified from a Class III to a Class II 
or I designation. This complicated and somewhat cumbersome two-step process has 
resulted in the rare use of the de novo route and in unnecessary delays when it has 
been used. For example, only 54 de novo classifications have been made since the 
process went into effect in 1998, and once a de novo application is submitted, it takes 
the FDA an average of 240 days to review (Ladin and Imhoff 2010). Ladin and 
Imhoff (2010) found that de novo review times have increased in recent years and are 
sometimes longer than PMA reviews. The main reasons for the few de novo 
applications and the rise in review times are unclear. But, procedural inefficiencies 
are likely a cause, as well as the more complex devices being reviewed, the greater 
use of multiple predicates (IOM 2011), and the poor quality of applications (FDA 
2011b). Consequently, some innovative, lower-risk technologies may have been 
inappropriately subjected to PMA approval or delayed market entry because of 
lengthy de novo review times.     
 
  The new de novo process outlined in recent reforms simply requires that 
manufacturers submit a request to the FDA for de novo classification, which will 
streamline the procedure by removing the requirement for 510(k) application and 
review. The FDA will have 120 days to issue a decision on classification. A recent 
analysis by the agency suggests that since 2011, the average 510(k) review time has 
decreased (FDA 2012), and the new process should raise the number of de novo 
applications and further shorten review times.  
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       The reforms also make it easier for the FDA to reclassify “grandfathered” 
devices as either Class I or II or to call for a PMA application. The main change is 
that FDA will no longer be required to issue a reclassification regulation in order to 
reclassify a device, which used to require an economic review of the potential impact 
of reclassification. This process can take years to complete. As a result of the reform, 
the FDA can accomplish the same thing by administrative order, which should 
expedite the process. To date, six types of devices have been proposed for 
reclassification, including metal-on-metal hip implants, which are required to meet 
PMA review (Meier 2013). One area of uncertainty with the new process is that the 
reform called for all reclassifications to go before a panel. Consequently, it may now 
take longer for the FDA to down-classify certain devices and additional time may be 
needed to assemble the requested panels.         
 
  The European reforms generally uphold the safety and performance 
requirements outlined in the Essential Requirements under the current approach, 
even in the case of high-risk devices (European Commission 2012b). But, the 
reforms do require greater harmonisation of evidence standards across Europe 
(European Commission 2012b), and it is encouraging that the latest reform language 
suggests that the “clinical evaluation” of devices may include not only safety and 
performance, but also clinical benefits (European Parliament 2013).     
 
Improving monitoring of post-market patient safety and quality of care  
 
  In the US and Europe, reforms have focused largely on improving post-market 
regulation to better safeguard patients’ safety and quality of care. Both jurisdictions 
introduced a unique device identifier (UDI) requirement to enhance the traceability 
of devices. In the US, device manufacturers will be required to place a UDI on the 
device’s label. Some devices will also need to be directly marked with the UDI itself. 
In addition, accompanying device information will be made available through the 
Global UDI Database (GUDID). As the FDA explained, the purpose of the UDI 
system is to provide speedy identification of devices associated with adverse events, 
assist with faster and more efficient resolution of device recalls, and deliver an 
easily-accessible source of definitive device identification.  
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  The UDI system will allow devices to be incorporated into the Sentinel 
Initiative. Sentinel proactively monitors various data sources rather than relying on 
spontaneous reporting from manufacturers and health care providers, which will 
enable the more timely identification of safety issues. The system, however, was 
initially designed to track drugs (via a National Drug Code), and adapting Sentinel to 
monitor devices has been difficult because of problems with identifying specific 
devices in the available data. The UDI system will help address this issue by 
allowing information about specific devices to be integrated into electronic patient 
health records and health insurance claims, two of Sentinel’s main data sources. UDI 
also will be able to improve other types of post-market surveillance, such as 
registries, and provide important information to and from relevant stakeholders as 
devices move from the manufacturer to the health system and eventually become part 
of patient care.  With certain exceptions, implementation of these requirements will 
be based on device class (first applied to implantable, life-saving, or life-sustaining 
devices) over a period of five years from the Final Rule, which was recently released.  
 
  The goals and general requirements of the European UDI system are similar to 
those of the US to ensure a harmonised approach to device traceability and a globally 
accepted UDI system. The European approach will also have a Europe-wide UDI 
database. Most likely, the UDI information will be included in Eudamed (European 
Parliament 2013). It remains to be seen whether member states will decide to 
develop their own UDI systems, which could reduce the UDI’s usefulness, but that 
seems unlikely if it becomes part of Eudamed.  
 
  In addition to the UDI system, the US reforms aim to improve the device recall 
system. In particular, the FDA is encouraged to proactively identify strategies for 
using recall information to improve the safety of devices and create tools to identify 
frequently recalled devices and the common root causes of safety problems. In 
addition, to ensure and speed up the completion of post-market studies, the FDA now 
requires manufacturers to submit study plans within 30 days of the agency’s order 
and to initiate studies within 15 months. 
 
  Similarly in Europe, the reform proposals under discussion are considering 
several actions to achieve a more robust post-market surveillance system. The role of 
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Eudamed will be expanded. Member states will be required to submit information 
about the registration of manufacturers and devices; any CE certificates issued, 
modified, withdrawn or rejected; vigilance activities and outcomes; and, any clinical 
investigations. Manufacturers of high-risk devices will also have to submit a written 
report of the device’s safety and performance and the outcome of the clinical 
evaluation, with the expectation that the summary be updated annually. The reform 
language also states that Eudamed should be robust and transparent and ensure 
access by the public and health care professionals to key parts of the database, such 
as vigilance and market surveillance information (European Parliament 2013). In 
addition, member states will use compatible harmonised reporting forms for adverse 
events and device deficiencies, and time lines for reporting will be established 
according to the severity of the event reported. 
 
Additional directions for high-performing medical device regulation  
 
  While the current reforms in the US and Europe will go some way to address 
the current weaknesses in both systems, additional actions could be taken to further 
improve medical device regulation (Tables 7 and 8).  
 
Pre-market evidence requirements 
 
  In Europe, there is no agreed-on requirement that the approval of medium- and 
high-risk devices be based on high-quality evidence of benefits that are relevant to 
patients. Patient safety could be improved by requiring an assessment of short- and 
long-term benefits and harms in well-designed RCTs, with the use of blinding and 
hard endpoints whenever possible. These requirements should be the same across 
member states (and Notified Bodies). There should be no region or body of least 
resistance, in which devices are approved more rapidly and on the basis of less 
evidence.    
 
  In line with more robust evidence requirements, European device reforms 
ideally would extend beyond enhanced oversight of the Notified Bodies. In 
particular, the reforms should contain a centralised review and approval process for 
high-risk (and, ideally, medium-risk) devices, with the approval of all other devices 
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going through the Notified Bodies as usual. It is encouraging that the latest reform 
proposals are moving in this direction by requiring specialized Notified Bodies to 
review certain high-risk devices. Moreover, it will be important to ensure that all 
Notified Bodies have enough in-house expertise to review an increasingly diverse 
range of devices. The new requirements for standardised processes, evidence 
requirements, and fees for Notified Bodies should protect against manufacturers 
“cherry-picking” the easiest and fastest option. It may be prudent, however, to 
eliminate the ability of manufacturers to select the Notified Body to which they 
submit their applications.     
 
  In the US, along with completing the reclassification process for devices on the 
market before 1976, the FDA should apply more stringent standards for acceptable 
predicates. Hines and colleagues (2010) discussed several issues with the existing 
use of predicates, including the permissive interpretation of intended use, disparate 
technological characteristics between the new device and predicate, and “predicate 
creep” (over time, a new device differs quite a bit from that of the original predicate). 
The agency has started to better clarify the use of predicates, which should help 
addresses some of these issues. Periodic audits of 510(k) applications and decisions 
may also help improve their adequacy, accuracy, and consistency.  
 
  Both jurisdictions could also encourage manufacturers to conduct pre-market 
studies. The current systems tend to reward “fast followers” to market that can take 
advantage of existing evidence from already marketed products. If eliminating the 
use of predicates in pre-market approval is not possible, fast followers could be 
required to generate the same clinical evidence as for other devices already on the 
market, unless there is compelling evidence of their comparable manufacture. Under 
such an approach, the first to market would set the evidence standard. This not only 
would reward manufacturers first to market by protecting against other 
manufacturers benefiting from their investment in clinical studies, but also would 
ensure that each new device is supported with evidence regarding its effectiveness, 
safety, and quality.  Other actions to support the conduct of clinical trials and 
submission of quality clinical data are guidance on appropriate clinical trial designs 
to fulfil pre-market data requirements, new methods of streamlining clinical trials, 
and early scientific advice exchanged between the FDA and manufacturers.   
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  When the evidence is insufficient at the time of approval, market access should 
be conditioned on rigorous prospective post-marketing studies to substantiate 
effectiveness and safety in real-world settings. Conditional approval would be one 
way to support innovation without burdensome overregulation while ensuring the 
patients’ safety. Given manufacturer’s poor record of completing such studies, US 
and European regulators should monitor studies more closely and take enforcement 
actions when they are delayed. In addition, comprehensive information on completed 
post-approval studies, including trial results, should be made easily accessible online. 
This would strengthen regulatory decisions and support “downstream” regulation by 
providing more robust evidence from which to inform pricing and reimbursement 
decisions. Ongoing investments in post-market data networks, such as Sentinel, 
electronic medical records, and UDI, may also help facilitate greater use of 
conditional approvals through better post-market data collection and analysis.                   
 
Post-market surveillance 
 
  Ensuring pro-active, not passive, post-marketing systems is just as important as 
strengthening pre-market authorisation. While reforms on the use of UDIs are a good 
step toward enabling the tracking and identification of devices, the true benefit of the 
UDI system will require its broad adoption and use by manufacturers, payers, 
providers, patients, and other stakeholders involved throughout the lifecycle of 
devices. Accordingly, we need strategies to facilitate the awareness, adoption, and 
implementation of the UDI system. Such efforts should focus on including UDIs in 
inventory logs, electronic health records, and claims data and linking different post-
market databases, such as the GUDID and adverse event reporting repositories. 
Moreover, providers and patients should be engaged early to report, receive, and 
retain device information as well as to tailor strategies for communicating 
information (e.g. smart phone applications that can link the identifier to the UDI 
database) to different end users.  
 
  The UDI should be included in and facilitate the use of registries. Registries, 
which collect data on large numbers of patients using observational methods, may be 
a good way to monitor the use of devices in clinical practice and evaluate their long-
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term safety and performance. Both Europe and the US have used registries to collect 
and evaluate post-market data, especially in cardiology and orthopaedics. For 
example, the National Joint Registries currently operate in the UK, Germany, and 
Italy, collecting information on hip, knee, and/or ankle replacement operations to 
monitor the devices’ performance. In the US, the Kaiser Permanente Cardiac Device 
Registry tracks and monitors pacemakers and ICDs, with data on more than 22,000 
ICD pulse generators, 52,000 pacemakers, and 90,000 leads. The registry allows the 
analysis of implant statistics, including complications, failures, replacements, usage, 
and costs.  
 
  Registries have been instrumental in identifying potential problems with a 
device or its use in practice (James et al. 2011). A recent analysis of the United 
Kingdom and French registries for transcatheter aortic valve implantation (TAVI) 
found that 25% and 20% of patients, respectively, were being treated transapically, 
which far exceeds what is justified by the clinical evidence and outside use approved 
by the FDA (Van Brabandt et al. 2012). The aforementioned SCAAR study on DES 
is another example (Lagerqvist et al. 2009).  
 
  Nonetheless, the use of registries needs to be improved. Because there is no 
consensus regarding which devices registries should include, we need criteria for 
when a device should be captured in a registry as a condition of approval and which 
devices might produce the most public health benefit from inclusion in registries. 
Ideally, this would also involve regulators working with stakeholders to establish 
basic standards for registries regarding methods, data quality, and transparency. 
Some of the main challenges with registries are adequately accounting for potential 
bias and the variability in the treatments, population, and settings captured, as well as 
the continuous development of devices. Creating a registries forum or consortium 
would be one way to bring the relevant parties together to share best practices and 
develop new methodologies for registries’ data collection and analysis. New 
registries should also be linked to routinely collected health data, national mortality 
statistics, claims data, electronic health records, and other possible sources of 
relevant information. The implementation of UDIs should, in principle, increase the 
linkage of data.    
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  Finally, given the continuous evolution of devices, regulators should require 
periodic update reports from manufacturers, especially for Class III devices. This 
could encompass information relevant to the device’s benefits and risks, including 
new study results or scientific assessments of the device’s risk-benefit ratio and 
estimates of the population exposed to the device. European regulators might 
stipulate a timeframe for beginning post-market device studies, similar to that of the 
FDA. Both jurisdictions should ensure that the results are publicly available in a 
timely manner.    
 
Transparency of processes 
 
  Recent reforms, especially in Europe, have concentrated on improving 
transparency in device regulation. One particular focus of the proposals is improving 
the public’s and health care professional’s access to information. These stakeholders 
must have access to comprehensive information on the data submitted in the 
application (with due regard to commercial confidentiality when justified), the 
rationale for the Notified Body’s decision, any post-market safety issues or defects, 
and devices that have been removed from the market. The EPARs used by the EMA 
may provide a model for communicating this type of summary. In addition, any 
request for information about a device not available publicly (from health care 
professionals, the public Competent Authorities, the commission, etc.) should be 
addressed without delay.  
 
  In the US, a public database of cleared devices would further aid transparency. 
The database could contain information about the device, a 510(k) summary, 
predicates used, and any other details pertinent to the clearance decision.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
139 
 
Table 7: Overview of existing weaknesses in US medical device regulation, recent 
reforms, and additional actions for improvement 
*Not an exhaustive list of reform actions 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
 
Aspect of 
Regulation 
Weaknesses Recent Reforms* Additional Actions Needed 
Pre-market review  Some high-risk 
devices undergo 
510(k) route 
 Lack of or 
insufficient clinical 
data 
required/submitted 
for 510(k) and 
PMA applications 
 High/inappropriate 
use of predicates 
 Poor incentives for 
manufacturers to 
conduct new 
clinical studies 
 Lag in reclassifying 
“grandfathered” 
Class II devices 
 Inefficient de novo 
process 
 Modifications to 
the de novo process 
 New 
reclassification 
procedures 
 New guidances on 
510(k) 
modifications, 
improving clinical 
trials, etc.  
 Investments in 
additional staff and 
industry training to 
enhance 
consistency and 
predictability of 
reviews 
 Apply more stringent standards 
for and review of acceptable 
predicates 
 Periodic audits of 510(k) 
applications and decisions 
 Require manufacturers that 
claim substantial equivalence 
to produce the same level of 
evidence as the first device to 
market 
 Guidance on appropriate 
clinical trial designs/data to 
fulfil pre-market data 
requirements 
 Identify and develop new 
methods of streamlining 
clinical trials 
 Early scientific advice between 
FDA and manufacturers  
 Greater use on conditional 
approvals tied to post-market 
studies, where appropriate 
Post-market 
monitoring and 
surveillance 
 Difficulty 
identifying and 
monitoring post-
market device use  
 Poor rate of adverse 
event reporting  
 Subpar completion 
rate and quality of 
post-market studies  
 
 Develop UDI  
 Inclusion of devices 
in Sentinel 
surveillance system 
 Time requirement 
for submission of 
post-market study 
plans and initiation 
of studies.   
 Recalls system to 
identify devices 
most frequently 
subject of recalls 
and underlying 
causes of recalls 
 Include UDIs in existing 
databases, data networks, and 
health information technologies 
 Create strategies to engage 
provider and patient 
involvement in collecting, 
reporting, and retaining device 
information 
 Develop tailored 
communication strategies to 
relay device information to end 
users 
 Further development and use of 
registries 
 Require post-market device 
updates from manufacturers, 
especially for high-risk devices 
Information 
provision on 
devices and 
regulatory 
processes  
 Limited access to 
information 
contained in 
manufacturer 
applications and on 
major agency 
decisions, recalls, 
and adverse events 
 No publicly 
accessible 
information on 
unapproved 
applications 
 Limited 
transparency of 
clinical investigator 
financial interests 
 New guidances on 
agency review 
processes and 
requirements 
 Quarterly and 
annual reporting on 
progress toward 
meeting agency 
performance goals 
 Requirement for 
substantive 
summary of the 
rationale for any 
significant decision 
regarding a device 
application and 
review   
 Institute a public database of 
cleared devices with device and 
510(k) information  
 Ensure results from post-
market device studies are made 
publicly available in a timely 
manner 
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Table 8: Overview of existing weaknesses in European medical device regulation, 
recent reforms, and additional actions for improvement 
 
Aspect of 
Regulation 
Weaknesses Recent Reforms* Additional Actions Needed 
Pre-market review  Devices generally 
only required to 
prove they are safe 
and work as 
intended 
(performance)  
 For most devices, 
limited 
requirements for 
clinical trial data; 
data submitted most 
often from 
laboratory tests, 
literature reviews, 
and small clinical 
studies 
 Lack of uniform 
standards and 
evidence 
requirements across 
Notified Bodies  
 Minimal 
coordination across 
Notified Bodies and 
Competent 
Authorities 
 
 Enhanced oversight 
and coordination of 
Notified Bodies 
 Greater 
harmonisation of 
the processes and 
evidence standards 
utilised by Notified 
Bodies 
 More centralised 
oversight of pre-
market process by 
the European 
Commission and 
other expert groups 
  Certain high-risk 
devices must 
undergo review by 
specialised Notified 
Bodies 
 Notified Bodies 
must demonstrate 
sufficient in-house 
expertise to review 
applications  
 Require devices to demonstrate 
safety, performance, and 
effectiveness  
 More centralised review for all 
high-risk (and ideally medium-
risk) devices 
 Consider eliminating ability of 
manufacturer to self-select 
Notified Bodies 
 Require manufacturers that 
claim equivalence to produce 
the same level of evidence as 
the first device to market 
 Guidance on appropriate 
clinical trial designs/data to 
fulfil pre-market data 
requirements 
 Identify and develop new 
methods of streamlining 
clinical trials 
 Early scientific advice between 
relevant scientific expert bodies 
and manufacturers  
 Greater use on conditional 
approvals tied to post-market 
studies, where appropriate 
Post-market 
monitoring and 
surveillance 
 Unclear and 
inconsistent 
adverse reporting to 
Eudamed 
 Vague guidelines 
on Eudamed 
requirements and 
use 
 Restricted 
information 
exchange 
opportunities via 
Eudamed 
 Difficulty 
identifying and 
monitoring post-
market device use  
 No direct 
mechanism for 
health care 
professionals and 
patients to report 
device problems 
 Subpar completion 
rate and quality of 
post-market studies  
 Develop UDI  
 Required 
submission of more 
comprehensive 
information 
collected in 
Eudamed 
 Harmonised 
safety/adverse 
event reporting 
forms across 
member states 
 Regular submission 
of device safety 
reports by 
manufacturers  
 Extend Eudamed 
access to health 
professionals and 
the public 
 Institute deadlines 
for adverse event 
reporting 
 Include UDIs in existing 
databases, data networks, and 
health information technologies 
 Create strategies to engage 
provider and patient 
involvement in collecting, 
reporting, and retaining device 
information 
 Develop tailored 
communication strategies to 
relay device information to end 
users 
 Further development and use of 
registries 
 Require post-market device 
updates from manufacturers, 
especially for high-risk devices 
 Specific timelines for initiation 
of post-market studies 
Information 
provision on 
devices and 
regulatory 
processes  
 Limited access to 
information 
contained in 
manufacturer 
applications and on 
major Notified 
  Offer public access 
to Eudamed 
 Any publicly 
available 
information must 
be written in lay 
 Ensure stakeholder access to 
information on evidence 
submitted in CE application, 
rationale for Notified Body’s 
decision, any post-market 
safety issues, and devices 
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*Not an exhaustive list of reform actions 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Body decisions, 
recalls, and adverse 
events 
 No publicly 
accessible 
information on 
unapproved 
applications 
 No EU-level 
repository of 
devices and 
relevant CE 
information 
 Post-market data 
not shared with the 
public 
language 
 Regular overviews 
of vigilance and 
surveillance 
information 
intended to be 
available to health 
care professionals 
and the public 
removed from market 
 Any requests for information 
should be made in a timely 
manner 
 Ensure results from post-
market device studies are made 
publicly available in a timely 
manner 
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Concluding remarks          
 
  Regulatory systems for medical devices have an important role in supporting 
market access to technological innovations, while duly protecting public health. In 
order to meet this aim, robust pre-market assessment and post-market vigilance are 
required. Both the US and Europe have recently introduced or are in the process of 
establishing reforms to meet this end. Such initiatives should be implemented in a 
timely manner, though additional actions will be required to enhance the reforms’ 
effectiveness. More research is needed to assess the ongoing performance of 
regulatory approaches for devices.  
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SECTION II: HEALTH TECHNOLOGY COVERAGE, 
REIMBURSEMENT, AND PRICING POLICIES 
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Study 3: Comparative analysis of pharmaceutical coverage and 
pricing in Europe: Policy levers and mechanisms and insights for the 
United States 
 
Introduction  
 
  Pharmaceuticals are a crucial and growing component of health care delivery. 
While increased demand for and use of pharmaceuticals has brought considerable 
benefits to patients and led to medical advancement, it has also resulted in 
burgeoning pharmaceutical spending (OECD 2010). This is the case in all developed 
countries, independent of the predominate source of expenditure and changes in the 
public-private mix of spending over time. In most countries, pharmaceutical 
expenditures are rising at rates greater than gross domestic product and, in some 
cases, more than other health care budgets (Vogler et al. 2008)56. Consequently, 
rising pharmaceutical costs are considered an enduring challenge and one that 
requires a complex balancing act between expenditure control, affordable and 
equitable access to beneficial treatments, and support for innovation. 
 
  European governments have introduced a variety of policy approaches, 
particularly around regulating pharmaceutical pricing and coverage, to meet these 
often competing objectives. Such policies, and their perceived political and economic 
viability, vary across countries, reflecting distinct national traditions and policy 
priorities. Comparative drug evaluation, however, is increasingly employed in 
Europe to support evidence-based pricing and coverage decisions, as governments 
aim to attain better value for money from expenditures. 
 
This paper undertakes a critical review of current policies across nine European 
countries - Denmark, England57, France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
and Switzerland. The paper first provides an analysis of national strategies to control 
pharmaceutical prices and set coverage and reimbursement levels. The discussion 
                                                            
56 Comparing pharmaceutical expenditure levels across countries is beyond the scope of this paper. However, 
there are important differences in spending due to variations in price levels, national generic drug policies, 
therapeutic mix of drugs, volume and structure of consumption, and medical norms.  
57The study focuses on pharmaceutical policy in England, but where indicated, some of the data presented refer to 
the UK as a whole.  
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then turns to the use of comparative drug evaluation in making pricing and coverage 
decisions. The paper concludes with a discussion of measures European countries 
have taken to support evidence-based coverage, reimbursement, and pricing 
decisions. Given the recent investment in CER in the US and drive toward obtaining 
greater value for the high levels of health care spending (Antos et al. 2013; Ginsburg 
et al. 2012; Schoen et al. 2013), the paper also discuss some lessons American policy 
makers might consider based on the European experience. 
 
National policy measures to control pharmaceutical prices and set coverage 
levels 
 
  To regulate access to pharmaceuticals and control prices, European countries 
employ a range of policy measures (Table 8), with the majority aiming to address 
supply-side objectives. In particular, these tools aim to ensure efficient spending, 
equitable and clinically appropriate access to high-quality medicines, and, in some 
countries, a vibrant domestic pharmaceutical industry (Mossialos et al. 2004).  
 
  Countries apply direct price controls to on-patent drugs, except in Denmark, 
England, and Germany, where prices can be freely set by manufacturers or, in some 
instances, wholesalers at market launch. However, prices are indirectly influenced by 
the reimbursement system in Denmark and Germany and within the context of the 
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) in England. In the latter case, 
indirect controls, principally in the form of profit or rate of return regulation, aim to 
ensure that manufacturers do not receive excessive profits on products financed by 
the National Health Service (NHS), while concurrently rewarding innovation 
(Mossialos et al. 2004).  
 
Within the framework of price controls, countries use a range of strategies to 
set price limits or define reimbursement amounts (Table 8). Statutory pricing, the 
most commonly used method, involves comparing proposed prices for new products 
against those prices paid by other payers (external reference pricing or international 
price comparisons), or against those prices already paid for products judged to be 
similar (internal reference pricing).  
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External reference pricing is used in all countries to set prices, except those that 
free price and Sweden58, typically based on comparisons using a basket of reference 
countries, selected according to geographic proximity and economic comparability. 
Germany, England, and France are the three countries most commonly referenced, 
driven largely by the fact that they often have prices available for reference soon 
after launch. The prices in these countries are commonly used informally in price 
negotiations internationally, even if they are not used in formal reference price 
schemes. Countries also differ in the way in which international benchmark prices 
are used, including the type of drug covered (e.g. reimbursed, patented), at what 
point in time comparisons are made, and where in the supply chain prices are 
derived.  
 
In practice, most countries use external reference pricing as one of a range of 
measures to set prices or only apply it to a limited range of drugs (Mossialos et al. 
2006). For example, France uses this approach only for reimbursed, highly 
innovative products. This is likely due to the technical challenges in making 
international price comparisons, such as the sensitivity to sample selection and units 
of measurement, as well as the general difficulty in establishing what prices are 
actually paid in reference countries given the extensive use of rebates and other 
pricing mechanisms (Danzon and Kim 1998; Mossialos et al. 2006). Moreover, such 
comparisons can create access issues, as manufacturers may be incentivised to delay 
launch in lower-priced markets (OECD 2008). 
 
Internal reference pricing is used in Denmark, Germany, Italy, and the 
Netherlands to define the maximum price or reimbursement level for defined groups 
of interchangeable drugs, typically within a therapeutic class59.  These groups of 
drugs have generally included generic drugs only, but the Netherlands includes on-
patent drugs and Germany has recently started to do so. In countries using this 
approach to set reimbursement limits, as opposed to a direct tool for price regulation 
                                                            
58 However, Sweden plans to introduce external reference pricing in 2014 and Germany recently established, via 
the new 2011 German Act to Reform the Market for Medicinal Products (AMNOG), a process where if pricing 
negotiation fail between the GBA and manufacturers, an arbitration board sets the price on the basis of the 
comparator’s price, a GBA assessment, and the price in 15 other European countries.  
59 Drugs are normally grouped together in the same reference group if they have the same chemical ingredients 
and have comparable therapeutic effects based upon the concept that they are interchangeable. 
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(Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands), coverage levels are often set at the price 
of the cheapest drug (often generic) and most drug prices converge at the reference 
price, as there are limited financial incentives to price below the reference price 
(Danzon and Ketcham 2003; Kanavos and Reinhardt 2003; Lopez-Casasnovas and 
Puig-Junoy 2000). For drugs priced above the reference price, payers either fund part 
of the premium price in the form of higher reimbursement or the additional cost is 
shifted to the patient through increased cost-sharing, with the latter being more 
common in most cases.  
 
In principle, reference pricing attempts to stimulate demand-side cost 
containment by shifting the difference in prices between branded and generic 
substitutes to the consumer, thereby incentivising patients and physicians to consider 
drug prices in decision making. However, the European experience suggests that this 
is rarely realised, as manufacturers adapt their prices to coincide with the reference 
price and physicians may prefer to prescribe products that are not included in the 
reference price scheme to avoid discussing co-payments with patients. Similar to 
external reference pricing, this approach introduces additional technical challenges, 
in that implicit judgments are often required for valuing differences across drugs as 
well as a robust empirical methodology (i.e. how products are clustered and 
reimbursement amounts set). This approach has gained popularity, however, because 
it can be effective in reducing price differences among drugs defined as therapeutic 
substitutes by improving market transparency (Giuliani et al. 2003).   
 
Internal reference pricing is also used in France, Italy, and Sweden60 to regulate 
the price of generic drugs. The generic is priced at market entry at a discount by 
reference to the price of the original product; the amount of the discount is specified 
by the regulator. In France, generic drugs must be priced at least 50 percent below 
the originator price. Other countries require a discount ranging from 20 percent 
(Italy) to 40 percent (the Netherlands) (OECD 2010). Increasingly, regulators also 
revise the price of originals at market entry; this is the case of France, where price 
reductions are not only suggested for the originator product, but also for other on-
patent drugs of the same therapeutic class at the time of generic listing.  
                                                            
60Technically more of a system of obligatory generic substitution, where substitutable drugs are clustered and 
prices not exceeding the highest price within such a group are automatically accepted for reimbursement.  
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As illustrated in Table 9, several countries apply both external and internal 
reference pricing in pricing and/or coverage determinations. This dual-approach 
functions effectively as a double budgetary “safety net”; external reference pricing 
provides a safeguard that prices do not exceed those elsewhere, where internal 
reference pricing protects against significant price differences within therapeutically 
equivalent medicines. 
 
One strategy increasingly used in Europe is CER or, more broadly, HTA61 to 
inform decisions about which drugs to include on national lists or formularies62, 
reimbursement levels, and, in some cases, pricing. It is also used to encourage high 
quality care by identifying which patients are most likely to benefit from treatment, 
optimal patterns of use, and appropriate placement in the spectrum of care 
(Drummond 2003). This approach is particularly well established in England, the 
Netherlands, and Sweden, although it is applied differently across countries, as 
discussed in further detail in the following sections.   
 
Finally, countries also use a number of ex-post mechanisms63, which seek to 
minimise the financial impact of a drug after its initial entry onto the market 
(Mossialos et al. 2003). These include price-volume agreements (France, Germany, 
Italy, Sweden); price or margin cuts (Denmark, England, France, Germany, Italy, 
Sweden, Switzerland); payback or clawback policies (England, France, Italy); and, 
discounts or rebates (France, Germany, Italy). Many of these mechanisms are 
considered blunt policy instruments and therefore may have unintended 
consequences on other policy measures. For example, payback policies may reduce 
                                                            
61HTA normally includes CER and health economic evaluation, a form of comparative analysis that, unlike CER, 
incorporates costs (and, often other factors such as social, ethical and legal considerations) as well as health 
outcomes.  
62 Almost all countries use a ‘positive’ list to indicate which drugs are eligible for public reimbursement 
(covered) in part or in full. The exceptions are England and Germany, which use a national ‘negative list’ to 
delineate products excluded from coverage. However, in these countries regional health authorities may 
formulate their own positive lists. Some countries have more than one positive or negative list due to different 
eligibility criteria and/or reimbursement rates. France, for example, has separate lists of innovative drugs, 
allowing for special funding arrangements. Spain has both positive and negative lists. 
63Price-volume agreements: prices are set according to expected or realized volume, such that if volume passes a 
threshold, the price level will decrease and/or companies have to repay the government or associated health 
insurance plan; price or margin cuts: Prices are cut (or frozen) by law or as an outcome of a negotiated 
agreement; paybacks/clawbacks: requires manufacturers to pay back a share of their revenue, if a pre-specified 
budget ceiling for public pharmaceutical expenditures is exceeded or applies to pharmacies (clawbacks), 
requiring them to pass a part of their turnover to third party payers; discounts/rebates: imposed on manufacturers 
and pharmacists, such that they have to return a part of their revenue.   
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price transparency, as it changes the effective price, but not the list price, thereby 
reducing the effectiveness of external reference pricing. However, these instruments 
have been largely effective in controlling expenditure (Espin and Rovira 2007). In 
fact, some of these policies have been introduced to attain short-term desired savings 
during the recent economic crisis (Vogler 2011).
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Table 9: Strategies to control outpatient drug prices and set coverage and reimbursement levels 
Strategies  CH DK EN FR DE IT NL SE 
Branded drugs 
Free pricing  Prices freely set 
by manufacturers, 
but indirectly 
influenced by the 
reimbursement 
system; obligatory 
price notification 
to Medicines 
Agency 
Prices freely set 
by 
manufacturers, 
but indirectly 
controlled 
through PPRS  
 Prices freely set by 
manufacturers, but 
indirectly influenced 
by the reimbursement 
system; obligatory 
price notification to 
Pharmacists 
Association 
However, external-
reference pricing-like 
procedures introduced 
in new 2012 AMNOG 
law 
  
Profit controls   Free pricing 
subject to rate 
of return 
regulation 
(PPRS) 
     
External reference 
pricing  
Applies to 
reimbursable 
drugs; 
references DK, 
DE, NL, UK 
(AT, FR, IT 
may also be 
considered) 
  Applies to 
reimbursable, 
innovative drugs; 
references DE, IT, 
SP, UK 
 Only used as 
additional information 
during price 
negotiations for 
reimbursable drugs;  
references all EU 
member states 
Applies to 
prescription-only 
medicines; references 
BE, DE, FR, UK 
Will begin to use 
in 2014 
Internal reference 
pricing 
 Applied to set 
reimbursement 
limits (not in price 
regulation); 
reference groups 
include generics 
only (via generic 
substitution 
scheme) 
  Applied to set 
reimbursement limits 
(not in price 
regulation); reference 
groups include generic 
and branded drugs   
Only used during price 
negotiations to 
determine 
reimbursement 
decision for 
reimbursable drugs 
Applied to set 
reimbursement limits 
(not in price 
regulation); reference 
groups include generic 
and branded drugs 
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Price-volume 
agreements 
   Two general types 
of schemes used: 
1) payback 
mechanism for 
excessive sales by 
therapeutic class, 
based on 
manufacturer’s 
agreed turnover, 
and 2) special 
rebates for certain 
drugs where 
prescribing 
volumes in France 
are high compared 
to other countries	 
May be agreed during 
price negotiations 
between manufacturer 
and the payer group; 
may be part of a risk-
sharing agreement 
For a limited number 
of pharmaceuticals 
(e.g. expensive drugs); 
agreement negotiated 
during the pricing 
procedure. Often 
entails a payback 
clause, where 
manufacturers must 
pay back a proportion 
of agreed target 
budgets (to the 
Ministry of Health) if 
they sell more drugs 
than expected 
 Typically used in 
the case of 
innovative drugs 
as part of risk-
sharing agreement 
Price or margin 
cuts 
Regular price 
reviews to 
assess price 
revisions 
Agreement on 
reduction in 
overall price level 
such that overall 
expenditure on 
subsidized 
pharmaceuticals is 
kept constant 
Price cut of 
1.9% on 
branded NHS 
medicines as 
part of 2009 
PPRS 
Periodic price 
reductions for new 
and expensive 
products 
Price freeze on 
reimbursable 
medicines (2010) and 
changes in structure to 
whole margin from 
2012 
Frequent use of price 
cuts and wholesale 
margin cuts 
 Annual price 
reviews to assess 
price revisions 
Paybacks/clawbacks   Linear statutory 
wholesale mark 
up with 
clawback 
A predetermined 
turnover rate is set 
for each producer 
Three thresholds 
ranging from 50-
70% payback 
growing with 
excess 
consumption 
Innovations, 
generics, and 
orphan drugs are 
exempt 
 Industry pays 40% 
excess consumption 
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Discounts/rebates    Rebates calculated 
for each 
manufacturer 
based on drug’s 
innovativeness 
(added therapeutic 
benefit and share 
of the increase in 
expenditure) 
Orphan drugs are 
exempt  
Mandatory 
manufacturer’s rebate 
to social health 
insurance (originally 
6% and increased to 
16% in 2010) 
Choice between 
payback and price cuts 
  
HTA No formal HTA 
requirements, 
but submission 
of health 
economic 
information by 
manufacturer 
recommended 
No formal HTA 
requirements, but 
submission of 
health economic 
information by 
manufacturer 
recommended 
National 
Institute of 
Health and 
Clinical 
Excellence 
(NICE) – 
assessments 
inform coverage 
decisions for 
select drugs 
(e.g. high health 
or budget 
impact) 
No formal HTA 
requirements, but 
submission of 
health economic 
information by 
manufacturer 
recommended 
Institute for Quality 
and Efficiency in 
Health Care (IQWiG) 
– assessments inform 
coverage 
decisions/reimburseme
nt price for drugs 
outside of reference 
pricing system 
Italian Medicines 
Agency (AIFA) – 
assessments only 
required to inform 
pricing decisions for 
innovative drugs 
Health Care Insurance 
Board, Committee for 
Pharmaceutical Aid 
(CHF) – assessments 
inform 
coverage/reimburseme
nt price for drugs 
outside of reference 
pricing system 
Dental and 
Pharmaceutical 
Benefits Board 
(TLV) – 
assessments 
inform pricing and 
coverage 
decisions for 
drugs  
Generic drugs 
Free pricing    Prices freely set 
by manufacturers; 
but indirectly 
influenced by the 
reimbursement 
system; obligatory 
price notification 
to Medicines 
Agency 
Internal reference 
pricing 
Priced at least 
30% lower than 
price of original 
product 
  Priced at least 
50% lower than 
price of original 
product 
Priced at least 20% 
lower than price of 
original product 
Priced at least 40% 
lower than price of 
original product 
Priced lower or 
equivalent as the 
highest price 
within a group of 
substitutable 
products 
Sources: Carone et al. (2012), IMS (2010), Vogler et al. (2008), Vogler et al. (2011), Vogler (2012) 
Denmark (DK), England (EN), France (FR), Germany (DE), Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NL), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH)
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Determining pharmaceutical pricing and coverage 
 
Given some of the limitations of more traditional direct control policies (e.g. 
price controls), decision makers have placed greater emphasis on making explicit 
assessments of a drug’s therapeutic benefit and, in some cases, cost-effectiveness to 
inform coverage and pricing determinations. Such an approach increases the scope to 
obtain better value from expenditures, where decision making is based on evidence 
of value (not simply cost) and, in principle, grounded in greater transparency. The 
following sections discuss how pricing and coverage decisions are governed and 
organised, and the processes and methods employed by different countries to make 
such determinations (Table 10).  
   
General framework and governance 
 
Across most countries, pharmaceutical coverage and pricing entails a multi-
staged process. A review or assessment of a drug’s benefits, relative benefits, and 
costs is first undertaken, followed by an appraisal (i.e. interpretation and 
consideration) of the evidence generated or considered in the assessment phase to 
inform the coverage and, sometimes, pricing decision. To that end, pricing and 
coverage determinations generally entail separate processes, but there are some 
synergies between these two functions in each country64. Coverage recommendations 
or decisions directly influence pricing determinations (to varying degrees) in some 
countries, namely France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland. In 
Germany, for example, evidence from the benefit assessment is used in price 
negotiations between the GBA and payers. In all the other jurisdictions, the 
relationship between coverage and pricing determinations is more implicit and 
indirect. Most countries consider the issue of ‘value’ at the coverage stage to help 
determine whether a product should be covered and under what conditions. Such 
considerations are not typically used to directly set the price of a treatment, but rather 
to determine the reimbursement rate and to substantiate whether it will receive a 
premium price over other drugs.    
  
                                                            
64Pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement generally follows a two-step process: first, a drug is accepted for 
coverage and second, its price is determined. In practice, however, except in countries that have free pricing, a 
loose agreement on price is reached before the coverage decision is made and a final price is agreed afterwards.   
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Centralised national agencies are involved in pharmaceutical pricing and 
coverage65; these two functions may or may not be carried out by the same body. In 
the European countries examined, the agencies assume different roles, in terms of 
decision-making authority and relation to government (Hutton et al. 2006; Sorenson 
et al. 2008a). Some agencies act in a regulatory capacity, making decisions about 
coverage and/or pricing. In several cases, these bodies typically possess an arms-
length relationship to government. Others take an advisory role, making coverage 
and/or pricing recommendations to government, often the Ministry of Health, which 
then a final determination. In countries with a direct relationship with government 
(e.g. France, the Netherlands), the Ministry of Health oversees the assessment 
process or set priorities for assessment to some degree (Hutton et al. 2006). The 
entities involved in pharmaceutical coverage and pricing can also be categorised as 
those that “produce” evidence (England, Sweden) – that is, they conduct evidence 
synthesis, economic modelling, and other studies – and those that mainly “use” 
existing evidence, typically submitted from manufacturers, to support coverage and 
pricing recommendations or decisions (Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland).   
 
Prioritising reviews  
 
Countries use different mechanisms to determine which drugs to review. 
Denmark, France, Italy, Sweden, and Switzerland, for example, evaluate every new 
drug before making a decision about coverage66. In England, only drugs referred to 
NICE are candidates for review, which are then prioritised using a variety of criteria, 
including health impact, disease burden, and clinical and policy relevance. In 
comparison, the Netherlands only assesses drugs that cannot be classified by existing 
reference pricing systems, while Germany limited evaluation to drugs that have a 
new active ingredient (or combination thereof), have economic significance to the 
SHI system, and are used in multiple setting (not only in hospitals).  
 
                                                            
65 See Velasco-Garrido et al. (2008) for a comprehensive overview of other national HTA organisations and 
activities.  
66This entails reviewing every new drug dossier submitted by manufacturers to support a coverage determination. 
Thus, in principal, manufacturers ultimately decide which drugs are reviewed. 
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Regardless of the prioritisation approach adopted, countries aim to ensure that 
the prioritisation process is as sound and transparent as possible by involving a 
variety of stakeholders in the process, publishing prioritisation criteria, and/or 
soliciting public opinions on social values and priorities. However, the degree of 
openness and transparency of the process does vary across countries. England is 
arguably the most inclusive, allowing a range of stakeholders (e.g. health experts, 
Department of Health, patient groups) to recommend potential drugs for review. 
NICE in England also publishes its criteria on its website and regularly gathers 
public perspectives on review priorities and important coverage decision criteria.    
 
Assessment requirements and procedures 
 
There are distinct differences across countries regarding what type of evidence 
or methods are required and the processes involved in the assessment. Such 
differences are due largely to differences in resource and regulatory constraints, as 
well as health system objectives. Several countries publish guidelines outlining their 
evidence and methodological requirements, but the guidelines often vary in detail 
and transparency (Sorenson et al. 2008a; Sorenson 2010).   
 
All countries require a clinical effectiveness assessment (i.e. therapeutic benefit 
and safety). In most cases, the assessment is based on evidence supplied by the 
manufacturer, but may also be informed by research conducted in-house or by an 
independent group, including systematic reviews and meta-analyses of available 
data. Data from RCTs are generally preferred to assess a drug’s comparative 
effectiveness, while a variety of approaches (cost-effectiveness, cost-utility, and cost-
benefit analyses) are accepted to demonstrate economic costs and benefits. Data to 
substantiate economic value typically derive from different types of data (clinical, 
epidemiological, demographic, economic) from different sources (studies, registries, 
databases, models). For countries requiring cost-utility analysis, a quality-adjusted 
life year (QALY) is used to measure health benefit (and cost per QALY to ascertain 
value for money). Although the QALY is broadly accepted, there is continuing 
debate regarding its limitations (Oliver and Sorenson 2010). As an alternative, 
countries such as France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland have largely rejected the 
QALY approach and instead favor the use of disease-specific measures.     
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Only England, the Netherlands, and Sweden require an economic assessment in 
drug reviews. In Germany, a cost-benefit analysis is only required if no additional 
benefit or therapeutic improvement has been found to exist and the manufacturer and 
Federal Association of Statutory Health Insurance Funds cannot reach agreement 
regarding price. Recent reforms in France (decree 2012-1116) will result in a 
requirement for economic assessments in select circumstances, namely when the 
claimed therapeutic benefit of the drug falls within the major, important, or moderate 
categories and the drug is likely to have a significant impact on care organisation, 
clinical practice, patient care, or costs (Remuzat et al. 2013). Such requirements will 
be extended to drugs applying for renewal of inclusion on the reimbursable drugs 
formulary.    
 
The data available for assessments, however, often are not sufficient or 
conclusive. Head-to-head RCTs, which are preferred by assessors, are generally 
lacking, particularly prior to or by product launch. This is partly influenced by the 
fact that the EMA does not require a comparative assessment of a drug’s efficacy, 
safety, and quality with existing therapies in pre-marketing licensing (Eichler et al. 
2010; Sorenson et al. 2011b). Beyond problems of quantity, there are issues with 
data quality, namely that studies do not always compare all possible treatments or 
patient populations and often fail to measure all relevant outcomes, particular 
economic data.  
 
To address these issues, some countries (England, Italy) offer product-specific 
scientific advice to manufacturers by reviewing early product development plans to 
assess whether they will generate the relevant evidence for future assessment. In 
addition, HTA bodies or payers in England, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and 
Sweden use risk-sharing agreements and CED schemes in limited circumstances to 
allow temporary coverage and reimbursement while the outcomes of a drug are being 
further substantiated. Risk-sharing agreements, for example, allow coverage based 
on meeting certain, specified conditions, such as cost, volume, market share, and 
cost-effectiveness targets (Adamski et al. 2010; Cook et al. 2008). If the conditions 
are not met, then coverage may be withdrawn or the drug’s price reduced. For 
example, after NICE controversially recommended against the use of various 
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products for multiple sclerosis, the government established a risk-sharing scheme 
with manufacturers to supply these treatments on the NHS. Under the scheme, 
patients were monitored annually and the amount paid for the drugs was adjusted on 
a sliding scale if patient outcomes differed from an agreed cost per QALY of no 
more than £36,000 ($59,000). The CED approach applies a similar strategy. 
Coverage is condition, based on the collection of post-market evidence and re-
evaluation (Hutton et al. 2007). These types of approaches are particularly suitable 
for severe conditions or areas of high unmet need, high-cost drugs, and situations 
where there is strong political or patient lobbying for access (Sorenson et al. 2010).  
 
In addition to its CED program, NICE in England is piloting an “Innovation 
Pass” scheme in collaboration with the Departments of Health and Science and 
Innovation, with the aim to help patients with rarer disease to get innovative new 
drugs not yet appraised by the institute. Select patients will be given access to the 
drug while additional data collected, which will contribute towards a future NICE 
assessment and appraisal.  
 
Evidence appraisal and coverage and pricing determination  
 
Based on an appraisal of the evidence, a decision is taken on whether to grant 
coverage and, in some cases, to ascertain the level of reimbursement and a final 
price. In each of these countries, a drug’s relative therapeutic benefit is the most 
important criterion in determining coverage status, followed by cost-effectiveness, 
where applicable (Sorenson et al. 2008a). Other criteria considered in coverage 
decisions include patient benefit (health-related quality of life); disease severity; 
availability of alternative therapies; public health impact; degree of innovation; 
budget impact; and social and ethical aspects, such as equity.  
 
Cost-effectiveness is particularly important for drugs that have new indications, 
are expensive, are expected to be widely used, or whose benefits differ by indication 
or patient sub-group. Some countries (England, the Netherlands, Sweden), which 
explicitly use cost-effectiveness in coverage decision making, use a cost-
effectiveness or price threshold to establish whether a drug provides sufficient value 
and to determine coverage status and, in some cases, reimbursement levels. A 
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threshold generally represents the amount of money a society is willing to pay for an 
additional unit of health outcome (i.e. an additional QALY). Such “decision rules” 
are often implicit and case-dependent. The value of the cost threshold varies by 
county: it is generally set at £20,000-£30,000 ($30,000-$45,000) in England; €20,000 
($30,000) in the Netherlands; and 500,000SEK ($62,000) in Sweden (Devlin and 
Parkin 2004; Zwart-van Rijkom et al.; Perrson and Hjelmgren 2003). The use of a 
threshold and at what value(s) it is (or should be) set at is an issue of considerable 
debate, with concerns that it is arbitrary, does not capture important measures of 
value, and may not reflect societal preferences (Kennedy 2009; McCabe et al. 2008). 
Several countries have formally taken into account these issues. For example, the 
Netherlands and Sweden are considering adopting a revised approach that adjusts the 
threshold according to need, severity of disease, or equity considerations, especially 
for certain high-cost drugs (e.g. orphan and cancer drugs). Following public 
consultation, England recently agreed to extend its threshold for drugs aimed at end 
of life care under some circumstances to facilitate cancer drug access in the NHS. 
 
Instead of a threshold France and Germany employ a ranking measure to 
represent therapeutic value and the relative benefit for new drugs. In France, the 
therapeutic value of a drug is ranked across five categories, including major benefit, 
important benefit, moderate benefit, weak benefit, and insufficient benefit67. 
Similarly, Germany’s ranking categorises drugs as follows: major added benefit, 
significant added benefit, small added benefit, an additional benefit, no added 
benefit, and benefit below alternative therapy(s). The main difference between these 
two ranking systems is that France only assesses absolute benefit, while Germany 
evaluates comparative value between the new drug and a specified comparator(s). 
However, France does consider relative benefit in its pricing determinations. 
 
Although countries are becoming more selective in coverage determinations, 
especially for expensive products, it is rare for an approved drug not be accepted for 
                                                            
67 France is planning to implement a new system called the Relative Therapeutic Index (ITR), which will 
combine the ranking scales currently used for reimbursement and pricing determination. Evidence of therapeutic 
benefit of a new drug will be assessed against a relevant comparator(s) and ranked accordingly: -1 (inferiority 
compared to the relevant comparator or use of a non-relevant comparator, unacceptable methodology, or lack of 
evidence), 0 (non-inferiority compared to the relevant comparator), 1 (minor improvement compared to the 
relevant comparator or improvement of conditions of use with impact of care and non-inferiority compared to the 
comparator), 2 (moderate improvement compared to the relevant comparator), or > 3 (major improvement 
compared to the relevant comparator).  
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any level of coverage. For example, over the last ten years, NICE, who arguably 
employs the most comprehensive reviews of the countries examined, only gave a 
negative recommendation to around seven out of its 110 or so drug appraisals. 
However, it is common for drugs to be covered with conditions based on use in 
certain indications, patient groups, treatment settings, or consumption levels. For 
instance, Germany and Sweden recommend specific first-line treatments for 
coverage, while the Netherlands determines coverage based upon patient population, 
indication, and prescribing physician (Sorenson et al. 2008a; Vogler et al. 2008).      
 
  In addition to any conditions to coverage, positive coverage decisions generally 
outline the extent of reimbursement and patient cost-sharing (if any) and any 
exemptions. All of the countries except the Netherlands employ some form of cost-
sharing for outpatient prescription drugs in the form of coinsurance (France), 
deductibles with coinsurance (Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland), or co-
payments (England, Italy). France is the only country where the level of cost-sharing 
coincides with a drug’s assessed effectiveness (Remuzat et al. 2013). Cost-sharing 
arrangements range from 30% (changed from 35% in May 2011), 65%, and 100%, 
based on “major” or “important”, “moderate”, and “weak” or “insufficient” benefit, 
respectively68. This tiered payment system aims to motivate patients (and their 
physicians) to choose high value drugs. Drugs deemed as irreplaceable and 
particularly expensive (e.g. HIV drugs) are covered in full. In countries that reference 
price, patient are often required to pay any price above the maximum reimbursement 
price. This approach assumes that some patients will be willing to pay for the 
additional benefits provided by higher-price (generally newer) drugs. Consumers 
then, in turn, send signals regarding the value they place on certain benefits. In 
practice, however, it is unclear that patients have the necessary information and 
ability to ascertain the relative benefit across products in a meaningful way. In all 
countries, however, positive lists are fairly comprehensive and cost-sharing is usually 
low, allowing patient access to medically-needed therapies69. Moreover, patients 
falling under certain categories (e.g., children under 18 years, chronically ill, low 
income) are regularly exempt (Thomson and Mossialos 2010).    
                                                            
68 Once the ITR (see footnote 55) is implemented, the level of cost-sharing will depend on which one of the five 
categories the drug is ranked and the level of reimbursement of the comparator used.  
69 If a drug is not publicly covered, it may be available through (voluntary) private health insurance, which is the 
case in England, the Netherlands, possibly Sweden, and Switzerland. However, individuals may be more likely to 
pay out-of-pocket for unlisted drugs.  
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Some countries use evidence of value to also directly inform pricing 
decisions70. In Sweden, manufacturers are required to apply to the TLV for coverage 
and reimbursement at a proposed price, so these decisions are taken concurrently 
based on clinical and cost-effectiveness evidence. While the TLV does not negotiate 
the price of the drug based on the evidence, pricing may be varied by patient 
subgroup (i.e. use in some groups may be more cost-effective than others). There 
were plans to adopt a similar approach in England, but it appears this will no longer 
be the case and the system of free pricing will remain in place. In France and 
Germany, the use of evidence is more indirect, where a drug’s therapeutic advantage 
over existing alternatives is considered in price negotiations with manufacturers.  
 
According to a European Commission Directive (Transparency Directive 
89/105/EEG), the coverage, reimbursement and pricing process is required to be 
completed within 180 days of application submission. In most countries, however, it 
takes longer to get to a final decision(s). The review process alone takes three months 
to two years on average across countries; longer review times are normally taken for 
cancer drugs and other complex therapies. The time to decision is a frequent point of 
contention with policy makers, industry, and patient groups. France, the Netherlands, 
and Switzerland offer expedited review processes for particularly innovative drugs or 
those that treat life-threatening illness, and England uses a single technology 
appraisal (STA) process to limit assessments to a single technology. STAs place 
more emphasis on manufacturer data and less on extensive systematic review and 
expert consultation, compared to its usual multiple technology appraisal (MTA) 
process.   
                                                             
Ex-post re-evaluation of pricing and coverage status  
 
While the drug assessment and appraisal process typically occurs prior to 
market launch, some countries (England, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Switzerland) also undertake systematic re-evaluations after drugs have been used in 
                                                            
70 In some countries, particularly those with reference pricing systems, evidence of therapeutic benefit can 
indirectly influence pricing decisions to the extent that it helps forms a judgement about whether or not a drug 
offers additional therapeutic value relative to similar products (ie, reference groups). If so, it may be granted a 
higher price than the reference amount.  
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practice to identify products that do not demonstrate good value or those that have 
become obsolete. Re-evaluating allows a greater range of drugs to be assessed for 
value, especially in countries where not every drug is reviewed, and helps ensure 
optimal resource use and patient care. 
  
Evidence from post-market reviews can be used to modify pricing and 
coverage status, where appropriate, or to determine areas of disinvestment (i.e. 
removal from list of publicly covered drugs). For example, Denmark operates a five-
year review process of the pricing and coverage status of existing drugs, and the TLV 
in Sweden has been evaluating all drugs approved prior to 2002 (Vogler 2008). In the 
past ten years, NICE in England has identified over 800 interventions for 
disinvestment (Garner and Littlejohns 2012) – an activity supported strongly by 
policy makers in recent years (Darzi 2008).  
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Table 10: Comparative approaches to pharmaceutical pricing and coverage decisions 
 CH DK EN FR DE IT NL SE 
Structure and Organisation 
Key agencies Federal Office of 
Public Health 
(FOPH) and the 
Federal Drug 
Commission (FDC)  
Reimbursement 
Committee of the 
Danish Medicines 
Agency (DKMA) 
National Institute 
for Health and 
Clinical 
Excellence 
(NICE) 
 
 
National Health 
Authority (HAS): 
Transparency 
Commission 
(coverage); 
Economic 
Committee for 
Health Products 
(pricing) 
Federal Joint 
Committee (GBA) 
and Institute for 
Quality and 
Efficiency in Health 
Care (IQWiG)  
Italian Medicines 
Agency (AIFA): 
Scientific and 
Technical 
Committee 
(coverage); 
Pricing and 
Reimbursement 
Committee 
(pricing) 
Health Care Insurance 
Board, Committee for 
Pharmaceutical Aid 
(CHF) 
Dental and 
Pharmaceutical 
Benefits Agency 
(TLV) 
Role in 
coverage and 
reimbursement 
decisions  
FDC evaluates and 
classifies new 
drugs and makes 
recommendation to 
FOPH, who 
renders a final 
coverage decision  
DKMA 
committee 
reviews evidence 
and renders 
coverage decision 
NICE reviews 
evidence and 
makes renders 
coverage decision 
 
 
Transparency 
Commission 
reviews evidence 
and advises on 
coverage decisions; 
Ministry of Health 
makes final listing 
decision; Economic 
Committee for 
Health Products 
considers evidence 
and renders pricing 
decision 
GBA reviews 
evidence and may 
commission the 
IQWiG to conduct a 
benefit assessment. 
GBA produces 
report, consults with 
stakeholders, and 
renders final 
coverage decision 
(initial benefit 
determination). 
Price negotiation 
and arbitration 
transpires between 
manufacturer and 
the Federal 
Association of 
Statutory Health 
Insurance Funds. 
Reviews evidence 
and renders 
coverage and 
pricing decisions 
CHF reviews evidence 
and makes 
recommendations on 
coverage and pricing;  
Ministry of Health, 
Welfare, and Sport 
makes final listing and 
pricing decisions 
Reviews evidence and 
renders coverage and 
pricing decisions 
Relationship to 
government 
Integrated Integrated Arms-length Integrated Integrated Arms-length Integrated Arms-length 
Requirements and Methods 
Prioritisation 
criteria 
Every new druga Every new druga Drugs referred by 
Department of 
Health (other 
stakeholder can 
also nominate 
Every new druga Every new drug that 
have new active 
ingredients or new 
combinations of 
active ingredients. 
Every new druga Drugs that cannot be 
classified within 
reference pricing 
system 
Every new druga 
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drugs for review), 
which are then 
prioritized based 
on a variety of 
criteria, such as 
health impact, 
disease burden, 
and clinical/policy 
relevance.  
 
Drugs that are of 
limited economic 
significance (<1 
million Euro/yr with 
SHI) and those only 
used in hospitals are 
excluded for benefit 
assessment. 
Evidence 
requirements 
RCT data for 
clinical efficacy 
preferred; health 
economic, 
epidemiologic, and 
disease burden 
information 
accepted, if 
available; 
comparative 
effectiveness with 
existing therapies 
(via internal 
reference pricing or 
therapeutic 
benefit); summary 
of the three most 
relevant clinical 
papers; Swiss and 
foreign physicians 
drug prescription 
information; 
request for and 
justification of an 
innovation bonus. 
 
Source: evidence 
from manufacturer 
dossier 
RCT data for 
clinical efficacy 
preferred; health 
economic 
information 
recommended, but 
not required to 
establish value for 
money (usually 
submitted to 
justify a high 
price) 
 
Source: evidence 
from 
manufacturer 
dossier. 
RCT data for 
clinical efficacy 
preferred; health 
economic 
information 
required to 
establish value for 
money. Other 
evidence on 
societal 
preferences, 
equity impacts, 
innovative 
characteristics, 
and budget impact 
may be submitted. 
 
Source: 
systematic 
reviews and 
analyses of 
clinical and 
economic studies; 
may or may not 
include 
manufacturer data. 
RCT data for 
clinical efficacy 
preferred; health 
economic 
information 
recommended, but 
only required in 
certain 
circumstances to 
establish value for 
money. Other 
evidence on public 
health impact, 
innovative 
characteristics, and 
budget impact may 
be submitted. 
 
An economic 
assessment is only 
required when the 
benefit claimed by 
the manufacturer fall 
in the major, 
important, or 
moderate categories 
and the drug is 
likely to have a 
significant impact 
on care organisation, 
clinical practice or 
patient care. The 
price of the drug 
may also warrant an 
economic 
assessment (if high).  
 
Source: evidence 
from manufacturer 
dossier 
RCT data for 
clinical efficacy 
preferred; number of 
patients and patients 
groups for which an 
additional benefit is 
claimed; therapy 
costs for SHI; and, 
safety information.  
 
A cost-benefit 
evaluation is only 
considered after an 
arbitration award if 
no additional benefit 
or no therapeutic 
improvement has 
been found to exist 
and the 
manufacturer and 
Federal Association 
of Statutory Health 
Insurance Funds 
cannot reach 
agreement regarding 
price.  
 
Source: evidence 
from manufacturer 
dossier 
RCT data for 
clinical efficacy 
preferred; health 
economic 
information 
recommended, but 
not required to 
establish value for 
money (mostly for 
pricing purposes); 
budget impact; 
estimated market 
share; prices and 
consumption data 
in European 
countries. 
RCT data for clinical 
efficacy preferred; 
health economic 
information required 
to establish value for 
money. Other 
evidence on innovative 
characteristics and 
budget impact may be 
submitted. 
 
Source: evidence from 
manufacturer dossier 
RCT data for clinical 
efficacy preferred; 
health economic 
information required 
to establish value for 
money. Other 
evidence on disease 
burden/severity and 
equity impacts may be 
submitted. 
 
Source: systematic 
reviews and analyses 
of clinical and 
economic studies; may 
or may not include 
manufacturer data. 
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Assessment of 
health benefit  
Comparative 
benefit assessment 
categorization 
Not specified QALY Comparative benefit 
assessment 
categorization 
 
If economic 
assessment required, 
LY or QALY used 
depending on the 
type of assessment 
Comparative benefit 
assessment 
categorization  
Comparative 
benefit assessment 
categorization 
QALY QALY 
Assessment of 
economic 
valueb 
CEA CEA, CUA CUA  
(CEA considered 
in some cases) 
CEA, CUA CBA (but only in 
certain 
circumstances) 
CEA, CBA CUA  
(CEA considered in 
some cases) 
CUA  
(CEA and CMA 
considered in some 
cases) 
Choice of 
comparator 
Existing treatment 
alternatives 
Not specified Current best 
alternative or 
routine treatment 
All relevant 
competing 
interventions 
(current best or 
routine treatment 
most common) 
Selected by GBA on 
case-by-case basis  
Most widely used 
treatment 
Routine treatment Three comparators 
required from same 
therapeutic group: 1) 
routine treatment, 2) 
nonmedical 
intervention, and 3) no 
treatment 
Principal 
outcome 
measures 
Effectiveness, 
appropriateness, 
and cost-
effectiveness 
Relevant to 
specific treatment, 
willingness to pay 
(but only to 
supplement main 
outcomes) 
Mortality, 
morbidity, quality 
of life 
Mortality, 
morbidity, quality of 
life 
Mortality, 
morbidity, health-
related quality of 
life 
Mortality, 
morbidity, disease 
specific endpoints 
Mortality, morbidity, 
quality of life 
Mortality, morbidity, 
quality of life, 
willingness to pay 
Costs Direct costs 
(mainly treatment 
costs) 
Direct costs; if 
indirect costs are 
included, must be 
reported 
separately 
Direct costs; 
indirect costs, 
depending on the 
assessment 
Varies; if indirect 
costs are included, 
must be reported 
separately 
Direct costs; indirect 
costs 
Direct and indirect 
costs 
Direct costs; if indirect 
costs are included, 
must be reported 
separately 
Direct costs; indirect 
costs, depending on 
the assessment 
Sensitivity 
analysis 
Not available Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subgroup 
analysisc  
Not available Not specified Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Applications to Coverage and Reimbursement Decisions  
Applications of 
evidence 
Used to make 
decisions on 
inclusion in the 
benefit schedule 
and any pricing or 
reimbursement 
conditions. 
Used to make 
decisions on 
inclusion in the 
benefit schedule 
and any pricing or 
reimbursement 
conditions. 
Used to make 
decisions on 
inclusion in the 
benefit schedule 
and any pricing or 
reimbursement 
conditions. Also 
Used to make 
decisions on 
inclusion in the 
benefit schedule and 
any pricing or 
reimbursement 
conditions. 
Used to make 
decisions on 
inclusion in the 
benefit schedule and 
final pricing 
decision.  
 
Used to make 
decisions on 
inclusion in the 
benefit schedule 
and 
reimbursement 
conditions. Also 
Used to make 
decisions on inclusion 
in the benefit schedule 
and any pricing or 
reimbursement 
conditions.  
 
Used to make 
decisions on inclusion 
in the benefit schedule 
and any pricing or 
reimbursement 
conditions.  
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plays a role in 
establishing 
clinical 
guidelines. 
 
 
used to negotiate 
pricing with 
manufacturer.  
 
 
  
Key decision 
criteria used to 
establish value 
Size of therapeutic 
effect, 
appropriateness, 
and cost-
effectiveness 
(although mainly 
indirectly through 
international and 
therapeutic 
benchmarking), 
burden/prevalence 
of disease, 
innovative 
characteristics.  
Size of therapeutic 
effect, relevant 
clinical endpoints, 
cost-effectiveness 
(although unclear 
if and when it is 
considered). 
Size of therapeutic 
effect, relevant 
clinical endpoints, 
clinical 
uncertainty, cost-
effectiveness, 
quality of clinical 
and economic 
modelling 
evidence, budget 
impact, equity, 
innovative 
characteristics, 
ethical/legal/social 
considerations. 
Size of therapeutic 
effect, clinical 
uncertainty, cost-
effectiveness 
(although unclear if 
and when it is 
considered), public 
health impact, 
innovative 
characteristics, 
budget impact. 
Size of therapeutic 
effect, quality of 
clinical evidence, 
availability of 
treatment 
alternatives, budget 
impact. 
Size of therapeutic 
effect, innovative 
characteristics, 
severity of 
disease, 
availability of 
treatment 
alternatives. 
Cost-
effectiveness/cost-
benefit and budget 
impact generally 
only considered in 
pricing decisions. 
Size of therapeutic 
effect, cost-
effectiveness, 
innovative 
characteristics, budget 
impact, availability of 
treatment alternatives, 
ethical/legal 
considerations. 
Size of therapeutic 
effect, cost-
effectiveness, 
burden/prevalence of 
disease, severity of 
disease, availability of 
treatment alternatives, 
equity. 
Decision 
threshold used 
No No Yes, generally set 
around £20,000-
£30,000 ($31,000-
$47,000) 
No (when CUA 
employed, the 
efficiency frontier is 
used to assess 
dominance)  
No No Yes, generally set 
around €20,000 
($27,000) 
Yes, generally set 
around 500,000 SEK 
($74,000) 
a This entails reviewing every new drug dossier submitted by manufacturers to support a coverage and reimbursement decisions. Therefore, in principal, manufacturers ultimately determine which drugs are reviewed.  
b CEA= cost-effectiveness analysis; CMA=cost-minimization analysis; CUA = cost-utility analysis. CEA is the most widely used assessment approach, of which CUA is a type of CEA. CUA uses quality-adjusted life 
years (QALYs) as the principal measure of health benefit in economic evaluation, which allows comparison of the value of money of different drugs across different therapeutic areas.  
c Subgroup analysis is used to explore how cost-effectiveness varies by characteristics of different patients or patient groups eligible for treatment. 
Sources: Sorenson et al. (2008a); Sorenson (2010); author’s compilation based on agency websites; ISPOR Pharmacoeconomic Guidelines Around the World (www.ispor.org/PEguidelines/index.asp).  
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Conclusions and insights for the United States 
 
  The analysis highlights that countries in Europe are becoming increasingly 
sophisticated in their approach to pricing and coverage policy. Governments are 
applying several measures in parallel to ensure national policy objectives are most 
effectively attained within the constraints of their respective systems. In particular, 
European countries are using technology assessments to inform coverage and pricing 
decisions, in order to ensure value for money and improve quality of care. This 
approach allows policy makers to focus financial investments on those drugs that 
offer the most value to patients and the health system, as opposed to simply those 
that are cheapest (or cost-neutral). Table 11 presents the different measures countries 
have adopted to enhance the use of evidence in drug coverage and pricing, 
particularly within the technology assessment process.  
 
Table 11: Measures to enhance evidence-based pharmaceutical coverage and 
pricing decisions  
Aim Measures 
Ensure sufficient 
evidence for 
assessments  
 Applies risk-sharing and/or coverage with evidence development 
schemes (EN, FR, IT, NL) 
 Offers ‘access schemes’ prior to coverage review (EN) 
 Collaborates with manufacturers to design studies and discuss 
data requirement prior to coverage review (EN, IT) 
Strengthen link 
between evidence 
of value and 
coverage and 
pricing decisions 
 Use of a threshold to determine value for money (EN, DE, NL, 
SE) 
 Use of value-based pricing to incorporate clinical and cost-
effectiveness evidence in pricing decisions and making pricing 
and coverage decisions concurrently (SE) 
 Employ evidence of therapeutic value to negotiate price of drugs 
(DE, FR)  
Monitor value of 
drugs post-
market and 
disinvest of low-
quality, 
ineffective 
therapies 
 Engages in post-market reviews/re-evaluation to identify areas for 
disinvestment or modify pricing and coverage status once a drug 
is used in practice (CH, DK, EN, NL, SE) 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
Denmark (DK), England (EN), France (FR), Germany (DE), Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NL), Sweden (SE), 
Switzerland (CH) 
 
  To be sure, there are challenges and outstanding problems to the 
pharmaceutical policies used in Europe, many of which were discussed previously. 
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External reference pricing, for example, is often technically challenging, in terms of 
selecting which countries to reference and determining the real prices of drugs. 
Sufficient evidence also may not be available or conclusive at the time of 
assessments. While new measures have been introduced in recent years to improve 
evidence generation, they bring other challenges. Preliminary studies on the English 
NHS risk-sharing schemes for multiple sclerosis and cancer drugs suggest significant 
challenges regarding their governance, ethics, and data collection (Briggs et al. 2010; 
Raftery 2010; Williamson 2010). There are also existing methodological issues with 
current assessment methods and concerns that they may not adequately capture all 
aspects of a drug’s value (Drummond et al. 2009; Kennedy 2009; Oliver and 
Sorenson 2009), and post-market reviews of existing drugs, while important, require 
additional resources and are political challenging if coverage status is modified.    
 
   However, the available evidence suggests that overall direct price control 
measures have been effective in containing costs (Espin and Rovira 2007; Giuliani et 
al. 2003; Lee et al. 2012). In addition, Cohen et al. (2013) found that relative to the 
approach used in the US, and in the Medicare programme in particular, the European 
evidence-based approach to coverage and reimbursement appears to result in reduced 
prices for those drugs included in national formularies (Cohen et al. 2013). The result 
is improved affordability for payers and increased access for patients. Cost-
containment is not a main health policy objective in itself and should not be confused 
with efficiency, but is one of the tools that governments use to manage 
pharmaceuticals (Mossialos et al. 2006). To the extent that evidence of value is used 
to inform coverage and reimbursement decisions, however, greater efficiency may be 
attained.   
 
  The experiences of European countries offer several insights for the United 
States. Enhancing health system efficiency and quality of care as well as reducing 
costs are central goals of recent and ongoing health reforms. Considering the 
entrenched resistance to pharmaceutical price controls in the US, there are likely few 
lessons to be learned from international pricing systems. However, important insights 
can be gained from European evidence-based drug assessment approaches to support 
coverage and reimbursement determinations. While there is no one specific national 
model that is ideal or can be wholly transferred to the US, there are particular 
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strategies that could be modified to best meet US policy needs and fit the unique 
features and complexities of the American context.  
 
  In the US, there is a lack of publicly available, accessible, and robust 
comparative information on the effectiveness of drugs and other health interventions 
(IOM 2007). This gap makes it difficult for clinicians, other decision makers, and 
patients to make informed choices on which interventions work best and under what 
circumstances. CER (or, more broadly, HTA) is one viable tool to support evidence-
based decision making on new drugs and to meet public expectations of safety, 
effectiveness, and value for money. Recent investment in PCORI offers an important 
step forward to better support a CER infrastructure in the US. To date, PCORI has 
approved 197 CER research awards totalling more than $273.5 million.  
 
  Currently, there are no blanket prohibitions in the ACA regarding the use of 
CER by public and private payers71, but it remains to be seen how such research will 
be used. Based on the experience of Europe, the uptake and impact of CER may be 
limited if it does not have the authority to formally link research with policy and 
practice. Establishing a more formal link would improve the transparency of 
coverage decisions and ensure that such policies are based on independent, scientific 
assessment. Therefore, evidence generated from CER studies should be used to 
inform coverage and/or reimbursement decisions for drugs (and other health 
interventions). In particular, comparative effectiveness evidence could be utilized to 
ascertain 1) breadth of coverage (what to pay for), 2) depth of coverage (how much 
to pay), and 3) access rights (for whom). This could apply in the context of Medicare 
as well as in the private sector, although this is already being done in the latter to 
some extent.       
 
  The objective of this approach would be to use CER as a tool to move towards 
value-based reimbursement or, more broadly, value-based insurance. In the first 
instance, CER would be employed to link positive coverage decisions with 
reimbursement levels, where the evidence for or against a drug’s comparative 
clinical effectiveness would be considered. Pearson and Bach (2010) proposed a 
                                                            
71 In the case of public payers, CER can be used for setting reimbursement rates as long as it is part of a large, 
“iterative and transparent process, which includes public comment and considers the effect on subpopulations” 
(Pearson and Bach 2010).  
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framework for linking CER to Medicare reimbursement, where different levels of 
clinical effectiveness, based on available evidence, would result in different payment 
levels. Drugs (and other services) offering greater health benefits than an existing 
alternative would receive cost-based reimbursement, while those offering only 
comparable benefits to an existing alternative would receive a “reference price” 
equal to the reimbursement rate for that alternative. New treatments for which CER 
evidence is inconclusive would receive cost-based reimbursement for a limited time, 
while further evidence is collected. If new evidence failed to demonstrate superior 
benefit, payment levels would drop down to the reference price. Although not 
commonly used by US private payers, references prices are not foreign to Medicare; 
they are already used under the guise of the “Least Costly Alternative”, which could 
help facilitate the implementation of the aforementioned framework. Evidence on the 
European experience with internal reference pricing suggests that they have resulted 
in decreased drug prices and increases in utilization of targeted medicines, while also 
reducing payer and patient expenditures (Lee et al. 2012).    
 
  In order to reap the greatest potential gain from CER and strengthen its role in 
a broader strategy towards value-based health care, however, comparative evidence 
could also be applied in the above framework to define for whom a new drug works 
best, where it is placed in the treatment pathway (i.e. 1st line, 2nd line), and co-
payment levels. For example, different payment categories could be assigned when 
CER evidence differed across patient subgroups. Moreover, the lowest co-payments 
could be used for those drugs that have the best clinical outcomes, in general or for a 
particular subset of patients. Similarly, those treatments with outcomes of less or 
highly uncertain clinical value would be granted higher co-payments. Such an 
approach is already being rolled out in several US health plans, with some initial 
evidence of resulting health gain and cost savings (Chernew et al. 2007; Choudhry et 
al. 2010; Spaulding et al. 2009). Public acceptance of this approach would likely be 
facilitated by the fact that most insurance policies have utilised some type of tiered 
co-payment structure for pharmaceutical benefits for decades (Wallack et al. 2004). 
 
Of course, there are both technical and political hurdles to implementing the 
aforementioned framework, particularly at the Federal level. Such challenges include 
clearly determining evidence requirements to ascertain if a new treatment is 
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clinically superior; garnering resources for additional data collection and re-
evaluation; modifying existing payment mechanisms to formally incorporate use of 
CER/reference prices; and, adding complexity to an already complex health care 
system. Learning from Europe, a necessary first step to address some of these issues 
would be arrive at some consensus on evidence standards and what level of certainty 
is sufficient to make judgments on superiority or ‘added value’. To allay some of the 
political constraints associated with Medicare, private health plans and state 
Medicaid programs, both of which have greater flexibility, should be encouraged and 
supported to be early adopters of this kind of reimbursement approach. Moreover, 
introduction of such measures could be done incrementally, first for only a few 
classes of drugs, before scaling up to more classes.  
 
  In closing, policy makers in Europe have increasingly turned to more evidence-
based approaches to pharmaceutical policy. There are indeed clear differences 
between the US and European health systems, due in part to divergent political and 
historical traditions, incomes, and cultural attitudes, but adoption of some of 
strategies to drug coverage, reimbursement, and pricing used in Europe could 
potentially lend to more equitable and affordable coverage for citizens and enhance 
the efficiency of the US health care system. Many of these strategies are underway or 
under discussion in the US. Examining the European experience provides an 
opportunity to enhance their development, implementation, and sustainability.    
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Study 4: Evolving reimbursement and pricing policies for devices in 
Europe and the United States and considerations of value  
 
Introduction  
 
  Given rising costs of health care and limited budgets, jurisdictions worldwide 
are increasingly concerned with getting better value from health care investments. 
This quest for value is especially evident in the case of health technologies, such as 
pharmaceuticals and medical devices, which account for a growing proportion of 
health care expenditures in almost all countries in the OECD.  
 
  The US spends more on health technology per capita than does Europe, 
without evidence of commensurate gains in health outcomes (OECD 2011). A range 
of factors influence the higher US spending, including higher prices paid for 
technologies; a larger volume of certain procedures, such as hip and knee implants; a 
greater supply or use of hospitals and doctors; and, the possibility of more readily 
accessible technology (Kaiser Family Foundation 2012; Squires 2012). For example, 
in 2009 the rate of knee replacement in the US was about 75 percent higher than the 
OECD median (OECD 2011).   
 
  One way Europe has been able to maintain lower spending levels is through the 
use of national coverage, reimbursement, and pricing policies that place greater 
emphasis on cost containment, efficiency, and affordability, compared to the US 
(Mossialos et al. 2004; Mossialos et al. 2006). Historically, European countries have 
employed various approaches, such as reference pricing, price volume discounts, 
price cuts, and centralised purchasing, to meet these ends.  
 
  Over the past ten years, however, European decision makers have shifted their 
focus from simple cost control to obtaining better value from investments made in 
new interventions (Sorenson et al. 2008a). Consequently, most European countries 
have established some system of technology assessment (HTA) to apply in 
conjunction with other policy tools. These value-based programs evaluate and weigh 
the available evidence on the clinical and cost-effectiveness of select interventions to 
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determine their value for money. The evidence is then used to inform or guide 
national and regional coverage and reimbursement – and, in some cases, pricing – 
decisions.   
 
  Although the US has traditionally failed to exercise a similar cost-conscious 
approach toward health technology, US policy makers and other stakeholders are 
increasingly focused on transforming the health system into one that seeks value, 
especially in light of current economic difficulties. For instance, the ACA made 
substantial investments in CER and in other reforms that promote value in Medicare 
payment and delivery systems. To date, however, comparative policy analyses and 
the overall discourse about health technology reimbursement and pricing in the US 
and elsewhere have focused on pharmaceuticals. Given the growing number and 
complexity of medical devices on the market, the time is ripe to examine 
reimbursement and pricing policies relating to those technologies. This article 
compares such policies in Europe and the US, with a particular focus on 
considerations of value. We also explore various policy initiatives, some of which 
have already been implemented in the US and European countries, to better support 
value-based device reimbursement and pricing.   
 
Device reimbursement and pricing 
 
Europe 
 
  In Europe, coverage and reimbursement of devices typically occurs through 
publicly financed national health care systems. Such systems cover approximately 
four-fifths of the populations of the four largest device markets: Germany, France, 
the UK, and Italy (Cappellaro et al. 2011). In principle, all member states are equal. 
Market approval of a device in one country should provide access to other markets 
through the CE marking process, which denotes that the device is safe and functions 
according to the intended purpose described by the manufacturer.  
 
  In practice, however, institutional arrangements for financing differ among 
countries, which can result in divergent coverage, reimbursement, and pricing 
decisions for a particular device (Schreyogg et al. 2009; Torbica and Cappellaro 
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2010). In France, for example, a centralised body makes reimbursement decisions 
after assessing the safety and effectiveness of individual devices. Similar bodies in 
England and Germany conduct broader assessments of device types or procedures 
and include other considerations, such as cost and cost-effectiveness. In contrast, 
coverage and reimbursement decisions in Italy and Spain are delegated to the various 
regions, which apply their own methods and requirements.  
 
  Prior to making coverage decisions, European jurisdictions typically require 
that high-risk, innovative, or costly devices, such as implantable technologies, 
undergo a HTA. An example of this process is the assessment of coronary stents by 
NICE in the UK. In its appraisal, the institute considered clinical trial evidence and 
cost-effectiveness data submitted by several manufacturers and an independent 
assessment group. Based on the evidence, the institute recommended use of the 
device only in a subset of patients at high risk of restenosis (Box 2). 
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Box 2: Examples of a device HTA in the UK 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
The HTA processes required by each country differ with respect to the 
methods, evidence, processes, and criteria used to determine coverage (Sorenson et 
al. 2008a). However, all countries require that a device demonstrate therapeutic 
benefit, such as improved morbidity, mortality, or quality of life. In some countries, 
such as England and the Netherlands, evidence of cost-effectiveness is also required 
and measured against a value for money threshold. In some cases, the available 
evidence for a particular device is insufficient or inconclusive to support a coverage 
determination. Consequently, some European countries, including England, France, 
and the Netherlands, have established policies that offer restricted coverage for 
patients enrolled in studies designed to collect better data on safety and effectiveness. 
Once enough evidence is generated, the coverage decision is revisited to determine 
whether coverage should be extended to a broader patient population, restricted to 
certain patients, or removed altogether. For instance, NICE has applied its “only in 
Background and rationale of the assessment: In October 2003, the National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence (NICE) in the United Kingdom conducted a technology appraisal of coronary stents. A critical 
feature of the appraisal was to determine the criteria for using the newer, more expensive, drug-eluting stents 
(DES), as an alternative to bare metal stents (BMS). 
Evidence considered in the assessment: The Institute reviewed 12 clinical trials comparing BMS with DES. 
Of these, seven involved paclitaxel, four sirolimus, one everolimus and one actinomycin drug-eluting stents. 
The evidence for the different DES was considered separately. In addition, evidence on cost-effectiveness 
was supplied in submissions made by the four manufacturers and an independent assessment group appointed 
by the Institute. The available evidence was considered by the Technology Appraisal Committee, an expert 
committee consisting of epidemiologists, economists, clinical experts and health service managers.  
Appraisal determination: The Committee considered that, for single-vessel disease, restenosis rates were in 
general low using a BMS in the majority of patients requiring a percutaneous coronary intervention and 
therefore the routine use of a DES was not justified. However, this was not the case for patients presenting 
with either small-calibre arteries (<3 mm) or long lesions (>15 mm). In these patients, the risk of restenosis 
using a BMS was considerably higher, and that the absolute reduction in restenosis rates would justify the use 
of a DES. This conclusion was reinforced by the cost-effectiveness evidence. The incremental cost-
effectiveness of DES, expressed as the incremental cost per quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) gained, was 
£94,000 for the total population of patients with single vessel disease, but below NICE’s threshold of £20,000 
per QALY gained for the patients with long lesions and narrow vessels. 
Re-evaluation: Common to all NICE guidance, the guidance on the use of DES was reviewed five years later 
in July 2008. Although the clinical evidence on DES was more extensive, the major change in the intervening 
period was that the cost difference between the two types of stents had increased, primarily because of a 
greater reduction in the price of BMS. Therefore, in the revised guidance the Institute recommended that DES 
be used for the same sub-groups of the patient population, but only if the price difference between DES and 
BMS did not exceed £300.  
Sources: National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (2003) Technology Appraisal 71. Guidance on 
the use of coronary stents. London: NICE; National Institute for health and Clinical Excellence. (2008) 
Technology Appraisal 152. Drug-eluting stents for the treatment of coronary artery disease. London: NICE. 
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research” policy to laparoscopic surgery for colorectal cancer and endovascular stent 
insertion for intracranial atherosclerotic disease (Chalkidou et al. 2007). 
 
  Once coverage is determined, most European countries use prospective 
payment systems to determine reimbursement rates. In some cases, these payments 
reflect value, such as when a new diagnosis-related group (DRG) or payment amount 
is calculated for a new device that is based on evidence or guidance from HTA or 
other sources. However, because payment systems in many countries are updated 
infrequently, they may not adequately reimburse new technologies, especially those 
that are particularly innovative or costly. The lack of sufficient payment may provide 
a disincentive for hospitals to adopt and use new devices that may be beneficial, 
because the payment amount is below actual costs (Scheller-Kreinsen et al. 2011).  
 
  To address this issue, Germany, the UK, France, Italy, Spain, and Sweden have 
introduced separate or supplementary payments to provide partial or total 
reimbursements for potentially beneficial devices until they are fully captured by the 
payment system, either though a new DRG or an increase in the reimbursement price 
(Scheller-Kreinsen et al. 2011). Such payments are negotiated nationally or locally 
with manufacturers, hospitals, or other local authorities, and they are generally 
temporary, lasting two to three years. Most of the countries using this approach – 
particularly Germany, the UK, and France – consider evidence of therapeutic benefit 
and, in some cases, cost-effectiveness to determine whether a technology is eligible 
for the short-term payment.   
 
  Although hospitals are encouraged to collect evidence on the health outcomes 
and costs associated with a new medical device during the temporary payment 
period, there is limited evidence available to substantiate whether this is achieved. To 
date, these payments have been applied to drug-eluting stents, gastric bands (for 
weight loss), cochlear implants, and hip and knee prostheses, among other 
technologies. For low-risk and typically low-cost devices, such as crutches and 
incontinence pads, coverage and reimbursement are generally determined at the 
hospital level or through centralized public purchasing arrangements. In many 
countries, including France, Germany, and England, hospitals are increasingly 
entering into collaborative purchasing partnerships to negotiate lower prices, and 
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they are encouraged to do so by their respective departments or ministries of health. 
Either way, reimbursement prices are derived through reference pricing for similar 
existing devices or through a competitive public-tender process (Scheller-Kreinsen et 
al. 2011). Unlike more complex, higher-cost devices, these types of devices do not 
normally undergo a health technology assessment to determine value. 
 
United States 
 
  Similar to other areas of health care in the US, coverage and reimbursement for 
devices are the responsibility of both public and private payers. The CMS, the largest 
public payer, provides coverage for the vast majority of devices once they earn 
approval from the FDA. After approval, most devices do not require a formal 
coverage determination, partly because of Medicare’s prospective payment system – 
DRGs for inpatient care and ambulatory service categories for outpatient care. These 
payment mechanisms, which bundle items into an episode of care, allow payment for 
new technologies that offer incremental improvements over existing technologies or 
services. In effect, the provider simply determines coverage within the constraints of 
the fixed prospective payment. For a limited number of devices each year, however, 
CMS conducts a national coverage determination (NCD). Although there is no 
coherent framework for activating NCDs, this process is typically prompted by new 
technologies with major clinical or economic impacts – such as implantable 
cardioverter defibrillators – and important new evidence, substantial variation in 
local coverage decisions, or concerns about inappropriate use. All other explicit 
coverage decisions are made locally by the private insurance carriers with which 
CMS contracts to administer Medicare coverage.  
 
  NCDs are made through an evidence-based process, which besides CMS’s own 
research is supported by evidence from manufacturers, physicians, and other entities, 
such as the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). In some cases, 
coverage determinations may also be made via consultation with the Medicare 
Evidence Development and Coverage Advisory Committee (MedCAC), which 
provides independent and expert advice to CMS on various clinical issues. Such 
evidence is used to determine the degree of benefit conferred by the devices 
compared to standard treatment alternatives. Unlike processes in some European 
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countries, NCDs do not explicitly require or consider evidence of cost-effectiveness, 
which has proved politically controversial (Chambers et al. 2010).  
 
  Despite these procedures, designed to improve CMS’s ability to make 
informed decisions about the underlying value of a technology, existing evidence 
suggests that in the majority of cases, positive NCDs are based on poor or limited 
evidence from clinical studies (Neumann et al. 2008). However, in cases where 
technologies offer promise, but have been inadequately studied to support a NCD, 
the CMS can approve coverage of a device under a clinical trial or another protocol, 
such as an observational study or patient registry, until the required evidence is 
amassed. This approach, called “coverage with evidence development”, has been 
applied to a few devices to date, including implantable cardioverter defibrillators, 
angioplasty of the carotid artery with stenting, cochlear implants, and left ventricular 
assist devices.  
 
  For local coverage determinations, depending on the technology or service 
considered, local administrative contractors make decisions relying on an evidence 
base that ranges from no evidence to peer-reviewed RCTs (Foote et al. 2004), which 
may be one reason why local contractor coverage often varies considerably.  
 
  The amount paid by Medicare is determined through a prospective payment for 
an episode of care or a retrospective payment for an episode of care or a retrospective 
fee-for-service payment for the actual service, or device, provided. With limited 
exceptions, CMS does not currently consider a device’s comparative effectiveness or 
its cost relative to alternative treatment options in its pricing. Rather, payments are 
based on estimates of average cost for the provision of the particular device or 
bundle of care.  
 
  Similar to the situation in Europe, some beneficial yet costly new devices used 
in patient care may be granted separate “add-on payments” to account for the high 
cost of new technology relative to the base DRG payment and to encourage providers 
to adopt the technology (Clyde et al. 2008). To receive these payments, devices must 
be new and high cost, and they must substantially improve the diagnosis or treatment 
of beneficiaries, compared to existing treatment alternatives. In such cases, the 
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devices might offer a treatment option for patients unresponsive to current therapy, 
diagnose conditions that are currently undetectable, provide meaningful impacts to 
patient management, or substantially improve clinical outcomes. Similar payments, 
called “pass-through payments” and employing the same eligibility criteria, are used 
for devices provided in the outpatient setting. For add-on payments, Medicare pays 
an amount equal to 50 percent of the additional costs of treating a case using the new 
device, which is capped at 50 percent of the estimated cost of the new technology. 
Pass-through payments are made equal to 100 percent of the reported costs of the 
new device minus the device costs already built into the base payment rate. A device 
is eligible for an add-on or pass-through payment until data reflecting its costs are 
used to recalibrate the appropriate diagnosis-related group weights, generally two to 
three years after the new technology has entered the market.     
 
  Add-on payments have been extended less frequently than pass-through 
payments. Fewer than ten technologies have been approved for add-on payments, 
while pass-through payments have been made for more than a hundred different 
device categories. The majority of add-on payments made to date have been for 
implantable medical devices, while a wider range of devices have received pass-
through payments.  
 
  Private payers cover about two-thirds of the US population. There is 
considerable diversity among insurance plans’ coverage and reimbursement policies. 
Private payers sometimes look to CMS NCDs to guide their decisions, but largely 
develop independent policies based on the goals of the individual plan. Private 
insurers also tend to make coverage decisions more quickly after FDA approval than 
does Medicare, although the speed of decisions made by private payers depends on 
the amount and quality of evidence of clinical benefit (Basu and Hassenplug 2012). 
 
  Private payers are increasingly considering evidence of value to support 
formulary and tier placement decisions and in applying preauthorisation or utilisation 
reviews. For example, WellPoint draws on comparative effectiveness evidence and 
on input from panels of medical experts to assign existing and new treatments to one 
of four value tiers (Academy Health 2010). Both the Blue Cross Blue Shield 
Association and Kaiser Permanente have established institutional policies and 
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dedicated funding for in-house or external programs that generate evidence to 
support coverage determinations and clinical practice guidelines. Other, smaller 
health insurers and health plans often rely on independent research organisations to 
provide evidence reports on new devices and other technologies. Similar to 
Medicare, when evidence is considered, private payers tend to consider effectiveness, 
not costs or cost-effectiveness (at least not explicitly).    
 
  Private insurers rarely directly reimburse devices. Rather, insurers negotiate 
payment terms directly with physicians and hospitals, where each medical procedure 
or episode of care is reimbursed at a specified or negotiated amount that must cover 
the price of the device along with other items – such as supplies, labour, and facility 
costs – that are part of the procedure or care episodes. Negotiated reimbursement 
amounts are rarely based on whether a technology is more effective, or easier or 
more efficient to use, than existing treatment alternatives.   
 
United States versus Europe 
 
  As highlighted in the overview, there are distinct differences in the approaches 
that Europe and the US take toward reimbursing and pricing medical devices. 
European countries have more centralised processes for making coverage 
determinations than the US, which has a patchwork of public and private payers that 
may employ different processes and criteria to make decisions.  
 
  Moreover, compared to the US, Europe more formally and consistently 
considers value to determine which technologies to cover, especially complex, costly 
ones. In the US, a limited number of devices actually undergo a formal value 
assessment at the time of a coverage decision, especially within the public sector. 
Europe also places more emphasis on accounting for cost-effectiveness. In the US, 
cost-effectiveness raises concerns about the formal rationing of care and whether 
such analyses can adequately capture the value of interventions for different 
population subgroups.  
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  There are similarities, however. Both the US and Europe tend to use evidence 
of value more frequently to support coverage decisions than to guide reimbursement 
or price decisions. However, the US and many countries in Europe have introduced 
temporary payment mechanisms to provide increased reimbursement for beneficial, 
but costly, technologies. These approaches aim to allow payers to balance the goals 
of ensuring adequate payment for beneficial new technologies and being prudent 
purchasers. For the selected number of technologies that receive such payments in 
the US and Europe, evidence of therapeutic benefits play a central role in 
determining eligibility. Costs are also considered, with a number of European 
countries also accounting for cost-effectiveness. Finally, where evidence is applied in 
coverage policies, both jurisdictions are often faced with having limited information 
to inform decisions.  
 
  The lack of high-quality evidence for making informed coverage decisions 
means that coverage may be provided for a new device based on fair or poor 
evidence or that access to potentially beneficial technologies may be delayed or 
denied until better evidence is available. Conditional coverage with evidence 
generation has therefore gained some use in recent years. 
 
Policies to improve value-based device reimbursement and pricing  
 
  We outline and discuss potential initiatives to obtain better value in health care 
in Europe and the US, highlighting their possible advantages and disadvantages. 
 
Fostering pre- and post-market evidence  
 
  One of the main challenges in ensuring adequate evidence of effectiveness to 
make coverage and reimbursement decisions is that such data are not generally 
required for market approval. Following recalls of articular surface hip prostheses 
and PIP breast implants, however, the FDA and European regulators are now 
considering an overhaul of the current regulatory frameworks for medical devices 
with a particular focus on strengthening premarket requirements for high-risk 
technologies (European Commission 2012; Institute of Medicine 2011). 	
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  One action that both European and US regulators should consider is raising the 
pre-market evidence requirements for new devices. Current requirements allow 
clinical evaluations of most new devices to be based on similar existing (predicate) 
technologies rather than the actual device in question, and the clinical data submitted 
to be based on a literature review along. Current systems therefore reward ‘fast 
followers’ that can take advantage of existing evidence about similar products that 
are already on the market.  
 
  Instead of simply assuming that devices of a given type are equivalent, fast 
followers could be required to generate the same level of evidence as exists for other 
devices already on the market. Discussions could take place between regulators and 
the first manufacturer to determine the level of evidence required—for example, a 
registry or a randomised controlled trial. Imposing such a requirement would not 
only give industry an incentive to undertake clinical studies on new devices and 
foster a better understanding of the comparative differences between devices, but it 
would also enhance public health protection. 
 
  Regulators should supplement efforts to strengthen premarket evidence with 
incentives and, where possible, requirements for post-market evidence generation. 
Pre-market evidence is often not ideal for ‘real-world’ decision making because of 
uncertainty regarding long-term outcomes, effectiveness in different practice 
settings, and benefits and risks to populations that are not well represented in clinical 
trials. 
 
  The various approaches to coverage with evidence development for new 
technologies in Europe and the US offer some opportunities to ensure that sufficient 
post-market evidence is available to inform coverage determinations. Although CED 
has been used on a limited basis, it has provided evidence that otherwise might not 
have been obtained. However, substantial improvements to this approach are needed. 
Because it has been used on a limited basis, clear and predictable criteria for its 
application and methods are lacking. There are also challenges in delineating well-
defined funding sources to cover the large research costs and an infrastructure to 
collect and share data. 
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	 	 CED should be aligned with existing mechanisms to expand electronically 
available health data, including longitudinal patient registries; electronic health 
records; and, in the United States, claims data collection and analyses. Some 
European countries— including Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the UK —have 
introduced registries, particularly in orthopedics and cardiology, to collect post-
market data. Typically, medical associations, academic centers, and national research 
organisations collaboratively support these registries. 
 
  Similarly, the PCORI and the NIH in the US could provide support for an 
ongoing infrastructure for registries or clinical trials in major clinical areas. The 
involvement of clinicians or medical associations may prove particularly helpful, 
given their early contribution to device development and acquired early knowledge 
of particular technologies (Wilmshurst 2011). These efforts would help ensure that 
the necessary data are generated to support CED schemes and, ideally, that better 
evidence exists to make informed coverage decisions in the first place.  
 
  Given the substantial expense and time involved in collecting reliable data on 
new technologies, more public-private collaboration would be desirable. One 
approach would be for payers and regulators to provide scientific advice and 
manufacturers to ensure that clinical studies meet the evidence requirements for both 
market authorisation and coverage and reimbursement. In relation, concurrent review 
of devices by regulators and payers could help reduce evidence generation burdens 
and thereby allow beneficial technologies to reach patients more quickly. In the US, 
for example, the FDA and CMS have initiated a voluntary, two-year “parallel 
review” program for devices, which entails a partial alignment of their respective 
review processes for regulatory approval and coverage, respectively (Messner and 
Tunis 2012).  
 
Exploring new approaches for assessing value 
 
  Another possible initiative would be to establish new methods for assessing the 
value of devices. Devices have particular characteristics that introduce unique 
challenges to measuring their value (Drummond et al. 2009; Sorenson et al. 2011a).  
For instance, devices undergo frequent modifications following initial development, 
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which means that they do not “stand still” long enough during the period of 
randomised controlled trials to allow for adequate data collection. Moreover, 
accurate or effective use of devices often depends on the skills and training of the 
health professionals who use them, especially for those devices used in surgery 
(Sorenson et al. 2011a). Practitioners may acquire more expertise with a device over 
time—or move along the “learning curve”—even over the period of a trial (Guillou 
et al. 2005).   
 
  Some of these issues can be tackled through the use of tracker trials, which 
begin in the early stages of technology development and follow the evolution of a 
device (Lilford et al. 2000), but these are not commonly conducted. Although not 
officially required by the regulator, the trial of endovascular aneurysm repair, a 
procedure using a stent, is an example of a trial using this approach (Brown et al. 
2012).  
 
  Alternative study methods might also be better suited to medical devices. 
Although randomised controlled trials are considered the gold standard, there is 
increasing recognition that alternative study approaches may be suitable in some 
instances. For example, the CER initiative in the US has focused attention on 
pragmatic randomised controlled trials, which take place in real-world practices as 
well as observational studies and patient registries (Dreyer et al. 2010; Chalkidou et 
al. 2012).  
 
Linking evidence of value to reimbursement 
 
  Value-based reimbursement, an approach increasingly of interest to US private 
payers, may provide a viable option to better incorporate evidence into 
reimbursement decisions. In a survey of employer-sponsored health plans, Niteesh 
Choudhry and co-authors (2010) estimated that 81 percent of large employers plan to 
offer this approach in the near future.  
 
  This approach sets different reimbursement rates for different levels of clinical 
effectiveness, based on available evidence. It may also entail differential copayments 
for treatments of demonstrated high value versus those of questionable or low value, 
  
184 
 
and it aims to encourage the use of services when the clinical benefits exceed the 
cost. The approach may likewise discourage use when the benefits do not justify the 
expenditure. This may also help remove financial barriers to beneficial technologies 
and thereby increase patients’ compliance with treatment (Maciejewski et al. 2010), 
which in turn can improve health outcomes, rein in costs, and assist in controlling 
total spending by health plans or hospitals. Elements of this approach could also be 
employed in Europe, but given the absence of cost sharing, evidence of value could 
not be tied to copayments.  
 
  A related strategy that could be considered is the use of performance-based 
reimbursement and pricing strategies that link payments to patient outcomes. For 
example, a certain reimbursement price may be set—and later modified— according 
to whether the device is used in accordance with evidence-based clinical guidelines 
or produces satisfactory clinical outcomes. Using such strategies, payers may face 
less financial risk from the treatment of demographically different patient groups that 
were not included in clinical trial testing or that did not demonstrate substantial 
improvement (Towse and Garrison 2010). This approach has been used on a limited 
basis in Europe and by private payers in the US, but only with regard to 
pharmaceuticals, not devices. 
 
  These approaches need to be applied with care, however. The few 
performance-based schemes implemented for pharmaceuticals in Europe have been 
costly to administer and marked by difficulties regarding oversight, methodological 
requirements, and ethical considerations (Raftery 2009). Such challenges may be 
more pronounced in the case of devices. In addition, even in cases where the 
available evidence demonstrates that a device provides low value, it may prove 
administratively and politically difficult for payers to disinvest from the technology 
once it has diffused into practice (Elshaug et al. 2007).  
 
Conclusion 
 
  Policy makers and other stakeholders in Europe and the US are increasingly 
concerned with getter value from investments made in technological innovation. One 
potential solution is to rely more heavily on studies of the effectiveness and costs of 
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new technologies to inform coverage, reimbursement, and pricing decisions. 
Historically, such efforts have largely focused on pharmaceuticals. But with the 
growth in the number and complexity of devices, the US and Europe have shown 
interest in applying evidence of value in coverage and reimbursement decisions, 
albeit with varying degrees of implementation and success. 
 
  Although these strategies are still unfolding, we have outlined a number of 
them that could help support the timely generation of evidence to inform value-based 
decisions about reimbursement and pricing for devices. Further discussion and 
research are needed on the various options to substantiate their effectiveness, best 
practices, and areas for improvement. 
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SECTION III: IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES 
ASSOCIATED WITH POLICIES TO IMPROVE HEALTH 
TECHNOLOGY REGULATION  
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Study 5: The evolution and impact of health technology assessment 
in Europe 
 
Introduction 
 
  Few issues in health policy have generated more commentary, and perhaps 
more controversy, than HTA. Over the last 30 years, several European countries have 
established agencies and programmes to carry out HTA; there is now a flourishing 
research sector to support assessments; and its use in decision making has provoked 
much discussion within academic and policy circles. Although HTA was initially 
considered to be primarily an academic exercise, it is now used to support coverage 
and pricing decisions; inform the development of clinical practice guidelines and 
quality standards; develop public health programmes; and aid purchasing or 
disinvestment decisions (Sorenson et al. 2008a). 
 
  While HTA has advanced most rapidly within Europe, it had its origins in the 
US with the OTA in the early 1970s, which sought to provide policy makers with 
information on the economic, social and legal impacts of modern technology 
(Goodman 2004). The OTA was later disbanded principally due to political reasons, 
but it served as a model for other countries, namely those in the European 
community (OTA 1996). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the soaring costs of 
health care and emerging concerns about the effectiveness of many existing medical 
practices and variation in access to care in Europe spurred interest in HTA (Oliver et 
al. 2004). With governments (and other decision makers) increasingly required to 
efficiently and equitably allocate resources among available health-care technologies, 
it was recognised their costs and benefits needed to be assessed. HTA was also 
considered a potential mechanism to help policy makers justify or legitimise 
rationing decisions and render the process more transparent. The first institutions or 
bodies dedicated to HTA were established in France and Spain in the early 1980s and 
in Sweden a few years later in 1987 (Velasco-Garrido and Busse 2005). These early 
efforts aimed to provide unbiased, scientifically rigorous assessments of health 
technologies and other interventions (e.g. procedures) for a wide range of end users, 
including policy makers, payers, physicians and patients. A decade or so later, 
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several other countries, including England and Germany, instituted new agencies or 
programmes to carry out HTA. In recent years, several Central and Eastern European 
countries, such as Poland and Hungry, have followed suit. HTA programmes and 
activities have also been established at regional and local levels in many countries 
(Velasco-Garrido et al. 2008). 
 
  HTA in Europe has undergone notable growth and change since the initial 
establishment of these institutions and programmes. This paper reflects upon this 
evolution and discusses key developments over the last 10 years, with a focus on 
England, France, Germany and Sweden. All of these countries have significant 
experience or a long history of using HTA and have influenced the approach used in 
other countries. In particular, we discuss how HTA has evolved over time in these 
countries, in terms of organisation and governance, objectives and scope, processes 
and procedures, stakeholder involvement, assessment methods, applications to 
decision making and implementation; its impact on various outcomes; and key 
similarities and differences between countries. We focus principally on the following 
national bodies: NICE (England); the Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health 
Care, IQWiG (Germany); French National Health Authority, HAS (France); and the 
Dental and Pharmaceutical Benefits Agency, TLV (Sweden).72 Existing comparative 
research highlights that while these national agencies share some of the same basic 
objectives, there are divergences in how HTA is configured and operates within the 
health-care system (Chalkidou et al. 2009; Sorenson et al. 2008a; Velasco-Garrido 
and Busse 2005). 
 
Key developments in HTA 
 
Organisation and governance 
 
  The organisation and governance of HTA in the various countries has 
witnessed significant changes over the last 10 years or so. In general, there has been 
an expansion in the number of HTA bodies and breadth of activities in each country, 
                                                            
72 See Velasco-Garrido et al. (2008) for a comprehensive overview of other national HTA organisations and 
activities.  
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with one or more entities assuming a key regulatory or advisory role73 in policy 
making, typically with regards to coverage and reimbursement and, sometimes, 
pricing decisions. In some countries, such as France and England, there has been 
some degree of reorganisation to consolidate and rationalise assessment functions. 
	
	 	 In Germany, HTA came to the fore principally over the last 10 years. The 2000 
health-care reform law (Statutory Health Insurance Reform Act of 2000) first 
established a Coordinating Committee responsible for technology assessment in the 
hospital sector (IQWiG 2010a). The law also charged the German Institute for 
Medical Documentation and Information (DIMDI) with the administration of a 
federally funded HTA programme to provide evidence in support of decision making 
processes in health care (Perleth et al. 2009). The German Agency of Health 
Technology Assessment (DAHTA) was later created within DIMDI. Another round 
of reforms in 2004 (SHI Modernization Act) established the Federal Joint Committee 
(GBA) to serve as the supreme decision-making body of the ‘self-governed’ health-
care system; its directives define the provision and reimbursement of a wide range of 
health technologies as well as non-medical treatment within the benefit package 
(Gerhardus 2006). In the same year, IQWiG was founded to serve as an independent 
advisory body that conducts assessments on the benefits and harms of medical 
interventions (IQWiG 2010a). One reason for IQWiG’s creation was to strengthen 
the use of evidence-based medicine and to aid the GBA’s appraisals based on ‘the 
principles of effectiveness, necessity and cost-effectiveness’ (Perleth et al. 2009). 
  
  Similarly, in Sweden, the Pharmaceutical Benefits Board (LFN, later the TLV 
after expanding its remit to include dental care) was introduced in 2002 following 
reforms aimed at enhancing the cost-effective use of pharmaceuticals and ensuring 
equal benefits across the country. The TLV significantly changed the introduction of 
drugs in Sweden; rather than automatic reimbursement within the benefit scheme, 
reimbursement and pricing decisions were based on an assessment of available 
evidence, with resultant appraisal underpinned by the principles outlined in the 1982 
Health and Medical Service Act – health dignity, need and solidarity, and cost-
effectiveness (Sorenson et al. 2008a). 
                                                            
73 A regulatory role involves direct decision-making authority, whereas an advisory function entails making 
recommendations to a governmental body. 
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  While HTA has always been highly centralised in France, in 2004 the French 
National Health Authority (Haute Autorite´ de Sante´, HAS), established by the 
Health Insurance Reform Act, replaced the previous National Agency for 
Accreditation and Evaluation and assumed the directorate responsible for HTA at the 
French Medicine Agency, in attempts to place all activities focused on improving 
quality of care under the remit of one body. Besides ensuring greater efficiency, the 
reorganisation was driven by a desire to facilitate equity within the health-care 
system. HAS’ responsibilities are diverse, including technology assessments, best 
care standards, guideline publication and health organisation and professional 
accreditation.  
 
  The breadth of organisations involved in HTA in England has always been 
diverse. During the 1970s and 1980s, a growing number of bodies, from the Medical 
Research Council to the Department of Health and universities, became involved in 
HTA. Later, in the early 1990s, a national HTA programme was established to set 
research priorities, commission HTA studies, and disseminate reports. During this 
time, there was increasing concern over national variations in care (‘post-code 
prescribing’) and a desire to ‘de-politicise’ decisions about which technologies to 
cover in the NHS. In response to these issues, NICE was established in 1999 to serve 
as an arms-length organisation that employs the best available methods to provide 
national guidance on health technologies, interventional and diagnostic procedures 
and clinical guidelines. In 2004, NICE assumed the responsibilities of the Health 
Development Agency, expanding its remit to include the evaluation of public health 
interventions (e.g. preventive screenings, smoking cessation). Following recent 
transitions in government, NICE’s role in the NHS is set to expand further in the next 
year or so, with a role in social care and responsibility for setting quality standards 
(e.g. stroke, dementia), which will feed into various commissioning activities, 
regulation and pay-for-performance schemes. At the same time, other functions of 
NICE’s work may well evolve, with the announcement of the move towards value-
based pricing (Department of Health 2010). 
 
	 	 There are some important differences in the role these organisations play in 
HTA. In England and Sweden, NICE and the TLV, respectively, are regulatory 
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bodies with direct decision-making authority and are involved in both the assessment 
and appraisal process. In contrast, IQWiG in Germany is positioned further 
downstream in the decision-making process, where it assumes an advisory role, as 
does the French HAS, an arrangement arguably influenced by their social insurance-
based health-care systems. IQWiG and HAS conduct assessments and make 
recommendations on coverage and reimbursement, generally regarding 
pharmaceuticals, to the GBA and Ministry of Health, respectively, who appraise the 
evidence and render a final determination. HAS also advises individual insurance 
plans responsible for decisions regarding other types of health services. As a result of 
their regulatory function, the workings of NICE and the TLV are more closely linked 
to, and therefore influential, in the policy-making process, which we discuss further 
in the following sections. 
 
Objectives and scope 
 
  The objectives guiding assessment requirements and methods have changed 
over time. All four agencies were established to improve the effectiveness and 
quality of health care through their activities, but only NICE and the TLV also 
focused on efficiency or value for money, based on cost-effectiveness analysis, as an 
explicit aim of HTA. Recent reforms in France and Germany, however, have 
introduced such objectives to HAS and, to some extent, IQWiG (Chalkidou et al. 
2009; Chevreul and Durand-Zaleski 2009).  
 
  In 2008, the French Social Security Finance Act introduced the consideration 
of value for money in HAS’s reviews and recommendations. A HAS Commission for 
Economic Evaluation and Public Health (Commission e´valuation e´conomique etde 
sante´ publique, CEESP) was established to oversee the integration of cost-
effectiveness into public decision making as well as clinical practice. The CEESP 
will issue a recommendation on a drug’s cost-effectiveness, which will be considered 
alongside advice regarding reimbursement and pricing. However, cost-effectiveness 
will only be considered when reassessing classes of drugs, medical devices, or 
organisational aspects of health delivery already in use; new technologies will 
continue to be evaluated primarily on therapeutic benefit. To date, the use and 
  
192 
 
implementation of this new approach is uncertain and currently under discussion 
(Chevreul and Durand-Zaleski, 2009). 
 
	 	 A new German law (Neuordnung des Arzneimittelmarktes, AMNOG) enacted 
in January 2011 now requires an early assessment of the benefit of medical products. 
Following regulatory approval, the GBA will assess whether the new medical 
product demonstrates additional benefit in comparison to a corresponding established 
therapy. Assessment of added benefit will be based largely on manufacturer data 
(e.g. clinical studies) and principally relate to relative effectiveness, although costs of 
the therapy will also be considered. Evidence of cost-effectiveness will only be 
sought if a price cannot be negotiated between the manufacturer and the sickness 
funds based on the GBA relative effectiveness and cost–benefit assessment. 
Chalkidou et al. (2009) suggest that such changes in both countries were driven by 
the recognition that the lack of early and comparative evaluation was limiting 
comprehensive assessments, and by the growing need to prioritise expenditure across 
different types of health technologies. 
 
  The scope of HTA activities undertaken by these agencies has also evolved. 
While the focus on assessments has been principally on pharmaceuticals, this has 
expanded over recent years to include other technologies and interventions. For 
example, NICE assesses not only drugs, but also public health interventions, surgical 
procedures, and has recently established a separate technology appraisal programme 
for medical devices (Sorenson et al. 2008b). HAS also evaluates a wide range of 
health-care interventions. Expanding HTA to non-pharmaceuticals, however, has 
introduced new procedural and methodological challenges (Sorenson et al. 2011a). In 
the case of medical devices, for example, application of existing evidence standards 
– developed with pharmaceuticals in mind – can be problematic, as randomised 
controlled trials are often unavailable or too small to detect meaningful differences in 
clinical and economic outcomes between technologies. Moreover, devices are often 
developed iteratively, so there is unlikely to be a substantial ‘steady state’ period 
when all relevant evidence can be collected and evaluated.    
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Processes and procedures 
 
  Increasingly over the last decade, it has been debated that good process in HTA 
is important, at least from an instrumental perspective (Culyer and Lomas 2006). 
While the notion of ‘best practices’ for conducting assessments continues to evolve, 
consensus is coalescing around several dimensions (Drummond et al. 2008; 
Chalkidou et al. 2009). Good process entails independence for those conducting 
assessments; transparency; openness about those involved in the assessment process; 
explicit timelines for completing assessments; opportunities for stakeholder input; 
and clear rules for appealing decisions. 
 
  While it is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate each country on these 
principles, it is possible to note several developments in this area. As discussed 
earlier, most HTA bodies operate with a degree of independence from government 
and recognise and strive to protect against any conflict of interest in their processes 
and policies (Chalkidou et al. 2009). In England, NICE has increasingly made its 
processes and guidance publicly available to improve transparency. With the same 
aims in mind, IQWiG publishes previously unpublished (manufacturer) data 
considered in benefit assessments (IQWiG 2008) and the TLV publishes its decisions 
on its website. Both England and Sweden have also instituted formal appeals 
processes. Finally, all four agencies afford opportunities to stakeholders to contribute 
input on various aspects of the assessment process, which we discuss subsequently in 
further detail, with some countries, such as Germany, making it a legal requirement. 
 
  Although steps have been taken to improve the HTA process, there are 
potential trade-offs involved. For example, opportunities for stakeholder input and 
appeals can delay assessments and resulting decisions (Haycox 2008). Greater 
transparency can leave the HTA process open to challenge by stakeholders. 
Additionally, it can be argued that procedural aims or principles are often context-
specific and therefore adhering to one particular set of expectations and practices 
across systems or even decisions may not desirable or appropriate. 
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Stakeholder involvement 
 
  As highlighted above, countries have sought to increase stakeholder 
involvement in various aspects of HTA in recent years as a way to enhance the 
relevance, acceptance, transparency and legitimacy of the process (Abelson et al. 
2007; Milewa and Barry 2005; Milewa 2006; Syrett, 2003). In addition, stakeholder 
involvement was seen as a way to acquire important information on new treatments 
and people’s medical preferences and values. Today, various stakeholder groups, 
including industry representatives, health professionals and patients and patient 
groups are participants in HTAs.  
 
  Manufacturers have assumed an increasingly integral role in HTA processes. In 
all countries, they submit evidence to be used or considered in assessments. In 
England, France and Germany, industry representatives also serve on assessment or 
appraisal committees that review the available evidence and develop 
recommendations. Given the growing number and diversity of new technologies, 
which often add more complex evidence and assessment requirements, HTA 
agencies have looked to work with industry more closely to outline evidence 
requirements and scope assessments. For example, in 2008, IQWiG launched its 
programme ‘IQWiG in dialogue’, which aims to offer representatives from the 
scientific community, industry and the Institute the opportunity for scientific and 
technical discussions on various topics related to the work of the Institute (IQWiG 
2010b). Similarly, health professionals, medical associations and payers are often 
involved in assessment or appraisal committees. The GBA, for example, includes 
members from associations of physicians, hospitals and sickness funds, along with 
patient representatives, as does many of IQWiG’s governing boards and advisory 
panels (Nasser and Sawicki 2009). NICE recently established a comparable body, a 
Partners Council, to engage with industry, NHS managers, clinicians and academics 
to discuss strategic challenges (Chalkidou et al. 2009). It also offers Scientific 
Advice, a fee-for-service consultation to manufacturers to ensure their early product 
development plans generate relevant evidence for future submissions to the institute. 
All of these stakeholder groups, in addition to manufacturers, patient groups and the 
general public, are also offered opportunities to identify topics for assessment in 
most countries. 
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  Historically, patients, consumer groups and the public have been the least 
involved or represented in the HTA process, but this has changed over time. In 
England, for example, NICE established a Citizens Council in 2002 to gather public 
perspectives on key issues that inform the development of the Institute’s guidance. 
The council was partly a response to criticism that the ethical and social aspects of 
decisions were not being sufficiently articulated and that NICE was recommending 
too many new drugs, sometimes heavily influenced by industry and interest groups, 
leading to aggravated forms of implicit rationing elsewhere (Cookson et al. 2001; 
Devlin et al. 2003). The council is comprised of lay members reflective of the 
broader population; health professionals, industry and interest group representatives 
are precluded from participation. To date, the council has discussed such issues as 
clinical need, age and rare conditions. In recent years, HAS and IQWiG have 
established similar opportunities for these stakeholder groups. HAS, for example, 
holds patient and consumer focus groups and public debates to explore sensitive and 
controversial topics and these groups may be members of document revision groups, 
which aim at improving the comprehensibility of guidance. 
 
  However, stakeholder involvement is not without challenge. For example, it 
has been argued that the opinions of clinicians and other professional actors often 
take precedence over more ‘lay’ representatives in assessment committee or working 
group meetings, especially given the latter almost never argue against health 
technologies and more frequently make more emotion-driven arguments (Milewa 
and Barry 2005; Milewa 2006). This is due, in part, to the fact that patient group 
representatives, for example, are often personally invested in ensuring access to a 
particular technology or treatment, but also because they are sometimes affiliated 
with or funded by pharmaceutical companies74. Milewa (2006) suggests that the 
perspectives of ‘non-professionals’ are thus more likely to have their credibility or 
legitimacy questioned.  
 
  In relation, a growing role for industry in the HTA process raises concerns 
about the potential for ‘regulatory capture’, where manufacturers influence regulators 
through lobbying, superior information (i.e. about the products under assessment), 
                                                            
74 Only HAS requires industry to declare funding of patient groups. 
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and potentially other means to guard against unfavourable regulation. Other invested 
stakeholders, such as patients and the general public, however, face major obstacles, 
such as limited resources and a lack of information, to exercise influence (Olson 
1965). Consequently, decisions may ensue against the interests of a broader range of 
stakeholders and biased in favour of industry, a highly resourced group with 
significant stakes in resulting policy (Schlozman and Tierney 1986). 
 
  A broader concern is that, overall, increased stakeholder involvement has not 
substantially resulted in greater consideration of a broad range of views and values, 
but rather serves to merely justify or legitimise difficult decisions or those that would 
be taken anyway. Indeed, explicit resource allocation can heighten the politicisation 
of decisions (Oberlander et al. 1994). Therefore, stakeholder involvement may be a 
mechanism to minimise potential challenges regarding their rationality and 
legitimacy and the assessment process in general. 
 
Assessment methods 
 
  There have also been several key developments in assessment methods over 
the last 10 years. Generally, assessments can involve different methodological 
components, including a clinical effectiveness assessment (i.e. therapeutic benefit, 
safety) and an economic evaluation, typically involving cost-effectiveness analysis. 
They can also evaluate broader social and ethical impacts. 
 
  In England, NICE has been recognised for its methodological rigour and, in 
particular, its assessment guidelines, which set standards for consistency and 
compatibility of the studies submitted to NICE. One of the more contentious aspects 
of the guidelines is NICE’s requirement for the use of QALYs to measure health 
benefit (NICE 2008a). Although the QALY is broadly accepted, there is some debate 
regarding its limitations, namely that there are methodological problems with its use 
and that it does not fully capture the social value of interventions (Johnson 2009; 
Oliver and Sorenson 2009).  Drummond (2009) also notes that NICE has been 
influential on other methodological approaches, most notably in the use of mixed 
treatment comparisons in the use of probabilistic sensitivity analysis to account for 
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uncertainty surrounding cost-effectiveness estimates. The TLV in Sweden also 
adopted and uses the QALY approach. 
 
  In contrast, HAS uses a expected service (service attendu, SMR) and added 
value (ASR) ranking to determine the coverage and pricing, respectively, of new 
drugs and devices. Technologies are evaluated alone to determine their therapeutic 
benefit using the SMR rating and then against comparator products using the ASR 
ranking, where they are graded from I to V, with I indicating a major improvement 
over existing treatments and V denoting no therapeutic benefit or added benefit 
compared to existing alternatives. HAS has also developed a new ‘social benefit 
measure’ (service rendua` la collectivite´) to allow for assessments to not only 
evaluate the therapeutic benefits of interventions, but also economic endpoints and 
important ethical, social and legal considerations (National Health Authority 2007). 
While its use to date has been limited to screening programmes, ongoing discussions 
suggest that it may be applied to pharmaceuticals and other interventions. 
 
  Germany has also taken a different approach. In 2009, IQWiG, in line with its 
expanded remit to consider costs, adopted an alternative approach, ‘efficiency 
frontier analysis’. This method, which has generated considerable debate within the 
scientific community in and outside of Germany,75 uses prior funding decisions for 
similar products in the same disease area to determine the maximum ceiling 
reimbursement level for a drug. However, no decisions using the efficiency frontier 
have been made to date and IQWIG’s recommendations continue to rely almost 
entirely on cost-minimisation analysis, which does not assess efficiency. 
 
  In response to criticisms that the time taken to assess technologies76 poses 
barriers to patient access to new treatments, HTA bodies in England, France and 
Germany have established new expedited processes and methods for evaluating 
certain categories of drugs, typically those that are deemed highly innovative or for 
those treating life-threatening illnesses. England, for example, is increasingly 
                                                            
75 Critics argue that the efficiency frontier approach fails to reflect international standards of economic evaluation 
and that it potentially hinders effective resource allocation, as it does not allow decisions to be made across 
different therapeutic areas. However, one reason underpinning this approach is that it is not possible under 
German law to deny drugs above a set standard threshold; rather, the aim is to determine a fair price that reflects 
additional clinical benefit (Bundesgesundheitsministerium 2008). 
76 On average, assessments take between three months to two years, depending on the HTA body, drug, 
indication and extent of available data. 
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conducting more single technology appraisals (STAs), which consider only a single 
technology in a single indication and rely principally on manufacturer submitted 
data, rather than a de novo analysis. Research on the impact of STAs indicate that 
they reduce the time to publication of guidance by about eight months compared to 
the usual multiple technology appraisal process (Casson et al. 2013). However, 
appeals against the final appraisal determination have more than doubled the time it 
takes for STAs to conclude. In Germany, the new reforms will require manufacturers 
to submit their evidence dossiers to the G-BA and IQWiG and agree on a price 
within one year. However, it is important to note that greater timeliness may come at 
a price, in the form of less robust assessments and reduced stakeholder input. 
 
Applying evidence to decision making 
	
	 	 Evidence generated by assessments is subsequently used to support decisions 
(appraisal) on the value of new technologies. Countries differ, however, in terms of 
what criteria are considered in the appraisal process. All countries, for example, 
prioritise evidence on therapeutic benefit (Sorenson et al. 2008a), but to date, only 
NICE and the TLV explicitly consider cost-effectiveness. Cost-effectiveness data is 
appraised using a decision threshold, measured in cost per QALY, to support 
determinations of value for money. The threshold differs between countries and is 
often implicit and case dependent. It has been estimated that NICE’s and TLV’s 
threshold ranges from £20,000–£30,000 to £45,000–£50,000, respectively (Devlin 
and Parkin 2004; NICE 2008a; Persson and Hjelmgren 2003; Rawlins and Culyer 
2004). 
 
  However, there have been recent debates around whether the threshold should 
be raised (or lowered) and if a broader range of decision criteria, reflecting political, 
social and ethical considerations, should be more formally integrated into decision 
making (Kennedy 2009; NICE 2008b; Raftery 2010a; Towse, 2009). Discussions 
around these issues stemmed partly from concerns that certain patient populations 
(e.g. those with rare or orphan conditions or terminal disease, elderly and disabled) 
were disadvantaged by existing decision rules and that the value of innovation was 
not accurately captured by current approaches. In recent years, both NICE and the 
TLV have considered adopting or have applied a revised approach to the threshold in 
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certain circumstances. Sweden, for example, has discussed adjusting the threshold to 
better account for need or equity considerations, decision criteria outlined in the 
Board’s founding principles, especially for drugs that are potentially expensive or 
address unmet medical needs. NICE recently extended its threshold for drugs aimed 
at end-of-life care under some circumstances to facilitate cancer drug access in the 
NHS, albeit under intense media, ministerial and public pressure to do so. While 
decision makers do consider other criteria (e.g. disease burden, equity, innovation), 
at both the assessment and appraisal stage, it is often unclear (and lacking 
transparency) what aspects are indeed considered and with what weight (Kennedy 
2009). This is likely in part reflective of the need and desire of decision makers to 
maintain a degree of flexibility to consider political influences or other context 
specific factors of importance. 
 
	 	 The different national approaches to assessments and the appraisal process 
begs the question whether HTA bodies arrive at the same or different decisions. A 
recent study by Kanavos et al. (2010) examining all decisions made by six HTA 
agencies between 2007 and 2009, including NICE, HAS and the TLV, found a 
significant degree of heterogeneity across the coverage decisions made by the 
different agencies, with outcomes differing in more than half of the cases. A closer 
examination of agency decisions across similar cancer, central nervous system and 
orphan drugs showed a number of factors driving the differences in decisions, 
including divergent clinical and economic evidence requirements, preferred clinical 
endpoints, data interpretation, choice of comparator and use of cost-effectiveness 
thresholds. For example, compared to NICE, the TLV was more willing to consider 
need over cost, as intimated earlier, approving drugs beyond the threshold, up to 
£75,000, when there is high clinical need in certain sub-populations. Other research 
(Bending, Hutton and McGrath 2010; Patel et al. 2010) on cancer drugs substantiates 
the influence of evidence requirements, where agencies (i.e. NICE) focused on cost-
effectiveness less frequently gave positive recommendations (about 50%) compared 
with those only requiring evidence of clinical effectiveness (i.e. HAS). 
 
	 	 Data availability and quality may also play a role in differential decisions 
across countries, introducing uncertainty into the appraisal process and opportunities 
for misinterpretations of existing evidence. In response, all four HTA agencies are 
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experimenting with new approaches to generate better pre-and post-market data. For 
example, all countries have recently employed some form of coverage with CED, 
risk-sharing agreements, or patient access schemes, where coverage of a technology 
is made conditional based on arrangements for additional post-market evidence 
collection or meeting certain health or financial outcome targets. Concurrently, 
agencies are assuming greater involvement in prospective data generation (Chalkidou 
et al. 2009). NICE, for example, does so through its ‘only in research’ option of 
conditional reimbursement (Chalkidou et al. 2008), with a similar programme in use 
in Germany and under consideration by HAS in France. Such programmes condition 
the use of an intervention to those patients receiving it as part of a well-designed 
programme of research, and are typically applied when there is insufficient evidence 
to make a conclusive coverage or reimbursement decision. These approaches, 
however, often require more sophisticated data collection and assessment methods 
and additional time and resources, thereby potentially adding further complexity to 
the HTA process. Increased analytical sophistication could result in making 
assessment findings less understandable and transparent and therefore more exposed 
to resistance by decisions makers and other stakeholders. A recent commentary 
(Raftery 2010b) on the English NHS multiple sclerosis risk-sharing scheme 
highlights potential issues of governance, methodological requirements and ethics 
raised by these arrangements. 
 
Implementation 
 
  The implementation of HTA-based decisions has assumed greater importance 
over the last decade. Although implementation was originally beyond the initial 
remit of almost all four bodies (Chalkidou et al. 2009), most have subsequently 
strengthened their focus on this issue, with NICE taking the most comprehensive 
approach77. Since 2004, NICE has operated an implementation programme to 
support guidance adoption and to evaluate the uptake of guidance. Additionally, 
financial and regulatory levers are employed in England to promote adoption (e.g. 
funding mandate that creates an entitlement for patients to access technologies 
receiving a positive NICE recommendation) and strengthen links between guidance 
                                                            
77 In Germany, the G-BA is responsible for implementation, not IQWiG. 
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and performance standards and payment systems; financial incentives are also used 
in Sweden. 
 
Evaluations of impact 
 
	 	 The rise of and investment in HTA in Europe, and in the four countries in 
particular, raises the question whether and how it has impacted policy and practice. 
As Jacob and McGregor (1997) note, ‘‘however excellent an HTA may be, if it fails 
to influence the workings of the health care system, it is without impact and must be 
considered without value’’. In this discussion, we examine the direct impact of HTA 
on the following dimensions: (1) whether assessments are reflected in decisions or 
linked with policy; (2) if policy is adopted and integrated into clinical practice; and 
(3) the extent to which changes in practice result in better outcomes, in terms of 
health and/or budget impact. We also discuss its indirect impact on innovation. 
 
Influence of coverage and reimbursement decisions 
 
  The impact of HTA on national policy varies across and within countries, but is 
arguably a function of the regulatory and legislative authority and instruments 
available to each HTA body. As intimated earlier, HTA has been most directly 
influential on national policy in England and Sweden, particularly with regards to 
pharmaceutical coverage and reimbursement. For example, as previously mentioned, 
in the case of NICE, the NHS Constitution makes all positive NICE decisions an 
entitlement, and in Sweden, a positive approval decision by the TLV is required for a 
pharmaceutical to be made available on the health system. In Germany, the GBA is 
not mandated to follow IQWiG’s recommendations, although it is required to 
provide justification if its policies deviate from the Institute’s advisement. This is 
also true in the French context, where HAS only gives an opinion to the Ministry of 
Health. However, available evidence suggest more than 95% of HAS 
recommendations are followed (Rochaix and Xerri 2009). Moreover, in the German 
case, under law, new drugs and inpatient medical services are covered by default and 
are assessed for possible exclusion only if the GBA requests an evaluation by 
IQWiG. Consequently, Germany pays higher prices and covers more new drugs than 
other European countries (Nasser and Sawicki 2009). However, the 2011 reform 
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strived to address this issue by requiring early comparative benefit assessment to 
prevent additional cost and harm of medical services without proof of benefit.  
 
  For countries with some level of decentralised decision making regarding 
access to or funding of treatments, there is concern that HTA has had less of an 
impact, or an inconsistent impact, on policy making at the local level. For example, 
as NICE only examines a fraction of all services provided across the NHS, most local 
decisions are not supported by HTA. Moreover, given funding mandates for local 
implementation of NICE technology appraisal guidance, concerns have been raised 
that implementation requirements potentially shift resources away from other, more 
cost-effective services (Devlin et al. 2003; Sheldon et al. 2004), although it is not 
clear what these services may be, as the opportunity costs of adopting particular 
technologies are not considered in assessments and local authorities rarely have 
formal mechanisms in place or the resources to make such judgements (Appleby et 
al. 2009; Audit Commission, 2005; Chisholm et al. 2009). In the Swedish context, 
Anell and Persson (2005) indicate that is not clear the extent to which formulary 
committees, organised by the county councils, consider available HTA-generated 
recommendations, particularly economic evidence, to support decision making, and 
that the  recommendations of the committees and the TLV often differ. Furthermore, 
HTAs may be limited in accounting for important geographic specificities in local 
policy making, in that use of a technology may be cost-effective in one region, but 
not in another due to different clinical practice patterns or patient population 
characteristics and needs. 
  
	 	 The impact of HTA on policy is also dependent on the particular circumstances 
surrounding an assessment or decision. For instance, decision makers may not fully 
understand or accept an assessment, resulting evidence, or final recommendation, 
and even if they do, the consequences (e.g. a negative recommendation to adopt a 
given technology) may not always be accepted, especially if it results in challenge 
from industry, clinicians, patients and the general public. In Germany, for example, 
the Federal Constitutional Court challenged an earlier decision that restricted 
reimbursement for bioresonance therapy following request for treatment from a 19-
year-old patient suffering from Duchenne muscular dystrophy. Based on the life-
threatening nature of the illness, sickness funds were required to cover the treatment 
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despite a lack of solid scientific basis demonstrating benefit (Schmidt and Kreis 
2009). Similarly in England, various stakeholder groups have pressured policy 
makers to circumvent negative NICE decisions on cancer drugs and multiple 
sclerosis treatments, and as a potential by-product, the new coalition government 
announced intentions to create a ‘cancer fund’ to pay for oncology therapies rejected 
by NICE.  
 
  Williams and Bryan (2007) suggest the more high profile the decision body or 
the decision being taken, the more likely external stakeholder groups and the media 
are likely to intervene if decisions are viewed as negative. For example, HTA 
decisions can significantly impact potential financial gains (or losses) for 
manufacturers, so they understandably exercise voice to ensure such interests are 
protected, especially if the decision of a particular HTA body has some degree of 
international influence, as in the case of NICE. Besides political considerations, 
assessments may or may not be influential in decisions depending on administrative 
capacities, equity concerns, broader societal preferences, and decision makers own 
values and experiences (Goddard et al. 2006; Owen-Smith et al. 2010). Furthermore, 
the evidence generated by HTAs may not sufficiently meet the information needs of 
decision makers or may not be made available early enough to benefit decisions 
(Hutton et al. 2006; Williams and Bryan 2007). 
	
Clinical practice 
	
	 	 The available evidence evaluating the influence of HTA on clinical practice is 
sparse and predominately relates to NICE. Several studies concluded that practice 
generally reflected the recommendations of the NICE technology appraisal(s) 
evaluated (National Cancer Director 2006; NICE 2006a, 2006b), but generally more 
so in the case of pharmaceuticals than procedures and devices (Sheldon et al. 2004). 
Other researchers, however, found limited impact on practice patterns and evidence 
of a high degree of regional variation in guidance adoption (Brickwood 2004; 
Hitchen 2008; Owen-Smith et al. 2010).78 Yet, for some interventions, particularly 
cancer and obesity drugs, there is evidence of improved uptake of NICE-approved 
                                                            
78 It is important to note that some of these studies were conducted prior to making implementation of technology 
appraisals mandatory and recent initiatives to improve guidance uptake. 
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therapies and reduced regional variation in care (Department of Health 2009; 
Sheldon et al, 2004). In a qualitative analysis of stakeholder perspectives on the 
usefulness of NICE guidance in practice (Owen-Smith et al. 2010), clinicians 
generally agreed with the importance of evidence-based medicine and found 
guidance useful, but its utility declined in certain contexts: the secondary care 
setting, when requisite funding was insufficient, and when they disagreed with the 
recommendations. Interestingly, several practitioners noted that the existence of 
NICE guidance can make it more difficult to resist patient demands, resulting in 
overtreatment, but that when the Institute said ‘no’ or placed restrictions on access, it 
offered a ‘good defence’ against blame for rationing treatment. 
 
	 	 Similar conclusions regarding impacts on practice can be drawn in the French 
context. Criticisms have been raised that the process of disseminating guidelines is 
not well-structured and that adherence amongst physicians is poor, even though they 
are legally required to follow them in most cases. Moreover, guidelines are 
frequently produced on clinical issues that are not well-defined (i.e. little clinical 
certainty exists) and do not reflect areas where the most significant practice 
variations exist. Commentators have argued for better tools to prioritise and update 
or revise guidelines in attempts to be more responsive to emerging topics and 
stakeholder needs (Caniard 2002). The influence of HTA on clinical practice 
depends partly on available incentives for guidance adoption, in addition to strong 
professional support and a clear and robust evidence base demonstrating a given 
treatment provides value (Sheldon et al. 2004). Several countries have therefore 
introduced a range of mechanisms to support practitioner uptake, including the use of 
financial incentives, such as provider performance standards, and through 
educational and training programmes to enhance understanding of HTAs and how to 
access and interpret associated evidence. For example, the newly proposed Best 
Practice Tariff in England aims to align provider payment with NICE clinical 
guidelines by providing additional payment for delivering services that meet quality 
standards. To enhance professional support, a network of local experts was 
developed in Sweden help to ensure HTAs are applied in clinical practice (Sorenson 
et al. 2008a). 
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Health and economic outcomes 
 
  There is limited evidence demonstrating the health and/or budget impact 
attributable to changes in policy and practices associated with HTA. Some 
proponents of HTA promulgate its use based on conclusions that it reduces health-
care costs. However, cost containment or cost-savings was never an objective of any 
of the four national bodies (Chalkidou et al. 2009), with aims of better quality of 
care, equitable access to care, and value for money taking precedence. In the case of 
NICE, its guidance has most likely been cost-increasing, in the order of £1.65 billion 
per year in additional NHS investment (NICE 2009). This is not surprising since 
most interventions that are deemed cost-effective are more expensive than their 
comparator interventions. The French HAS also claims that any adoption of cost-
effectiveness analysis would not be used to save money (by reducing services), but 
attain more efficient use of resources (Chalkidou et al. 2009). 
 
  Whether overall costs increase or decrease as a result of HTA and how this 
should be evaluated depends on a number of factors. One issue relates to the baseline 
or starting point from which to derive conclusions about cost impact. For example, in 
France, where the use of drugs is significantly higher per capita than in England or 
Sweden, HTA may result in cost-savings without harming health outcomes. Another 
consideration is a particular system’s structure, including its funding model. In 
England where budgets are set by government rather than supply and demand, 2002–
2010 saw a significant increase in NHS spending, which NICE took advantage of, 
rather than caused, by then allocating some of the additional funding toward new 
technologies; a situation that will change in the future with restricted spending. In 
addition, the effect of HTA decisions on total costs is rarely measured or taken into 
account; therefore it is difficult to accurately assess impact on this dimension. NICE 
has tried to address this issue recently by costing the national impact of 
implementing its guidance for certain technologies or conditions. Finally, it is not 
entirely possible to assess the cost impact of the counterfactual; that is, if a given 
HTA decision had not been implemented. 
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Innovation  
 
  Critics of HTA often cite potential negative impacts on innovation by creating 
yet more ‘hurdles’ for industry. However, there is no evidence coming from any of 
these countries (or elsewhere) to substantiate such concerns. In fact, as Chalkidou et 
al. (2009) point out, HTA systems can serve to create a more predictable and 
consistent way for industry to get their products to patients and for payers to make 
purchasing decisions. For products of true value, the HTA process should be of no 
real concern and even welcomed. In particular, for countries applying value-based 
approaches, manufacturers of truly innovative technologies will be rewarded with 
high or higher prices and from the onset will be armed with some indication of the 
type of innovation that is valued by decision makers (Claxton 2009; Hughes 2008; 
Kennedy 2009). 
 
Conclusions 
 
  While HTA in Europe has evolved differently across jurisdictions over the last 
10 years, it is evident that countries have generally strived to modify their methods 
and practices to improve the impact of assessments on policy and practice, meet 
national objectives and the various needs of stakeholders, and achieve greater 
transparency, legitimacy and relevance. Based on the last 10 years, it seems likely 
that countries will continue to evolve and improve upon their HTA processes in a 
variety of ways.  
 
  First, in order to better link decision makers’ needs with research agendas and 
account for the growing sophistication of health technologies, there will be increased 
attention placed on developing and considering different kinds of evidence (i.e. apart 
from evidence from traditional clinical studies) and ways to generate such 
information, such as observational research and new methods of evidence synthesis. 
This will also include new methods to evaluate different types of treatments, such as 
medical devices. In tandem, it is likely countries will continue to employ strategies 
such as CED and patient access schemes in order to reduce the uncertainty in 
decision making, while supporting access to potentially valuable interventions. Given 
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there is limited evidence on the effectiveness or cost-effectiveness of these strategies, 
evaluation is warranted. 
	
	 	 Second, while HTA is often applied to coverage and reimbursement decisions, 
its influence in other areas of policy making seems set to grow. For example, the 
concept of value-based pricing (VBP) has gained traction. VBP is a method of 
setting prices for health technologies based on measured benefits to patients, in 
attempts to yield greater efficiency and to create a stronger link between evidence-
based reimbursement and pricing decisions. A few countries (Sweden, Australia) 
have adopted variants of VBP, with the UK slated to follow by 2013–2014 
(Department of Health 2010; Sweden Dental and Pharmaceutical Benefits Agency 
2010). Evidence from Sweden suggests that VBP has resulted in reduced expenditure 
on drugs (Persson 2012) and higher profit margins for drugs that offer significant 
advances in therapy (Lundkvist 2002; Roughead et al. 2007), which may encourage 
industry to focus their research and development efforts away from “me-too” drugs 
and towards those that provide added-value. However, Sweden’s experience with 
VBP has raised implementation challenges, namely that reimbursement prices linked 
to the product and not the indication for a drug has led to increased variation in 
prescribing (Moise and Docteur 2007). Other potential areas of HTA application 
include developing (and updating) performance/outcome measures and payment 
tariffs. For example, the Quality and Outcomes Framework in the English NHS uses 
clinical indicators derived from NICE guidance to assess provider performance. 
Similarly, financial incentives are used to reward or penalise providers that do not 
adhere to NICE guidance. There is risk, however, that expanding the uses of HTA 
ignores its limitations and expects too much of the approach.  
 
  Third, discussion around the disinvestment of existing, ineffective 
interventions is mounting to achieve greater health system efficiency. Some countries 
(e.g. England, France, Sweden) presently require re-assessments of technologies (or 
entire therapeutic categories) after they have been on the market and used in routine 
practice for a specified number of years, and use such evidence to modify 
reimbursement and pricing status, or to remove interventions from the benefit 
package altogether. Given the current economic situation and limited budgets, the 
need for disinvestment of low-value interventions will grow in importance. The 
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practical implementation of disinvestment decisions, however, is marked with 
controversy and problems, which must first be addressed. Transparent, formal, and 
evidence-based approaches to identify ineffective and low clinical value treatments 
are needed (Flynn and Gericke 2012).   
 
  Fourth, in light of existing hurdles to use or implement HTA at the local level, 
a potential area for future work is how to better localise or contextualise evidence-
based decision making. Potential strategies could come in the form of more effective 
financial planning tools or implementation of horizon scanning or alternative systems 
to inform decision makers of new technologies that may be introduced. Other 
mechanisms might include guidance and training to support local decisions on 
interventions not assessed at the national level. For example, the use of a ‘mini-HTA’ 
tool is currently in use in hospitals in Denmark to help guide purchasing decisions. 
With GPs now having greater responsibility over NHS’s budget in England, ‘mini-
NICE’ programmes may also be set up to support Clinical Commissioning Groups. 
 
  Fifth, international collaboration between HTA bodies is set to grow. While 
general consensus exists that the appraisal process should be undertaken within 
national and local contexts, there are potential efficiencies to be gained from 
enhanced collaboration around assessments. Increased sharing of information (e.g. 
methods, data requirements, results) across countries may save costs and reduce 
duplication. International collaboration may also facilitate evidence development for 
promising technologies, where existing data are often limited and pooled expertise is 
increasingly required. The feasibility and effectiveness of international collaboration 
is dependent, however, on addressing potential challenges, such as attaining 
agreement on review priorities and assessment perspectives (e.g. societal vs. payer), 
standardising methods, ensuring that supporting studies or assessment meet the needs 
and circumstances of different countries, and protecting the confidentiality of 
commercial data. The EUnetHTA is working to address some of these hurdles.      
 
  Finally, the lack of studies on the impact of HTA constitutes an important gap 
in understanding the role and influence of HTA in health policy. As one 
commentator noted, whereas the previous 10 years have been well-spent on building 
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the HTA infrastructure and evidence base, the next decade should focus on 
ascertaining outcomes (Straus 2004). 
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Study 6: Decision making under uncertainty: An investigation of 
international coverage with evidence development policies in the 
context of medical devices 
 
Introduction 
 
  Making coverage decisions on new health technologies is an enduring 
challenge for payers worldwide. Patient access to new technologies and support for 
innovation must be balanced against broader demands for prudent use of resources 
and increasing requirements by policy makers and payers that coverage 
determinations be based on solid evidence of clinical- and, in some cases, cost-
effectiveness and wider socio-economic benefits. Often, however, the available 
evidence for individual technologies, especially with regards to routine (“real 
world”) use or compared to existing interventions, is suboptimal or inconclusive at 
the time coverage is determined (Claxton et al. 2012; Sorenson et al. 2012).  
 
    Determining coverage policy in cases where evidence is uncertain or limited 
can have important consequences. For instance, coverage may be denied for 
potentially beneficial technologies or delayed, which may hinder patient access to 
important new treatments. Conversely, technologies may be covered and integrated 
into clinical practice that later prove ineffective or lacking in value for money. This 
could displace resources that could be availed to pay for more effective treatments, 
potentially resulting in suboptimal patient care. Additional costs may also be 
incurred from having to reverse an inappropriate coverage decision (Eckermann and 
Willan 2008; Palmer and Smith 2000). Moreover, without sufficient evidence about 
the risks and benefits of existing treatment options, payers, physicians, and patients 
may lack the information necessary to guide the best care decisions. 
 
  To address these issues, several jurisdictions in North America and Europe 
have established CED policies, which provide provisional coverage for a promising, 
but unproven, intervention, on the condition that additional data are generated to 
inform coverage and payment policy (Tunis and Pearson 2006; Hutton et al. 2007; 
Mohr and Tunis 2010). Upon completion of a CED study, if the findings substantiate 
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that the new treatment is better than existing options, then payers may expand 
coverage to more beneficiaries or decide to cover the treatment permanently. 
Conversely, payers may deny coverage or restrict use to certain patient subgroups. 
 
CED schemes assume different names across jurisdictions, such as ‘only in 
research’, ‘field evaluations’, ‘conditional coverage or reimbursement’, or ‘access 
with evidence development’. However, a common feature is that they embody a 
systematic approach to collecting data on outcomes in regular clinical practice – 
evidence that is subsequently used to inform or modify coverage and/or 
reimbursement decisions.  
 
  Despite the growing interest in and use of CED internationally, much of the 
published evidence on the approach has been conceptual in nature. A few case 
studies on a single country or particular technology have been published (Briggs et 
al. 2010; Carino 2006; Chalkdou et al. 2007; Claxton et al. 2010; Dhalla et al. 2009; 
Levin et al. 2011; Longworth et al. 2013; Ramsey and Sullivan 2005; Tunis and 
Pearson 2006; Whicher et al. 2009), but none that compare the use of CED in 
different countries and in the context of medical devices. Devices, in particular, may 
be viable candidates for the CED approach, given a range of challenges associated 
with generating robust evidence on their benefits and costs (Ciani et al. 2013; 
Drummond et al. 2009; Sorenson et al. 2011). For instance, there are particular 
characteristics of devices that make it difficult to conduct RCTs, especially for first 
generation technologies. Unlike pharmaceuticals, it is difficult to control (or ‘blind’) 
the treatment assignment, which introduces the possibility of bias in the outcome 
assessment. Moreover, there appears to be some concern that CED, while attractive 
in principle, has not resulted in expected outcomes or uptake by payers, which 
suggests a need to better understand associated challenges with applying the policy 
in practice.   
 
  This paper aims to meet these existing evidence gaps and is structured as 
follows. First, the study methods outlined. Second, a brief overview of international 
CED approaches is provided, including select case studies of CED applied to 
devices. Third, key challenges for CED policies in general and for devices in 
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particular are identified and discussed. Finally, the paper concludes by outlining 
some key areas for improving the use of CED in practice.   
 
Methods 
 
  A two-phased approach was used to address the research aims. First, a 
literature review on international CED schemes was conducted. For purposes of 
guiding the study, we defined CED as: a form of conditional reimbursement 
characterized by restricted coverage for patients enrolled in a study that is designed 
to collect better data around the safety and effectiveness of a medical technology. 
The review analysis focused on CED programs in Europe and North America, 
namely Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK and US. 
While other countries, such as Sweden, also operate national CED programs, they 
have not been applied to devices to date, only pharmaceuticals. Therefore, they were 
excluded from the study. The countries selected represent a mix of health care 
systems (public, private, mix) and countries with more established and new CED 
schemes. In addition to specific national CED schemes, the available literature on 
cases where CED has been applied to medical devices was searched as well as on the 
CED approach more generally. Second, semi-structured, in-depth expert interviews 
were conducted to supplement the information gathered from the literature and to 
better understand some of the key opportunities and challenges faced to date by the 
respective national experiences with CED, particularly with regards to medical 
devices.  
 
  For the literature review, several key databases were searched, including 
PubMed, EMBASE, MEDLINE, Scopus, and Google Scholar, using the following 
search terms: “medical technology”, “medical devices”, “coverage with evidence 
development”, “access with evidence development”, “conditional reimbursement”, 
“innovative reimbursement”, and “restricted reimbursement”. The search also 
included grey data sources, such as relevant website materials, policy documents, 
and academic working papers. After the abstracts were identified (total of 75) and 
reviewed for relevance, the full published papers or materials were obtained and 
reviewed. In total, 50 articles were gathered and reviewed. Appendix A contains the 
list of articles reviewed. Besides providing information on international CED 
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policies, the available literature informed the development of semi-structured 
interview guides used to conduct the expert interviews. Appendix B contains the 
interview guides used in the study. 
 
  The study sample encompassed experts from three different groups – 
payers/HTA bodies, the medical device industry, and academia/policy analysts – 
which allowed for a diversity of opinions of those involved in CED to be captured. 
The sample of potential interview participants was developed based on the authors’ 
knowledge of and experience with experts in CED and related areas, and through 
snowballing techniques to identify other possible informants. In particular, the 
sample represented individuals involved in the development and operation of CED 
schemes, those heading reimbursement and pricing departments within industry, and 
academics with specialisation in CED, HTA, evidence-based policy making, and 
related fields of study.    
 
  Potential participants were sent an email inviting them to participate in an 
interview and were provided a summary description of the study. A total of 27 
experts were invited to participate, of which 22 agreed to be interviewed (81% 
response rate). Appendix C provides an overview of the interview sample. All 
interviews were conducted by telephone by both members of the research team and 
were approximately 45 to 60 minutes in length. An interview response coding guide 
was used to aid collection and later analysis of the interview data. Expert participants 
were not remunerated for their involvement, but were offered a copy of the final 
study findings upon completion of the research. 
 
  Upon completion of the interviews, the interview data was synthesised in two 
main ways. First, the data were used to supplement the information gathered in the 
literature review, particularly to understand the different national approaches to CED 
and the cases where devices have undergone CED. Second, the data were used to 
gather expert opinion on CED. The interviews were read and notes were taken and 
key themes and word usages were extracted and imputed. Illustrative quotes were 
gathered to highlight and support key points associated with the identified themes. 
Interviewees were promised anonymity and, as a result, they are only identified by 
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their role in the process and the country where they work. The following section 
presents the study findings.   
 
 Results   
 
Overview of international approaches to CED 
 
  Countries in Europe and elsewhere have adopted CED policies to better inform 
coverage policies for new device and other technologies (Table 12). Box 3 outlines 
select cases of medical devices CED schemes in different jurisdictions, and 
Appendix D provides a broader range of examples of CED schemes in Canada, UK, 
and the US. 
 
While some policies have been in operation for a decade or longer (e.g. 
Canada, Switzerland, the UK), others are just getting started or are still under 
development, such as in Germany and the Netherlands. Countries generally share 
similar aims for CED, namely to address outstanding uncertainty about the benefits 
and/or costs of new technologies; allow more flexible coverage decisions (as 
opposed to either yes or no); and, enhance the existing evidence base on new 
technologies. Those jurisdictions with culture traditions for supporting innovation 
and industrial policies toward this end, such as France and Germany, also focus on 
the benefit of CED to speed patient access to new therapies and to support industry. 
However, countries have adopted divergent approaches to CED, from involving 
different stakeholders groups to requiring different criteria for which technologies 
and interventions are eligible for CED and who oversees and runs studies.  
 
For example, while all countries’ CED policies involve the regulatory or 
advisory body directly responsible for making coverage and reimbursement 
decisions, the jurisdicitons differ with regards to other stakeholders involved in the 
CED process. Canada, the Netherlands, UK, and, occasionally, the US involve their 
national health or clinical health organisation in advising and/or overseeing CED 
studies. While still in the planning phase, Germany and the Netherlands intend to 
involved physician, hospital, and insurance associations in the process (which 
Switzerland already does) by allowing these groups to submit applications for CED 
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candidates. The role of manufacturers also differs across countries, with the most 
central role likely in Germany and perhaps in Switzerland. In Germany, for example, 
manufacturers can submit appliations for CED and, if selected, are involved in 
negotiating the terms of the studies and funding them. In other countries, such as 
Canada, industry plays a minor to no role in CED schemes.  
 
 The funding of CED studies also varies between countries. In Canada, 
Germany, and the Netherlands, public bodies – either the national payer or health 
research organisation(s) – fund CED studies, although in Germany manufacturers are 
sometimes be responsible for financing studies. In these countries, funding processes 
are also more formalised, where funding is guaranteed if a particular CED scheme is 
selected to go forward. Funding for studies in the UK and US, for example, is not 
required or pre-determined a priori before a CED recommendation is given. 
Switzerland is similar, although it is generally the applicant who is responsible for 
funding the study if it is indeed conducted. 
 
Finally, countries differ slightly in terms of perferences for, or experiences 
with, particular types of studies. The newer CED programs, such as in Germany and 
the Netherlands, have expressed interest in a variety of study methods (e.g. RCTs, 
registries, prospective case series), while countries with more experience with CED 
(e.g. France, US) have traditionally leaned toward the use of RCTs (with the 
exception of Switzerland), although this could be due, in part, to the types of 
technologies involved in their respective CED schemes to date.  
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Table 12: Comparative overview of international CED programs  
 
Country Name of 
Program  
Aims Year 
Established 
Technologies 
Included 
Actors 
Involved 
Procedures and Methods Funding Sources Examples of 
CED 
Canada Conditionally-
funded Field 
Evaluations 
Assess real world 
performance; 
address outstanding 
uncertainty about 
benefits/costs; 
improve coverage 
decision making. 
2003 Non-drug 
technologies 
(devices and 
procedures) 
OHTAC, 
PATH, 
THETA, 
ICES, Ontario 
Health 
Ministry 
 Decision makers request field 
evaluations. 
 OHTAC allocates evaluation to 
affiliated academic institutions. 
 All types of study designs 
accepted. 
 To date, majority of 
evaluations have entailed 
observational or registry 
studies. 
OHTAC funds the 
evaluations; 
Ministry funds 
device (or 
procedure) if not yet 
insured. 
Over 40 studies to 
date. 
 
Examples include: 
 
 PET 
 DES 
 CT angiography 
 Sleep apnea 
device 
France CED Avoid delays in 
coverage and 
utilization of 
innovative 
technologies. 
2011 Devices, 
procedures, 
and 
procedures 
involving 
devices.   
Ministry of 
Health, HAS 
 To date, no clear eligibility 
criteria or methodological 
standards (case-by-case basis). 
 HAS generally prefers RCTs, 
although registries have been 
established. 
 
Information not 
available. 
Several studies 
are underway, 
including: 
 
 TAVI 
 Retinal implants 
 CT angiography 
 Monitors for 
continuous 
blood glucose 
measurement
Germany CED  Address lack of 
sufficient evidence 
on new 
technologies; allow 
more flexible 
coverage decisions; 
link clinical 
researchers and 
decision makers; 
enhance 
transparency; and, 
strengthen history 
of support for 
industry and 
innovation.  
2012 Procedures 
and 
procedures 
involving 
devices. 
Ministry of 
Health, GBA, 
sickness 
funds, 
German 
hospital 
association, 
Association of 
Board 
Certified 
Physicians, 
IQWiG. 
 GBA, physician and hospital 
associations, and (now) 
manufacturers can submit 
applications to assess a 
procedure for reimbursement. 
 If procedure deemed to offer 
“potential”, GBA, in 
collaboration with IQWiG, 
determines if eligible for CED. 
 If so, a directive requesting a 
study is published and terms of 
the study negotiated between 
the GBA, manufacturer, and 
other parties involved in 
conducting the study. 
 GBA has expressed interest in 
If application 
submitted by 
manufacturer, they 
must fund study; 
otherwise, GBA 
funds.  
None to date. First 
studies anticipated 
in 2014/2015. 
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a wide range of studies (RCTs, 
non-randomized studies, 
comparative studies).  
Netherlands  Conditional 
Entry 
Collect evidence on 
new (not yet part of 
the benefit package) 
interventions, while 
providing patient 
access. 
2012 Procedures, 
devices, and 
drugs. 
CVZ, NZa, 
ZonMw 
 Application for conditional 
entry made by a patient or 
provider association. 
 Candidates for conditional 
entry selected based on well-
defined evidence gaps; quality 
of research protocol; feasibility 
of collecting relevant evidence; 
value of evidence.  
 Currently, no specific guidance 
on what study designs are 
acceptable, but must be 
“methodologically acceptable 
and realistic”.  
 To date, majority of studies 
have been large, multi-center 
RCTs. 
ZonMw funds all 
conditional entry 
studies. 
A number of CED 
studies are now 
underway, 
including:  
 
 Radio 
frequency 
denervation for 
chronic low 
back pain 
 Renal 
denervation for 
therapy resistant 
hypertension 
 Intra-arterial 
thrombolysis 
for acute stroke 
Switzerland 
 
 
 
 
 
CED (yes, in 
evaluation) 
Provide temporary 
coverage for novel 
and promising 
interventions, while 
additional evidence 
is gathered.  
1996 Procedures, 
procedures 
involving 
devices, and 
drugs. 
SFOPH  New technologies: SFOPH 
performs horizontal scanning to 
identify new interventions that 
lack sufficient evidence of 
effectiveness, efficiency, and 
appropriateness. If 
manufacturer seeks coverage, a 
CED arrangement may be 
requested/imposed. 
 Old technologies: If questions 
arise regarding effectiveness, a 
request can be made to SFOPH 
to reclassify from covered 
without evaluation to CED.  
 In either case, CED determined 
on a case-by-case basis.  
 Use of prospective multi-centre 
case series observational 
studies most common.  
Costs of studies 
covered by 
manufacturers only. 
Around 27 studies 
to date: 10 
diagnostic 
procedures (7 
involving 
devices); 10 
alternative 
medicines; and, 7 
surgical 
interventions (5 
involving 
devices).   
 
Examples include: 
 
 PET 
 Total disk 
replacement 
 Balloon 
kyphoplasty 
 TAVI 
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UK Only in 
Research 
(with limited 
use of 
Approval with 
Research) 
Provide coverage to 
promising 
interventions not yet 
supported by 
sufficiently robust 
evidence, while 
additional data is 
collected. 
1999 Procedures, 
devices, and 
drugs. 
NICE, NIHR  Eligible technologies 
determined on a case-by-case 
basis, as a result of the 
technology appraisal process. 
 NIHR systematically reviews 
feasibility and priority of 
potential study.  
 NICE outlines broads areas of 
inquiry the research should 
address. 
 Either NIHR or the 
manufacturer initiates study. 
 Use of RCTs and registries 
most common. 
 
No standard or 
requirements for 
funding. NIHR or 
manufacturer may 
fund study. 
Over 25 studies to 
date. 
 
Examples include: 
 
 PET 
 ICDs 
 Metal-on-metal 
hip implants 
 Drainage, 
irrigation and 
fibrinolytic 
therapy (DIFT) 
 Laparoscopic 
surgery 
US CED Allow greater 
flexibility in 
coverage 
determinations; link 
coverage to efforts 
to generate evidence 
needed to gain 
greater certainty on 
the benefits and 
harms of particular 
technologies. 
2006* Procedures, 
devices, and 
drugs. 
CMS  Through the NCD process, 
CMS determines candidate 
technologies for CED process. 
 CMS published requirements 
for study. 
 Interested parties submit study 
proposals for approval. 
 Studies generally overseen by 
party who submitted proposal. 
 Use of RCTs and observational 
studies most common.  
 
No standard or 
requirements for 
funding. Public 
agencies, such as 
NIH or AHRQ may 
fund studies, as well 
as manufacturers, 
medical 
associations, or 
academic research 
groups.  
Over 15 studies to 
date. 
 
Examples include: 
 
 PET 
 ICDs 
 Lung Volume 
Reduction 
Surgery 
 Angioplasty and 
stenting 
 Transcutaneous 
Electrical Nerve 
Stimulation 
*Applied since 1995, but no clear policy until 2006. 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on literature review and expert interviews. 
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Box 3: Select case studies of medical devices CED schemes  
 
    
 
Drug-Eluting Stents (DES) - Canada 
 
  In 2002, the Ontario Medical Advisory Secretariat (MAS) completed a secondary 
literature-based technology assessment of the clinical effectiveness of DES compared with bare-
metal stents (BMS). It concluded that RCT evidence would likely demonstrate that DES was 
more effective than BMS, after which there would be a steep uptake for DES. However, when 
the initial RCT results on DES were published later that year, there was uncertainty regarding 
the generalizability of the results. Accordingly, OHTAC recommended that the Health Ministry 
commission a field evaluation from PATH. PATH proposed a prospective observational study, 
which took advantage of both an existing province-wide registry established by the Cardiac Care 
Network (CCN) of Ontario and the ability to link this registry to administrative databases housed 
at the ICES. Faced with rapid growth in the use of stents and projections for a major shift away 
from bare metal to the more expensive DES, the Ministry agreed to cover DES only if additional 
data were collected on the effect of stent choice on outcomes. Consequently, new fields were 
added to a pre-existing CCN database to facilitate a study comparing different stent designs. The 
aim of the study was to estimate the reduction in risk of revascularisation within two years of 
treatment with DES, compared with BMS, as well as comparative cost-effectiveness. Hospitals 
were able to provide DES free of charge to patients enrolled in the study (Bowen et al. 2007; Tu 
et al. 2007).  
 
  The study found that DES were effective in reducing target-vessel revascularisation 
among patients at highest risk for restenosis, but had no effects on death or myocardial infarction 
(Bowen et al. 2007; Tu et al. 2007). Based on this study, OHTAC recommended that DES be 
restricted to use among high-risk patients (those with diabetes, or particularly long or narrow 
lesions) to improve the appropriate use of DES. Estimates suggest that this controlled diffusion 
of DES led to estimated savings of $35 to $58 million (Bowen et al. 2007).  
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Stenting and Aggressive Medical Management – United States  
 
  In 2006, CMS issued a CED policy for intracranial stenting for preventing recurrent 
stroke in intracranial stenosis (CMS 2006). The policy provided coverage for high-risk 
Medicare beneficiaries only when they were enrolled in an FDA-approved trial for Category B 
Investigational Device Exemption study. Over the years, there has been rapid adoption of 
percutaneous transluminal angioplasty and stenting (PTAs) for prevention of a second stroke in 
high-risk patients. The trial evaluated if treatment with PTAs and medical management was 
superior to medical management alone in the treatment and prevention of a second stroke in 
high-risk patients. The study was conducted at approximately 50 sites in the US with financial 
support from the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS) and other 
public and private sponsors. The CED scheme played an essential role in expediting enrolment 
in the Stenting and Aggressive Medical Management for Preventing Recurrent Stroke in 
Intracranial (SAMMPRIS) trial. The results of this study demonstrated that patients undergoing 
PTAS have a much higher rate of stroke or death (14.7%), as compared to patients receiving 
medical management alone (5.8%) (Chimowitz et al. 2011). Consequently, the trial was stopped 
early due to the high risk of early stroke in patients undergoing PTAs.      
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Total Disc Anthroplasty (TDA) – Switzerland 
 
  Short-term clinical results for TDA in the treatment of degenerative spinal diseases are 
promising, but its use has a relatively young history in clinical practice and long-term follow-up 
data are limited. Consequently, the Swiss SFOPH commissioned a nationwide prospective, 
multi-centre, observational study (SWISSspine) before making a final decision about the 
reimbursement of TDA (primarily for cervical and lumbar TDA and for balloon kyphoplasty. 
The national registry was established in collaboration with the implant manufacturers, the Swiss 
Spine Society, and the Institute for Evaluative Research in Medicine at the University of Bern. 
Funding of the registry was shared amongst the participating manufacturers.   
 
  Between March 2005 and June 2008, 1682 interventions (808 cervical, 427 lumbar, 331 
balloon kyphoplasty) with implantation of discs from several different manufacturers were 
performed. Surgery, implant, and follow-up case report forms were administered by spinal 
surgeons. Co-morbidity questionnaires, EQ-5D, others forms were completed by patients. Data 
collection transpired pre- and peri-operatively at 3 months, 1 year follow-up, and annual 
thereafter. The three year study results suggested that both cervical and lumbar TDA are 
relatively safe and efficient procedures concerning pain reduction and improvement of quality 
of life (Diel et al. 2009; Schluessmann et al. 2009; Schluessmann et al. 2010). However, mid- to 
long-term effectiveness and safety were not established (and the patient sample was relatively 
small) and therefore the SFOPH required a 10 year follow-up and extension of the study before 
making a final coverage determination. Conversely, the SFOPH agreed to permanent coverage 
of balloon kyphoplasty following the study based on findings suggesting a significant and 
clinically relevant reduction of back pain, improvement of quality of life and preoperative 
segmental kyphosis, and reduction of pain killer consumption.   
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Laparoscopic Surgery – United Kingdom  
 
  NICE first reviewed the use of laparoscopic surgery for colorectal cancer in 2000. Based 
on the assessment, the Institute determined that there was a lack of evidence about the long-term 
outcomes of the laparoscopic approach compared to the conventional open technique (NICE 
2006). As a result, NICE recommended that laparoscopic surgery for colorectal cancer only be 
used as part of a randomised controlled trial (Chalkidou 2007). This decision encouraged 
recruitment to the then ongoing UK-based Medical Research Council CLASICC trial, which has 
since provided the necessary evidence to support a revised recommendation. In particular, the 
trial indicated that the long-term outcomes for patients are equivalent for both techniques. In 
addition, there were important additional benefits associated with laparoscopic surgery, both in 
terms of shorter hospital stays and the ability of patients to return to normal activities post-
operatively faster than with conventional surgery (NICE 2006). Therefore, NICE revised its 
recommendation to support use of the technique in routine HHS practice. 
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Key challenges for CED policies  
 
  While the various jurisdictions have developed their CED policies differently 
to meet the particular needs of their respective health care systems, the analysis 
suggests that they share many common challenges in ensuring the effectiveness and 
efficiency of CED. The following section discusses five key challenges facing CED 
policies identified in the interviews, including establishing a clear framework for 
initiating and overseeing CED studies; identifying and applying appropriate study 
methods; funding CED studies; incentivising research; and, applying new evidence 
to coverage policy. 
 
Establishing a clear framework for initiating, overseeing, and stopping CED 
 
  CED initiatives are likely to be more credible to patients, policy makers and 
industry if there is a well-defined, transparent and consistent approach for initiating 
topics for CED. However, “current processes do not provide public stakeholders the 
level of clarity of specificity needed to ensure a transparent, predictable process” (US 
policy analyst 1) and operate on a “reactive case by case basis” (UK policy maker 1) 
with “no rules or standards” (Switzerland policy analyst 1), rather than having a well-
defined priority-setting procedure and criteria to select technologies for this 
approach. This particular issue was highlighted in recent public comments on ways 
to improve the CED program in the US (CMS 2012a) and has been the focus of 
research in the UK on the circumstances within which NICE should recommend use 
of health technologies only in the context of further evidence development (Claxton 
et al. 2012). Identifying clear criteria for initiating CED studies for particular 
technologies was considered particularly important given the growing number of 
devices on the market. “There are lots of devices; we cannot have CED schemes for 
all of them” (US policy analyst 2)... “CED is good policy, but we do not want to 
make it the default option in all cases where uncertainty in the evidence exists” (UK 
policy analyst 5).        
 
  Informants provided specific ideas for when CED should be employed. “Some 
devices are low-risk with low-budget impact, which are probably not good 
candidates for CED, especially given the financial demands of CED studies....rather, 
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CED should be applied to those technologies that offer the potential for significant 
improvement in care, but there is some material uncertainty about effectiveness or 
other important endpoints” (UK policy analyst 2). To that end, the potential impact 
on patients was seen as important criteria for CED. ”Higher risk medical devices, 
such as implantables, are appropriate candidates for CED” (Industry representative 
3) as are “devices that address a true unmet medical need” (France policy maker 1). 
A few informants suggested that CED schemes cover both new and existing 
technologies, although they also duly noted the challenges in doing so, including 
limited resources to conduct CED studies as well as “difficulties recruiting patients 
and collecting evidence once a product is already routinely used” (Netherlands policy 
maker 1). Respondents emphasised that CED is not the sole tool to address issues of 
uncertainty. In cases where there is uncertainty about the financial impact of a 
technology or whether it will be used appropriately in practice, risk-sharing 
agreements and performance-based contracts were deemed more suitable. 
 
  Issues around clarity and transparency were also evident with regards to 
planning and overseeing CED studies. Informants generally thought that insufficient 
attention is currently given, prior to initiating studies, to agreeing the key evidence 
gaps, the acceptable quality of evidence, study design and key endpoints, such as 
what constitutes meaningful clinical benefit, when to stop CED studies, and how 
studies will be funded. “In planning the scheme, it is important to be precise and 
clear about the evidence that is lacking and that such evidence is critical to the 
decision...CED cannot be used to simply delay a difficult decision” (UK policy 
analyst 2). The feasibility of additional evidence collection is central to such 
discussions. “For a scheme to work, it has to be feasible to collect the data through 
the necessary study design in the timescale required....time, resource, and financial 
burdens of additional data collection all need to be carefully considered” (US policy 
analyst 2). Informants carried these sentiments over to more procedural 
considerations, such as outlining clear roles for the parties involved, timelines for 
key tasks, and how collected evidence will be linked to the coverage decision. 
 
  Greater predictability in these areas was also considered particularly important 
by and for industry. “If we are going to use these policies, they need to be 
predictable...there needs to be clear rules of engagement in order to incentivise 
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manufacturers to play ball” (Industry representative 3). Therefore, the challenge is to 
have a “clear agreement in advance among the main parties involved on when to 
review the data and how to use the evidence, especially given that industry tends to 
want pre-set rules to ensure any additional evidence collection will directly support a 
reimbursement decision, while the authorities want less specification, in order to 
retain their decision flexibility” (UK policy analyst 2). 
 
  A lack of clear terms of stakeholder roles in CED also introduces challenges in 
terms of aligning policy makers, manufacturers, and the research community, 
especially as these different groups hold different expectations and reservations 
around CED in practice.  For example, “industry may feel that CED gives payers 
license not to make a decision based on existing data, while payers contend it 
provides an excuse for manufacturers not to collect adequate data in the first place” 
(US policy analyst 2) and the “research community feels constrained by timelines, 
lack of adequate funding, and the often political nature of the CED process” (UK 
policy maker 1). Several of the industry representatives interviewed highlighted the 
importance of bringing industry to the table when planning CED studies. “Industry 
needs to be involved throughout the process, especially in determining appropriate 
evidence and designing studies. A trial of coronary stents in France did not involve 
industry, but rather was overseen by centers that had no experience with implantation 
or with stents in general. The design of the trial did not take into consideration issues 
of the learning curve with implanting stents. In the end, it was a mess and negatively 
impacted the market for coronary stents. CED cannot be done in isolation of the 
authorities” (Industry representative 5). Another example relates to a case of 
negative pressure wound therapy, where the “authorities wanted to see wound 
closure as the primary outcome, but to those developing the intervention, this was not 
an appropriate endpoint. Rather, the aim of the therapy is to first get skin rosy and 
then switch to cheaper, advanced wound therapies, keeping the wound moist to heal. 
Authorities required manufacturers to take this approach, which was a recipe for 
failure” (Industry representative 3). However, others, particularly researchers, 
maintained the industry-sponsored CED studies must be “vetted carefully” (US 
policy analyst 2).   
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Identifying and applying appropriate study methods 
 
  One of the key challenges of CED is designing and executing an appropriate 
study to address any outstanding gaps or uncertainties in the existing evidence. In 
some regards, devices introduce unique challenges to this process, as acknowledged 
by almost all informants. “Devices can be difficult to randomise against a no 
intervention arm and it is important to take into account the operator-dependent 
nature of certain devices and procedures and the associated learning curve (Industry 
representative 3). Operators can entail not only clinicians, but also patients. In 
addition, “some devices bring long-term benefits that require assessment of outcomes 
over the course of several years” (France policy maker 1). The need for long-term 
data is “especially important in the case of implants” (Switzerland policy analyst 1). 
When evaluating devices, it is also important to account for the fact that “their 
development is iterative in nature and that their effectiveness is sometimes 
contingent in part on organisational factors” (Industry representative 2). To that end, 
“studies for devices often require involvement of a greater number of professionals 
and organisations, as use tends to entail a greater number of actors and depends more 
heavily on the clinician or surgeon, compared to other technologies, such as drugs” 
(Netherlands policy maker 1). In addition, it can be “difficult to accurately capture 
device use in studies” (Switzerland policy analyst 2), as they generally do not possess 
a unique identification code that allows for identification and tracking. However, 
policies to implement a UDI system to track and monitor device use have been 
introduced recently in both Europe and the US, which may help improve data 
collection within CED studies.       
 
   Yet, there was some consensus among informants that the evaluative 
challenges faced by devices are not always sufficiently acknowledged in planning 
CED studies. “Policy makers do not fully understand the nuances and difficulties in 
studying devices. Similarly, industry, which is largely composed of small enterprises, 
is generally unaware of the difficulties and are desperate to obtain some level of 
coverage and access for their product...these pressures lead companies to 
underestimate the difficulty in conducting studies” (UK policy analyst 2).  
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  Several informants noted challenges for CED in terms of accounting for the 
diversity of devices in designing appropriate studies, making it difficult to pre-
determine certain standards or requirements for studies. “There are a lot of different 
devices with different technical specifications and they are often used in the same 
procedure, which makes it difficult to standardise” (Germany policy maker 
2)...”different devices have different issues, which would impact study designs and 
data collection strategies” (Industry representative 5). Consequently, rather than 
determining a “gold standard”, selecting appropriate methods for device studies 
depends on the particular technology, as well as the evidence at the time of market 
authorisation, the outstanding evidence gaps, and available treatment alternatives, if 
any. “If the uncertainty regards treatment effect or comparative effectiveness, it is 
difficult to get away from doing an RCT”, while if the uncertainty is about long-term 
effectiveness or safety, then a well-coordinated registry or large, prospective case 
study would be indicated” (UK policy maker 2). The type of study may also depend 
on the stage of development of a device. For example, “if a second generation device 
is coming in the next couple of years, it will not make sense to conduct an RCT” 
(Industry representative 3).  
 
  Some differences in opinion emerged with regards to the challenges in 
conducting RCTs for devices, reflecting recent debates among analysts in the field 
(Drummond et al., 2009; Taylor and Iglesias, 2009). One perspective is that RCTs 
for devices are not always possible and therefore “evidence might come from 
registries and observation trials” (Industry representative 1). Another perspective, 
most often held by policy makers, is a preference for RCTs comparing a new device 
with the current best treatment standard...”[we] do not accept that devices cannot be 
effectively studied via RCTs” (Germany policy maker 2). A few informants 
suggested that it is not a question of whether RCTs are possible, but if they are 
designed appropriately. “RCTs are still possible, if one designs the trial appropriately 
and to the specificities of the technology. Trials should be designed for the 
technology, not technologies for certain types of studies” (Industry representative 5). 
Considerations regarding a robust study design also apply to other types of studies, 
such as registries. Ideally, registries should be “representative of hospitals (or other 
health care setting) nationally, include a comparator, and collect high quality 
evidence” (Switzerland policy analyst 1). Overall, however, it was generally believed 
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that it is most important to adopt the most feasible and practical methodological 
approach from both a cost and time perspective....”we need to be pragmatic” (UK 
policy analyst 3).        
 
Funding CED studies 
 
  The costs associated with CED medical device studies are considered by 
informants to be one of the most important challenges to effective and impactful 
CED programs. Informants recognised a myriad of associated costs, including the 
costs of designing a study; recruiting patients and, in some cases, training physicians; 
aligning organisational needs (e.g. additional equipment requirements); and, 
overseeing studies and subsequent follow-up. Other indirect costs were also 
recognised, such as the transaction costs of reaching agreement on the terms of a 
CED study with the manufacturer, costs for new systems to track or monitor studies, 
and the cost of delays in approving a potentially beneficial technology for 
widespread use.   
 
  Such cost considerations have limited the use of CED in some countries, 
deterred buy-in from key constituents, and impacted the robustness and quality of the 
studies themselves. As highlighted by one informant, “the cost of CED studies can 
hinder buy-in from involved parties...they see the costs of funding CED studies, but 
not the benefits in practice” (Canada policy maker 1). “Lots of device companies are 
SMEs, especially given the current economic situation, and do not have the 
infrastructure and resources to conduct studies, which can negatively impact not only 
the ability to conduct studies, but the quality of the studies that are conducted (UK 
policy analyst 3). Funding of CED studies may be particularly challenging for 
procedures that involve devices, as there are typically several different manufacturers 
of the device involved.   
 
  The constraints on funding CED studies by public authorities (e.g. payers, 
HTA agencies, other research organisations) further hinder the success of CED 
schemes. As previously discussed, agencies such as the CMS in the US and NICE in 
the UK do not possess designated research budgets to fund CED studies and funding 
through other public agencies, such as NIH or NIHR, is tenable at best, especially 
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under tight economic conditions. “If the relevant policy maker does not hold the 
purse strings, it is difficult to mandate studies” (Industry representative 3).  Coupled 
with the limited ability of or incentives for device manufacturers to fund studies, 
there is the inherent risk that CED will never get off the ground or be completed 
properly. 
 
Incentivising research 
 
  Several informants mentioned issues around insufficient or misaligned 
incentives to conduct CED studies. In the Netherlands, one of the “biggest problems 
has been getting commitment from both physician and manufacturers to collect the 
necessary data...some of the evidence dossiers submitted at the end of studies have 
been less than impressive, which is one of the reasons that the length of CED studies 
was extended from three to four years in the recent revision of the scheme” 
(Netherlands policy maker 1). The lack of incentives for CED evidence generation 
relates to issues associated with the CED approach and process itself, inherent 
characteristics of a given health care system, and particular characteristics of the 
device industry.   
 
  To the former, “given that many CED studies are not mandatory for 
manufacturers or clinicians, it can and has led to limited participation” (UK policy 
maker 1) and “it is not always to the advantage of physicians to conduct studies and 
recruit patients” (Netherland policy maker 1), especially if “they get paid, regardless 
of participation in the study” (Switzerland policy analyst 2). Moreover, although 
informants recognised the benefit of providing coverage while additional evidence is 
collected, they also noted that allowing patients early access to a technology may 
affect the prospect of the research being conducted. Manufacturers may have less 
incentive to invest in additional research about a technology once it is covered; 
physicians might consider further clinical trials or other studies to be unnecessary 
and unethical; and, patients might be unwilling to participate if they already have 
access to the new technology. Physicians may also not understand the importance or 
necessity of collecting the requisite data, which is one of the factors that have 
hampered the SWISSspine registry discussed previously.  
 
  
230 
 
   Informants also believe the lack of a clear framework or guidance for CED 
disincentivises commitment from stakeholders to move forward on potential CED 
studies. “The process for CED is unclear...what is the incentive for industry to 
conduct additional research? If manufacturers undertake additional R&D they need 
some direction that the results will inform policy...and when” (Industry 
representative 5). “The role of evidence in policy making is not clear or predictable, 
which sends wrong signals to manufacturers to collect the necessary evidence” (UK 
policy maker 3). The time and effort it takes to agree a CED scheme can act as a 
deterrent by “delaying access and hindering interest in the approach” (Germany 
policy maker 1). In relation, in order for CED studies to be conducted successfully, 
“readily available and integrated data collection and monitoring systems” 
(Switzerland policy analyst 1) may be required. Some providers or hospitals (and 
other relevant parties involved in the study) may not be equipped with such systems, 
which may deter the timely completion of CED studies or the collection of high 
quality data.   
 
  A few informants mentioned the fact that some CED schemes, such as 
Germany, only consider evidence and studies conducted in that particular country 
context, which was viewed as a limitation to the CED approach that should be 
addressed. “If the German trial results are inconclusive, there is a risk that those 
involved might want to wait until trials in the other countries, if any, are complete, 
which will just extend timelines and there is the cost of waiting” and “manufacturers 
are increasingly global and therefore desire to conduct trials on an international 
basis; restricting studies to German boarders could hamper the studies associated 
with CED and threaten the German CED approach (Germany policy maker 1). 
Restrictions on national CED studies also have implications on the generalisability of 
the generated evidence....”why invest in these studies when the results will only be 
applicable to a certain country context” (Industry representative 4).                  
 
  Several informants noted the existence of system-wide disincentives that could 
potentially threaten the effectiveness of CED in their respective jurisdictions. For 
example, in the Netherlands, “temporary reimbursement in the basic benefit package 
means available to all, so we cannot restrict reimbursement to only patients that 
participate in the study” (Netherlands policy maker 1). Similarly, all new devices 
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used in the inpatient setting can be reimbursement through short-term ‘NUB 
payments’ in Germany regardless of additional evidence collection, so the “right 
incentives may be lacking to recruit patients” (German policy maker 1). In Germany, 
CED many therefore only be effective in the ambulatory care sector for devices used 
outside of the hospital.   
 
  There are also unique characteristics to the device sector that may discourage 
CED studies. For SMEs, who largely comprise the medical device market, there is 
“considerable pressure to get their devices to the market quickly to bring in revenue” 
and, given the shorter development timeframes for devices, avoid the “threat of fast 
followers that can get on the market before technology completes the study” (UK 
policy maker 2). In relation, there is an issue of a “free rider problem”...“if 
manufacturers think that data collected on a similar device can be used to obtain 
coverage for their device, then they will not undertake their own study” (US policy 
analyst 4).    
 
Applying new evidence to coverage policy  
 
  Applying CED within the coverage process can create time pressures on 
designing, conducting, and analysing studies. In most cases, evidence must be 
generated in a limited time frame to inform a final coverage determination. Some 
informants maintained that the time frame for CED studies is generally too short, 
which prevents the collection of sufficient data. “Studies simply do not always 
generate needed data” (Netherlands policy maker 1). Even in the case of new CED 
schemes, there are “doubts that the data generated will be conclusive enough to 
effectively inform coverage policy” (Germany policy maker 2). For example, an 
RCT on negative pressure wound therapy was initiated a couple of years ago in 
Germany to gather further evidence on its performance in the community setting, 
with the goal to recruit all patients by the end of 2014. Given patient recruitment 
rates to date, one of the informants familiar with the study estimated that only around 
50% of the total target number of patients will be recruited by that date. Conversely, 
some informants indicated that the time frame for CED studies “hinders their utility” 
(US policy analyst 3), as data collection takes too long to inform decision making in 
a timely manner. 
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   The policy impact of several CED studies has been somewhat limited to date 
given that study timelines are extended due to the time required to approve studies 
and/or recruit patients. In some cases, studies do not start or are continuing to run 
more than five years after the initial CED decision. Some of the delay in achieving 
reasonable timelines is linked to difficulties in agreeing the terms of the CED 
scheme, securing ample funding for studies, and the lack of incentives for physicians 
to enrol patients. For instance, one informant mentioned internal problems with the 
perceived ownership of a particular registry. Other times, studies may not get 
underway due to political and practical issues associated with revising coverage. 
“Insurance companies have expressed some reservations about the conditional entry 
policy, because of concerns that it will be hard, if not impossible, to stop 
reimbursement once it is given, even if the resulting evidence demonstrates it is less 
effective than anticipated or in cases where the evidence is inconclusive” 
(Netherlands policy maker 1). 
 
  To that end, a key issue that hampers the application of evidence to coverage 
decisions once studies are completed is a lack of relevant or conclusive data. “Some 
studies ultimately did not provide the type of evidence Medicare needed to make 
informed decisions” (US policy analyst 2)...“when data are missing or resulting data 
is inconclusive, it is difficult to stop reimbursement” (Netherlands policy maker 1) 
and, “Then what? Accept outstanding uncertainty and make a decision whether to 
fund, acknowledge poor study design or inadequate patient recruitment, or continue 
with further evidence collection?” (UK policy analyst 2).        
 
  Ideally, the evidence generated by studies will be clear and conclusive. 
However, even in such cases, ensuring its use in coverage decisions can be 
problematic, especially if the data are negative. “If [the evidence] is clear, it is easy 
to make a decision, but then there are challenges with acceptance of the decision 
among clinicians and patients, if the decision is negative or calls for restrictions on 
access” (Netherlands policy maker 1)....“It is nearly always very hard to modify or 
remove coverage at a later date, unless there is a complete lack of effectiveness or 
important safety concerns” (UK policy analyst 3). Despite these political challenges, 
informants maintained that if the results of CED studies do not support use, the 
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technology must be withdrawn from coverage if the policy is to have impact and 
provide the necessary incentives for evidence generation....”If results are negative, 
the device has to be withdrawn from reimbursement, but this is not always the case 
and it hinders the impact of CED and stakeholder buy-in to support additional 
evidence generation. The policy needs to reward those that undertake studies and 
meet outcome expectations” (Industry representative 5).  
 
  Some of these issues played out in the CMS review of lung volume reduction 
surgery (LVRS). Rapid growth in the procedure volume of LVRS, despite limited 
evidence supporting its safety and effectiveness prompted CMS to suspend payments 
and co-sponsor a nationwide RCT (the National Emphysema Treatment Trial) to 
evaluate the procedure (Ramsey and Sullivan 2005). The subsequent trial findings 
showed no improvement in survival for surgical patients, but differential 
improvements for a percentage of surgical patients. Moreover, the subgroup analysis 
resulted in uncertain significance and the cost-effectiveness of LVRS compared with 
medical therapy was judged to be unfavourable. However, CMS’ resulting coverage 
policy was considered generous based on both the weight of the evidence and 
incremental benefit for LVRS patients show in the trial. Some analysts have 
questioned the politics involved in shaping the agency’s decision, suggesting that it 
was swayed by political, professional, advocacy, and other pressures (Gillick 2004).      
 
Discussion  
 
  While CED is increasingly discussed in health policy and scientific circles as a 
potentially beneficial way to improve coverage policy, there has been limited 
empirical intvestigation of this approach. Therefore, this research fills an important 
gap, serving as the first study to examine the role and operation of CED policies in 
the context of medical devices. This work is especially important given that many 
international CED policies or programs are increasingly focusing on devices or 
procedures involving devices.  
 
Countries in Europe and elsewhere have increasingly adopted CED policies to 
better inform coverage policies for new devices and other technologies. Overall, 
informats mainly agreed that CED holds potential to enhance coverage decisions and 
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strengthen existing evidence bases on the benefits and costs of new technologies, with 
resulting benefits to payers, manufacturers, hospitals, physicians, and patients. CED 
was deemed a particularly appropriate mechanism for devices, given their sometimes-
underdeveloped evidence base and unique and diverse characteristics. However, use 
of the approach in practice is not without challenge, as previously discussed. There 
are a number of areas for improvement and possible strategies that could be 
considered to help address these issues.  
 
  First, there is a need to attain greater predictability associated with CED 
policies. Countries that have recently established CED programs, such as Germany 
and the Netherlands, have strived to make the process more standardised and 
transparent by clearly outlining eligibility criteria for CED and the initial procedures 
for consideration of applications or selected CED topics. However, after selecting 
technologies for CED and developing a call or request for research, almost all 
countries struggle to maintain a clear and predictable process. Therefore, formal and 
transparent procedures are needed to more effectively determine, execute, and 
communicate study design issues, the oversight and funding of studies, actions to 
address potential setbacks (e.g. slow or insufficient patient enrolment, insufficient or 
inconclusive data) and how generated evidence will be used to inform coverage 
decisions. 
 
   Such procedures may include requiring a series of pre-study meetings with 
involved parties to discuss key study design considerations upfront, including what 
endpoints will be collected, comparators used, criteria for study site selection, patient 
eligibility criteria, arrangements about access to data, opportunities for stakeholder 
input, and what constitutes an acceptable outcome(s) and how that will be assessed 
over what time period. Mechanisms to periodically provide publicly-available 
updates on the status of studies and report the results would also be beneficial. For 
example, in the US, if the CED scheme involves an RCT, information on the status 
of the study can be found on ClinicalTrials.gov, but providing current updates where 
the scheme is reported on the CMS website would be helpful, as well as reporting on 
non-RCT studies. The ISPOR Task Force on Performance-Based Risk-Sharing 
Agreements argues that CED and similar schemes have “public good aspects”, which 
should be considered. In part, this means that public authorities that negotiate and 
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fund CED should make the results of the results public, where possible (Garrison et 
al. 2013).  
 
  In addition, payers responsible for CED policies could produce and 
disseminate clear guidelines outlining the overall process and various stages that 
manufacturers, health care professionals, patients, and others, such as national 
research organisations or independent academic groups, can expect when a CED 
scheme is undertaken. The aforementioned actions could go some way in enhancing 
commitment from industry to engage in CED studies, ensuring reasonable timelines 
are achieved, and improving the quality of the data collected and, in turn, the 
ultimate coverage decision.                
 
  Second, policy makers, manufacturers, and the research community need to be 
better aligned and collaborate to ensure that CED studies most effectively address the 
outstanding uncertainties in the most efficient and timely way possible.  Results from 
collaborative CED studies can be viewed as more credible and neutral, than those 
from studies undertaken by a single payer or by industry alone. Moreover, although 
payers may be well suited to identify the need for evidence, there are other critical 
assessments (e.g. type of research and its priority) that are not necessary ones for 
which they have particular expertise. Informed judgements and better decisions 
might be possible through greater involvement of the research community. The case 
of the ICD CED scheme in the US is a good example of the potential value of 
bringing together these various stakeholder groups. The ICD registry would not have 
been possible without the cooperation and financial support of the ICD 
manufacturers or the electrophysiology community, which supported the ICD 
registry primarily as means to monitor and potentially minimise procedure-related 
complications associated with ICD implantation. Private payers were also brought 
into the process and agreed to help fund the ICD registry and contribute ideas for 
what data elements would be useful for future coverage decisions.  
 
  To date, CED initiatives have largely been collaborative, although there is 
room for improvement. For example, Germany’s new CED policy is offering 
opportunities for greater collaboration with and within the medical device industry. 
Manufacturers will be encouraged to exchange ideas about study design with the 
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GBA and to collaborate together on joint applications. This is particularly beneficial 
given that CED studies only apply to procedures, where a procedure could involve 
various types of the same device.  Another benefit across all countries entails 
opportunities for manufacturers to explain their technology and any particular issues 
that may impact the design of a study to payers and others, especially in systems 
where manufacturers are not involved in the actual conduct of the study.  Besides 
enhancing the involvement of manufacturers, more opportunities for co-sponsored 
studies should be established. For example, payers could support any patient care 
costs, while pooled funds from product developers or public research grants could 
support the research costs. In the US, the CMS could work more closely with other 
federal agencies, such as the FDA, NIH, and AHRQ, to identify topics for CED and 
oversee and fund studies. Moreover, PCORI could provide support for ongoing 
registry or clinical trial systems. In all countries, the involvement of clinicians or 
medical associations may prove particularly helpful, given their early involvement in 
device development and acquired early knowledge of particular technologies. As part 
of any discussion among the interested parties, it is important to gain a shared 
understanding of the reasons for the particular CED scheme and the ways in which 
the information gathered would reduce the uncertainty around the coverage decision.  
 
  Third, better incentives are needed to encourage physicians to recruit patients 
and/or collect data associated with CED studies. One possible strategy is to more 
adequately compensate physicians for referring patients to studies, especially clinical 
trials. Alternatively, it may be helpful to exercise some kind of negative sanction 
against physicians that do not comply with patient recruitment or data collection 
requirements.  Making it easier for community-based physicians to participate 
actively in clinical trials could also have a positive effect on patient recruitment in 
CED studies, as well as improve the engagement of the community in important 
research and increase the chances that physicians will change their practice patterns 
based on the research results they were involved in generating. In addition, to 
encourage physician participation, study questions and protocols should be designed 
in the context of clinical practice, meaning that the procedures required by the study 
protocol should be easily incorporated into practice. Finally, it could be helpful to 
utilise non-traditional patient enrolment strategies alongside more traditional 
approaches, such as using physician referrals. Such tactics include using social media 
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networks, such as Facebook, Twiter, and YouTube, online data mining, and 
electronic medical record monitoring and analysis. 
 
  Fourth, given the time and resources required for CED schemes, it is important 
to capitalise on existing data collection sources and networks to monitor technology 
use and patient outcomes after the initial coverage decision has been made. In 
particular, CED efforts should align with existing mechanisms to expand 
electronically-available health data, including longitudinal patient registries, 
electronic health records, and, in the US, claims data collection and analysis. In 
Europe, several jurisdictions, such as Germany and the UK, have introduced patient 
registries, particularly in orthopaedics and cardiology, to collect post-market data, 
which are usually collaboratively supported by medical associations, academic 
centers, and national research organisations. Again, in the US, such actions would 
include creating greater synergies between the CMS CED program and current 
investments in CER. Together, these efforts would help ensure that the necessary 
data is generated to support CED schemes as effectively as possible and, ideally, that 
better evidence exists to make informed coverage decisions in the first instance. 
 
  Fifth, and in relation to the previous point, one strategy to improve the 
effectiveness of CED or perhaps reduce the need for it is to address some of the 
challenges related to pre-market regulation of devices. In particular, as previously 
discussed, data on the effectiveness of devices (particularly with regards to high-risk 
Class III devices) is not often available or is insufficient at the time of coverage 
determination. These are issues that are largely attributable to the fact that such data 
are not commonly required for a device to achieve market authorisation. While it is 
outside the scope of this paper to discuss potential regulatory reforms to address this 
issue79, one approach to consider is for payers and regulators to provide scientific 
advice to manufacturers to better harmonize evidence requirements. In the US, for 
example, the FDA and CMS have initiated a voluntary, two-year “parallel review” 
program for devices, which entails a partial alignment of their respective review 
processes for regulatory approval and coverage, respectively (Messner and Tunis 
2012). 
                                                            
79 See Sorenson C, Drummond M. (2014). Improving medical device regulation: The United States 
and Europe in perspective. Milbank Quarterly 92(1): 112-148. 
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  Sixth, several of the informants noted the need for greater international 
collaboration between those involved in national CED schemes. At present, devices 
are being studied in multiple countries simultaneously, which duplicates efforts and 
consumes resources that could otherwise be dedicated to applying CED to a greater 
number of technologies or towards other objectives. Increased collaboration between 
countries would also help lower-resourced countries to conduct CED in a more 
regular and formal manner. The EUnetHTA has played some role in fostering greater 
collaboration between European countries and information exchange about what 
technologies have been studied and the associated research and policy outcomes. For 
example, the EUnetHTA Planning and Ongoing database allows HTA agencies to 
share information with each other on planned and ongoing projects conducted at the 
individual agency. In addition, the Evidence Database on New Technologies allows 
sharing and collection of information on coverage and reimbursement and 
assessment status of promising technologies and on additional studies requested or 
recommended further to an assessment.   
 
  Finally, it appears that almost all countries struggle with ensuring that evidence 
collected in CED studies is subsequently used to inform coverage policy. A range of 
factors impact the resulting use of evidence, including the quality and certainty of the 
data generated; alignment between the timing of data collection and the decision 
needs of policy makers, physicians, and patients; and, political acceptability, 
particularly if the evidence points to removing coverage. Some of the 
aforementioned actions would help towards addressing some of these issues. 
However, CED is only effective if it is used to inform decision making and, 
therefore, a coverage decision must be made reflective of the data generated and in 
alignment with any previously agreed commitments between all involved parties. 
This is a necessary step to foster trust and commitment in, and, ultimately, the utility 
of the CED approach. 
 
  In closing, it is worth noting the limitations of this study. The opinions and 
experiences of the experts we interviewed may not be reflective of all those involved 
in CED schemes internationally. However, the experts involved in the study are 
leading internationally-recognised experts in the areas of HTA, CER, evidence-based 
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policy making, and coverage and reimbursement policy. Those from payer agencies 
and industry are senior leaders within their respective organisations. Moreover, our 
informants constitute a variety of key stakeholder groups involved in CED to ensure 
that a range of perspectives and experiences was captured. In addition, the opinions 
of the experts interviewed were complemented by, and verified against, information 
gathered from our literature review.   
 
Conclusions 
 
CED offers potential to provide patients with access to potentially beneficial 
technology, while duly enhancing the existing evidence base on the technology. As 
an approach, it also has the benefit of improving evidence-based coverage policy. 
However, as highlighted throughout this paper, employing CED in practice comes 
with various challenges, from determining eligibility criteria to designing and 
funding studies to applying the new evidence to coverage decisions. Some of these 
challenges have presumably stymied the use of CED, as evidenced by the limited use 
of this approach to date in most countries. The strategies discussed herein may help 
towards identifying optimal use and supporting improvements in the operation, and 
implementation of CED. Given the dynamic nature of medical technologies and CED 
itself, the approach should be evaluated on both a short-term and long-term basis, in 
terms of its impact on static and dynamic efficiency.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
240 
 
Study 7: Valuing end of life care: The case of advanced cancer drugs 
in the United States 
 
Introduction  
	
  New cancer therapies offer the hope of improved prognosis to patients with life 
threatening disease. Over the past five to ten years, a number of specialty treatments 
in particular have entered clinical practice in the US to provide better systemic 
therapy for advanced cancers that respond to few therapeutic alternatives. To date, 
however, such advances have been only modestly effective in extending life 
(Schnipper et al. 2010; Schrag 2004). 
	
	 	 Alongside the optimism generated by new advanced cancer drugs comes 
difficult trade-offs. The prices of many of these therapies exceed $25,000 a year and 
result in benefits measured in months (Fojo and Grady 2009; Meropol and Schulman, 
2009). Consequently, patients are often faced with exorbitant costs and physicians 
are increasingly placed in the undesirable position of having to help patients decide 
whether the potential benefits warrant the financial strain that these medications may 
generate. Concern over the high costs and relative value of new cancer drugs are not 
only confined to physician offices, but also in discussions at influential meetings of 
the American Society for Clinical Oncology (ASCO) (Meropol et al. 2009) and on 
the pages of medical journals and the popular press. Moreover, such issues are being 
considered against the backdrop of recent health care reforms – from more general 
discourse on costs, access to care and obtaining better value from the stratospheric 
spending levels on health care to more specific proposals around the use of CER and 
payment reform. The dramatic trade-offs proffered by these drugs extends beyond 
the national arena; indeed, their adoption has become a touchstone for broader health 
policy debates elsewhere, most notably in the UK (Chalkidou 2012; Department of 
Health 2010; Faden et al. 2009; Jeffreys, 2007). 
 
  With increased attention worldwide placed on the cost of cancer care, the time 
is ripe to explore how cancer drugs are currently being valued in the US context. 
This article aims to address this issue, particularly in the case of end-of-life care, and 
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is structured as follows. First, the article provides some context around these new 
therapies, followed by a discussion on costs and patient access. The article 
subsequently turns to outlining the current evidence on the value for money of 
advanced cancer drugs and then examines some of the technical, political and social 
challenges in assessing their value and considering such evidence in decision 
making. The article concludes with some preliminary thoughts on how to obtain 
greater value in advanced cancer care.  
 
Waging the war on cancer 
 
“.....the time has come in America when the same kind of concentrated effort that 
split the atom and took man to the moon should be turned toward conquering this 
dreaded disease. Let us make a total national commitment to achieve this goal.”  
President Richard Nixon, January 1971, State of the Union Address 
 
  Eleven months later, President Nixon formalised the war on cancer with the 
passage of the National Cancer Act, an act designed to promote the discovery of new 
treatments for cancer and to encourage early detection and prevention of disease. 
More than three decades later, cancer remains an important cause of mortality and 
morbidity in the US. In 2007, cancer represented the second leading cause of death, 
accounting for 23.2% of all deaths, or roughly 563,000 people (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention 2010). Today, 1.5 million new cases of cancer are diagnosed 
in the US annually (American Cancer Society 2010). However, the last three decades 
have witnessed important strides in understanding, preventing and treating the 
disease. Scientists have identified some of the genes responsible for cancer, 
discovered new chemotherapeutic and biologic approaches to treating the disease and 
developed new imaging techniques to detect cancer earlier. Accompanying these 
scientific advances have been equally important public health campaigns and 
educational programmes, which have led to improved screening rates and lifestyle 
changes (e.g. reduced smoking, increased physical activity) that help prevent the 
occurrence and reoccurrence of disease. Consequently, median survival rates have 
improved for many cancers, particularly breast cancer, colon cancer, prostate cancer 
and non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma (American Cancer Society 2010). 
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	 	 Despite these advances, however, there is significant debate over whether the 
war is truly being ‘won’ and, if so, at what cost. Criticisms generally centre on two 
closely related issues. First, there are concerns that medical progress in cancer care 
have predominately focused on the development of expensive treatments that only 
marginally prolong life and may reduce its quality (Epstein 2005; Faguet 2005). As 
intimated previously, many commentators have questioned the cost-effectiveness of 
recent cancer treatments and whether the high cost of such therapies is therefore 
warranted (Berenson 2005; Faguet 2005; Kolata and Pollack 2008; Malin 2010; Shih 
and Halpern 2008). Critics often point to the fact that the US spends twice as much 
as any other country for the same overall survival results (Meropol and Schulman 
2009) as evidence that value in advanced cancer care is suboptimal. Second, some 
argue that too much effort has been placed on developing such costly treatments, at 
the expense of prevention and early detection (Faguet 2005). The following sections 
critically explore the first issue in further detail. 
	
The price tag on progress: Costs of and access to new cancer drugs 
 
  Expenditures on cancer care have nearly doubled over the last 20 years, in part 
as a result of the prices and rapid uptake of new agents and other technologies, 
including advances in imaging and therapeutic radiology (Meropol et al. 2009; 
Tangka et al. 2010). In particular, spending on cancer drugs has risen 15% annually 
in recent years, with many approved medications carrying costs of $5,000-$10,000 or 
more per month of treatment (Gatyas and Longwell 2008; Schickedanz, 2010). Sales 
of cancer drugs are now second only to those of drugs for heart disease and estimates 
suggest that more than 40% of Medicare drug spending is for oncology agents 
(McNeil 2007; Smith and Hillner 2011) To be sure, scientific advances in oncology 
have not come cheap.  
 
The growing economic burden associated with such treatments begs the 
question of why costs are so high. First, there are factors related to their supply and 
demand that contribute to high drug prices. Most new cancer drugs are biologics, 
which are more costly to produce than traditional medications and administered via 
infusion or direct injection, both of which involve substantial costs. The rising costs 
of production is partly due to the escalating expense and inefficiencies of clinical 
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trials and the time and resources required to meet the evidentiary requirements of 
national drug regulatory authorities (Rawlins and Chalkidou 2011). In addition, the 
majority of therapies are patented and under other market exclusivities that limit 
competition in order to preserve incentives for research and development (R&D), 
thereby reducing competitive (downward) pressures on prices (Danzon and Taylor 
2010).  Furthermore, as many of these drugs treat advanced disease that respond to 
few therapeutic alternatives, they are able to command premium prices without 
significantly deterring provider and patient demand (Goldman et al. 2010). Neumann 
et al. (2010) and Nadler et al. (2006) found that 67% and 78% of oncologists, 
respectively, endorsed the notion that all patients should have access to available and 
effective care regardless of costs. For many terminally ill patients, even when prices 
are high, demand for cancer drugs has been found to be largely inelastic, as they 
understandably place a high value on any additional life and therefore willing to pay 
more for treatment (Goldman et al. 2010).  
 
Second, existing health insurance distortions and payment policies contribute 
to high costs. In principle, insurance creates a gap between the out-of-pocket prices 
that consumers pay and those received by manufacturers, with the difference paid by 
insurance. In cases where insurance coverage is insufficient to cover costs, many 
patients have supplementary insurance to cover the remainder or they forgo treatment 
if they cannot afford the co-insurance, and manufacturers often offer discounted 
drugs or assistance programmes for some patients without the ability to pay (Danzon 
and Taylor 2010). Consequently, patients and physicians have had limited incentives 
to demand cheaper drugs, thereby giving manufacturers little reason to constrain 
prices, although this may change due to the rising cost of care and growing levels of 
patient cost-sharing, as discussed further below. In the case of Medicare, current 
payment policies for cancer drugs used under both Parts B and D benefits further 
encourage rising costs. With regard to the former, existing policies effectively reduce 
physicians’ margins80, which encourages manufacturers to charge high prices, 
                                                            
80 Most cancer drugs are dispensed in physician offices and therefore covered under Part B or by a private 
insurer’s medical benefit. Prior to 2005, they were paid at average wholesale price (list price), but are now paid at 
average selling price (ASP) plus 6%. Historically, physician reimbursement for oncology treatments has been 
highly lucrative, based on the relative margin between acquisition costs and reimbursement rates (the ‘buy and 
bill’ approach). 
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especially at initial launch, to offer larger margins to physicians and indirectly 
influence use of costlier, more aggressive therapies (Danzon and Taylor 2010; 
Jacobson et al. 2006; Medpac 2010). In contrast, reimbursement for cognitive 
services (e.g. end-of-life counselling) is dismally low (Smith and Hillner 2010). 
While there is little to no evidence that physicians base treatment decisions solely on 
potential profit, when deciding between two equally efficacious treatments, 
oncologists tend to choose the more expensive therapy (Jacobson et al. 2006; Smith 
and Hillner 2010).  
 
For drugs under Part D, pharmacy benefit managers contracted by Medicare 
have limited ability to negotiate price discounts for preferred formulary placement 
with certain classes of drugs, including those for cancer (Danzon and Taylor 2010). 
In fact, as of 2010, contracting private plans are required to include all drugs for 
conditions that are major or life-threatening (Bach 2009), regardless of cost or value 
for money. To that end, Medicare’s overall standard for coverage is whether the drug 
is ‘reasonable and necessary’ for the diagnosis or treatment of disease; it is not 
permitted to refuse coverage of a drug based on grounds of either cost or cost-
effectiveness. A further source of upward pressure on costs is the extensive use of 
and payment for ‘off-label’ cancer drugs and treatments within Medicare81. While 
off-label use in cancer care is commonplace, with estimates indicating that 50–75% 
of drug or biologic therapy used to treat cancer is off-label (Soares 2005), use is 
higher in advanced cases when patients are no longer experiencing benefit from 
standard approved treatments, and increasingly involves expensive therapies 
(Sullivan et al. 2011). Some off-label use is supported by clinical data, although in 
many cases there is little supporting evidence of benefit, with accumulating evidence 
of harm (Giezen et al. 2008; Hecht et al. 2009; Tol et al. 2009). Nevertheless, off-
label use of cancer therapies has endorsement from the NCI and, in some 
circumstances, the FDA. Moreover, the CMS must pay for off-label use if available 
medical compendia – reference guides Medicare relies on to determine which off-
                                                            
81
	Off-label use entails any use of a drug different from that described in the FDA-approved drug label. In 
oncology, off-label use includes uses for a different cancer or at a different time in the course of the disease, or in 
a dose or schedule different from that in the approved label.  
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label uses of cancer drugs to cover – recommend use, even if such recommendations 
are based on scant evidence of effectiveness and safety82. 
 
Given that private plans generally follow Medicare’s policies and coverage and 
reimbursement decisions, the aforementioned payment rules have a ripple effect 
across the whole of the health system, affecting physician treatment choices and 
distorting pricing on value and broader cost containment.  
 
Thirdly and finally, the high costs associated with advanced cancer care are 
also attributable to overutilisation of treatment or the utilisation of futile care. Several 
studies suggest that a substantial portion of the total cost of cancer care is for 
treatment delivered in the last months, weeks, or days of life, and that much of this 
care is of little to no therapeutic benefit and potentially inconsistent with patients’ 
wishes (Earle et al. 2008; Lubitz and Riley 1993; Mack et al. 2010; Zhang et al. 
2009). Existing evidence indicates that patient preferences for end-of-life cancer care 
vary widely (i.e. some patients want aggressive treatment until the very last day, 
others want home or hospice care with minimal medical intervention) and that 
existing national variations in care83 largely do not reflect such preferences or 
differences in need (Barnato et al. 2007; Earle et al. 2008; Goodman 2011; Goodman 
et al. 2010, 2011). Rather, regional differences in end-of-life care intensity are often 
guided by ‘supply-sensitive care’, resulting from uncertainty about how best to treat 
advanced cancer patients, practice styles of different health systems and physicians, 
and the tendency of physicians to use the medical resources available to them, 
especially when it involves lengthening life84 (Goodman et al. 2011; Hollingsworth 
et al. 2010).  
 
                                                            
82 Compendiums entail a listing of drugs, their clinical properties and recommended uses, and are put together by 
non-governmental bodies (e.g. American Hospital Formulary Service Drug Information). If only one 
compendium recommends use, Medicare must provide coverage. Based on a systematic review of available 
compendium, Abernethy et al. (2009) noted variability in the consistency and transparency of the policies applied 
in delineating off-label cancer indications and the approach to the review, rating and updating of evidence was 
often neither systematic nor comprehensive. 
83 The use of chemotherapy and life-sustaining treatment at the end of life varies considerably. Goodman et al. 
(2010) found that the percentage of cancer patients receiving chemotherapy during the last two weeks of life 
varied fourfold among hospital referral regions and the percentage receiving life- sustaining treatment during the 
last month of life varied by a factor of more than six. Similar patterns were found for intensive care and the use of 
hospice care (Goodman et al., 2010, 2011). 
84 This may be due in part to the basic tenets of practicing medicine – that is, to sustain life – as well as the 
changing norms of modern medicine, which entails using more technological approaches to care over other 
means.  
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The growing price tag associated with these treatments is increasingly 
impacting patients and providers alike. Even Medicare beneficiaries and those with 
private health insurance can be faced with considerable out-of-pocket costs. 
Goldman et al. (2010) reported that although median patient out-of-pocket costs for 
new oncologic biologic therapies was only 1-2% of the total cost, the mean was 4-
13% at the 90th percentile, and patient share of total cost ranged from 13% for 
imatinib to 15% for rituximab. For Medicare beneficiaries in particular, Faden et al. 
(2009) found that patient costs can total between $2,900 and $6,000 for three months 
of treatment to $7,400 and $24,000 for an annual course of therapy. Such co-pays are 
particularly a concern for those with low or fixed incomes, who spend about a 
quarter of their annual income on such expenses (Berenson 2005; Kim 2007; Langa 
et al. 2004). For uninsured and underinsured Americans, out-of-pocket costs can 
easily be four times higher; depending on the agent, annual therapy, for example, can 
soar to more than $100,000 (Faden et al. 2009). Given that patients are likely to be 
taking multiple drugs, patient expenditures are presumably higher. 
 
When confronted with high out-of-pocket expenses, some patients, particularly 
those without the ability to pay, may forgo or discontinue treatment (Szabo 2008). 
Even those patients with some capacity to finance treatment may not undertake all 
recommended care in fear they will burden their families with unmanageable debt 
(Berenson 2005; Kim 2007). Among those declaring bankruptcy for medical reasons, 
cancer is frequently the condition that precipitates the financial crisis (Himmelstein 
et al. 2009). Therefore, while increased patient cost-sharing may serve to control 
overall costs, there is evidence that it is associated with worse outcomes in the 
sickest and poorest patients, perhaps by causing lower use of necessary services (Hsu 
et al. 2006). Growing patient cost burdens is also affecting physician treatment 
patterns. In a survey of oncologists (Neumann et al. 2010), 56% and 84% reported 
that the cost of new cancer drugs and patient’s out-of-pocket costs, respectively, 
currently influence which cancer treatment they recommend to their patients.    
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Evidence on the value for money of end of life cancer drug treatments               
 
 Given the substantial costs associated with advanced cancer drugs, their value 
for money is increasingly being questioned by patients, clinicians, payers and policy 
makers, with many observers arguing that these drugs, often used in the last months 
of life, are not cost-effective, in the sense of extending QALYs at a reasonable price. 
Indeed, these treatments frequently have cost-effectiveness ratios that exceed (or well 
exceed) $100,000 per QALY, which is higher than the $50,000-$100,000 per QALY 
threshold often suggested as denoting good value for money (Neumann et al. 2000). 
Suggestions have been made for the threshold to be raised to take into account 
societal preferences and medical inflation (Ubel et al. 2003), and that cancer drugs 
(that increase life expectancy in the final month of life) in particular should be 
regarded differently than treatments that lower mortality risks only incrementally 
throughout an individual’s entire adult life (Becker et al. 2007). As discussed in 
Chalkidou’s (2012) article in this issue, the national HTA body in the UK, NICE, 
recently extended its cost-effectiveness threshold for drugs aimed at end of life care 
under certain circumstances. The new policy was, in part, guided by societal 
preferences for the lives of terminally ill, mostly cancer, patients to be valued more 
than those suffering from other, potentially curable, chronic, or acute conditions.      
	
However, there is limited understanding of how these treatments are valued by 
different stakeholders in the US, although some evidence is starting to emerge. In a 
recent survey of oncologists on the value of cancer drugs, Neumann et al. (2010) 
found that they had an average implied cost-effectiveness threshold of roughly 
$300,000 per QALY. Interestingly, when later asked to generally define reasonable 
value for money, the majority (49%) indicated $50,000-$100,000 per QALY, with 
approximately 20% deeming a higher range of $100,000-$150,000 per QALY as 
good value. A similar study (Nadler et al. 2006) demonstrated that 62% of 
oncologists believed that a life expectancy gain of at least two to four months 
justified the use of a hypothetical agent with a cost of $70,000 per year above the 
standard of care and another 20% believed four to six months would justify this cost. 
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	 	 Goldman et al. (2010) estimated patients’ willingness to pay for cancer drugs85 
to be equal to four times the total cost paid by the patient and his or her insurer. 
Annual net benefit ratios were slightly higher for those aged 65 years or older and 
female patients; no differences in willingness to pay were found by income, although 
there were acknowledged limitations in how income was imputed. Research by 
Becker et al. (2007) and Selvin et al. (2010) highlight that people who face imminent 
death, as in the case of advanced cancer patients, may place a much higher value on 
life-extending treatments than people for whom death is a remote risk. This may 
result in a willingness to spend any remaining wealth to live a few weeks longer, 
because the value of their wealth may lose much of its value at death. 
	
Despite this initial evidence suggesting high valuations for advanced cancer 
drugs, there are qualifications to making deductions about their value for money. 
Importantly, oncologists and terminally ill patients may have different perceptions 
regarding economic value and benefit than other physicians, patients and broader 
society. For example, oncologists often practice in a context where grave situations 
in which treatments offer modest benefits are the norm and this arguably influences 
their perceptions of value (Nadler et al. 2006). Smith and Hillner (2010) suggest this 
may indirectly cause oncologists to overvalue (and overutilise) costlier drugs, as they 
expect sufficient financial reward in return for routinely dealing with complicated 
treatments and the “fractured dreams and extreme suffering” of patients.  
	
Furthermore, Nadler et al. (2006) found that physician perceptions of economic 
value do not correlate highly with their own practice patterns. The majority (78%) of 
oncologists surveyed believed that patients should receive ‘effective’ treatment 
regardless of cost, but when queried whether a therapy that has been shown effective 
offered good value, most were unsure or disagreed, which suggests that they offer 
drug therapy to patients regardless of perceptions of value for money as long as the 
treatment is considered effective. Recent research by Colosia and colleagues (2011) 
highlights that oncologists’ perceptions of quality cancer care includes effectiveness, 
but not costs. In addition, physicians often either under- or over-estimate survival 
benefits and costs, indicating that some oncologists’ knowledge on the matter is 
lacking or that they have exceedingly high cost-effectiveness thresholds. How these 
                                                            
85 Goldman and colleagues looked at Avastin, Herceptin, Rituxan, Tarceva and Gleevac in particular. 
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findings comport with evidence that oncologists are increasingly considering cost in 
treatment decisions is worth further exploration.   
	
Similar issues hold for advanced cancer patients, but are likely heightened 
given their lack of medical expertise, variable understanding of the risks, benefits, 
and costs involved86, and the distress of facing death, which as stated earlier, may 
result in higher valuations of these therapies than would be elicited by healthy people 
or patients with acute or chronic conditions.  
 
In addition, given increasingly limited resources to fund all health care, the 
value of cancer drugs should be considered from a broader societal perspective, 
which has yet to be explored in the American context, to ascertain how public 
valuations of these treatments might differ from cancer patients and their physicians. 
Determinations of their social value should be gauged against that of other 
interventions or policy priorities (inside and outside of health care), many of whom 
may provide better value for money.  
 
The road to value-based funding for and access to cancer drugs: Technical, 
political and social challenges 
 
It is clear that use of these drugs at the end of life often entails a complex cost-
benefit trade-off for physicians, patients, payers, and society alike, which will only 
get more challenging in the future with greater R&D activity in this area, 
increasingly expensive therapies87 (Schickedanz 2010) and tighter health care 
budgets. In attempts to address the “value crisis in oncology” (Ramsey and 
Schickedanz 2010), there have been recent developments toward better 
understanding the value of cancer drugs and measuring the value of cancer drugs and 
advanced cancer care more generally.  
 
                                                            
86 Patients’ ability to understand probabilities of survival and adverse events are influenced by their health 
numeracy skills (Ancker and Kaufman 2007) and patients tend to update their perceptions of the benefits and 
harms as well as the level of uncertainty based on their individual clinical experiences and subjective assessment 
of treatments and resultant outcomes. Harrington and Smith (2008) found that one third of patients persist in 
believing they can be cured even when conversations and evidence stating otherwise are documented.  
87 Currently, there are over 100 new cancer drugs in randomized phase III trials, all with a price tag of thousands 
of dollar per month. 
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In particular, in the last few years considerable attention and investment has 
been put towards CER. The ACA dedicated $1.1 billion to fund CER88 and establish 
the public-private PCORI to oversee the research. The aim of CER is to provide 
evidence of which interventions work in practice to allow physicians and patients, 
among others, to make better health care decisions. Cancer was one of the key 
priorities identified in early CER priority-setting processes (Institute of Medicine 
2009) and recent research suggests that there is demand for CER on cancer drugs. In 
particular, 79% of oncologists surveyed wanted more government research on their 
comparative effectiveness and 80% favoured greater use of cost-effectiveness data in 
coverage and payment decisions for these treatments (Neumann et al. 2010). 
 
  While CER is arguably needed in the context of cancer drugs and other 
available interventions – less than half of medical care in the US is based on or 
supported by evidence about its effectiveness (IOM 2007) – there are aspects of 
cancer drugs that introduce technical challenges to measuring their value (Mullins et 
al. 2010). Due to the incentives inherent in the clinical research enterprise, RCTs are 
designed for specific purposes of regulatory approval and maximum market 
penetration, not to reflect the complexities of real-world patient care, where patients 
may have significant co-morbidities and other clinically mitigating factors, and they 
often do not collect economic information. Moreover, trials are rarely designed to 
compare a new drug against existing treatment alternatives to demonstrate relative 
therapeutic advantage (Smith and Hillner 2010).  
	
Although these are not challenges unique to cancer drugs per se, for a variety 
of reasons these issues are exacerbated in the area of oncology. In cancer care, for 
example, clinical uncertainty in measuring comparative effectiveness leads to 
economic uncertainty, as for many cancers, there is no dominant treatment 
alternative and thus each attempt to treat incurs a separate cost, especially toward the 
end-of-life when additional, more aggressive lines of therapy are employed (Virgo et 
al. 1995). It is also difficult to accurately capture patient preferences and assessments 
of impact on quality of life when, in advanced cancer, there are notable uncertainties 
about survival, side effects of drugs, and personalised responses to care that 
                                                            
88 The ACA defines CER as “research evaluating and comparing health outcomes and the clinical effectiveness, 
risks, and benefits of two or more medical treatments, services, and items”.  
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frequently change along the course of treatment. Along these lines, existing 
preference-weighted quality of life measures (often used in QALY determinations) 
may not be sensitive enough to pick up changes in the health status of cancer patients 
or reflect preferences driven by specific characteristics or severity of the disease 
(Garau et al. 2010). In addition, the ubiquitous use of oncology drugs off-label makes 
it difficult to assess their value, as there is often insufficient or poor quality evidence 
from clinical trials to determine benefit, as previously discussed (Mullins et al. 
2010).     
 
  There are also political challenges to measuring value and, in particular, to 
applying resulting evidence in decision making on the availability and use of cancer 
drugs. The emotional debates preceding passage of the health reform legislation 
illustrated strong disagreements about what should constitute ‘value’ (i.e. whether 
both clinical effectiveness and costs (or other factors) should be considered), who 
should evaluate value, and what role for CER in decision making (Garber and Sox 
2010). Some legislators opposed using CER evidence for federal decisions about 
health insurance coverage, a stance supported by intense lobbying from various 
interest groups and dramatised with references to ‘death panels’, the dreaded R-word 
(rationing), and the heartless British NHS who leaves grandma to die to save money. 
These debates highlighted the political risk of giving PCORI even the resemblance of 
authority over health care decisions and, consequently, the ACA prohibited the 
Institute from assuming the responsibility or authority to measure value and limited 
the ways in which CER can be used by Medicare (Garber and Sox 2010). Moreover, 
it barred Medicare from using cost-effectiveness as a factor in making coverage and 
reimbursement decisions89. Such provisions were largely supported by the general 
public (Gerber et al. 2010).  
 
Research specific to advanced cancer drugs suggests oncologists concur; very 
few desire explicit resource allocation with government assuming a role in 
determining what care constitutes good value for money (Neumann et al. 2010). 
While current provisions rendered CER more politically palatable and fostered 
                                                            
89 The bill specifically prohibits any cost-effectiveness analysis that would use any adjusted life years factor that 
would place lower value on the life of elderly, disabled, or terminally ill individuals compared to younger and 
healthier persons, as well as the use of a strict cost-effectiveness threshold.  
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stakeholder acceptance of PCORI, there is risk that without some policy ‘teeth’, such 
research will have limited impact on clinical practice and costs.  
	
  Given the existing scenario where CER is restricted to more decentralised and 
implicit use by physicians, patients, and other actors in the health system, there has 
been a surprising lack of discussion of how CER evidence on the value of treatments 
will get from ‘bench to bedside’. Simply making such evidence available will not 
likely be sufficient to ensure its consideration in patient care, including end-of-life 
treatment – that is, evidence is only as good as what you do with it (Freemantle and 
Drummond 2010). First, in Neumann et al.’s study (2010) of oncologists, physicians 
reported insufficient time to consider available evidence, which may be heightened 
in end-of-life care when time to treat may be limited (Sullivan et al. 2011).  
Moreover, only 42% of oncologists said they felt well prepared to interpret and use 
such information in their treatment decisions. Second, even if one assumes that 
physicians and patients will have access to CER information on cancer drugs and use 
it in their decisions, there is evidence suggesting that the cost issue will not be 
adequately addressed. The most obvious reason is that as currently fashioned, CER 
evidence may not include the costs of therapy. Furthermore, patients are often 
reluctant to raise concerns regarding costs because they feel awkward addressing the 
topic and worry about how such discussions might affect quality of care (Alexander 
et al. 2003; Kim 2007). Oncologists feel similarly uneasy, which stymies open 
discussion of costs with patients (Neumann et al. 2010; Schrag and Hanger 2007). 
This discomfort may be more pronounced in the context of end-of-life treatment 
decisions, when it could feel that a life is being priced (Schickedanz 2010), 
especially if costs have not entered into patient-physician discussions previously.  
 
  In addition, the existence of a “cancer taboo’’ may pose additional political and 
social barriers to value-based decision making on cancer drugs. Cancer holds a 
privileged position - the “emperor of all maladies’’90 - in US health care, as 
evidenced by significant public and private research investment in understanding and 
treating the disease, a powerful industry, the multitude of influential interest groups 
                                                            
90 See S. Mukherjee (2010), The Emperor of All Maladies: A Biography of Cancer. This may be influenced by 
the research imperative that is pervasive in US health care (Callahan 2009). Considerable investments are made 
in medical research, particularly with regards to cancer, and researchers, funders, advocacy groups, among others, 
all have a stake in heralding the success of the research. Moreover, such investments uphold expressed beliefs in 
the incremental nature of medical progress and that small differences lead to large net gains in public health. 
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and national associations with considerable political and financial capital, and, of 
course, the human element that almost every citizen knows of someone who has 
suffered from or died from cancer. One only needs to envision the bevy of organised 
sporting events in support of various types of cancer and the ubiquitous coloured 
rubber bracelets that have now become a global phenomenon to understand the 
extent of public support for ‘fighting the war’. In the context where available CER 
evidence demonstrates a lack of benefit against the costs, such influence, coupled 
with national sensitivities toward rationing, will render saying ‘no’ extremely 
difficult. Inevitably, payers will fear negative publicity and potential lawsuits, policy 
makers will want to avoid ‘disease politics’ and the entire CER enterprise could be 
placed under threat.  
 
While not specific to advanced cancer drugs, tensions between evidence, 
access to treatment, and political and social preferences played out in the recent 
breast cancer screening guidelines. The guidelines, if followed, would reduce the use 
of mammography among women ages 40 to 49; substantial opposition ensued, which 
lead to a provision in the health reform legislation requiring the government to ignore 
the recommendations (Gusmano and Gray 2010). The experience of the UK, as 
discussed by Chalkidou (2012), further underscores the difficulty in balancing such 
tensions. Even in a long-standing and centralised system of CER via NICE, where 
the use of evidence to support access decisions is well known and formally integrated 
into policy, the Institute has faced significant negative media attention and public 
backlash to ‘no’ decisions for advanced cancer drugs, which arguably contributed to 
its change in policy for end-of-life treatments, the promulgation of a dedicated cancer 
fund, and discussion of potential removal of the Institute’s decision-making authority 
among government officials.  
	
Conclusions   
    
  This paper illustrates some of the key issues present in valuing end-of-life care 
in the US in the case of advanced cancer drugs, from the difficult trade-offs between 
their marginal health benefits and high costs to the challenges in assessing their value 
and applying such evidence in decision making. While policy makers, payers, 
physicians and patients will continue to face such issues into the foreseeable future, 
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there are a number of initial steps that could be pursued to address existing evidence 
gaps and some of the outlined challenges.  
 
First, as intimated earlier, additional research is needed to determine how 
different stakeholders value these treatments. While evidence specific to oncologists 
has recently emerged, there is a lack of understanding around the preferences of 
policy makers, payers, patients and the general public regarding the use of these 
drugs and within the context of end-of-life care in particular. This would be a first 
step in better understanding perceptions of value, how to effectively define and 
measure it, and, more broadly, how best to manage the different needs and 
expectations of these various groups.  
	
Second, although cancer drugs introduce unique technical challenges to 
assessing their value, there has been movement to address some of the limitations of 
RCTs through the use of pragmatic clinical trials91 and CED, which has been used by 
Medicare since 2005 to provide conditional coverage for promising medical 
technologies while additional clinical evidence is generated to reduce the uncertainty 
and evidence gap in valuing treatments (Cohen and Looney 2010; Mullins et al., 
2010). Additionally, better incentives are needed to address the poor evidence base 
with regards to off-label use, which could involve a greater role for Medicare to 
strengthen evidence compendia and for developing methodological standards for 
evaluating off-label indications (Sox 2009). Other strategies to build the evidence 
base in oncology, particularly with regard to better understanding what (and how) 
cancer care is delivered to patients and its consequences, include use of outcomes 
databases and developing improved metrics to measure quality of care. These 
approaches could be potentially incorporated into existing physician payment 
schemes to incentivise development of evidence about what works and for whom in 
advanced cancer care. It could also help guide and encourage appropriate care at the 
end-of-life, with the aim to protect against over- and under-utilisation of care. 
UnitedHealthcare recently introduced a pilot programme incorporating such 
                                                            
91 Pragmatic trials or prospective controlled studies are specifically designed to be informative for post-regulatory 
decision makers through selection of more relevant comparators, better generalizability to diverse patient 
populations, and inclusion of relevant outcome measures of interest to payers, clinicians, and patients (e.g. quality 
of life) (Mullins et al. 2010).   
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strategies, where oncologists can earn incentives for delivering quality care that 
results in controlling costs as well as for developing outcomes data (Burns 2011). 
 
Third, although CER is focused on comparative effectiveness, it does not 
preclude consideration of costs. Garber and Sox (2010) argue that any CER research 
supported by PCORI and other sponsors should include data on use and costs to 
ensure that the most accurate and comprehensive information is available to decision 
makers. For example, CER-related legislation limits the use of cost-effectiveness 
analysis by certain federal programs, but cost data could still prove valuable to 
Medicare and other stakeholders. To the latter, private entities (e.g. private insurers, 
hospitals, physician groups) and other government programs could consider costs 
and perform or apply cost-effectiveness analysis based on comparative effectiveness 
results in their decisions. Insurers, in particular, could use such information to 
improve benefit design where patient cost-sharing for cancer drugs would not simply 
be based on cost, but value. Value-based insurance design, where co-pays are 
reduced for services when the clinical benefits exceed the cost and raised when the 
benefits do not justify the expenditure, has already been implemented by pioneering 
private payers to drive value in areas outside of oncology (de Souza et al. 2012). As 
applied to oncology, this more nuanced approach would protect individual freedom 
of treatment choice, while maintaining controls over the total financial expenditure 
of health plans, and acknowledge and respond to patient heterogeneity across the 
entire spectrum of cancer care (de Souza et al. 2012; Drummond and Towse 2012; 
Pearson and Bach, 2010). Research by Wong et al. (2010) suggests that patients may 
be willing to pay higher co-pays for more effective treatments.  
 
Fourth, simply making CER evidence available on the relative effectiveness 
(and costs) of cancer treatments will not be sufficient to impact clinical decision 
making, especially in the absence of national policy or guidelines requiring 
implementation of such evidence in practice. The development of decision-support 
systems and aids, using available evidence of value, could be used to help 
oncologists make decisions; some available programs can calculate the cost-
effectiveness of a given intervention and help physicians better elicit patient 
treatment preferences (Garber and Sox 2010). Such tools could also be used to help 
oncologists to communicate with patients about the risks and benefits (and costs) of 
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available treatment options, including end-of-life care, and realistic expectations 
regarding their prognosis and response to therapy. Available evidence suggests that 
oncologists infrequently speak early and openly to patients about their options, the 
possibility of death, and ways they can make the transition to the prospect of dying 
(Huskamp et al. 2009; Keating et al. 2010; Wright 2008).  
 
Greater patient-physician discussion of transitions to end-of-life care has been 
shown to correlate with significantly lower intensive care unit admissions, use of 
aggressive care, and costs, while promoting patient acceptance of terminal illness, 
caregiver quality of life, and reduced feelings of regret, depression, and anxiety 
(Smith and Hillner 2011; Wright et al. 2008; Zhang et al. 2009). Moreover, existing 
evidence indicates that patients and their families want and need more information 
on what is available to those at the end of life and, more generally, how the US 
health system works in this context, and would prefer that such information come 
from physicians, not elected officials or politicians (DoBias 2011; Harrington and 
Smith 2008). Support from insurers and national medical associations could be 
beneficial for fostering shared physician-patient communication and decision 
making. For example, ASCO could develop guidance and educational opportunities 
to assist oncologists in considering and discussing costs with patients, as well as less 
expensive treatment options that might be more appropriate at the end of life. As a 
starting point, ASCO now recommends that oncologists educate patients on the 
financial realities of cancer care (ASCO 2009). 
 
Other steps that could be taken to enhance the value of advanced cancer care 
include more open and substantive debate about how best to care for terminally ill 
cancer patients. A recent survey conducted by the Regence Foundation and National 
Journal found that roughly 78% of Americans indicated that end of life treatment 
and palliative care should be part of the public discourse, and 93% believed that such 
decisions should assume a top priority for the US health system (DoBias 2011). 
Moreover, the current use of community-based palliative care appears to fall short of 
what many patients want (Barnato et al. 2007; Goodman e2011; Goodman et al. 
2011). Key issues of discussion would include: Is aggressive drug therapy that 
marginally extends life at a high price tag the best course of action? If so, what 
constitutes a clinically important difference in survival – 1 month, 2 months, 3 
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months, longer? Authorities in France, for example, consider 1 month sufficient, 
while those in the UK, require evidence of at least a 3 month survival benefit. Would 
greater value for money be obtained by helping patients more effectively transition to 
the end of life through high-quality (and earlier) palliative care? Existing evidence 
suggests that earlier access to palliative care can extend life, reduce suffering and 
save money (Temel et al. 2010).  
 
In a poignant commentary in The New Yorker, Atul Gawande maintains that 
modern medicine has done well at staving off death with expensive and aggressive 
interventions, but has been considerably less successful in knowing when to stop and 
instead focus on improving the days terminal patients have left (Gwande 2010). In 
addition to greater public discussion on these issues, progress on the latter might be 
attained through improving coordination of care between usual care and hospice, 
where both could be more effectively combined into integrated care models; payment 
reform for cognitive care, such as outlining and discussing advanced directives and 
other end-of-life planning and counselling; and, additional research on determining 
the optimal time to transition from curative to palliative care and ways to predict 
death more accurately.       
 
Finally, aspects of value other than clinical and economic outcomes should also 
enter into public discourse about advanced cancer care - hope, choice, opportunity of 
treatment, compassion, convenience, equity, and quality of life can all be considered 
domains of value for patients (and likely other stakeholders, such as their caregivers, 
physicians, and society). For example, the importance of considering quality of life 
was highlighted in recent national poll data, which found that most (70%) of 
Americans agree that it is more important to enhance quality of life for seriously ill 
patients, even though it means a shorter life (DoBias 2011). Of course, how value is 
defined, particularly from the patient point of view, will depend on personal 
circumstances and preferences and what therapies are available. For some patients, 
this will entail trying every available treatment to prolong life; for others, there may 
be greater value placed on simplifying their choices and eliminating unrealistic 
treatment options, while allowing them to live out the remaining months or years of 
their lives without aggressive therapy, and the health, emotional, and financial 
implications that may result. Therefore, an important point of discussion is how to 
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build consensus about when to give and when to omit particular treatments, while 
still allowing for personalisation of cancer care.  
 
While the aforementioned steps may go some way to ensure the US is 
achieving greater value in advanced cancer care, there remain broader challenges 
around the acceptability (and sustainability) of the high prices of cancer drugs and 
associated services and how much society is willing to spend on treating a small 
minority of patients and what we might forgo as a result. Resources are limited, 
especially given the current economic climate, and difficult decisions are required 
regarding the availability and affordability of health care. While this is an enduring 
problem, it is preferable to tackle it head on using the best available evidence and 
determined in a transparent, representative, and fair way.  
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Study 8: The politics of comparative effectiveness research in the 
United States: Lessons from recent history 
 
Introduction  
 
  As part of the ACA of 2010, the PCORI was established to fund and oversee 
CER at the national level. As a concept, CER has garnered support from a variety of 
stakeholders, including government officials, researchers, professional associations, 
and patients. With growing concerns over health care costs and the quality of care, 
determining which therapies, care strategies, delivery models, and public health 
programs are most effective makes good sense. Existing estimates suggest that less 
than half of medical care in the US is based on or supported by evidence about its 
effectiveness, often resulting in care that is inappropriate and unnecessary (IOM 
2007; McGlynn and Brook 2001). 
 
  However, in the year preceding passage of the ACA, the initiative sparked 
substantial controversy. Many Republicans, private institutions, and conservative 
pundits went into “rhetorical overdrive” (Iglehart 2010), with claims of government 
interference in patient care and rationing of services. Town hall meetings resonated 
with concerns over the creation of “death panels” and fear that the US would adopt a 
“British-style” model of health care. Despite intense opposition and attempts to gut 
the funding in the final reform package, CER managed to survive the legislative 
process and is now well under way. Nevertheless, these first years of formulating and 
implementing CER represent a challenging new chapter in the initiative’s history. 
Many unresolved questions remain, including how CER will be implemented and 
operationalised in practice and, ultimately, what impact it will have on its intended 
aims to improve the quality of health services, eliminate inappropriate and wasteful 
care, and “bend the cost curve.” There is also uncertainty regarding its survival in 
both the near and the long term. With ongoing attempts to overturn provisions in the 
health care reform law, the debate regarding CER is far from over. 
 
  Although CER has garnered significant attention in recent years, the issues and 
methods underpinning the approach are not entirely new. There have been a number 
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of efforts at the federal level over the last forty years, some more successful than 
others, to improve the evidence base on the benefits and costs of new health care 
interventions and policies. Therefore, the aim of this article is to examine past 
attempts to implement and use this type of research, in order to identify lessons for 
current and future CER efforts. To date, there has been a lack of research on previous 
attempts at CER and the implications these efforts have had or might have for current 
CER initiatives. The article begins by providing further policy and political context 
around recent CER legislation and the creation of PCORI, followed by a historical 
analysis of previous efforts to formally integrate related research into US health care. 
It then turns to a discussion of key lessons from past attempts and concludes by 
highlighting two main challenges CER will likely face in the future. We suggest 
potential ways to address these pitfalls to ensure the success and sustainability of 
CER. 
 
Setting the policy context  
 
  Although debate around CER came to a head during formation of the health 
care reform bills during the summer of 2009, discussions on its potential role in 
health care largely took shape earlier, in late 2006 and early 2007. During this time, a 
shift from a Republican to Democratic congressional majority renewed focus on 
health care and the need for comprehensive reform (Patel 2010). In this context, CER 
was increasingly viewed as a mechanism to address deficits in the quality and 
efficiency of health care by better integrating available evidence on effectiveness 
into care delivery (CBO 2007). There were also growing calls among congressional 
leaders and health policy experts for an identifiable entity responsible for the 
research (CRS 2007; IOM 2007; Schoen et al. 2007; Wilensky 2006). 
 
  Some of the key policy questions fundamental to these discussions were issues 
related to the governance, structure, and funding of such an entity. Of particular 
importance were whether it would be connected with or independent of government 
and what role the research would have in Medicare coverage decisions and other 
areas of policy, such as the development of clinical practice guidelines. A proposal 
put forth by the House in 2007, for example, introduced a potential organisational 
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structure that would be housed within the AHRQ. Alternatively, Senators Max 
Baucus (D-MT) and Kent Conrad (D-ND), chairs of the Finance and Budget 
Committees, respectively, introduced legislation (Comparative Effectiveness 
Research Act of 2008, S. 3408, 110th Cong. 2008) that would establish a 
nongovernmental, public-private entity, based on the idea that a nongovernmental 
body would offer a more efficient, transparent, and accepted mechanism for 
integrating CER into US health care. Although neither proposal was fully adopted, 
these broader questions about the structure and role of a CER entity and the 
application of such research in policy and practice remained central to subsequent 
health care reform debates and the final reform bill. 
 
  During the 2008 presidential election, momentum for and interest in CER 
continued to grow. Both major party nominees made CER a key component of their 
approach to health care reform. Although CER garnered bipartisan support in the 
campaign, once Obama was elected in November 2008 and the Democrats took the 
election, Republican support waned, with many party leaders distancing themselves 
from or opposing the issue (Iglehart 2010). As the battle over health care reform 
intensified and the stimulus bill was being debated in the early months of 2009, the 
discussion shifted from the specifics of CER and a possible research institute to 
whether it should be included in the reform at all (Patel 2010). 
 
  During this time, opponents of CER found their voice in conservative 
commentators that linked the research with government domination over health care 
and warned of the negative implications of adopting foreign models of CER, such as 
the NICE in the UK (Avorn 2009; Conservatives for Patients’ Rights 2009; Iglehart 
2010). Such opposition centred on fears that CER would restrict patients’ access to 
care and physicians’ autonomy and threaten biomedical innovation (Iglehart 2010). 
For example, Senator Mike Enzi (R-WY), the ranking Republican member of the 
Senate HELP Committee, asserted that a CER institute would “create a new 
bureaucracy to dictate which treatments to pay for” (US Senate Committee on HELP 
2009). Parallel arguments were made by political pundits and, perhaps not 
surprisingly, industry representatives (Will 2009; Zhang 2009). 
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  As health care reform legislation worked its way through House and Senate 
committees during the latter part of 2009, Republicans called for dozens of 
amendments focused on eliminating funding for a research entity, restricting 
considerations of cost or cost effectiveness in the research, and prohibiting research 
results from being used in coverage decisions. Both committees received an endless 
stream of comments from organisations, researchers, and citizens expressing 
concerns that CER would dictate insurance coverage decisions, prevent Americans 
from receiving innovative therapies, and hamper developments in personalised 
medicine. Committee staffs, in turn, gathered statements of support from various 
stakeholders and launched an educational campaign of sorts to clarify intensifying 
misperceptions that CER would deny or dictate care (Patel 2010). Despite these 
distractions, congressional leaders successfully guided their respective versions of 
comparative effectiveness entities through the legislative process: the House called 
for a government based institute, while the Senate supported a public-private entity. 
 
  In the process of reconciling the two bills into a final reform bill, the concept 
of a public-private institute—PCORI—prevailed. In compromise with the House, 
funds would be dedicated to AHRQ for dissemination of the research. Moreover, a 
number of calculated decisions and negotiated amendments were made to garner 
bipartisan and stakeholder support. For instance, the bill language prohibited the use 
of QALYs, a metric used in cost-effectiveness to measure net health gain, as well as 
the use of research findings to dictate coverage, reimbursement, or other policy 
recommendations (Neumann and Weinstein 2010). This reflected the need not only 
to counter any claims that health care reform would lead to rationing, but also to 
protect PCORI from perceptions that it was sponsoring research to be used by 
Medicare for coverage and reimbursement decisions. The bill also emphasised 
commitments to transparency and stakeholder representation in almost every aspect 
of the institute’s operations, which were central tenets of the House bill. Such actions 
were intended to allay fears of government takeover of health care and maintain 
independence of the scientific process (Iglehart 2010). 
 
  In the end, PCORI was charged with identifying research priorities, 
establishing a research agenda, and coordinating CER. To realise these aims, the 
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institute draws on a dedicated trust fund of dollars from the Medicare program and 
contributions from private insurers, with initial expectations of an annual budget of 
up to $500 million within a few years (Iglehart 2010). As previously discussed, 
substantial funding is dedicated to AHRQ to disseminate CER findings and link 
databases and disease registries to improve evidence generation. 
 
Past Federal attempts to formalise CER and related approaches 
 
  To better understand the potential challenges and opportunities facing the CER 
initiative, we now explore key past attempts to establish a formal role for CER and 
related research approaches (Table 13). Assessing the history of related efforts may 
offer important lessons, considering that US health policy, especially on contentious 
issues, often develops incrementally: it is often tried, modified or scaled back, or 
sometimes dropped before it is eventually adopted. Indeed, current CER policy can 
be viewed as the latest in a long line of related proposals, policies, and initiatives that 
started in the 1970s.  
 
  First, however, it is useful to outline the different terminology commonly used 
to characterise CER and related activities. Although terminology has changed over 
the years, the underlying concepts remain quite similar between HTA, evidence-
based medicine (EBM), and CER. In the 1970s, such efforts were mainly framed 
under the rubric of HTA. However, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the term HTA 
was often replaced by terms such as outcomes research and effectiveness research, 
and later, in the 2000s, with EBM and CER. Luce et al. (2010) note that much 
confusion remains around how these terms—namely, HTA, EBM, and CER—are 
used or intended and offer a framework to lend greater clarity. Both HTA and CER 
address the question “Does it work?” and involve evidence synthesis. However, they 
can be distinguished by the fact that CER also focuses on evidence generation and is 
principally concerned with the comparative assessment of effectiveness of a broad 
range of interventions and care delivery approaches in routine settings, whereas HTA 
considers evidence on effectiveness, safety, cost-effectiveness, and, when broadly 
applied, social, ethical, and legal aspects of health technologies. Because HTA often 
(but not always) includes an economic dimension (cost-effectiveness), it also 
addresses the question “Is it worth it and should it be paid for?” and is often used to 
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inform coverage and reimbursement decisions. As previously discussed, these are 
aspects that are not included in current conceptions of CER. Similar to HTA and 
CER, EBM is underpinned by evidence synthesis (largely via systematic reviews), 
but differs in terms of also entailing a decision process, where such evidence is used 
to support individual patients’ and physicians’ clinical treatment decisions. Taken 
together, CER can be viewed as a potential input into HTA and EBM. 
 
  In the following sections, we primarily reference the terms that were used at 
the time a particular initiative was conceived or adopted. While there is no widely 
accepted definition of these terms, the framework outlined by Luce et al. (2010) 
provides a guide for understanding the underlying focus of different approaches to 
ascertain the benefits and costs of health care interventions and policies. 
 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 
 
  One of the first key federal efforts was the OTA, which was established by 
Congress in 1972 at the request of Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) to serve as an 
advisory body to Congress on technical and scientific policy issues, including the use 
of medical technologies. The office was overseen by the Technology Assessment 
Board, a bipartisan committee of six senators and six representatives drawn equally 
from the two parties, and only the board or the ranking member of the minority party 
could request studies. Given its placement in Congress, OTA reports rarely outlined 
specific recommendations; rather, they summarised the available evidence, identified 
policy alternatives, and discussed their advantages and disadvantages (Bimber 1996). 
Consequently, legislators on opposite sides of contentious policy issues often cited 
the same report to advance their respective lines of argument. As a result of its 
neutrality and robust analyses, the OTA was highly praised in government, 
academic, and scientific circles and served as a model for other countries interested 
in establishing a similar body.  
 
  However, after the general election of 1994, both the House and Senate had 
new Republican majorities determined to enforce fiscal discipline, shrink the size of 
government, and reduce governmental regulation. Congress decided to start by 
cutting its own budget - eliminating one of its support agencies, the OTA; cutting the 
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budget of others; and reducing staff in general (Bimber 1996). Although legislators 
who supported the agency, such as Representative Amo Houghton (R-NY) and 
Senators Ted Stevens (R-AK) and Charles Taylor (R-NC), made several attempts to 
save the agency, it was not enough to shift the vote to withdraw its funding, and the 
OTA closed in late 1995. 
 
  Reasons for the agency’s defunding include criticisms over its explicit 
inclusion of costs and cost-effectiveness in assessments, the fact that its research 
duplicated the work of other public and private organisations and often lagged 
behind legislation, and some structural elements that increased its vulnerability 
(Kunkle 1995). For example, Senator Connie Mack (R-FL), who helped lead the 
effort to kill the agency, and other opponents maintained that its role could be filled 
by other congressional agencies, such as the GAO and the Congressional Research 
Service (CRS), or private entities (e.g., the National Academy of Sciences). 
Moreover, because the OTA’s structure insulated it from direct contact with most 
members of Congress in attempts to maintain political neutrality, many policy 
makers had very limited personal knowledge, experience, or appreciation of the 
agency. Therefore, when the OTA was under immediate threat, there was not a 
critical mass of support to save it. Moreover, knowledgeable observers believed that 
some of the OTA’s assertions, particularly those pointing to the lack of available 
evidence to allow rational and objective utilisation of medical technologies, likely 
alienated organised medicine and the drug and device industries and led them to 
favour the agency’s elimination (Eisenberg and Zarin 2002). Certainly, the device 
industry’s position that “no single provision of health reform could work greater 
harm on medical innovation or patients than national assessments of technologies 
before they could be used by local plans” (Tunis and Gelband 1994: 354) supports 
this observation—and these sentiments were formally expressed again in the 1994 
testimony on health care reform. Critics of the closure viewed it as an example of 
politics overriding science and evidence, and since its closure, proponents of the 
agency, such as Hillary Clinton, have called for its reinstatement (Healy and Dean 
2007; Malakoff 2001). 
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National Center for Health Care Technology (NCHCT) 
 
  In 1978, six years after the OTA was established, the National Center for 
Health Care Technology (NCHCT), an agency in the Executive Branch and housed 
within the DHHS, was created to promote and support HTA, to conduct 
comprehensive assessments of technologies with important national implications, 
and to advise the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) on Medicare 
coverage issues. The tenure of the NCHCT was brief, and its operations limited, with 
a small staff (around twenty) and a minimal budget; four years after its inception, the 
Reagan administration eliminated the agency by zeroing its annual budget and 
transferring many of its functions to the National Center for Health Services 
Research (NCHSR), later the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research. Cotter 
(2009) suggests that the demise of NCHCT was attributable largely to opposition 
from industry and medical associations, particularly the American Medical 
Association (AMA), who argued that the “relevant clinical policy analysis and 
judgements are being made—and are being responsibly made—within the medical 
profession” (Boyle 1981: 297) and therefore the agency was redundant and 
overstepping the role of clinicians. The AMA was also in strong “opposition to those 
who would make cost-effectiveness the essential factor in determining whether 
medical care is . . . reasonable and necessary” (Boyle 1981: 297). In addition, 
industry representatives often attributed the center’s work as attempts to regulate 
industry and bluntly cut costs—a likely reaction to the fact that about 40 percent of 
its recommendations were for non-coverage of evaluated technologies. The small 
operations of the center were also nested in the DHHS, whereas more powerful, 
affluent, and prominent agencies, such as the NIH, had much greater departmental 
attention and support and much stronger constituencies (Blumenthal 1983). 
 
Council of Health Care Technology (CHCT) 
 
  After eliminating the NCHCT, Congress still perceived a need for some 
capacity to evaluate health technology. In response to a congressional mandate, the 
Council on Health Care Technology (CHCT) was established in 1986 within the 
Institute of Medicine (IOM) to promote the concept and use of HTA and review 
health technologies for their appropriate use. It was considered the first public-
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private technology assessment partnership in the US (Luce and Cohen 2009), 
receiving “matching” government financial support on the condition that it first 
secure private funds. In the end, the CHCT focused primarily on conceptual and 
methodological issues in technology assessment (e.g. approaches to priority setting, 
and the relationship between technology assessment and quality assurance), 
producing only two technology assessments during its operation (OTA 1995). The 
council’s lack of tangible output brought its usefulness into question. Moreover, 
from the beginning its goals were never clear, and the need to raise private funds 
hampered its operations. The IOM therefore did not seek further public funds for the 
council in 1989, and its statutory authorisation was allowed to expire. 
 
Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR) 
 
  Soon after the council’s demise in the late 1980s, policy makers became 
increasingly concerned with health care costs and the financial sustainability of 
Medicare. There was also worry that the new prospective payment system for 
Medicare inpatient care was forcing patients out of the hospital earlier than clinically 
warranted because their “DRG had run out” (AHRQ 1999). At congressional 
hearings on Medicare, the phrase “quicker but sicker” reflected a central concern 
about the implications of such new financial incentives for quality of care. 
Concurrently, the DHHS convened several meetings, attended by John Wennberg, 
William Roper, David Eddy, Robert Brook, and others, to explore whether outcomes 
or effectiveness research could be useful on a large scale to define optimal treatments 
and monitor and improve quality of care. In these meetings, Wennberg (1984) 
emphasised that the necessary scientific information was needed to allow physicians 
to define optimum treatments. Influenced by Wennberg and colleagues, several 
Republican and Democratic congressional leaders heralded the idea that evidence-
based approaches, namely outcomes research and technology assessment, could 
potentially save billions of dollars by identifying unnecessary health care services in 
high-cost areas without harming patients (Gray, Gusmano and Collins 2003). The 
AMA also expressed interest in and commitment to reducing “waste” through 
scientific study and evidence-based guidelines.    
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  Subsequently, the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR) was 
created in 1989 to carry out outcomes studies, develop practice guidelines, and 
conduct and coordinate health services research. While its establishment attracted no 
opposition, there was a lack of widespread agreement among policy makers and 
stakeholders that federal support for effectiveness and outcomes research was 
entirely warranted. 
 
  In the first few years of its operation, the new agency was by several measures 
successful. Under its Medical Treatment Effectiveness Program, it established a new 
program for developing practice guidelines as well as fourteen new Patient 
Outcomes Research Teams (PORTs), multidisciplinary centers focused on particular 
medical problems (e.g. back pain, myocardial infarction) to determine “what 
worked” (Gray, Gusmano, and Collins 2003; Luce and Cohen 2009). The agency 
also established the Office of Health Technology Assessment (OHTA), which 
conducted formal, comprehensive assessments, often at the specific request of 
Medicare (Luce and Cohen 2009). Furthermore, the AHCPR collected and analysed 
large amounts of health services data through the National Medical Expenditure 
Survey, which was used to assist the White House, under both the Bush and Clinton 
administrations, in assessing the implications of different health care reform policy 
options. 
 
  The agency’s successes in implementing its legislative mandate led to 
substantial budget increases, from $53 million in 1989 to over $162 million by 1995. 
However, in 1994, following introduction of the conservatives’ broad government 
reduction agenda (notably the Contract with America), the AHCPR’s performance 
underwent significant scrutiny, and the agency was almost eliminated during the 
1996 budget appropriations. Its vulnerability to termination was attributable to many 
factors, several of which relate to the strategies underlying its creation (Gray, 
Gusmano, and Collins 2003). Namely, evaluations of the agency focused on its 
inability to meet the original expectations of Congress, deeming its practice guideline 
program ineffective and expressing doubts that its effectiveness research work (via 
PORTs and use of administrative databases) would result in cost savings (GAO 
1995; OTA 1994; PPRC 1995). Moreover, as with other preceding agencies, some of 
its work was viewed as redundant with that of other federal agencies and private 
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organisations, and its occasional use of cost-effectiveness information in its 
technology assessments and practice guidelines often generated controversy. 
 
  The opposition of influential lobby groups also had a substantial impact. In 
particular, the North American Spine Society (NASS), an association of back 
surgeons, mounted an attack on the agency in 1995, with the support of a number of 
Republican politicians, after its PORT on low-back pain concluded that “there was 
no evidence to support spinal-fusion surgery and that such surgery commonly had 
complications” (Gray, Gusmano, and Collins 2003: W3-297). The AHCPR 
ultimately survived the backlash, thanks to a series of behind-the-scenes negotiations 
between the NASS and the former members of Congress who helped create the 
agency. These supporters emphasised that many of the problems that underpinned its 
establishment (e.g. practice variations and cost concerns) remained and therefore the 
agency was needed. Nevertheless, there were repercussions. The agency gained a 
new name, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), a deliberate 
move to remove the word policy from the name; its practice guideline program was 
abandoned; and it received a 21 percent budget cut (Gray, Gusmano, and Collins 
2003). 
 
  Support for the agency once again gained momentum in the early 2000s: in 
2003 the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) authorised the AHRQ to strengthen 
its role in conducting and disseminating CER to “improve the quality, effectiveness, 
and efficiency of health care” delivered to Medicare, Medicaid, and State Children’s 
Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) enrolees. The Effective Health Care (EHC) 
program was established to meet this aim, which oversees a range of external 
research networks that conduct systematic evidence reviews to assess the 
effectiveness, comparative effectiveness, safety, and, in rare cases, cost-effectiveness 
of medical technologies and interventions (Sullivan et al. 2009). While the MMA 
demonstrated the continued interest among policy makers in comparative 
information on the value of health care interventions, it also highlighted the strong 
opposition to provisions that would “strengthen the hand of government” over 
industry (Neumann et al. 2005). In particular, the legislation explicitly prohibited the 
AHRQ from mandating national standards of clinical practice and banned the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) from using comparative 
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effectiveness information produced by the EHC to withhold or restrict access to 
prescription drugs (Neumann et al. 2005; Sullivan et al. 2009). Moreover, the 
agency’s budget was once again reduced—the originally authorised $50 million per 
year for CER activities was ultimately reduced to $15 million. 
 
Medicaid and Medicare 
 
  Other federal efforts to formalise the role of CER-related activities were 
introduced in the mid-1990s and early 2000s, particularly with regard to Medicare 
and Medicaid. In 1994 Medicaid, and in particular the Oregon Medicaid program, 
sought to create a list of medical services, ranked according to cost-effectiveness 
analyses and public preferences (elicited through surveys and community meetings), 
to help determine which services would be covered under the Oregon Health Plan 
(Oberlander 2007; Oberlander et al. 2001). The core idea was to use any savings 
from rationing health services (by not covering low-ranking services) to expand 
Medicaid coverage across the state. The initial list and approach to priority setting 
received significant national controversy on political, technical, legal, and ethical 
grounds (Brown 1991; Eddy 1991; Oberlander et al. 2001). Consequently, state 
administrators were required to make political concessions (e.g., cost-effectiveness 
analysis no longer used) and to modify the list (Blumstein 1997). Oregon still uses 
some elements of this approach today, but perhaps unsurprisingly, it has not been 
adopted by any other state Medicaid program. However, several states do participate 
in the Oregon Drug Effectiveness Review Project (DERP), which provides state 
Medicaid agencies with comparative effectiveness and safety reports to inform their 
drug formulary decisions. Still, there is no shortage of controversy surrounding the 
DERP program (Neumann 2006). Pharmaceutical manufacturers have criticised the 
program’s reports as providing “political cover” for cost-containment decisions taken 
by state Medicaid programs. Others have expressed concern that DERP’s selection of 
evidence is too strict, thereby restricting the use of all possible available research that 
could inform coverage policies (Steinberg and Luce 2005). 
 
  Like Medicaid, Medicare has a complicated history with CER. Stipulated in 
authorising legislation in 1965, Medicare pays for medically necessary services 
provided to elderly and disabled individuals. For many years, “reasonable and 
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necessary” was understood to reflect the prevailing views of physicians, although 
there were no formal criteria to define this standard at either the local or the national 
level (Neumann et al. 2005). Amid growing complaints that its coverage process was 
unpredictable, unclear, and lengthy, in 1989 the HCFA (later the CMS), under the 
Reagan administration, pushed regulation stating that for purposes of coverage, a 
technology would need to be safe, effective, non-investigational, appropriate, and 
accepted by the medical community (HCFA 1989). The inclusion of costs and cost-
effectiveness as an explicit criterion in selected cases was also proposed, and this 
was the first time that HCFA had supported such considerations as criteria in 
coverage decisions. The proposal generated substantial opposition from medical and 
industry groups (e.g. the AMA and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers 
Association of America), who feared that important technologies would be rationed, 
leaving seniors to pay for or forgo necessary care, and was eventually withdrawn 
(CMS 1999; Foote 2002; Pear 1991).  
 
  Almost a decade later in 2000, during the Clinton administration, the CMS 
issued a notice of intent (NOI) to publish a proposed rule in which it did not mention 
cost-effectiveness per se, but did mention the concept of “added value” (CMS 2000). 
The proposed standards would require that new technologies provide some benefits 
to beneficiaries beyond what was already available to them in the program. If a 
technology did not provide added value, Medicare would deny coverage. The costs 
of alternative treatment options were, once again, considered relevant to determining 
coverage. However, a significant number of negative comments on the NOI 
persuaded the DHHS and the CMS to withdraw this proposal, and no further attempt 
has been made to address these issues through regulation. 
 
  In a number of ways, Congress has made the CMS’s interest in considering 
costs and comparative value more difficult, suggesting that these occasional efforts 
to develop national policies that explicitly address costs or cost-effectiveness have, in 
fact, resulted in policy moving in the opposite direction (Keenan, Neumann, and 
Phillips 2006). For example, when the CMS attempted to pay a single rate for 
products deemed “clinically equivalent,” Congress expressly prohibited the agency 
from any future use of this standard involving payments to hospital outpatient 
departments (Neumann, Rosen, and Weinstein 2005). Moreover, both the 
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Congressional Budget Office and the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission have 
asserted that regardless of legal interpretation of the current statue, the CMS would 
require clear statutory authority to formally consider costs in its coverage policies 
(CBO 2007; Medpac 2008). That authority is unlikely to be given, at least in the 
short term. As discussed earlier, the ACA prohibited Medicare from using a specific 
threshold for a cost per QALY in making reimbursement and coverage decisions, 
and limitations were placed on the ways CER could be used. 
 
  Another issue hindering the CMS from more frequently considering 
comparative effectiveness evidence in coverage decisions is that there are significant 
gaps in the available evidence bases, particularly as related to seniors and disabled 
Medicare beneficiaries. In part to address this issue, in 2006 the CMS issued 
guidance on a new policy called coverage with evidence development, which links 
coverage of an intervention with a requirement that patients receiving it be enrolled 
in prospective clinical studies to inform future revisions to the coverage decision 
(Tunis and Pearson 2006). The aim is to allow beneficiaries access to potentially 
promising technologies where available evidence on their clinical effectiveness is 
either insufficient or restricted to a particular patient population. Unlike previous 
attempts to codify the role of evidence in the CMS’s coverage policies, CED has 
largely escaped political backlash through its framing as a mechanism to enhance the 
adoption of new therapies, rather than to control or slow their diffusion (Luce and 
Cohen 2009), and because it avoided the issue of cost-effectiveness. Moreover, the 
policy has been applied in a limited number of cases since its inception, and only in 
two cases have the resulting evidence been used for policy, thereby lessening any 
perceived threat. Yet the policy has faced some opposition from patient advocacy 
groups as well as from manufacturers, who argue that CED raises the threshold of 
evidence needed to obtain a positive coverage determination and slows access to 
medical advances (Robinson 2010). There is limited evidence to support such 
concerns, however. For example, despite available comparative effectiveness 
evidence demonstrating that computed tomography of the coronary arteries offers 
little advantage over current angiographic approaches, the CMS has not been able to 
stop paying for the procedure due to strong resistance by radiologists (Appleby 2008; 
Redberg and Walsh 2008).  
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Veterans Health Administration (VHA) 
 
  The VHA has been conducting CER and putting the findings into practice for 
many years, beginning in the mid-1990s (Kupersmith 2009). There is no single VHA 
office that conducts HTA; rather, several in-house groups assume this role, 
conducting various forms of HTA with different purposes across the administration 
(Luce and Cohen 2009). Unlike other past CER efforts, the VHA has been successful 
in going beyond effectiveness research only to include costs and cost-effectiveness, 
and evidence is directly linked to coverage, acquisition, and care delivery decisions 
(Luce and Cohen 2009). A centralised staff-model structure enables researchers to 
access data from a variety of sources, and researchers have access to a clinical 
research network. There are also mechanisms in place for information dissemination, 
allowing the results of comparative effectiveness analyses to be broadly released 
within the VHA system. The centralised structure also facilitates monitoring of 
compliance with any new coverage or payment rules based on CER results. 
 
  Other elements of the system have contributed to the success of its CER 
activities. For instance, because the VHA is essentially an integrated, closed system 
that operates within an appropriated budget constraint, it faces pressures to offer the 
most effective range of health services from available resources. It also has a 
significant purchasing arm that exercises substantial control over providers and 
patient care. Furthermore, its CER activities are embedded in a history of reforms 
and strong leadership that have placed considerable emphasis on quality 
improvement (Oliver 2007). This has led to investments in performance 
management, a sophisticated health electronic record system, and VHA-funded 
health services research—policies that demand for and utilise research to evaluate 
health outcomes and costs and, subsequently, identify areas where quality of care can 
be enhanced.  
 
  In sum, recent CER initiatives bear resemblance to previous attempts to 
support similar evidence-based approaches at the Federal level. However, most of 
these efforts failed to get off the ground, were defunded or faced defunding, and/or 
were downscaled significantly. While the actual performance of these efforts, in 
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terms of quality, objectivity, transparency, and relevance, came into question on 
occasion, other factors, mostly political in nature, also significantly contributed to 
their lack of success, including perceptions that the research would impose barriers 
to technology innovation and delay market access, provide a guise for government 
control on the practice of medicine, and place cost considerations above patient care. 
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Table 13: Summary of past Federal attempts to formalise CER and related approaches 
Agency/Organisation Tenure Funding Governance 
Structure 
Remit Approach Major 
Accomplishments/Failures 
Office of Technology 
Assessment (OTA) 
1972-1995 $20M Overseen by the 
Technology 
Assessment 
Board, a 
bipartisan 
committee of 
Senators and 
Representatives 
(equal 
representation). 
Advise Congress on 
scientific and policy 
issues related to 
technology; 
conduct studies and 
publish reports on 
technical and 
scientific issues. 
Assessments included 
considerations of 
safety, effectiveness, 
costs, cost-
effectiveness, and 
wider social-economic 
benefits and costs. 
Produced objective and robust 
reports that were used to support 
policy across party lines. Issued 
over 750 reports. 
 
Agency and its work were not 
visible enough to a broad 
spectrum of policy makers and 
other stakeholder groups. Also, 
did not distinguish its role and 
contribution from that of other 
governmental agencies, and 
reports were not always timely 
enough to influence policy. May 
have alienated organised medicine 
and drug/device industries.  
National Center for Health 
Care Technology 
(NCHCT) 
1978-1982 $4M Part of the 
Executive 
Branch, housed 
within DHHS. 
Assess high-impact 
technologies and 
advise on Medicare 
coverage.   
Assessed safety, 
efficacy, effectiveness, 
costs, and cost 
effectiveness, social, 
ethical and economic 
impacts. 
Established extramural research 
grants program on technology 
assessment and assessment 
methods, performed technology 
assessments itself, and evaluated 
about 75 technologies for 
coverage by Medicare. Also, 
frequently involved medical 
professionals and industry groups 
collaboratively in its work. 
 
Agency was not able to garner 
industry and clinical community 
support; small, with limited staff; 
disappeared within the DHHS; no 
appropriations given in 1982. 
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Council on Health Care 
Technology (CHCT) 
1986-1989 $750K (max, 
3rd year of 
operation); 
contingent 
upon matching 
support from 
non-Federal 
sources. 
Part of the 
Institute of 
Medicine; 
involved health 
care and health 
economics 
experts, health 
professionals, 
insurers, 
patients). 
Promote HTA and 
HTA methods and 
assess health 
technologies. 
Unclear (conducted 
few studies). 
Enhanced awareness of HTA and 
created various resources on 
assessment activities in US, HTA 
methods, and individual 
assessments.  
 
Unclear mission/goals and lack of 
tangible output. Also, inability to 
raise sufficient private funds to 
continue operation. 
 
Agency for Health Care 
Policy and Research 
(AHCPR) 
1989-present $52M (1989) 
$390M (2011) 
Agency of the 
Department of 
Health and 
Human 
Services. 
Carry out outcomes 
research, develop 
practice guidelines, 
and conduct and 
coordinate health 
services research. 
Assessments include 
considerations of 
safety, effectiveness, 
costs, cost-
effectiveness, and 
wider social-economic 
benefits and costs. 
Productive clinical guidelines 
program; supported use of health 
services and outcomes research in 
devising health reforms; secured 
strong bi-partisan support base to 
guard against opposition in 
critical moments. 
 
Inability to demonstrate impact on 
health care practice and cost-
savings; problems showcasing 
value of work compared to similar 
Federal and private efforts; 
occasional reductions in funding 
and removal of certain programs. 
 
Medicaid (Oregon) 1994-present  Agency of the 
Department of 
Health and 
Human 
Services. 
Oregon Medicaid: 
Create a list of 
covered medical 
services based on 
evidence. 
DERP: Provide 
state Medicaid 
agencies with CER 
and safety 
information. 
Uses evidence from 
cost-effectiveness 
analyses, surveys, and 
community meetings 
to rank the value of 
available medical 
services. 
Pushed agenda on the need to 
consider cost-effectiveness in 
policy and to eliminate coverage 
for low-value services. 
 
Conceded to political pressures 
and dropped incorporation of 
cost-effectiveness evidence; lack 
support from certain stakeholder 
groups; approach limited to 
Oregon.   
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Medicare Late 1980s-
present* 
No dedicated 
funding for 
CER. 
Agency of the 
Department of 
Health and 
Human 
Services. 
Provide access to 
health insurance for 
the elderly, younger 
persons with 
disabilities, and 
those with end 
stage renal disease. 
Considers whether a 
service is “reasonable 
and necessary”, which 
may take into 
consideration 
comparative 
effectiveness; costs 
and cost-effectiveness 
is not considered. 
Established the CED program.  
 
Inability to include costs and cost-
effectiveness, despite efforts to do 
so; legislative restrictions on use 
of evidence in Medicare policy; 
limited applications to CED to 
date.  
Veterans Health 
Administration (VHA) 
1994-present No dedicated 
funding for 
CER. 
U.S. 
Department of 
Veterans 
Affairs. 
Provide 
comprehensive 
health care to US 
Veterans.  
Assessments include 
considerations of 
safety, effectiveness, 
costs, cost-
effectiveness, and 
wider social-economic 
benefits and costs. 
Formally considers a wide range 
of factors, including costs and 
cost-effectiveness, in its research 
and uses evidence in decision 
making; robust infrastructure for 
CER and dissemination of 
evidence; well-established 
organisational culture supportive 
of CER and quality of care 
improvement. 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
*When the first proposals to consider CER evidence in Medicare policy were introduced.
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  Given the substantial investments made to date in CER and the uncertainty 
surrounding its ultimate role in and impact on health care, it seems prudent to 
elucidate what previous initiatives have taught us, which we discuss in the following 
section. 
 
Lessons learned 
 
  First, past experiences suggest that while the concept of CER may be widely 
accepted in principle, support may wane if resulting evidence challenges current 
policy and practice. For example, in both the US and abroad, a public backlash has 
occurred when available evidence calls for some degree of disinvestment or places 
conditions on access to or payment for care. In such cases, the research (and general 
overall approach) is seen as a potential threat to the interests of vested stakeholders, 
namely organised medicine, industry, and patient advocacy organisations—groups 
who typically possess significant resources to influence policy makers (Gerber and 
Patashnik 2010). 
 
  This was typified in the cases of the NCHCT and AHCPR. In the former, 
technology manufacturers, supported by organised medicine, expressed extreme 
consternation over the potential threat that the center’s list of “emerging” medical 
innovations for evaluation would have on investments in innovative medical 
technologies (Luce and Cohen 2009). In turn, these groups raised doubt surrounding 
the NCHCT’s authority and utility by pointing out that it was unduly regulating 
industry and duplicating assessments carried out by physicians, leaving it vulnerable 
to termination during the Reagan administration’s government reductions. 
Opposition from organised medicine, namely the NASS, was similarly instrumental 
in the AHCPR’s near-death experience. The AHCPR case also illustrates that the 
prevailing political context can have an influential impact on the success of interest 
group lobbying efforts. Other AHCPR studies had drawn criticism by medical 
associations in previous years, but did not result in attacks on the agency by 
members of the administration or Congress (Gray, Gusmano, and Collins 2003). The 
efforts by the NASS were more successful largely because the House Republicans, 
who enjoyed a majority in the House, were prepared to believe the worst about the 
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agency, given that such criticisms aligned with their ideological assumptions about 
the government’s performance. 
 
  Second, many people who supported the creation of previous agencies to carry 
out CER-related activities often heralded unrealistic aims about what the research 
could achieve and within what time frames. For example, the members of Congress 
who championed the creation of the AHCPR believed that outcomes research, HTA, 
and practice guidelines would reduce health care spending and alleviate Medicare’s 
financial problems, and they justified supporting federal funding on this basis. 
Congressional opponents later used the fact that the agency’s research did not 
substantially save money as evidence that it had no impact and was thus a waste of 
tax dollars. It is possible that the AHCPR would have achieved greater impact, 
especially on costs, over the longer term, but by the mid-1990s the political tide had 
turned against government influence in the health sector, emphasising the challenges 
raised by the brevity of political time frames. 
 
  Third, previous initiatives in the US point to the importance of “political 
champion(s)” or “political entrepreneur(s)” to gain support for CER, especially in 
terms of its use in policy and practice. Without reinforcement from influential 
congressional leaders, the AHCPR would likely have folded under attack from 
conservative opposition and organised interests. The OTA, however, was less 
fortunate. Although the agency received widespread support for its reports and was 
almost saved by congressional supporters when it faced defunding, its arm’s-length 
position and lack of visibility among a range of policy makers left it vulnerable to 
elimination. The OTA case suggests not only that it is important to have political 
champions, but also that such support must be sustained over time, visible to a 
variety of stakeholders, and, ideally, bipartisan in nature. 
 
  Fourth, previous organisations often suffered from a lack of a single, 
authoritative “voice” in defining research agendas and offering guidance and 
recommendations. Consequently, it was unclear how their role differed from other 
public and private CER efforts, leading to questions about value. To illustrate, one of 
the reasons agencies such as the OTA, the AHCPR, and the NCHCT were targeted 
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for elimination was that their work was viewed as duplicative of existing initiatives 
or programs and thus unnecessary. This was often exacerbated by weak or unclear 
articulation of their aims and remit. 
 
  Fifth, explicit consideration of costs has often placed agencies at threat by 
opponents, particularly those against the use of cost-effectiveness analysis in policy 
making. The OTA, the NCHCT, and some Medicaid and Medicare programs or 
provisions were eliminated, came under threat, or were significantly modified in part 
because they explicitly considered (or proposed considering) costs and cost-
effectiveness in their analyses and recommendations. Doing so effectively increased 
their susceptibility to negative media coverage, interest group and lawmaker attacks, 
and public debate around rationing and government overreach when unfavourable 
decisions or recommendations were made, or when critics needed additional 
justification to eliminate a particular agency or program (Oberlander and Marmor 
2001). In reaction to criticisms, political concessions often followed to disregard cost 
or cost-effectiveness evidence in a specific context or to drop their consideration in 
policy overall, which one can argue placed these agencies at further risk for attack by 
hampering their ability to achieve some of the aims they sought to achieve (e.g. 
reduced costs). 
 
  Finally, in some ways, one of the most significant lessons is that the incentives 
inherent in the American health system have helped deter the success of past CER 
efforts. For example, the lack of infrastructure, requirements, and legislative 
mandates for use of CER in policy making have limited its impact on health care 
delivery and costs. Providing evidence alone has not been sufficient to meet the aims 
that CER initiatives have intended to achieve. In addition, because of health 
financing practices in the US, where volume of care rather than value is rewarded, 
providers have had limited incentive to consider comparative effectiveness, quality, 
or costs of care in their practice decisions. Furthermore, private insurers have faced 
little competitive pressure to attain greater value by improving quality and/or 
reducing costs; rather, the cost of new interventions is passed along in premium 
increases and limited benefits (Kaiser Family Foundation 2012). While the growing 
unaffordability of health insurance has received attention in recent years, insurers 
  
281 
 
have largely escaped scrutiny over the years due in part to the limited voice of the 
insured population. Moreover, clinical decisions are rarely subjected to any formal 
review of quality or adherence to up-to-date standards of care, which further 
contributes to making the use of evidence in practice discretionary. 
 
Discussion 
 
  Given the past efforts to identify what works in health care through CER-
related activities, what can or should be done to help support the success and 
sustainability of current CER initiatives? In many ways, the architects of health care 
reform have potentially protected PCORI from some of the political and practical 
challenges faced by previous agencies through its design features. For instance, 
linking PCORI’s financial support to a separate fund derived from both public and 
private revenue streams will help protect it from the whims and unpredictability of 
the annual budget process. Moreover, the fact that the institute is independent from 
government may go a long way in providing an offense and defense against potential 
claims that its work is simply a guise for government control over health care 
decisions. The legislation also provided for broad stakeholder involvement in 
PCORI, from representation on its committees to offering opportunities for public 
input on its processes, methods, and prioritisation of comparative effectiveness 
studies. Together with an emphasis on transparency and incorporation of conflict of 
interest protections, such provisions may serve to insulate the institute and CER 
more generally from uneven stakeholder influence.  
 
  The fact that PCORI’s leadership and committees contain a diverse set of 
representatives from multiple federal agencies and other organisations may also help 
improve coordination across different CER-related activities, lending to protection 
against accusations that it is merely duplicating other existing public and private 
efforts. In addition, prohibiting analysis of costs and cost-effectiveness and direct 
links between research findings and policy, namely coverage determinations, will 
likely render the initiative more politically palatable in both the short term and the 
long term. To that end, although PCORI does not have an “authoritative voice” over 
direct applications of CER in policy and practice, it does have significant influence 
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over determining the research agenda, methodological standards, and in funding both 
public- and private-sector comparative studies.  
 
  Finally, CER has benefited from support from a range of champions on both 
sides of the political divide. Senator John McCain (R-AZ) and other prominent 
Republicans backed CER during the 2008 campaign, and President Obama has 
activity presented CER as one of his central policy initiatives (Frederick 2008; 
Obama-Biden Presidential Campaign 2008). However, it is uncertain whether such 
support can be sustained when there is a change in leadership. For example, during 
the 2012 presidential debates, former Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney repeated 
the charges heard during earlier health care reform debates that the ACA represented 
a government takeover of health care, and Republican pundits expressed familiar 
rhetoric historically used to describe CER, focusing debates on rationing, restricted 
access to care, and threatened innovation.  
 
  Based on past history and the evolution of CER to date, we anticipate two 
major pitfalls that CER may face in the future. First, in principle, most stakeholders 
support the concept of more and better information about what works and what does 
not in health care. However, in cases where CER might contradict or change current 
practice, especially if it entails restrictions on patient access or provider choice of 
care, such support will likely wane, and entrenched stakeholder interests and agendas 
may once again rise to the surface. The example of the 2009 US Preventive Services 
Task Force guidelines on mammograms highlights that even with removing 
mandated links between comparative effectiveness studies and policy decisions, the 
application of research findings may still prove contentious. These 
recommendations, which advised against biennial screening in women aged forty to 
forty-nine years, were attacked by a broad range of stakeholder groups, and in 
response the ACA included a provision requiring the federal government to ignore 
them (Gusmano and Gray 2010). While stakeholders arguably had legitimate 
concerns about the validity of applying aggregate results to individual patients, most 
of the attacks on the guidelines ignored the nuances of the recommendations and 
accused the government of placing cost savings ahead of the lives of women. 
Therefore, whether CER will ultimately play a meaningful role in health care 
decision making and delivery will depend on the willingness of patients, providers, 
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industry, and other stakeholders to accept limits on access to certain technology and 
interventions, particularly those with limited or questionable value. 
 
  Given these challenges and the experiences of past initiatives, it will be 
important to continuously promote the value of CER over time. It is natural to 
advocate the virtues of policy initiatives in the beginning to gain support and 
momentum, but such efforts will need to be maintained to reemphasise the benefits 
of the research and proactively address any false impressions held by the public and 
other stakeholders, especially as existing evidence suggests that there is still a good 
deal of public scepticism about clinical evidence of any sort (Carman et al. 2010; 
Gerber et al. 2010). Besides better public relations on CER, it would prove helpful to 
design CER studies so that the research addresses questions most important to 
patients, providers, and policy makers, and to tailor communication of the findings to 
the needs of different end-users. Coupled with increased stakeholder involvement in 
the design and conduct of studies, this may help ensure greater understanding of 
CER, use of the resulting evidence in policy and practice, and commitment to its 
sustainability. From an implementation science perspective, there is a dearth of 
research on the use of comparative effectiveness information. In parallel with the 
scientific aspects of CER, such as research on improved methods, more research is 
therefore needed on potential policies and practices to encourage the uptake of 
comparative effectiveness information. 
 
  In addition, as previously illustrated, most past and recent arguments against 
the use of the CER have centred on research affiliated with the federal government. 
It may be that the private sector therefore has an important role in taking CER 
forward, especially in terms of using comparative effectiveness studies to support 
reimbursement and pricing decisions. Although most private insurers have not relied 
on CER to inform their policies to date, there is some activity in the sector. For 
example, Blue Cross Blue Shield and Kaiser Permanente both rely on comparative 
effectiveness information to inform coverage decisions, and a variety of independent 
research organisations provide evidence reports to insurers, hospitals, and patients. 
However, increased funding and use of CER in the private sector will require 
sufficient incentives to enhance the demand for such research and encourage patients 
and providers to consider effectiveness and costs of care in treatment decisions.  
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  A second significant possible challenge ahead for PCORI and the larger CER 
initiative relates to the lack of realistic aims and expectations that have been already 
set. During the debate over the ACA, and in the time since its adoption, proponents 
of CER have touted its potential to save nearly $800 billion—an important driver in 
“bending the cost curve.” However, given the limited power of PCORI and the 
restrictions placed on Medicare to formally consider CER and, in particular, costs or 
cost-effectiveness, in its policy making, it is difficult to accept this as a reasonable 
projection. Available evidence estimating CER’s impact on health expenditures 
suggest a notably modest reduction in federal spending (< 1 percent) to a potential 
increase in costs (Basu and Philipson 2010; CBO 2007).  
 
  Even countries that formally employ CER and explicitly consider costs and 
cost-effectiveness in policy making have not realised cost savings. In the UK, for 
example, while NICE guidance has likely increased the average cost-effectiveness of 
treatments covered by the NHS, there is no evidence that total spending or the rate of 
cost increases have been reduced. Furthermore, medical practice is notoriously slow 
to change in response to new research findings, even in cases where significant cost 
savings and better patient outcomes are possible. One analysis found that the lag 
between the discovery of more effective forms of treatment and their incorporation 
into routine patient care averages seventeen years (Balas and Boren 2000). Other 
corroborating evidence suggests that practitioners ofen ignore the findings of large 
comparative studies (Avorn and Fisher 2010; Maio and Gagne 2010). 
 
  There is some potential that the results of CER studies will influence clinical 
practice, because there is growing pressure from employers and the government to 
reduce spending, but any reductions will likely not result from CER directly. 
Therefore, maintaining unattainable expectations of CER’s impact may ultimately 
result in history revisited when there is a shift in the political tide or PCORI (or CER 
more generally) falls under the scrutiny of opponents. To guard against future losses 
of political support and funding, it may be advisable to position and integrate CER as 
part of a wider range of reform initiatives to improve the quality and value of US 
health care. For example, CER could be linked to other key health care reforms, such 
as those related to health information technology and physician payment reforms, 
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especially those initiatives that have received bipartisan support. This may protect 
against opponents singling out CER for scrutiny if the aims of the ACA are not 
achieved. Regardless of the potential political benefits, CER should indeed play a 
key role in these initiatives to ensure that the evidence generated is linked to other 
health care reform programs and policies. In addition, although the ACA prohibited 
PCORI from using CER to dictate policy and practice, it did not bar private payers 
from using the research to inform their policies. In the private sector, evidence 
generated by CER studies could feed into value-based insurance designs, where co-
pays are reduced for high-value services and increased for low-value services, with 
the aim to steer treatment choices toward more effective and efficient services 
(Pearson and Bach 2010). Attaining any cost savings from these options, however, 
will depend on the extent to which both research findings and treatment choices 
favour less expensive alternatives, and—again—the willingness of policy makers, 
physicians, and patients to take account of the relative cost and cost-effectiveness of 
treatment options in decision making. 
 
Conclusion 
 
  Comparative effectiveness research offers significant promise to provide better 
information on available health care interventions and methods of care delivery and 
thus ultimately to improve health care decision making and practice. However, as 
evidenced by previous related experiences that sought to meet similar aims, it is not 
without challenges. While much has already been done to support an integral and 
sustained role for CER in the American health care system, considerable efforts will 
be required in the days ahead to ensure the success and sustainability of PCORI and 
the overall CER effort. 
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Conclusions of the thesis  
 
Summary of key thesis findings 
 
  The purpose of this thesis was to examine the extent to which good health 
technology regulation is achieved and the effectiveness of the policy measures 
regualtions (and others) employ to meet the aims or criteria of ‘good regulation’. To 
accomplish these objectives, the thesis developed and considered a conceptual 
framework of good regulation and explored its various dimensions in eight studies. 
Taken together, the studies provide an analysis of:  
 
 The role, processes, policies, and performance of the regulators of the market 
authorisation and coverage and reimbursement of pharmaceuticals and 
medical devices in Europe and the US;  
 
 The role and use of technology assessment in health technology regulation 
and its impact on attaining good regulation; and,  
 
 The factors that impact regulatory performance.  
 
  As previously outlined, good health technology regulation can be considered to 
be attained if regulatory actions are legitimate, accountable, transparent, inclusive to 
relevant stakeholders, informed by expert and credible advice, effective, and cost-
efficient. Such goals are achieved through a set of tools, activities, and discourse 
through which regulators address their policy objectives and reform priorities. One of 
the main ways regulators strive to achieve these objectives is to review the available 
evidence on the technology’s benefits and risks or costs to ensure that available 
technologies are safe and efficacious and they provide value to patients and the 
health care system in return for investments made toward their financing.  
 
  The following section examines the main thesis findings based on the analyses 
presented in the eight studies. It then discusses the ways in which health technology 
regulators can advance existing regulatory practices to attain or maintain good 
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regulation. Finally, it outlines the limitations of the thesis and areas for further 
research.  
  
  As measured against the ‘good regulation’ framework, the following section 
explores the extent to which health technology regulators are meeting the outlined 
criteria; what factors, if any, inhibit or facilitate good regulation; and, the extent to 
which evidence-based regulatory process aid regulators ability to achieve and 
maintain the various criteria of good regulation.  
 
Mandate 
 
   There is considerable variation in health technology regulators effectiveness in 
terms of meeting their mandates. In particular, the EMA has attained, over time, a 
more balanced approach to meeting both of the main tenants of its mandate – 
industrial support and public health protection. To be sure, industrial objectives 
remain central to the EMA; however, in recent years, there has been a shift toward 
greater attention and activities focused on its public health responsibilities. Such 
improvements include the provision of more reliable and objective information on 
new medicines for patients (e.g. packaging and leaflet labelling), allowance of 
conditional marketing authorisations, increased regulation of and funding for post-
market data collection and pharmacovigilance. In addition, the agency has increased 
its interactions and collaboration with other leading medicines agencies, such as the 
FDA, to better align regulatory processes and harness surveillance activities to 
improve patient safety. These changes may be attributable to the shift in oversight 
from DG Enterprise to DG Sanco, expanded responsibilities of the agency, and 
increased pressure from stakeholder groups to protect public health given the 
growing number and complexity of new medicines.  
 
  Compatively, it is realtively unclear whether regulators involved in device 
market approval, most notably in Europe, align with their respective mandates. 
Device authorisation in Europe is highly decentralised, which has introduced barriers 
to the extent to which Competent Authorities can effectively monitor the work of the 
Notified Bodies and coordinate robust post-market surveillance systems to monitor 
and safeguard patient safety. In addition, the diversity in requirements and evidence 
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standards upheld by the various Notified Bodies hinders their ability to ensure device 
performance and safety. In both jurisdictions, some moderate- and high-risk devices 
are approved based on the evidence generated for similar products already on the 
market and robust post-market surveillance and adverse event reporting of adverse 
events are limited. Approvals based on less rigorous proof of effectiveness and safety 
may have a greater chance of later-identified adverse events. Moreover, assessments 
are conducted by manufacturers and Notified Bodies, which may introduce important 
conflicts of interest, particularly regarding the attention paid to the balance between 
effectiveness and risk of safety concerns.      
 
  Regulators in Europe and the US recently rejected significant changes to their 
existing regulatory frameworks that would better ensure the safety and effectiveness 
of moderate- to high-risk devices before they are marketed to providers and patients. 
In both cases, the medical device industry vehemently contested such changes, 
arguing that they would negatively impact patient access and hamper the broader 
innovation process. Rather, both jurisdictions are instituting or considering 
incremental measures to improve the systems. Such measures are predominately 
focused on improving post-market regulation through implementation of the UDI 
and heightened pharmacovigilance. The more politically controversial (and difficult) 
changes related to regulatory authority over device approvals and increasing the 
evidence requirements and robustness of reviews for moderate- to high-risk devices 
appear to be sidelined at present.   
 
Differences in culture, history, politics, and the organisation and financing of 
care all have important influences on the mandates of those bodies involved in health 
technology coverage and reimbursement, especially with regards to the underlying 
rationale for undertaking HTA to support such decisions. All of the countries 
examined in the thesis, with the exception of the US, have adopted technology 
assessment, as part of or the entirety of, their mandate to ensure that funded 
technologies offer patient benefit at reasonable cost. However, fulfilling their 
mandates has manifested differently across countries. For example, while all 
countries aim to ensure that covered technologies benefit patients, they diverge in 
terms of the importance of value for money, equity, and broader ethical and social 
considerations. That said, based on the thesis findings, we can see a shift in the 
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mandate of coverage and reimbursement regulators to ensure funded technologies 
provide added value to not only patients, but also to other stakeholders and the 
broader health care system. The mandates of these entities also depend on where they 
are situated within the health care system; some are integrated into other government 
authorities, while others are at arms-length to government. It can be argued that in 
most cases, those entities at arms-length have clearer mandates and tend to be more 
transparent in not only their role and aims, but also their processes and decisions, 
which has important (positive) implications for garnering public trust and legitimacy. 
A good case example is NICE in England. Although there are, of course, exceptions, 
in general being at arms-length can also help protect regulators from day-to-day 
politics and safeguard their exercise of specific competencies (expertise) to meet said 
mandate.  
 
Accountability 
 
  In general, health technology regulators have increasingly enhanced and 
maintained their level of accountability in recent years. These advancements are due, 
in part, to improvements made to attain some of the criteria, such as due process. 
Both market authorisation and coverage and reimbursement bodies provide avenues 
for communicating and justifying their decisions, such as publishing their decision 
processes and criteria on-line (especially with regards to coverage and 
reimbursement entities) and offering tailored guidance or other mediums (e.g. 
EPARs, SMPCs) that outline key evidence considerations and other aspects 
informing decisions to different end-users (e.g. patients, health professionals). This 
opens up the opportunity for external scrutiny of the regulators’ activities and 
decisions. NICE, for example, releases new draft guidance and methodological 
standards for stakeholder comment prior to final release and it undergoes an annual 
“performance review” by Parliament to ensure it remains “fit for purpose” and 
provides value to the NHS. Ensuring an appropriate locus of regulatory oversight has 
also been important for accountability. The EMA, for example, gained greater 
accountability by way of transferring oversight from DG Enterprise to DG Sanco. In 
Europe, improvements to the accountability of device regulators are in progress. The 
Competent Authorities will exercise additional oversight and quality assurance of the 
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Notified Bodies, and the European Commission will now be involved in selecting 
and vetting Notified Bodies and maintaining the Eudamed database.  
 
  However, challenges to accountability remain. Regulators involved in market 
authorisation require significant “user fees” from industry to review their products, 
which may beholden regulators to industry (and therefore facilitate regulatory 
capture) given that such fees comprise a high proportion of their budgets. 
Nevertheless, the regulation of health technologies is a high resource activity and is 
becoming increasingly so with the growing number and complexity of therapies. 
Such fees not only help support individual product reviews, but also contribute to 
retaining experts, developing post-market activities, and ensuring that approval time 
targets are met. Instituting effective due process mechanisms and ensuring proper 
conflict of interest policies can attenuate the potentials risks to accountability 
associated with user fees.  
 
  Another challenge centres on the degree of regulatory decentralisation, 
particularly with regards to coverage and reimbursement policy. In those countries 
with more decentralised health care systems (e.g. Italy) or processes for coverage and 
reimbursement determinations or implementation of decisions (e.g. Sweden), the 
lines of accountability are less clear, which can raise concerns about duplication of 
efforts and authority. This may stymie effective coordination, consistency of 
decisions, transparency, opportunities for appropriate external performance 
evaluation, and, ultimately, effectiveness and cost-efficiency.  
 
Due Process 
 
Health technology regulators have increasingly instituted practices and policies 
to improve due process, especially with regards to the market authorisation and 
coverage and reimbursement of drugs. The EMA involves patients, health 
professionals, and manufacturers in its processes and decision making, provides 
information on new drugs and the regulatory process itself on its website and via 
other methods, and is working toward greater transparency and open exchange of 
clinical trial results and the evidence used to support approval determinations. 
Policies and procedures to maintain due process are less evident in the case of 
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devices, particularly in Europe. In the US, the FDA places proprietary limits with 
public reporting of pre-market review of approved devices, recalls, and adverse 
events, lending public access to evidence on new devices. Moreover, a variety of 
stakeholders – from regulatory and scientific experts to consumer groups – are 
involved in the FDA’s work on devices. It is uncertain the extent to which relevant 
stakeholders are involved in the European system for device approval, given the 
breadth of Notified Bodies and Competent Authorities involved and a lack of 
uniform standards or policies in this regard. Such limitations also apply to 
appropriate levels of open communication about the procedures and decisions 
adopted by these different entitites. In both jurisdictions, however, information on 
approved (and rejected) devices should be more openly communicated and 
accessible.  
 
Achievement of due process has proven more central to coverage and 
reimbursement decisions. Coverage and reimbursement/HTA bodies generally have 
various opportunities for stakeholder involvement in different areas of the coverage 
and reimbursement process and clear procedures for their engagement. For instance, 
many of these bodies (e.g. NICE, IQWiG) have established both patient and industry 
groups to guide regulatory priorities, evidence and methodological standards, and 
decision implementation strategies. Manufacturers are increasingly collaborating 
with these entitites to guide research and development efforts and enhance the cost-
efficiency and predictability of the coverage and reimbursement process. The US, in 
particular, has prioritised the patient perspective and experience as central to 
technology assessment and, to some degree, coverage and reimbursement decisions. 
While the focus on “patient-centeredness” in the US, notably around the investment 
in CER and PCORI, may have initially served to garner political acceptance, patients 
have meaningfully participated in setting the research agenda, standards, and 
processes for communicating the resulting research. If CER data eventually plays a 
more significant role in the coverage and reimbursement decisions of CMS and/or 
commercial payers, the central involvement of patients (and other stakeholders) may 
lend to greater acceptance of evidence-based payment policies.  
 
 Coverage and reimbursement regulators have moved toward greater 
transparency and public availability of information about their activities, decision 
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processes, decicions, and modifications or reforms to their governance and policies, 
with some countries more successful in meeting these ends more than others. NICE 
in England is arguably the most transparent and inclusive with regards to offering a 
breadth of publicly-available and accessible information. The institute publishes 
details about its processes and coverage decisions on its website and tailors guidance 
to specific users, such as health professionals and patients. Other regulators have 
increasingly implemented similar approaches, as greater stakeholder involvement 
and interest in health technology regulation have resulted in growing demand for 
more accessible and user-friendly information.  
 
Greater openness, transparency, and inclusive participation have likely 
contributed to a blurring of boundaries between state-centred and self-regulatory 
(public and private) forms of health technology policy governance, where the 
regulated (industry) are involved themselves in the regulatory process and setting 
standards and policies; third parties (e.g. patient, the public, health professionals, 
media) may be engaged in monitoring and (direct or indirect) enforcement; and, 
regulators serve an enhanced role in information pooling and exchange and 
coordination across all involved and/or impacted parties.  These trends can be 
viewed in the increased role of manufacturers in determining regulatory priorities, 
evidence requirements, and post-market data collection and surveillance. Moreover, 
patients, the public, and media all increasingly exhibit external pressure on regulators 
to uphold their mandate, be accountable, exercise open and fair processes, and 
influence key outcomes of interest, such as timely access to safe technologies, 
affordable and equitable care, health gains, and managed spending. The ascendance 
of electronic communications and social media has played a significant role in 
fostering third party monitoring, evaluation, and enforcement of health technology 
regulators.  
 
Whether these changes have positive implications for good health technology 
regulation depends on the circumstances and how regulators respond to stakeholder 
influence. As previously discussed, the term ‘agency or regulatory capture’ is 
commonly used to describe an industry exerting undue influence over the agency that 
is regulating its activity and essentially “capturing” the agency for its own ends. 
There are certainly instances where the industry has heavily influenced health 
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technologies regulators, probably more so in terms of market authorisation than for 
coverage and reimbursement; there are, of course, differences across countries, type 
of technology, and the therapeutic area addressed (e.g. cancer versus a rare disease 
affecting a small patient population). Regulatory capture can be seen as more of a 
risk in those bodies or situations lacking sufficient transparency and accountability. 
For example, industry has probably had undue influence over regulatory 
requirements for data transparency and exchange, with the former claiming threats to 
innovation and competition (via ‘commerical in confidence’ concerns). Another 
instance is industry-sponsored patient organisation activity, where industry exerts its 
power and influence to organise patient groups to largely promulgate its own 
interests and objectives.  
 
With regards to coverage and reimbursement, industry, particularly in the US, 
has been pivotal in guiding the evidence and methodological requirements supported 
through technology assessment, such as the adoption of QALYs or cost-effectiveness 
analysis. The impact of industry influence also depends on the participation and 
representativeness of other affected parties. Indeed, ensuring due process as well as 
appropriate accountability encompasses meaningful participation of involved 
stakeholders, where proportional attention is given to all represented viewpoints and 
concerns. For instance, well-organised and resourced industry groups might manage 
to generate more effective pressure on the regulator than a group of consumers and 
patients. As illustrated in HTA systems to support coverage and reimbursement 
decisions, while patients and the public are frequently involved in providing input to 
the process, questions remain regarding whether their engagement is meaningful and 
not mere lip service, in attempts to consider their needs and preferences. The wider 
range of actors involved in health technology regulation and the resulting increased 
demands to have their preferences considered might challenge regulators ability to 
achieve good process across all circumstances, deter clear lines of independence, 
accountability and impartiality, and hinder regulatory efficiency. This issue will 
likely be exacerbated by the increasingly complexity of technology and resulting 
regulation, which will require greater input from and collaboration between 
regulators, industry, patients, health professionals, among other impacted 
stakeholders.  
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However, regulators, industry, and consumers (and other third parties) are 
becoming increasingly sophisticated in understanding and overseeing the nuances 
involved in the availability and financing of new health technologies. Most notably 
in the last several years, manufacturers have increasingly exercised “pre-emptive” 
self-regulation (Solomon 2010) to react to concerns from policy makers and affected 
publics by directly engaging in the actual functions and tasks of regulation. 
Manufacturers, for example, have sought to engage with the EMA, FDA, and 
coverage and reimbursement bodies to discuss evidence requirements and study 
designs and outcomes to meet such regulatory obligations. They also have become 
more directly involved in post-market data collection and ongoing assessments of 
technology safety and value. At the same time, we might consider an increase in 
“industry capture”, where regulators enlist industry to perform regulatory functions. 
One example is working with industry to advise on developing studies that would 
meet regulatory requirements, which serves not only to help industry get their 
products to market, but renders the regulatory decision process more efficient. 
Regulators can take advantage of this kind of interaction to avoid self-interested pre-
emptive self-regulation that serves to remove or delay regulatory issues and 
developments off the policy agenda.  
 
The blurring of regulatory roles, modes of regulation, and functions may 
actually aid regulatory effectiveness, particularly with regards to 
institutional/regulatory adaptation. Health technology regulators can create new 
regulatory regimes or processes with the flexibility to adjust to problems as they 
arise and with the necessary buy-in from the private sector (and other external 
affected parties, such as patient groups and medical associations) to encourage 
cooperation. Indeed, new regulatory features may emerge from private ordering. If 
the goal is continuous improvement in achieving regulatory goals, then relevant 
stakeholders should be working together to better achieve such aims, whereby 
regulatory activities, processes, methods, and requirements are frequently revisited.  
This process should be viewed as dynamic; modifications to health technology 
regulation will certainly be necessitated to balance stakeholder interests and 
perspectives and appropriately respond to technological advances and changes in the 
broader health care environment.      
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Expertise and Impartiality 
 
Both areas of health technology regulation – market authorisation and coverage 
and reimbursement – rely heavily on the use of experts to inform and guide 
regulatory processes and decisions. A range of expert committees and working 
groups are involved as well as individual experts who act as advisors or consultants. 
Maintaining an expansive network of experts is particularly important in the case of 
health technology regulation given the breadth and growing complexity and 
personalisation of new technologies. The primary concern is protecting against 
potential conflicts of interest that may influence the work and advice of involved 
experts in ways disconnected from the evidence and standards associated with 
regulatory decisions or actions. However, the real challenge is discerning when 
expertise lends to partiality, as different evidence could be selected and/or interpreted 
differently with similar levels of rationality and with divergent impacts on good 
regulation.  
 
Based on the thesis findings, impartiality and credibility can be fostered when 
nomination and selection of experts extends beyond the internal circles of the 
regulator to allow involvement of experts external to the “establishment”. In 
addition, some type of peer-review system should be used to safeguard the accuracy 
and validity of opinions reached by the committee. Conflicts of interest for all 
involved experts should be collected, monitored, and communicated in a 
transparency way. Such requirements should extend to external consultants and 
advisors. At minimum, mechanisms should be established to note and publish all 
involved experts and their particular role in the regulatory process.  
 
Effectiveness 
 
  As noted earlier, regulatory effectiveness can best be understood as whether a 
regulator delivers intended results or policy objectives. For regulation around market 
authorisation, this can, in part, be captured by their ability to protect public health. In 
general, the US system – where FDA has a mandate to regulate both pharmaceuticals 
and devices – may be more conducive to achieving greater oversight, coordination, 
pool of expertise, and transparency, and therefore may be more effective in 
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protecting public health. The FDA’s mandate also guides and reinforces its principal 
orientation toward public health protection. In Europe, the priority of public health in 
regulation is less clear. The EMA has always been part of a broader strategy to 
support industry and economic growth within the EU and the main bodies that 
approve devices are private, third party entities with commercial interests in 
authorising devices. One argument put forth against the US system of market 
authorisation is that it is overly risk adverse, slow, and cumbersome, resulting in 
protracted availability of beneficial, new technologies to better public health. 
Although this may have been true in the past, recent evidence suggests that approval 
times for durgs are largely equivalent between the US and Europe (with the FDA 
perhaps somewhat faster than the EMA). For devices, the European CE marking 
process is faster than the 510(k) or PMA process in the US – anecdotal information 
from Notified Bodies suggests that the process takes one to three months, excluding 
sponor time, while the FDA takes an average of eight to 13 months to review an 
application (FDA 2012). However, it takes considerably longer in Europe to gain 
coverage and reimbursement for a device (and drugs) than in the US. Certainly speed 
of approval is only one criteria of effective performance toward public health 
protection and must be considered against policies and practices to ensure a robust 
and thorough assessment of a technology’s risks, benefits, and costs. Nevertheless, 
health technology regulators have been pivotal in bringing innovations with 
significant public health impact to market.   
 
As evidenced in the thesis, there are key differences between the effectiveness 
of existing regulation for drugs and devices. Overall, pharmaceutical regulators 
require more robust evidence of safety, efficacy, and effectiveness (and, where 
applied, cost-effectiveness) and operate more extensive systems of post-market 
surveillance than expected for devices. In both jurisdictions, some moderate- and 
high-risk devices are approved based on the evidene generated for similar products 
already on the market, reporting of adverse events remains voluntary for certain 
users, and information on approved (and rejected) devices is insufficiently shared 
with affected parties. In Europe, devices are marketed with less rigorous proof of 
effectiveness and may have a greater chane of later-identified adverse events. 
Moreover, assessments are conducted by manufacturers and Notified Bodies, which 
may introduce important conflicts of interest, particularly regarding the attention 
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paid to the balance between effectiveness and risk of safety concerns. Conversely, 
however, the systems may offer regulatory flexibility to account for the diverse range 
of devises on the market. 
 
  In general, the effectiveness of coverage and reimbursement regulation has 
improved with the growing sophistication of these processes, mostly notably in 
Europe. Governments apply several strategies in parallel to ensure national policy 
objectives are met effectively within the constraints of their respective systems, with 
increased focus on evidence-based approaches to ensure value for money and 
improve quality of care. While these approaches have challenges and limitations as 
discussed, there is some evidence that they have led to lower prices, better patient 
affordability, reduced patient and payer expenditures, and improved efficiency. 
Moreover, in almost all European countries, positive lists (formularies) are fairly 
comprehensive and cost-sharing is usually low, allowing patient access to medically-
needed therapies. If a technology is not publicly covered, it may be available through 
(voluntary) private health insurance, although individuals may be more likely to pay 
out-of-pocket for unlisted therapies.    
 
  The US operates a decentralised system of coverage and reimbursement and 
has generally taken a less cost-conscious approach to technology adoption, access, 
and financing. At the Federal level, Medicare is prohibited from negotiating drug 
prices and explicitly considering costs or cost-effectiveness in making coverage 
determinations, both of which have proved politically contentious. Moreover, very 
few technologies actually undergo a formal national coverage determination (NCD). 
Private payers employ mechanisms to manage access to and efficiency of health 
technologies, but these tend to be focused on the demand side through utilisation 
management, patient cost-sharing, and physician payment and delivery reforms. A 
minority of private payers use formal HTA processes or other supply side strategies.   
Similar to Medicare, when evidence of value is considered, private payers tend to 
consider effectiveness, not costs or cost-effectiveness (at least not explicitly). 
Compared to Europe, the US pays more for technologies and health care services, 
and access to care is restricted based upon health insurance coverage and ability to 
pay. Furthermore, the high spending levels on health care have not produced 
commensurate health outcome gains. That said, as a result of recent health care 
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reforms and a push to achieve the triple aims in US health care (improve population 
health, enhance patients’ experience of care, and reduce costs), payers have 
considered and implemented some strategies focused on value, such as value-based 
insurance design.   
 
  In particular to health technology assessment, its impact on effective regulation 
depends on a range of factors. As noted in the discussion on mandate, technology 
assessment has probably been most effective in achieving and maintaining good 
regulation in countries where the national HTA bodies/payers have the regulatory 
and legislative authority or mandate to assess technologies and use the resulting 
evidence in decision making, and have a variety of policy instruments available to 
implement such decisions. These features also have a positive effect on securing 
legitimacy and accountability.  
 
Another important factor centres on data availability and methodological 
considerations. As demonstrated, the available evidence from which to base 
regulatory decisions is typically better for drugs than devices; lacks sufficient 
comparison to existing therapies; is often limited for therapies that address a 
specialised subgroup of patients; and, inadequately reflects “real world” use of the 
technology in practice. Meanwhile, the methods used in technology assessments 
have different advantages and disadvantages that have both positive and negative 
implications for regulatory effectiveness. Moreover, adopted methods often align 
with different national perspectives and societal norms as to what constitutes 
effective health technology regulation. So what may work and considered viable in 
one country may differ from others. A good example is the different use of value 
metrics (e.g., cost per QALY, efficiency frontier, added value ranking) across 
countries discussed earlier in the thesis. All of these issues have added complexity to 
both assessments and the overall regulatory process, given that many of these 
concerns must be balanced adequately if effectiveness regulation is to be realized. 
Such complexity will only grow as more diverse and specialised technologies enter 
the market. A number of actions could advance progress on some of these issues. For 
instance, RCTs are involved and costly and are not necessarily “fit for purpose” in all 
contexts or for all technologies, especially given the drive internationally toward the 
generation and use of real world effectiveness data. Regulators should consider other 
  
299 
 
study designs and methods, such as pragmatic clinical trials, observational studies, 
meta-analyses, among others to ascertain the benefits and costs of health 
technologies92. Recent increased investments in electronic health records, registries, 
large post-market data networks, and post-market surveillance systems should help 
facilitate the adoption and usability of these alternative methods. Another option, 
which has been explored throughout the thesis, is the promulgation of post-market 
solutions, such as CED and risk-sharing agreements. While these approaches hold 
promise and have piqued the interest of payers and manufactures alike, their lack of 
transparency, predictability, funding, and methodological and procedural 
development has hampered realising their full benefit to date. As a result, payers in 
both the US and Europe have moved toward use of rebates and discounts (essentially 
financial contracting) due to their relative ease and timeliness compared to 
outcomes-based agreements. However, continued interest in these arrangements and 
establishment of a more robust post-market data collection and monitoring 
infrastructure will likely have positive effects on the ability of the regulatory system 
to adequate capture and use downstream evidence on health technologies. In concert, 
incentives will need to be implemented to encourage data collection, use of evidence 
in downstream decision making, and any resulting changes in policy and practice.  
 
Additionally, the impact of HTA on regulatory effectiveness depends on the 
particular circumstances surrounding an assessment or regulatory decision. Such 
circumstances are more qualitative in nature and typically have indirect attenuating 
effects on regulatory outcomes. For instance, decision makers may not fully 
understand or accept an assessment, resulting evidence, or final recommendation, 
and even if they do, the consequences (e.g. a negative recommendation to adopt a 
given technology) may not always be accepted, especially if it results in challenge 
from industry, clinicians, patients and the general public. To that end, as evidenced 
throughout the thesis, assessments may not sufficiently capture the priorities, 
preferences, and values of decision makers, providers, patients, and broader society, 
which would hinder perceptions of due process and legitimacy. Consequently, 
coverage and reimbursement decisions may deviate from the available evidence. 
This may or may not be problematic, depending on the particular context or 
                                                            
92 See Sorenson et al. (2011b) for discussion of the advantages and limitations of these approaches. 
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circumstances. Brown and Gusmano (2013) emphasise the importance of recognising 
that the goal of technology assessment should not be to eliminate but to enrich 
political deliberations that govern what societies fund and receive from their 
respective health systems. To that end, the political climate is influencial. For 
example, HTA has not received sustained political and stakeholder support in the 
US, which has stymied its use to facilitate regulatory effectiveness. A number of case 
examples explored in the thesis highlight these challenges, including PCORI and 
previous agencies, such as Oregon Medicaid, and valuing advanced cancer care. The 
(failed) Oregon Medicaid experiment highlights how evidence/methodological 
complexity and many of the aforementioned circumstantial, social, and political 
factors can derail regulatory efforts to meet coverage and reimbursement aims. While 
those involved used a range of viable methods to rank the cost-effectiveness of 
health services to determine coverage by the Oregon Health Plan, the approach 
instigated national upheaval due to misunderstanding and disagreement of the 
ranking process, ethical and legal concerns, and political tensions around rationing 
and placing monetary value on medical conditions.   
 
  Overall, however, it is difficult to ascertain whether health technology 
assessment has led to more effective regulatory actions and decisions, as the 
counterfactual is unknown (i.e. what decision would transpire in the absence of 
technology assessment) and the evidence on outcomes is limited. Nevertheless, on 
balance it has probably resulted in regulation (notably with regards to coverage and 
reimbursement) that is more transparent, inclusive, predictable, consistent, and, 
ultimately, effective. Of course, attaining these endpoints has been – and still 
remains – a process of trial-and-error and continuous learning and evolution for 
regulators. An important consideration moving forward is whether wider 
expectations of HTA (and health technology regulators in general) are realistic and 
attainable. In other words, are we expecting too much from health technology 
regulation? There are limits on resources, time, and the speed and breadth of 
adaptation that can be expected of regulators, especially considering the quicky 
evolving and complex health technology landscape. On balance, health technology 
regulators have been responsive to ongoing shifts in the marketplace. They have 
introduced new methods and processes to address evolving needs and challenges and 
have engaged with other public and private actors to expand and complement their 
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expertise and resources in efforts to ensure good regulation. Regulators will need to 
continue to be responsive in order to effectively address an increasingly complex 
policy area. 
 
Cost-Efficiency  
 
  Ascertaining the cost-efficiency of health technology regulation is the most 
challenging to evaluate, given its links to the other criteria. The establishment of 
health technology regulatory agencies, such as the EMA and some HTA bodies, have 
undoubtedly saved member states time and effort in evaluating new technology and, 
in the case of the EMA, has created a homogenous market authorisation policy for 
drugs throughout the EU. Time to market authorisation and/or coverage and 
reimbursement approval may be one marker for cost-efficiency, but as discussed in 
study 1, factors external to the agency might impact productive efficiency, such as 
variations in timing of product entry into the different markets. Factors internal to the 
regulatory body may also influence efficiency, such as the robustness of technology 
reviews, stakeholder involvement, and mechanisms to ensure transparency. Although 
potentially detrimental to efficiency, these factors are generally viewed as essential 
to attaining the other criteria of good regulation. The right balance between 
efficiency and some of these other regulatory aims will likely differ across affected 
actors. Industry, for example, considers protracted approval and coverage and 
reimbursement processes problematic; others, such as the public, may equate slower 
timelines as necessary to protect public health and ensure new technologies provide 
good value for money. Predictability of the regulatory process also lends to cost-
efficiency. Standards, clear evidence requirements, industry guidance, and other 
mechanisms all support enhanced predictability and protect against duplication and 
unnecessary cost. Health technology regulators have generally instituted such 
approaches to meet these aims (in parallel to enhancing transparency).   
 
  Cost-efficiency is a central objective for coverage and reimbursement 
regulators. In particular, coverage and reimbursement bodies, primarily through the 
use of HTA, want to ensure that public (or private) public investments are used to 
maximise health gain. As discussed previously, the use of QALYs and cost per 
QALY is one method employed by countries to ensure decisions are allocatively 
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efficient93. Under these circumstances, a regulator would not be efficient in this 
regard if it covered therapies with low levels of cost-effectiveness (or other measures 
of efficiency), as limited funds could be better deployed for therapies offering higher 
potential health gain. As coverage and reimbursement bodies have adopted methods 
to ensure funds are allocated toward those technologies that provide value (and, in 
particular, value for money) to the health care system, greater cost-efficiencies have 
been achieved.  
 
  However, claims to cost-efficiency are more complex to ascertain. In most 
cases, coverage and reimbursement bodies review only select health technologies. 
This has several implications. First, those technologies deemed cost-effective may 
displace equally (or more) cost-effective technologies already on the market that 
have not undergone review. The fact that most cost-effective technologies are also 
cost-increasing contributes to this issue, as local purchasers of health care may be 
required to remove existing health care services in order to fund the recommended 
new technology. Unless local purchasers receive guidance on which services should 
be prioritised within budget constraints, they may displace different services 
(introducing differential geographic access to care) or, as mentioned, scale back on 
services that provide even greater value. Second, existing or new technologies that 
are not selected for review, yet covered, may be obsolete and/or of low value, which 
not only results in care inefficiencies, but also consumes limited resources that could 
be directed toward more cost-efficient therapies.  
 
  Moreover, an important trade-off to cost-efficiency, especially with regards to 
cost-effectiveness analysis, is the fact that it is concerned principally – as 
traditionally considered – with the total increase in health gain generated by a health 
technology, but not with how that health gain is distributed, leading to distributional 
or equity concerns. Such concerns generally fall into two perspectives – one being 
that the outcomes of regulation are equitable if they derive from a fair process, with 
the second focused on the fairness of the outcomes themselves (although the ethical 
acceptability of some processes may come in question).  One issue encapsulated in 
both perspectives is the need to consider social values or perspectives in judgments 
                                                            
93 Note that QALYs are just one method used to meet efficiency targets. Other countries, such as 
Germany and France, employ other approaches, as discussed in studies 4 and 5. 
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about fair access to health technologies and the equitable distribution of health 
outcomes amongst the population. Attendance to equity has many challenges, 
ranging from measurement complexity to deriving consensus on how value-laden 
assumptions should be incorporated into assessments (particularly the quantification 
of the comparative benefits and costs of technologies), which may increase the costs 
of regulation.    
 
Recent developments in health technology regulation have had likely mixed 
effects on efficiency. The increased number and complexity of health technologies 
has resulted in an expansion in the scope and complexity of regulators’ 
responsibilities. For instance, the centralised procedure for drug market authorisation 
in Europe now extends to orphan drugs, HIV/AIDS, cancer, diabetes, and mental 
health therapies, as well as to generics, biosimilars, and non-prescription medicines. 
Regulators are also increasingly required to oversee and participate in post-market 
activities. Without a commensurate rise in resources and funding, such changes have 
probably hampered efficiency. The movement towards collaboration with other 
regulatory agencies (e.g. EMA and FDA, EMA and HTA bodies in Europe), 
international experts, and industry has increased efficiency on some level, but the 
resources and time required for effective coordination may lessen such gains. This is 
also true of the introduction of conditional approval and reimbursement strategies 
(e.g. CED and risk-sharing agreements), where (certain subpopulations of) patients 
may be granted access to potentially beneficial technology on the condition 
additional data is collected post-market to substantiate the regulatory decision. Cost-
efficiency gains will only be realised if those post-market efforts are efficient and 
effectively address the outstanding uncertainty regarding the technology. Relevant 
studies in the thesis demonstrated that, to date, these approaches have not produced 
sufficient efficiency gains for the cost. Greater post-market data collection and 
assessment should also be used to support disinvestment of obsolete, low value, and 
unsafe technologies. Some countries have made progress to this end, but formal 
processes for identifying topics for disinvestment and removing them from practice 
(or deterring use) once identified as low value are required if disinvestment is to be 
effectively adopted.  
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In addition, the drive for greater efficiency requires not only assessing value, 
but also the creation and adoption of incentives that ensure that users effectively 
translate such evidence into practice, as previously discussed. As evidenced in the 
thesis, regulators have increasingly recognised and addressed this issue through 
different strategies to enhance evidence dissemination and translation. PCORI, for 
example, has a dedicated program and funding to ensure CER results are integrated 
into current practice. As more and more evidence is produced on the effectiveness 
and cost-effectiveness of health care technologies (and other services), issues around 
translation and implementation will be a priority for regulators in the years ahead.    
 
 In attempts to address the efficiency-equity trade-off, regulators, particularly in 
Europe, have strived to better incorporate societal values and equity concerns into 
technology assessments through citizen councils or working groups that discuss key 
social and equity concerns and priorities, broad stakeholder involvement 
opportunities, transparency of process, and improved value assessment methods to 
reflect social preferences and priorities, many of which were discussed throughout 
the thesis. The impact of these strategies on balancing both cost-efficiency and 
equity concerns remains to be substantiated.   
 
This thesis posited that meeting the criteria of ‘good’ health technology 
regulation is complex and challenging, because of the inherent uncertainty regarding 
the benefits and risks of new technologies, their growing diversity and complexity, 
the limitations of existing study designs and assessment methods, and the increased 
demands placed on regulators to meet sometimes conflicting and continuously 
evolving objectives and expectations. The impact of evidence-based approaches and 
policies to improve health technology regulation in particular depends on a number 
of factors, such as what outcomes are assessed and the quality of the evidence 
available; the strength of the link between the evidence reviewed or generated and 
decision making; stakeholder preferencs and interests and whether these are taken 
into account and, if so, how; the organisation and traditions of the institutions 
involved as well as the broader health care system; and, the extent to which all of 
these actions transpire with sufficient accountability, due process, expertise and 
impartiality, and efficiency.  
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The thesis demonstrated that procedural dimensions of good regulation, such as 
transparency, stakeholder involvement, accountability, and impartialty are closely 
linked to achieving effective and efficient regulation. Furthermore, it showed the 
challenge in adhering to these principles in all circumstances and contexts, and that 
achieving one principle may necessitate trade-offs in maintaining another. For 
example, inclusive stakeholder involvement in the HTA process for coverage and 
reimbursement may slow the decision process (weakening efficiency) and heighten 
the risk of potential conflict of interest or regulatory capture. Regulators have made 
progress on certain principles, namely stakeholder involvement and, to some degree, 
accountability and legitimacy. However, additional improvements are needed to 
improve the impartiality and transparency of health technology regulation. In 
particular, strong conflict-of-interest and public information sharing policies are 
needed. On balance, however, regulators continue to strive for good regulation, 
although to varying degrees of success across jurisdictions and type of technology. 
Like most of health care, movement toward achieving the various criteria of good 
regulation will likely be incremental, especially considering the often step-wise (and 
additive) pattern of technological innovation.  
 
  One of the main propositions of the thesis related to the priority of the different 
criteria outlined in the good regulation framework, namely outcomes (effectiveness, 
cost-efficiency) compared to the procedural criteria (mandate, accountability, due 
process, expertise and impartiality).  In particular, I proposed that while good process 
in and of itself is not sufficient to achieve and maintain good regulation, it is central 
to this aim in a couple of ways. First, as intimated previously, attaining the 
procedural criteria set out in the framework facilitates the likelihood of an effective 
regulatory outcome(s). If the EMA, for example, exercises a clear mandate, provides 
sufficient justification to its processes and decisions, involves a balanced 
representation of stakeholders and experts, and openly communicates relevant 
information (e.g. processes and criteria for decisions, changes in procedure, activities 
and priorities), it is more likely that its decisions will be effective and, perhaps, cost-
efficient. Second, good process helps maintain the credibility and sustainability of 
regulatory decisions or policies if and when they come under question. As previously 
noted, this is particularly important in the case of health technology regulation, 
which, as previously noted, is increasingly complex, often under external scrutiny, 
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and involves a broad range of affected stakeholders with often times competing 
interests. For example, if a regulator is criticised or challenged by a particular 
decision, the fact that is was arrived at by way of a transparent, inclusive, 
accountable, and independent process may protect against undue stakeholder 
influence and facilitate increased support and adoption. Upholding the procedural 
criteria seems to be especially important for regulatory decisions on high impact 
conditions with considerable stakeholder and public attention (and thus potential 
conflicts), such as cancer.    
 
  Given the challenges in adhering to all of the good regulation criteria in all 
circumstances and contexts, and that achieving one criterion may necessitate trade-
offs in maintaining another, it raises the question of whether or how the individual 
criterion should be ranked. Ultimately, regulators are first and foremost required to 
fulfil their mandates and deliver effective outcomes. In the case of those regulators 
overseeing market authorisation (e.g. EMA), for instance, it is vital that their actions 
and processes protect public health and support the availability of important new 
therapies. The ranking of the remaining criteria, however, becomes more nebulous 
and complex, as many of the procedural criteria are interconnected and bolstered by 
good regulatory practices associated with another criterion. For instance, adequate 
transparency of process and outcomes will help foster adequate accountability. In 
addition, cost-efficient regulation requires that all of the other criteria be met. 
Ranking the importance of the different criteria might be possible and beneficial in 
terms of assessing how different affected stakeholders view good regulation, the 
criterion that should be prioritised which criteria are priorities, and whether such 
perspectives of importance differ across contexts or regulator. This could be an 
important exercise considering the blurring lines between state-centered and self-
regulation, and the importance of stakeholder engagement and acceptance of health 
technology regulatory processes and decisions.                                                                                     
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Policy and practical recommendations to improve good health technology 
regulation 
 
  While the thesis demonstrates that existing health technology regulation, on 
balance, frequently meets many of the dimensions of good regulation (and 
increasingly so), there remain limitations and challenges. Based on the thesis 
findings, I discuss four important overarching mechanisms that regulators and other 
relevant stakeholders should consider and potentially adopt to further advance health 
technology regulation. 
 
Align aspects of market authorisation and coverage, reimbursement, and pricing for 
new technologies  
 
  A considerable degree of overlap currently exists between the market 
authorisation and coverage and reimbursement of health technologies, and 
harmonisation of certain aspects is both needed and feasible. Greater alignment 
would improve the efficiency of regulatory processes, enhance the clarity and 
predictability of regulation, raise evidence standards and resulting evidence quality, 
and increase the likelihood of bringing health gain to the populations regulators 
serve. In particular, the scientific/evidence requirements that underpin the evaluation 
of safety, efficacy, and effectiveness lend themselves to a more centralised, common 
approach. Decisions on coverage, reimbursement, and pricing often reflect local and 
political considerations that drive willingness and ability to pay, and therefore 
uniformity of processes or decisions is not likely feasible or even desirable.       
 
  One mechanism to facilitate the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of regulation 
is joint market authorisation/HTA/coverage scientific advice for industry on the 
design for pre- and post-market evaluations (especially Phase II/III and Phase IV 
studies) for specific therapeutic conditions. The joint scientific advice could address 
such matters as appropriate comparators/hierarchy of evidence (e.g. inclusion and 
choice of active comparator), meaningful clinical endpoints/surrogates where 
appropriate, ideal study populations and subgroups, and useful effectiveness 
measures (and patient-reported outcomes) that can be addressed during clinical 
development and subsequently used to inform coverage and reimbursement 
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decisions. The results of a pilot programme of joint advice in Sweden suggests that 
the approach (and its benefits) will need to be clearly communicated to and discussed 
with industry, as they are used to two separate processes, have organised their 
companies (and functions) accordingly, and are cautious of new approaches that 
could increase the costs of development. One particular benefit for industry from 
early scientific dialogue with regulators is assistance with aligning their research and 
development strategies so as to contribute to the maximisation of the social objective 
of providing the best possible quality and sustainable care for the largest number of 
patients – an outcome that will be increasingly required in the future as the gap 
between the costs and pace of technological innovation and economic growth is 
likely to widen in the future (Drummond et al. 2013).       
 
     In addition, pre-regulatory dialogue and collaboration between regulators and 
other stakeholders, namely clinicians and patients, could help identify evidence gaps 
about the value of a technology and provide guidance for the design of future trials 
that address recurring deficiencies. Indeed, systematic reviews intended to inform 
clinical and health policy decisions routinely conclude that the evidence published 
from thousands of clinical trials each year is inadequate to make an informed 
decision about the real-world value of a technology. More and earlier collaboration 
on trial design could therefore help address this problem. Both of the aforementioned 
recommendations illustrate instances where “pre-emptive self-regulation” via direct 
involvement of both regulators and manufacturers may lead to better and more 
efficient regulatory outcomes.  
   
  Another approach entails providing HTA bodies/payers full access to the 
evidence reviewed for market authorisation or, at minimum, revising the EPARs for 
drugs (and instituting them in the case devices) to allow better information exchange 
on their benefits and risks for use in effectiveness assessments. Such revisions should 
be guided by discussion and information sharing between licensing bodies and HTA 
bodies/payers to ensue the information needs of all parties are met in the most 
transparent way.   
 
  Finally, to address the low level of evidence available at market launch of a 
new technology (and when market authorisation and coverage and reimbursement 
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decisions are made), post-market studies are increasingly required by regulators to 
substantiate safety and effectiveness. This is therefore one more area of potential 
alignment, where regulators could develop a coordinated data collection and analysis 
plan, in collaboration with manufacturers.    
    
Increase pre-market evidence requirements and flexibility on accepted study 
designs/approaches   
 
  In the case of pharmaceuticals, regulators should require evidence of 
comparative efficacy for most new drugs (one exception would be when no treatment 
alternative exists in a therapeutic area). Such evidence at the time of authorisation 
would help ensure that the most beneficial and safe treatments reach patients and that 
limited health care resources are invested wisely. To that end, comparative efficacy 
data would serve as an important input into subsequent technology assessment 
conducted by HTA bodies/payers – data that is often poor or missing. Manufacturers 
can currently therefore differentiate their products from competitors on factors 
unrelated to therapeutic value (Stafford et al. 2010). However, as previously 
discussed, there are challenges associated with existing methods to assess 
comparative efficacy (e.g. direct, head-to-head RCTs with an active comparator), 
especially with regards to demonstrating superiority, which places greater demands 
on the size and complexity of trials (Sorenson et al. 2011b). Greater flexibility to 
develop and accept alternative study designs and approaches is therefore needed. 
Sorenson et al. (2011b) outline the potential advantages and disadvantages of RCTs 
with an active comparator versus alternative designs, including pragmatic clinical 
trials and network meta-analyses. In general, available study designs should be 
considered as potential complementary methodological tools. A number of actions 
could help foster the use of comparative efficacy evidence in drug approvals, 
including arriving at a consensus regarding appropriate and realistic comparative 
efficacy evidence requirements and study design standards; establishing an 
independent expert panel, bringing together regulatory bodies (including HTA 
agencies) and other relevant entities or investigators involved in designing and 
overseeing studies, to provide guidance on study particulars (e.g. appropriate 
comparators, sample size requirements to demonstrate superiority, equivalence or 
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non-inferiority) and create better linkages between pre- and post-market studies (see 
above).  
 
  While comparative data on devices at the time of market authorisation would 
be ideal, an important first step is to ensure that moderate- and high-risk devices are 
approved based on robust evidence that they benefit patients, not only that they 
perform as intended by the manufacturer. The fact that similar devices are on the 
market should not negate requirements for the new devices to demonstrate safety and 
efficacy. In Europe, this would require increasing the evidence requirements for 
moderate- and high-risk devices and ensuring that well-designed RCTs for high-risk 
devices, using blinding and hard endpoints whenever possible, are submitted to 
regulators. The latter point applies to the US as well as developing more stringent 
standards on acceptable predicates for moderate-risk devices reviewed by way of the 
510(k) route. 
 
Enhance adaptive or conditional market approval and coverage policies  
 
  An underlying theme running throughout the thesis is that regulators face 
problems of insufficient evidence on the benefits, risks, and costs of new health 
technologies at the time of decision making. This issue is set to grow in magnitude 
with greater research and development efforts focused on targeted therapies and 
personalised medicine, where patient populations are small and limited treatment 
alternatives exist. Therefore, generating evidence about new health technologies is 
and should be increasingly seen as an activity that occurs throughout the entire 
lifecycle of the technology, rather a single one-off review at product launch. 
Consequently, the use of adaptive or conditional approval and coverage and 
reimbursement policies may be increasingly adopted by regulators to allow for step-
wise learning about a technology under conditions of uncertainty, with iterative 
phases of evidence collection and regulatory evaluation. As previously discussed, 
such approaches could be increasingly viable as regulators, in collaboration with 
other stakeholders, develop and advance post-market data collection systems (via the 
use of registries, “big” data networks, meta-analyses, electronic health records and 
other health technology mediums). Collaborative studies between manufacturers, 
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industry, and payers may also help lend greater credibility to the results and 
improved effectiveness and efficiency to downstream value assessments. 
 
Develop and institute mechanisms to encourage the use of evidence in decision 
making  
 
  Given the resources dedicated to generate robust evidence on the benefits and 
risks of health technologies, it is important that it be used to inform and advance 
decision making. At present, such evidence has a fairly well understood and 
consistent role in market authorisation decisions (whether the relevant evidence 
requirements are sufficient is debatable) and a somewhat uncertain to formal link to 
coverage decisions (and, in some cases, reimbursement determinations). Therefore, 
regulators should implement additional mechanisms to ensure that investments in 
research are subsequently used to enhance decisions on coverage, reimbursement, 
and pricing across the range of available health technologies. However, to capitalise 
fully on investments in technology assessment or comparative effectiveness research, 
use of the research should extend beyond market authorisation and coverage and 
reimbursement. Sufficient infrastructure and incentives should be developed and 
implemented to encourage providers, patients, and other consumers to consider 
available evidence on the relative benefits and costs of a technology or intervention 
prior to use. Simply making the evidence available is insufficient. Rather, more 
creative and user-friendly mechanisms are needed, such as integrating evidence in 
physician decision support tools, physician performance standards and payment, 
smart phone applications and other health information technology platforms used by 
patients and consumers, as well as developing medical school and continued medical 
education curricula that educates new and practicing clinicians on the role and 
importance of technology assessment and comparative effectiveness research.   
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Limitations of the thesis 
 
  While the thesis provides an in-depth analysis of various aspects of health 
technology regulation, there are some limitations worth discussion. First, the 
individual papers possess a few shortcomings. In study 1, it may have been 
advantageous to comparatively evaluate the FDA in the US and the EMA in Europe 
together using the framework. However, evaluating the EMA alone was a significant 
undertaking and therefore beyond the feasibility of the thesis. Also, because the FDA 
has been thoroughly evaluated previously (Carpenter 2006, 2008, 2010), focusing 
study 1 on the EMA filled an important research gap. 
 
  With regards to studies 2 and 8, a comprehensive array of available published 
and grey literature (and, where applicable, legislative documentation) were collected 
and analysed on medical device regulation and past and present CER initiatives, 
respectively. However, interviewing various thought leaders (e.g. FDA leadership, 
European Commission staff, and regulation experts in the case of study 2; 
individuals involved with the various CER agencies and organisations regarding 
study 8) may have provided different and more nuanced insights not readily apparent 
based on in-depth analysis of secondary data sources. Moreover, the medical device 
reforms, particularly in Europe, and CER initiatives in the US are still being finalised 
and under development. Therefore, some information in the papers may not be 
entirely reflective of the changes ultimately adopted. Nevertheless, the documents 
reviewed were published at a time when relevant developments were still unfolding, 
and therefore served to inform current debates in these areas.     
 
  Given that studies 3, 4, and 5 were largely comparative review papers that 
cover an array of countries, they were not able to go into significant depth on any 
one country or policy. Therefore, the papers may overlook some meaningful details 
on the different national approaches. However, the goal of studies 3 and 5, in 
particular, were to provide a cross-country comparative overview of different pricing 
and coverage policy mechanisms, with a more detailed analysis of the drug 
evaluation process and HTA especially. An even further in-depth exploration of 
HTA in Europe can be found in my book (Sorenson et al. 2008a). The three papers, 
particularly studies 3 and 5, may also perhaps benefit from including other countries.    
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  In study 6, the opinions and experiences of the experts interviewed may not be 
reflective of all those involved in and affected by CED policies internationally. 
However, the experts participating in the study are leading internationally-recognised 
experts in the areas of health technology assessment, comparative effectiveness 
research, evidence-based policy making, and coverage and reimbursement policy. 
Those participants from payer agencies and industry are senior leaders within their 
respective organisations, and those from payer agencies have direct experience 
related to the development of their respective national CED policies. Moreover, I 
strived to involve a variety of key stakeholder groups engaged with CED policies 
internationally in the study to ensure that a range of perspectives and experiences 
were captured – scientific, technical/methodological, procedural, and political. In 
addition, the opinions of the experts interviewed were complemented by and verified 
against the information gathered from the literature review and, importantly, the 
interviews were carried out until sufficient saturation in the responses were achieved 
(both in terms of information on the national CED policies and on the opportunities 
and challenges of CED). The findings of the study were also presented and verified 
for accuracy and relevancy at two European meetings before finalising the paper(s), 
including one workshop on CED in the context of devices (with European policy 
makers, academics, and device industry representatives in attendance) and one 
annual conference on pharmacoeconomics and outcomes research. Another 
limitation worth noting is the incomplete information gathered on France. It proved 
extremely difficult to obtain sufficient information from the available literature and 
grey sources and secure interviews with more than one French expert. However, 
France does not represent a leader/innovator in this area, so it is unlikely that the 
overall results of the study were impacted. 
   
  Finally, with regards to study 7, although the paper attempted to include all 
available literature in the analysis, the existing evidence on stakeholder perceptions 
of the value of advanced cancer drugs is limited. As noted in the paper, there are 
number of studies focused on oncologists’ views, but relatively few to no studies 
examining the perspectives of patients, policy makers, carers, and the general public. 
Therefore, the evidence reviewed may not adequately capture how these various 
groups value these therapies.     
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  With regards to the limitations of the overall thesis, the conceptual framework 
of ‘good regulation’ developed and used to underpin the analysis in the various 
studies arguably cannot address all of the complexities of health technology 
regulation. Additionally, the various dimensions or criteria may not be considered 
universally applicable. However, the thesis strived to address these issues by 
integrating the academic and practitioner criteria together into the framework. Such 
criteria are not only applicable to health technology regulation, but the health arena 
more generally and in other policy contexts (e.g. environmental regulation, food 
regulation). One important way the framework might be improved is to more finely 
tune the dimensions. For example, the framework presumes that indicators of target-
setting and responsiveness are captured within the six dimensions, but it may 
advantageous to include them as separate criteria. Moreover, given the importance of 
transparency to good regulation, it may be helpful to make it a stand-alone criterion 
rather than include it within the due process criterion, which also encompasses 
stakeholder involvement, trust, and other measures of good process in regulation. 
Other criteria not included in the framework, such as equity, may be warrant 
inclusion, especially in the context of coverage and reimbursement. Finally, several 
of the studies (particularly study 8) highlighted the influence of politics on good 
regulation. As intimated earlier, politics matter – that is, they can have both an 
enabling and disabling impact on regulatory performance and quality (and, certainly 
on the sustainability of new regulatory entities). Therefore, it may be of value to add 
politics as an additional dimension to the ‘good regulation’ framework. Of course, 
this may be difficult to both define and measure, and arguably it may overlap with 
some of the other dimensions. For example, sufficient accountability, due process, 
and expertise and impartiality should, in principle, help protect against inappropriate 
or deleterious regulatory capture from industry and interest groups. The impact of 
politics, however, cannot be understated and conceptual framework of good 
regulation should reflect and capture its potential influence. 
 
  The thesis may have also benefited from investigating the same jurisdictions 
throughout all of the papers. However, the paper focused on the jurisdiction(s) that 
were most appropriate for the research issue(s) under examination. Furthermore, in 
situations where the thesis delved into national comparisons or case studies, the 
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countries were selected based on relevance, availability of information, and research 
need.      
 
Further research  
  
  In spite of growing policy and academic interest in and use of technology 
assessment, the thesis, particularly study 5, highlighted a dearth of research on 
resulting outcomes (and thus effectiveness) from the approach, particularly in terms 
of health care budgets, clinical practice, and health outcomes. Perhaps this is not so 
surprising given the data challenges of assessing outcomes and their attribution to 
technology assessment. Beyond the methodological difficulties, though, one may 
detect a lower priority level accorded to outcomes among governments wholly 
absorbed with building HTA infrastructure, and simultaneously trying to avoid the 
political pitfalls related to perception that technology assessment is simply the 
rationing of health care disguised as rigorous policy analysis. A better understanding 
of the impact of technology assessment or comparative effectiveness research on 
outcomes is particularly important to maintain and garner continued support for this 
approach. In particular to the US context, demonstrating impact is important for 
long-term adoption and use of such research. That said, research and subsequent 
analysis on the merits of this approach should be cognisant of the overall limitations 
of this approach and its intended aims. For instance, in most countries, it was never 
intended to reduce costs, but that is how it is often touted by supporters or opponents 
(when expenditures continue to rise).        
 
  Another area for further research centres on the methods for assessing the 
value of health technologies. Commentators have noted problems with the QALY as 
a measure of the social value of an intervention (Baker et al. 2010; Dolan et al. 
2008). Other alternatives to QALYs have been proposed such as the efficiency 
frontier approach adopted by the IQWiG in Germany, estimating willingness to pay 
through contingent valuation, and discrete choice experiments (Bridges et al. 2010; 
Neumann et al. 2012). To date, however, there is not enough research on these 
approaches to provide an assessment their feasibility, usefulness, and acceptability 
by decision makers. Further evaluation of these methods should also consider their 
respective advantages and disadvantages for different types of technologies. Devices 
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and drugs differ in important ways that impact methodological/assessment 
considerations (Drummond et al. 2009; Sorenson et al. 2011a).   
 
  In order for evidence on the comparative risks and benefits of new health 
technologies to improve decision making and, ultimately, patient and public health, it 
must be made available in a timely and understandable way and used by intended 
end-users. Considerable resources are dedicated to clinical studies, comparative 
effectiveness research, technology assessments, and the like, but investments in 
implementation science are limited. It is therefore imperative to better understand the 
perceptions, needs, and preferences of different stakeholder groups and to identify 
levers that both facilitate and hinder access and consideration of evidence in decision 
making.  
 
  In addition to further research on the outcomes of technology assessment and 
CER, we need to better understand the political and social considerations involved in 
evidence-based regulation or policy making, as previously mentioned. Such research 
would enable more effective analysis of decision making around health technologies, 
with respect to the interplay between evidence, political and institutional dynamics, 
“pressure politics”, stakeholder values and interests, and balancing technical, social, 
and political priorities. In essence, focused analysis along these lines would allow 
deep understanding of the impacts of political dynamics and the movement toward 
greater acceptance and adoption of self-regulation in health technology regulation. In 
addition, further inquiry is needed to better understand and assess the impact of 
increasingly blurred regulatory boundaries between state and self-regulation.  
 
  Along those lines, considering the growing policy interest in and action toward 
harmonisation of some aspects of HTA (and even market authorisation and coverage 
and reimbursement, to some extent) as well as increased collaboration between 
regulators and payers (e.g. FDA-CMS parallel review for certain devices, Green Park 
Collaborative, joint scientific advice), it would seem beneficial to evaluate the 
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of such arrangements and how they might be 
improved. Indeed, research in this area is needed to better understand in what ways 
multi-stakeholder collaboration and the harmonisation of certain processes and/or 
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evidence requirements improves or hampers effective and efficient health technology 
regulation.      
 
  Finally, while the thesis applied the conceptual framework of good regulation 
in the context of the health technology regulation, it would be informative to further 
test and substantiate the framework by employing it in other policy areas. For 
example, the framework could be applied in full to individual HTA bodies or other 
health care regulators (e.g. food, health care professionals), in addition to non-health 
regulators, and across different jurisdictions. Such research would presumably lend 
greater understanding of what constitutes good regulation and the influence (if any) 
of different policy or geographic contexts. Moreover, it may prove beneficial to 
conduct some sort of ranking exercise to explore different stakeholder perceptions on 
the prioritisation of different criteria of good regulation. Indeed, health economists 
and policy makers may prioritise the pursuit of efficiency, industry may place value 
on effectiveness and efficiency, while citizens and politicians may emphasise the 
importance of accountability, transparency, and other procedural outcomes. 
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Appendix B: CED study interview guides   
 
Payer/HTA Body Questionnaire 
 
Name of interviewee: 
 
Title and affiliation of interviewee: 
 
Date of interview: 
 
Interviewer: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
397 
 
USE OF CED SCHEMES IN YOUR JURISDICTION  
 
We are interested in better understanding the development and operations of CED 
programs and policies in different jurisdictions. The first several questions aim to 
obtain an informed overview of CED in your country.   
 
1. When was the CED policy established?  
 
2. What was the impetus for developing the policy? 
 
3. Who was involved in its development and oversight? 
 
4. What other stakeholders, if any, were involved in designing and 
implementing the policy? 
 
5.  Could you please describe the CED policy (e.g., criteria for CED; process for 
identifying candidate technologies; availability of different CED approaches, 
such as “only in research” or “only with research”; preferred study 
design/data collection method(s) or those used mostly frequently to date)? 
[Probe for answers to these domains if the interviewee does not address 
independently].  
 
6. In your opinion, is the CED process relatively standardized or is it guided 
more on a case-by-case basis? 
 
7. Which types of technologies have the majority of CED policies been applied 
to date – drugs, devices, procedures, or a combination? 
 
8. Can you give some examples of technologies that have undergone or are 
currently undergoing CED? [If interviewee is unable to recall example 
technologies, ask if they can point you to someone who might be able to 
address or to relevant source material, such as websites, publications, etc.] 
 
9. Prior to instigating a CED policy, to your knowledge is there some 
assessment of whether the benefits of additional research/evidence exceed the 
potential costs? [If the interviewee responds “yes”, request further 
information on the process. If the interviewee responds “no”, ask whether 
he or she believes this should be standard practice as part of overall policy.]  
 
10. What methodological approaches (e.g., RCTs, registries, etc.) are most 
frequently used in CED studies? 
 
11. In your opinion, what are the advantages and disadvantages of different study 
design approaches?  
 
12. Are their formal standards in place to establish when to modify or withdrawal 
coverage based on CED study findings?  
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13. In your opinion, what have been the greatest challenges in designing and 
implementing CED to date?  
 
14. What changes are needed to ensure CED is more effective?   
 
15. Are there proposals or plans in your country to modify current CED policies? 
If so, could you please provide a few examples?  
 
 
CASES OF CED POLICIES APPLIED TO MEDICAL DEVICES 
The following section is focused on examples where CED policies have been 
specifically applied to medical devices. To our knowledge, the following medical 
devices have undergone or are undergoing CED in particular countries: Spinal 
Cord Stimulation (SCS), Stenting and Aggressive Medical Management, Drug-
Eluting Stents (DES), Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators (ICDs), 
Laparoscopic Surgery, and Transcatheter Aortic Value Replacement 
(TAVR/TAVI).   
 
16. To your knowledge, what devices have undergone CED, either in your 
country or in others? [If the interviewee is uncertain, ask if they can point 
you to someone who might be able to address or to relevant source material, 
such as websites, publications, etc.] 
 
 
We would now like to ask some specific questions about one or two of these 
medical devices to obtain a better understanding of CED studies applied to medical 
devices. Would you be able to respond to such questions? [If interviewee responds 
“yes”, proceed. If interview responds “no”, ask if they can point you to someone 
who might be able to address or to relevant source material, such as websites, 
publications, etc.]    
 
17. What was the impetus behind the CED policy and when was it established?  
18. What were the terms of coverage? 
19. Who was involved in the CED study?  
20. How was the study funded? 
21. What study approach was used? 
22. Approximately how many patients were enrolled/involved?  
23. What were the main endpoints collected in the study? 
24. What were the primary outcomes of the study? In other words, did the study 
sufficiently address the uncertainty in the initial evidence base and overall 
conclusions about the value of the technology? Did the new evidence led to 
adoption, modified adoption, or withdrawal of the device? 
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25. In your opinion, what were the main challenges (technical, procedural, 
political) to the use of CED in this particular case? Do you feel that any of 
these challenges are unique to the device? [If interviewee responds “yes”, 
ask he or she to expound.] 
 
26. What would have improved the effectiveness or impact of this particular case 
of CED?   
 
 
POTENTIAL MEDICAL DEVICES TO UNDERGO FUTURE CED 
Given the fairly limited number of devices to have undergone CED to date, we 
would like to turn the discussion to devices that may be good candidates for CED.  
27. In your opinion, what devices would be viable candidates for CED and why? 
28. What CED approach would be beneficial to address any areas of uncertainty 
about the adoption and use of this (these) device (devices)? 
 
29. Are there any aspects of this (these) particular medical device (devices) that 
would require special consideration either in determining whether it (they) 
should undergo CED or in designing the CED study?     
 
 
GENERAL QUESTIONS ON THE APPLICATION OF CED TO MEDICAL 
DEVICES 
 
We would like to close with a few general questions on the application of CED to 
medical devices. 
 
 
30. What CED methodological approaches are most appropriate for medical 
devices? [Probe to get a sense of whether the diversity of devices would 
necessitate different CED approaches.]  
 
31. In your opinion, what are the key methodological challenges to CED in the 
context of medical devices? 
 
32. In your opinion, do medical devices introduce different challenges to CED 
compared to other types of technologies, such as drugs? [If interviewee 
responds “yes”, ask he or she to expound and follow-up by asking whether 
there should be distinct CED frameworks/processes for different technology 
types]. 
  
33. In general, what implications do you believe CED has or could have on 
innovation? 
34. Is there anything else you would like to mention about the use of CED 
policies for medical devices? 
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Thank you very much for participating in our interview. We greatly appreciate 
your time and input. 
[Ask interviewee if they would be interested in receiving our final study findings 
and note response (circle): Yes/No] 
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Industry Representative Questionnaire 
 
Name of interviewee: 
 
Title and affiliation of interviewee: 
 
Date of interview: 
 
Interviewer: 
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CASES OF CED POLICIES APPLIED TO MEDICAL DEVICES 
We would first like to talk about examples where CED policies have been applied 
to medical devices. To our knowledge, the following medical devices have 
undergone or are undergoing CED in particular countries: Spinal Cord 
Stimulation (SCS), Stenting and Aggressive Medical Management, Drug-Eluting 
Stents (DES), Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators (ICDs), Laparoscopic 
Surgery, and Transcatheter Aortic Value Replacement (TAVR/TAVI).   
 
1. To your knowledge, what devices have undergone CED, either in your 
country or in others? [If interviewee is uncertain, ask if they can point you 
to someone who might be able to address or to relevant source material, 
such as websites, publications, etc.] 
 
 
We would now like to ask some specific questions about one or two of these 
medical devices to obtain a better understanding of CED studies applied to medical 
devices. Would you be able to respond to such questions? [If interviewee responds 
“yes”, proceed. If interview responds “no”, ask if they can point you to someone 
who might be able to address or to relevant source material, such as websites, 
publications, etc.]    
 
2. What was the impetus behind the CED policy and when was it established?  
3. What were the terms of coverage? 
4. Who was involved in the CED study?  
5. How was the study funded? 
6. What study approach was used?   
7. Approximately how many patients were involved/enrolled? 
8. What were the main endpoints collected in the study? 
9. What were the primary outcomes of the study? In other words, did the study 
sufficiently address the uncertainty in the initial evidence base and overall 
conclusions about the value of the technology? Did the new evidence led to 
adoption, modified adoption, or withdrawal of the device? 
 
10. In your opinion, what were the main challenges (technical, procedural, 
political) to the use of CED in this particular case? Do you feel that any of 
these challenges are unique to the device? [If interviewee responds “yes”, 
ask he or she to expound.] 
 
11. What would have improved the effectiveness or impact of this particular case 
of CED?   
 
 
 
  
403 
 
 
POTENTIAL MEDICAL DEVICES TO UNDERGO FUTURE CED 
Given the fairly limited number of devices to have undergone CED to date, we 
would like to turn the discussion to devices that may be good candidates for CED.  
12. In your opinion, what devices would be viable candidates for CED and why? 
 
13. What CED approach would be beneficial to address any areas of uncertainty 
about the adoption and use of this (these) device (devices)? 
 
14. Are there any aspects of this (these) particular medical device (devices) that 
would require special consideration either in determining whether it (they) 
should undergo CED or in designing the CED study?     
 
 
GENERAL QUESTIONS ON THE APPLICATION OF CED TO MEDICAL 
DEVICES 
 
We would like to close with a few general questions on the application of CED to 
medical devices. 
 
 
15. What CED methodological approaches are most appropriate for medical 
devices? [Probe to get a sense of whether the diversity of devices would 
necessitate different CED approaches.]  
 
16. In your opinion, what are the key methodological challenges to CED in the 
context of medical devices? 
 
17. In your opinion, do medical devices introduce different challenges to CED 
compared to other types of technologies, such as drugs? [If interviewee 
responds “yes”, ask he or she to expound and follow-up by asking whether 
there should be distinct CED frameworks/processes for different technology 
types.] 
  
18. In general, what implications do you believe CED has or could have on 
innovation? 
19. Is there anything else you would like to mention about the use of CED 
policies for medical devices? 
 
 
Thank you very much for participating in our interview. We greatly appreciate 
your time and input. 
[Ask interviewee if they would be interested in receiving our final study findings 
and note response (circle): Yes/No] 
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Academics/Policy Analysts Questionnaire 
 
Name of interviewee: 
 
Title and affiliation of interviewee: 
 
Date of interview: 
 
Interviewer: 
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USE OF CED SCHEMES IN YOUR JURISDICTION  
 
We are interested in better understanding the development and operations of CED 
programs and policies in different jurisdictions. The first several questions aim to 
obtain an informed overview of CED in your country.   
 
1. When was the CED policy established?  
 
2. What was the impetus for developing the policy? 
 
3. Who was involved in its development and oversight? 
 
4. What other stakeholders, if any, were involved in designing and 
implementing the policy?  
 
5. Could you please describe the CED policy (e.g., criteria for CED; process for 
identifying candidate technologies; availability of different CED approaches, 
such as “only in research” or “only with research”; preferred study 
design/data collection method(s) or those used mostly frequently to date)? 
[Probe for answers to these domains if the interviewee does not address 
independently].  
 
6. In your opinion, is the CED process relatively standardized or is it guided 
more on a case-by-case basis? 
 
7. Which types of technologies have the majority of CED policies been applied 
to date – drugs, devices, procedures, or a combination? 
 
8. Can you give some examples of technologies that have undergone or are 
currently undergoing CED? [If interviewee is unable to recall example 
technologies, ask if they can point you to someone who might be able to 
address or to relevant source material, such as websites, publications, etc.] 
 
9. Prior to instigating a CED policy, to your knowledge is there some 
assessment of whether the benefits of additional research/evidence exceed the 
potential costs? [If the interviewee responds “yes”, request further 
information on the process. If the interviewee responds “no”, ask whether 
he or she believes this should be standard practice as part of overall policy.]  
 
10. What methodological approaches (e.g., RCTs, registries, etc.) are most 
frequently used in CED studies? 
 
11. What are the advantages and disadvantages of different study design 
approaches?  
 
12. Are their formal standards in place to establish when to modify or withdrawal 
coverage based on CED study findings?  
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13. In your opinion, what have been the greatest challenges in designing and 
implementing CED to date?  
 
14. What changes are needed to ensure CED is more effective?   
 
15. Are there proposals or plans in your country to modify current CED policies? 
If so, could you please provide a few examples?  
 
 
CASES OF CED POLICIES APPLIED TO MEDICAL DEVICES 
The following section is focused on examples where CED policies have been 
specifically applied to medical devices. To our knowledge, the following medical 
devices have undergone or are undergoing CED in particular countries: Spinal 
Cord Stimulation (SCS), Stenting and Aggressive Medical Management, Drug-
Eluting Stents (DES), Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators (ICDs), 
Laparoscopic Surgery, and Transcatheter Aortic Value Replacement 
(TAVR/TAVI).   
 
16. To your knowledge, what devices have undergone CED, either in your 
country or in others? [If interviewee is uncertain, ask if they can point you 
to someone who might be able to address or to relevant source material, 
such as websites, publications, etc.] 
 
 
 
We would now like to ask some specific questions about one or two of these 
medical devices to obtain a better understanding of CED studies applied to medical 
devices. Would you be able to respond to such questions? [If interviewee responds 
“yes”, proceed. If interview responds “no”, ask if they can point you to someone 
who might be able to address or to relevant source material, such as websites, 
publications, etc.]    
 
17. What was the impetus behind the CED policy and when was it established?  
18. What were the terms of coverage? 
19. Who was involved in the CED study?  
20. How was the study funded? 
21. What study approach was used?   
22. Approximately how many patients were involved/enrolled?  
23. What were the main endpoints collected in the study? 
24. What were the primary outcomes of the study? In other words, did the study 
sufficiently address the uncertainty in the initial evidence base and overall 
conclusions about the value of the technology? Did the new evidence led to 
adoption, modified adoption, or withdrawal of the device? 
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25. In your opinion, what were the main challenges (technical, procedural, 
political) to the use of CED in this particular case? Do you feel that any of 
these challenges are unique to the device? [If interviewee responds “yes”, 
ask he or she to expound.] 
 
26. In your opinion, what would have improved the effectiveness or impact of 
this particular case of CED?   
 
 
POTENTIAL MEDICAL DEVICES TO UNDERGO FUTURE CED 
Given the fairly limited number of devices to have undergone CED to date, we 
would like to turn the discussion to devices that may be good candidates for CED.  
27. In your opinion, what devices would be viable candidates for CED and why? 
 
28. What CED approach would be beneficial to address any areas of uncertainty 
about the adoption and use of this (these) device (devices)? 
 
29. Are there any aspects of this (these) particular medical device (devices) that 
would require special consideration either in determining whether it (they) 
should undergo CED or in designing the CED study?     
 
 
GENERAL QUESTIONS ON THE APPLICATION OF CED TO MEDICAL 
DEVICES 
 
We would like to close with a few general questions on the application of CED to 
medical devices. 
 
 
30. What CED methodological approaches are most appropriate for medical 
devices? [Probe to get a sense of whether the diversity of devices would 
necessitate different CED approaches.]  
 
31. In your opinion, what are the key methodological challenges to CED in the 
context of medical devices? 
 
32. In your opinion, do medical devices introduce different challenges to CED 
compared to other types of technologies, such as drugs? [If interviewee 
responds “yes”, ask he or she to expound and follow-up by asking whether 
there should be distinct CED frameworks/processes for different technology 
types.] 
  
33. In general, what implications do you believe CED has or could have on 
innovation? 
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34. Is there anything else you would like to mention about the use of CED 
policies for medical devices? 
 
Thank you very much for participating in our interview. We greatly appreciate 
your time and input. 
[Ask interviewee if they would be interested in receiving our final study findings 
and note response (circle): Yes/No] 
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Appendix C: Details of the interview sample 
 
Type of Expert Number Interviewed % of Total Sample 
Payer/HTA body 7 32% 
Industry representative 5 23% 
Policy analyst/academic 10 45% 
TOTAL 22 100% 
 
 
Country Represented Number Interviewed % of Total Sample 
Canada 1 5% 
France 1 5% 
Germany 2 10% 
Netherlands 3 15% 
Switzerland 2 10% 
United Kingdom 4 20% 
United States 4 20% 
Other* 5 25% 
TOTAL 22 100% 
*Informant associated with an international, mainly European, representation.  
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Appendix D: Select CED schemes in Canada, UK, and the US 
CANADA  
Disease Area Product Scheme Impact on Coverage Policy 
Multiple cancers PET for head and 
neck cancers 
Questions remained about the clinical utility of pre-surgery following radiation 
therapy. The Ontario Clinical Oncology Groups conducted a prospective cohort 
study to address area of uncertainty.  
Study findings suggest no clinical utility 
and, consequently, PET was not insured 
for head and neck cancer indications.  
Vascular disease Endovascular 
Abdominal Aortic 
Aneurysm Repair 
(EVAR) 
Potential safety issues resulting from endoleaks and uncertain cost-
effectiveness. To address these issues, PATH, with an Ontario Academic 
Health Services Centre, conducted a prospective, observational study.    
Study confirmed no issues regarding 
potential for endoleaks and found that 
EVAR only cost-effective for high 
surgical risk patients. EVAR funded for 
high, but not low, risk patients.  
UNITED KINGDOM 
Disease Area Product Scheme Impact on Coverage Policy 
Cervical cancer Liquid-Based 
Cytology (LBC) 
Insufficient evidence to justify nationwide introduction of LBC. Coverage 
limited to patients participating in large-scale pilot implementation studies 
carried out to evaluate the effectiveness, costs, and practical implications of the 
introduction of LBC technology into the cervical screening programme. 
Treatment was eventually recommended 
as the main way of preparing samples of 
cervical cells for cervical screening. 
Lymphoma (follicular 
non-Hodgkin’s) 
Rituximab Technology was only recommended for last-line therapy in the context of the 
construction of a case series study of past and new patients, in order to 
determine with more certainty its effectiveness in this indication. 
Rituximab later recommended in 
combination with select agents as an 
option for the treatment of symptomatic 
stage III and IV follicular lymphoma in 
previously untreated people. 
Hip disease Metal-on-Metal 
(MoM) Hip 
Resurfacing 
Arthroplasty 
Where hip resurfacing arthroplasty is considered appropriate, NICE 
recommended that the procedure should only be performed in the context of 
ongoing data collection on both the clinical- and cost-effectiveness of the 
technology, and ideally via a UK national joint registry. Until long-term 
evidence is available, NICE recommended that surgeons choose a device for 
MoM resurfacing for which there is at least 3 years’ evidence. 
Use of MoM followed via UK National 
Joint Registry. Analysis of the registry 
(through 2012) demonstrated that the 
total revision rate for the MITCHTRH 
System total hip replacements is higher 
than acceptable by NICE. Restrictions 
were later placed on the use of MITCH 
TRH acetabular cups/MITCH TRH 
modular heads in combination with 
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uncemented femoral stems. 
Breast cancer Taxanes Use of taxanes for adjuvant treatment of early breast cancer should be limited 
to patients enrolled in RCTs. 
Docetaxel was eventually recommended 
for breast cancer, while paclitaxel was 
not (Chalkidou, 2006). 
Colorectal cancer Oxaliplatin and 
Irniotecan 
Neither treatment was recommended for first-line treatment for advanced 
colorectal cancer except as a part of a clinical trial (Chalkidou, 2006). 
Both treatments were eventually 
recommended for wide spread use 
(Chalkidou, 2006).  
Chronic Pain of 
Ischaemic Origin 
Spinal Cord 
Stimulation 
Only recommended in the context of research designed to generate robust 
evidence (preferably RCTs) about the benefits of spinal cord stimulation 
(including pain relief, functional outcomes, and quality of life) compared with 
standard of care.  
No studies to date. 
UNITED STATES 
 
Disease Area Product Scheme Impact on Coverage Policy 
Cognitive Impairment FDG-Positron 
Emission 
Tomography (PET) 
Scan 
An FDG-PET scan covered in patients with mild cognitive impairment or early 
dementia in the context of a clinical trial. 
Study began in 2006 and is still in the 
process of recruiting patients. Study 
estimated to be completed in early 2016. 
Emphysema Lung Volume 
Reduction Surgery 
(LVRS) 
Rapid growth in surgery volume despite little evidence supporting its safety 
and effectiveness prompted CMS to suspend payments and co-sponsor a 
nationwide RCT to evaluate the procedure. LVRS covered only as part of a 
clinical trial (NETT) (Carino et al., 2004c).  
The main outcome of the study was 
mixed, resulting in questions about the 
meaningfulness of the results to 
substantiate meaningful benefit (Ramsey 
and Sullivan, 2005). The economic 
analyses also suggested that the 
procedure had relatively poor cost-
effectiveness in the short run. 
Nevertheless, CMS agreed to cover 
LVRS.  
Hearing Loss Cochlear Implant CMS may cover cochlear implantation for treatment of hearing loss in the 
context of an approved clinical trial. Patients must have hearing test scores of 
greater than 40% and less than or equal to 60% and only when the provider is 
participating in, and patients are enrolled in, either an FDA-approved 
investigational device trial or a prospective, controlled, comparative trial 
approved by CMS.
To date, no studies have been approved.  
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Tachyarrhythmia’s Implantable 
Cardioverter 
Defibrillators (ICDs) 
Published trials led to broad consensus regarding the clinical benefits of ICDs 
in appropriately selected patients. However, there was agreement that important 
questions remained about the benefits and risks in specific patient subgroups 
(Tunis and Pearson, 2006). In particular, existing trial data could not identify 
the majority of patients for whom ICDs were unlikely to fire. Therefore, CMS 
issued a CED policy to expand coverage of ICDs to a requirement to submit 
data to a national registry. 
Registry established that the risk of in-
hospital complication rates was lower 
for ICD implantation performed by 
electrophysiologist than for other 
physician specialty types. However, a 
different registry design was needed to 
address remaining evidence gaps. A new 
registry was designed to address these 
issues, which is still in progress. 
Artificial Hearts Heart Disease Artificial heart devices covered only when provided to Medicare beneficiaries 
when the device is implanted as part of a CMS approved clinical study. 
Studies still ongoing. 
Chronic low back 
pain (CLBP) 
Transcutaneous 
Electrical Nerve 
Stimulation (TENS) 
Coverage allowed for TENS only when the patient is enrolled in an approved 
RCT, using validated and reliable instruments, within three years (prior to June 
2015). Studies must be designed so that patients in the control and comparison 
groups receive the same concurrent treatments and either sham (placebo) TENS 
or active TENS intervention. 
Currently, no clinical trials have been 
approved by CMS. 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on literature review (mainly from the organisations’ websites). 
 
 
